Judgment :- C.R.P.No.3159ofl989: This revision is directed against an order dismissing the application filed by the petitioner to implead herself as a party to the execution proceeding. The petitioner is a purchaser from the second respondent under a document dated 10. 1986. Respondents 2 and 3 are the legal representatives of the deceased judgment debtor against whom the first respondent has obtained a decree on foot of a mortgage. The final decree was passed on 211. 1967. The judgment-debtor died on.19. 1978. Respondents 2 and 3 were impleaded in the execution petition as the judgment-debtor’s legal representatives. 2. The petitioner filed E.A.No.3323 of 1986 for impleading herself as a party to the execution proceeding claiming that she is an interested and necessary party to the proceeding, as she has purchased the property from one of the legal representatives of the judgment-debtor. The court below dismissed the application on the ground that the petitioner will be bound by the decree in the suit as she is a subsequent purchaser from one of the legal representatives. 3. The order of the court below is erroneous. Even though the decree is binding on the petitioner he is an interested and necessary party to the execution proceeding as she will have a right to redeem the mortgage. If she wants, she can pay the money to the decree-holder and prevent the sale of the property in execution of the decree. Hence she is a necessary party to the execution proceeding. 4. Consequently, the order of the court below is set aside. The petitioner is impleaded as a party to E.P.No.186 of 1980 in O.S.No.4151 of 1965 on the file of the X Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Madras. This revision petition is allowed. No costs. 5.C.R.P.No.3158 of 1989: In this revision petition, the petitioner has challenged an order dismissing her application under Sec.47, C.P.C. on the footing that the decree had become inexecutable as the proceedings were barred by limitation. 6. The short facts are these: The respondent obtained a decree on foot of a mortgage. The final decree was passed on 211. 1967. She filed E.P.No.186 of 1980 on 19. 1979. The decree-holder not being aware of the death of the judgment-debtor (mortgagor) filed the execution petition as if the judgment-debtor was alive. 6. The short facts are these: The respondent obtained a decree on foot of a mortgage. The final decree was passed on 211. 1967. She filed E.P.No.186 of 1980 on 19. 1979. The decree-holder not being aware of the death of the judgment-debtor (mortgagor) filed the execution petition as if the judgment-debtor was alive. On coming to know of the death of the mortgagor the first respondent impleaded respondents 2 and 3 as his legal representatives and sought to proceed against them. The order impleading respondents 2 and 3 was not challenged by them. 7. The petitioner purchased the property from the second respondent on 10. 1986. After purchase she filed an application to implead herself as a party to the execution proceeding and another application under Sec.47, C.P.C. dismiss the execution proceeding as barred by limitation. Both the applications were dismissed by the executing Court. 8. I have now allowed the revision petition (C.R.P.No.3159 of 1989), filed by the petitioner against the order dismissing her application to implead herself as a party. Thus the revision petitioner has become a party to the execution proceeding by virtue of my order. 9. However, the contention urged by the petitioner that the execution petition should be dismissed as barred by limitation is not acceptable. Learned counsel for the petitioner urges three contentions. The first is that the decree-holder ought to have followed the procedure under Sec.50, C.P.C. for impleading the legal representatives in the execution proceeding. Learned counsel submits that under Sec.50 if a judgment-debtor dies before the decree is fully satisfied, the holder of the decree should apply to the court which passed it to execute the same against the legal representative of the deceased. The section uses the word ‘may’. The option is given to the decree-holder to file an application before the court which passed the decree. But nothing prevents him from filing an application before the executing court to implead the legal representatives of parties to the execution proceeding as he is concerned only with the execution of the decree. Clause (2) of Rule 11 of O.21 provides for the particulars which should be set out in the written application for execution. In sub-clause (b) the name of the parties to the suit should be mentioned. In sub-clause (i) the name of the person against whom execution of the decree is sought, should be mentioned. Clause (2) of Rule 11 of O.21 provides for the particulars which should be set out in the written application for execution. In sub-clause (b) the name of the parties to the suit should be mentioned. In sub-clause (i) the name of the person against whom execution of the decree is sought, should be mentioned. In this case, originally the decree-holder mentioned the name of the judgment debtor in sub-clause (i), when she found that it could not be executed against the judgment-debtor as he was dead, she substituted the names of the legal representatives in the relevant columns. The procedures adopted by her and accepted by the court is certainly not illegal. Even if there had been any irregularity that could not vitiate the proceeding. At any rate, this irregularity is not fatal to the petitioner. Respondents 2 and 3 should have raised an objection to the procedure adopted by the first respondent. Assuming that they raised objections and they were overruled when they were impleaded by the executing court as parties, they did not choose to challenge the order of the executing court. They having allowed the order to become final, the alienee from them cannot challenge the order. The alienees cannot have any better fights then the alienors. Hence the first contention of learned counsel has to fail. 10. The second contention is that the executing court ought to have given a finding on the question of limitation at the time when respondents 2 and 3 were impleaded as parties. There is no such requirement in law. The question whether the execution proceeding is barred by limitation or not could be decided independently and it is not necessary that it should be decided at the time when the legal representative are impleaded as parties. If they had raised the objection that the execution proceeding was barred by limitation and they should not be impleaded thereto, it could have been considered by Court, but there is nothing on record to show that such objection was raised by respondents 2 and 3, As on this day, one has to presume that even if the objection has been raised by respondents 2 and 3 it had been overruled by the court and they were impleaded. If it is so, the order cannot be challenged by the petitioner as vendor had allowed it is become final. 11. If it is so, the order cannot be challenged by the petitioner as vendor had allowed it is become final. 11. The third contention urged by learned counsel for the petitioner is that the execution proceeding was not sustainable at the time when it was filed on 10. 1979 as it was directed against a dead person according to the counsel, the petition was a nullity and it had no existence in the eye of law. It is contended that the execution petition can be deemed to have been filed only on the date on which respondents 2 and 3 were impleaded as parties thereto. That according to him was beyond the period of twelve years from the date of the decree. Hence it is argued that the execution petition is barred by limitation. In support of his contention learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the judgment of a full Bench of this Court in Kanchanamalai v. Bhabaji Rajah, 70 M.L.J. 162: A.I.R. 1936 Mad. 205:162 I.C. 166. In that case, a court auction sale was held at a time when the judgment-debtor was dead and his legal representatives had not been brought on record. The Full Bench pointed out that if the decree-holder wants to execute the decree as against the legal representatives of a deceased judgment-debtor, he had to file an application under Sec.50, C.P.C. and got them impleaded and that he has no other option. I have already dealt with that aspect of the matter when I considered the first contention of learned counsel for petitioner. The Full Bench had no occasion to consider the effect of bringing on record the legal representatives of the deceased in the execution proceeding at a subsequent date. In the case before the Full Bench the legal representatives were not brought on record and hence the court sale was held to be void. The decision of the Full Bench will have no hearing on the facts of the present case. 12. With regard to the sustainability of the execution petition and continuation of the same as against the legal representatives, the matter is not res-integra. The matter has been considered at length by a Division Bench of this Court in Chinnan Chettiar v. Sivaganga Estate Manager, (1948)2 M.L.J. 377 : A.I.R. 1949 Mad. 348. 12. With regard to the sustainability of the execution petition and continuation of the same as against the legal representatives, the matter is not res-integra. The matter has been considered at length by a Division Bench of this Court in Chinnan Chettiar v. Sivaganga Estate Manager, (1948)2 M.L.J. 377 : A.I.R. 1949 Mad. 348. The Bench held that an execution application filed against a deceased judgment-debtor is not a nullity and there is only a mistake in giving the particulars required by O.21, Rule 11(2) and the defect can be remedied by on amendment under O.21, Rule 17(1). It is worthwhile extracting the following observations made by the Division Bench; as it lays down the law clearly: "It was next urged that the present execution application was barred by Sec.48, C.P.C. The argument was put thus; the application having been filed against a deceased judgment-debtor, was a nullity even as a plaint filed against a deceased person is a nullity; see Veerappa Chettiar v. Tindal Ponnan, 17 M.L.J. 555: I.L.R 31 Mad. 86. It become an effective application only when the legal representatives of Kan-nappa including that appellant were brought on record, and as this was done on 27th October, 1943, more than 12 years after the date of the decree, no order for execution should be passed on the application. This point, again, is concluded against the appellant by the decision in Samia Pillai v. Chockalingam Chettiar, 4 M.L.J. 8: I.L.R. 17 Mad.76. In that case the naming of a deceased judgment-debtor as the person against execution is sought was regarded as no more than a mistake in giving the particulars required under Sec.235 of the old Code corresponding to O.21, Rule 11(2) of the Present Code." The learned Judges observed: "Where there has been in fact an application for execution made by the party entitled to make it the mere fact of a mistake having been made in giving the particulars by Sec.235, C.P.C. cannot we think, have the effect of rendering the application a nullity." If so, the defect could be remedied under O.21, Rule 17(1) and when so remedied by amendment "it shall be deemed to have been an application in accordance with law and presented on the date when it was first presented." 13. It was suggested that Samia Pillai v. Chockalingam Chettiar, 4 M.L.J. 8: I.L.R. 17 Mad. It was suggested that Samia Pillai v. Chockalingam Chettiar, 4 M.L.J. 8: I.L.R. 17 Mad. 76, were wrongly decided and should not be followed and our attention was drawn to Gulab Singh v. Nathu, I.L.R. (1944) Nag. 419: A.I.R. 1944 Nag. 145, decided by a single Judge as laying down the correct principle. If the matter were res Integra in this Court, it would be a question for serious consideration whether the view expressed in the above case is not the sounder one. But Samia Pillai v. Chockalingam Chettiar, 4 M.L.J. 8:I.L.R. 17 Mad. 76, has never been departed from in this Court but has been followed in subsequent cases e.g., Subramania Desika v. Rangaswami Chettiar, 68 M.L.J. 261.A.I.R. 1935 Mad 161, and Loganath Rao v. Narayanamurthi, 65 M.L.J. 374: A.I.R. 1933 Mad.696, and also in other High Courts; see Bipin Behari Mitar v. Bibi Zohra, I.L.R. 35 Cal 1047 and Sheogobind Ram v. Nt. Kishumbansi Kuar, I.L.R 11 Pat.546: A.I.R 1932Pat. 222. In this state of the authorities, we are inclined to follow the decision in Swamia Pillai v. Chockalingam Chettiar, 4 M.L.J. 8: I.L.R. 17 Mad. 76, where, as already observed the mention of the name of the deceased judgment-debtor as the person against whom relief in execution in sought was regarded as a matter for amendment under O.21, Rule 17." 14. In view of the Judgment of the Division Bench, which is binding on me, I hold that the application for execution filed by the first respondent is not barred by limitation The first respondent is entitled to execute the decree as against the legal) representatives of the deceased judgment-debtor as well as the petitioner herein, who has now been impleaded by my order in C.R.P.No.3159 of 1989. 15. The petitioner’s application under Sec47, C.P.C. is without any merit and the court below is right in dismissing the same. This civil revision petition is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.