The suit, being Title Suit No. 33/89 was filed by the present petitioner as plaintiff for declaration that the order of the defendant No. l, namely, the Deputy Inspector of Schools dated 15.6.89 transferring the plaintiff from Khudra Kulhati Primary School to Barkulhati Primary School as Head Mistress vice proforma defendant No. 7, namely Lakhiram Kalita is illegal, It may be stated that initially the plaintiff was transferred by order dated) 23.2.89 which was modified by order dated 7.3.89 which was again modified on 27.5.89. It has been alleged by the plaintiff that at the intervention of the then Minister, Education, the order dated 27.5.89 was temporarily stayed and it was subsequently vacated. The plaintiff has further alleged that the order was vacated out of grudge. Again, the order was stayed by Minister 01 State, Education. But instead of stay order the impugned order dated 15.6.89 was passed. There was also an interim injunction. 2. In view of the provisions contained in the Assam Administrative Tribunal Act, 1977, for short 'the Act' a preliminary issue was framed as to whether civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain the present suit. After hearing the parties, the learned trial Court held that civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain the present suit. But by the impugned judgment and order the learned lower appellate Court held that jurisdiction of civil Court is barred in view of the provisions contained in the Act. Hence, the present petition. 3. I have heard Mr T.S. Deka, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. A. R. Paul Mazumdar and Mr. G. Uzir, learned counsel for the respondents. 4. The limited question in the present civil revision is whether the provisions of the Act have ousted the jurisdiction of the civil Court to entertain such a suit. 5. Section 2 of the Civil Procedure Code provides that the Courts shall have jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. Now, the question is whether by the provisions of the Act jurisdiction of the civil Court has been barred either expressly or impliedly. 5. Section 2 of the Civil Procedure Code provides that the Courts shall have jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. Now, the question is whether by the provisions of the Act jurisdiction of the civil Court has been barred either expressly or impliedly. In this connection, I may refer to a decision of the Apex Court in Dhola Bhai vs. State of M. P., AIR 1969 SC 1978 The matter was heard by a Bench consisted of five Hon'ble Judges of the Supreme Court and the Court speaking through Hon'ble Chief Justice Shri Hidayatullah after considering the earlier decisions laid down the following propositions for consideration regarding ouster of jurisdiction of the civil Court : (i) Where the statute gives a finality to the orders of the special Tribunals the civil Court's jurisdiction must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the civil Courts would normally do in a suit. Such provision, however, does not exclude those cases where the provisions of the particular Act have not been complied with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. (ii) Where there is an express bar of the jurisdiction of the Court, an examination of the scheme of the particular Act to find the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided may be relevant but is not decisive to sustain the jurisdiction of the civil Court. Where there is no express exclusion, the examination of the remedies and the scheme of the particular Act to find out the intendment becomes necessary and the result of the inquiry may be decisive. In the latter case it is necessary to see if the statute creates a special right or a liability and provides for the determination of the right or liability and further lays down that all questions about the said right and liability shall be determined by the Tribunals so constituted, and whether remedies normally associated with actions in civil Courts are prescribed by the said statute or not. (iii) Challenge to the provisions of the particular Act as ultra vires cannot be brought before Tribunals constituted under that Act. Even the High Count cannot go into that question on a revision or reference from the decision of the Tribunals. (iii) Challenge to the provisions of the particular Act as ultra vires cannot be brought before Tribunals constituted under that Act. Even the High Count cannot go into that question on a revision or reference from the decision of the Tribunals. (iv) When a provision is already declared unconstitutional or the constitutionality of any provision is to be challenged, a suit is open. A writ of certiorari may include a direction for refund if the claim Js clearly within the time prescribed by the Limitation Act but it is not a compulsory remedy to replace a suit. (v) Where the particular Act contains no machinery for refund of tax collected in excess of constitutional limits or illegally collected, a suit lies. (vi) Questions of the correctness of the assessment apart from its constitutionality are for the decision of the authorities and a civil suit does not lie if the orders of the authorities are declared to be final or there is an express prohibition in the particular Act. In either case the scheme of the particular Act must be examined because it is a relevant enquiry. (vii) An exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil Court is net readily to be inferred unless the conditions above set down apply." 6. For the purpose of the present petition there is no dispute that the petitioner is an employee of the Stat« Government in view of provisions of Assam Elementary (Provincialisation) Act, 1974. 7. (vii) An exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil Court is net readily to be inferred unless the conditions above set down apply." 6. For the purpose of the present petition there is no dispute that the petitioner is an employee of the Stat« Government in view of provisions of Assam Elementary (Provincialisation) Act, 1974. 7. To consider the present question the following provisions of the Act are necessary which read as under Section 2 (b)- Civil servant means a person who is or has been a member of a civil service or who holds or has held a civil post in connection with the affairs of the State of Assam and includes any such person on foreign service, a person whose services have been temporarily placed at the disposal of a local or other authority, any person in the service of a local or her authority whose services has been temporarily placed at the disposal of the Slate Government, a person in service under the State Government on contract and a person who has retired from the Government service elsewhere and has been re-employed under the State Government but does not include employees of the Gauhati High Court, employees of the Assam Legislative Assembly Secretariat, employees of the Assam Public Service Commission, persons in the All India Service and other civil services of the Indian Union, or persons of civil service of other State Government serving on deputation in Assam ; (e) 'conditions of service' includes all matters relating to the- (i) appointment, seniority, confirmation and termination of service of civil servant, (ii) censure, withholding of increments or promotion, recovery from pay of any loss to the Government reduction to a lower service, grade or post, or to a lower time scale, or to a lower stage in a time scale, denial or variation of pension or denial of the maximum pension; Section 4- Jurisdiction -(1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in sub-section (2) below the Tribunal shall have jurisdiction to entertain and dispose of appeals preferred by civil servants against any order passed by a competent authority in respect of any condition of service. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub section (1) above the Tribunal shall have no jurisdiction with respect to any order passed, when the civil servant has not availed of all the remedies available to him under the relevant service rules, executive instructions or orders : Provided that notwithstanding anything contained in the above paragraph the Tribunal may entertain an appeal from a civil servant, if any appeal, revision petition or representation filed by him under the relevant service rules before the competent authority has not been finally disposed of by the competent authority within a period of six months from the date of filing such appeal, revision petition or representation. Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) above, the Tribunal shall have no jurisdiction to entertain and dispose of appeals against any order passed by a competent authority under Article 3il (2) provisos (a), (b) and (c) as also under F. R. 56 (b). Section 9 - Finality of decision and bar of suit, powers of review of its own order and transfer of pending proceedings (1) (a) The order of the Tribunal passed in any appeal under the provisions of the Act shall be final. (b)... …. ….. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law, no civil court or other authority shall entertain any civil suit or other proceeding with respect to any of the matters which fall within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal or question in any form any order passed by the Tribunal in any appeal or review with respect to any matter when an appeal could have been preferred under the provisions of the Act t with respect to any other matter which arises out of the exercise of power under this. Act. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law, all suits or other proceedings in respect of any matter over which the Tribunal has juris­diction and which are pending before any civil court or other authority on the date of coming into force of this Act shall stand transferred to the Tribunal and the civil court or other authority before whom such a suit or proceeding is pending shall transfer all relevant and connected papers and records to the Tribunal and thereupon the Tribunal shall decide the suits and proceedings in the same manner as if they were appeals preferred under the provisions of this Act. 8. 8. Reliance has been placed on a Full Bench decision of this Court in Ranjlt Chakravorty vs. State of Assam, AIR 1981 Gauhati 1. In that case service of a Government Driver was terminated and he filed a civil suit. The question which was considered by the Full Bench was whether a Letters Patent Appeal arising out of a civil suit is maintainable in View of section 9 of the Act. According to majority view where on termination of services of a civil servant, he brought a suit for declaration that be should be deemed to be in service, and also for recovery of his salary, Division Bench of this Court was competent to dispose of the Letters Patent Appeal. It was further held that even if the appeal was entertained by the Administrative Tribunal and the reliefs claimed were granted, the plaintiff could not have executed the decree or order passed by the Administrative Tribunal, as no machinery has been created by the Administrative Tribunal Act for execution of the decree or order passed by the Tribunal. It was also held that punishment for contempt was no relief to any aggrieved civil servant in such civil suit. In my opinion this ratio is not relevant for the present purpose as the limited question is whether transfer is a condition of service as defined in clause (e) of sect on 2 of the Act. 9. It has been urged that transfer is also a condition of service and, as such, it may be deemed to be included in sub clause (i) of clause (e) of section 2 of the Act. There cannot be any doubt that transfer is also a condition of service so also, seniority and confirmation. I may also add that termination of service of a civil servant is also included in the word 'appointment' as under the principle of the General Clauses Act power to appoint also includes power to remove. Reading the said sub-clause (i) of clause (e) of section 2. I find that in the Act legislature has inserted not oily the word 'appointment', but also the words 'seniority', 'confirmation', and 'termination of service'. Reading the said sub-clause (i) of clause (e) of section 2. I find that in the Act legislature has inserted not oily the word 'appointment', but also the words 'seniority', 'confirmation', and 'termination of service'. But the word 'transfer' does not find place in the said sub-clause (i) and in my opinion this was an intentional omission as it was not the legislative policy to allow the Tribunal jurisdictions over an order of transfer of a civil servant. I say so, because transfer is made in the public interest and it should not be lightly interfered with by any Tribunal or Court including writ Court. 10- I am fortified in coming to the above decision after reading section 4 of the Act as a whole. Under the said section an aggrieved civil servant can approach the Tribunal after exhausting all remedies available to him, like, appeal, representation, revision petition, etc. Further, sub-sections (2) and (3) of section 4 of the Act lay down that jurisdiction of the Tribunal will come into play only in the event such appeal, revision petition or representation is not disposes' of within a period of six months. As transfer of a civil servant which is made in the public interest, has to take effect immediately, he cannot wait for six months in order to approach the Tribunal. I, therefore, hold that the legislature intentionally omitted jurisdiction of the Tribunal in respect of transfer orders passed by the competent authority in public interest. 11. Coming to the conditions laid down in Dhnla Bhai (supra) I am of the opinion that the case in hand has to be considered in the light of the propositions No. 1 and 2. In other words, it has to be considered whether adequate remedy has been, provided in the Act against an order of transfer and w1 ether remedies normally associated with actions in civil Courts are prescribed in the Act or not. 12. As stated above, as the Tribunal cannot give any relief immediately against a transfer order whereas a civil Court can do so by way of granting injunction by applying the ratio laid down in Dhnla Bhai (supra). I am of the opinion that in appropriate case civil Court can exercise jurisdiction over such transfer order and section 9 of the Act will not be a bar in this regard. 13. I am of the opinion that in appropriate case civil Court can exercise jurisdiction over such transfer order and section 9 of the Act will not be a bar in this regard. 13. A Division Bench of this Court while considering the power of High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution laid town the following in the case of Narayan Bhattacharjee vs. State of Tripnra, 1988 (2) GU-NOC 1 "(a) The Government or its functionaries have power to transfer its employees employed in a transferable post, as transfer is an incident of service to meet the exigencies of the administration. No right is conferrer ' on a government servant for being posted at a specified place; (b) The authorities incharge of an employee are the sole judges about the necessity or desirability of such transfer as they have to decide bow to distribute and utilise the services of their employees. The provision of transfer is intended to check creation of vested interest, nepotism and corruption. (c) This power of transfer, however, should be exercised only bonafide and reasonably and in public interest. If any transfer of employee is made on extraneous consideration or for achieving an alien purpose or an oblique motive, it would amount to malafide and colourable exercise of power. (d) A transfer is malafide when it is made not for professed pursue, such as in normal course or in public or administrative interest or in exigencies of service. In case a transfer order is malafide or oblique motive, such as by way of punishment or for collateral reasons the writ Court can interfere' with the orders of transfer". 14. I have not considered in the case in hand as to whether against any transfer order a civil servant can approach a civil Court or in other words, whether he has got a civil right to agitate the matter. I say so as in the case in hand malafide has been alleged. When a writ Court is reluctant to interfere with a transfer order, civil Court should not also lightly issue injunction order interfering transfer order as it may be against the public interest. This word of caution shall be strictly followed while considering injunction petition against such transfer order. 15. When a writ Court is reluctant to interfere with a transfer order, civil Court should not also lightly issue injunction order interfering transfer order as it may be against the public interest. This word of caution shall be strictly followed while considering injunction petition against such transfer order. 15. From what has been stated above, I hold that the civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain the present suit and, accordingly, the impugned judgment and order of learned lower appellate Court are set aside and the judgment and order of the learned trial Court are restored. 16. Before parting with the records, I direct the Inspector of Schools, Nalbari, who is the superior authority of the Deputy Inspector of Schools, respondent No. 1 herein, to look into the matter and pass appropriate orders within a period of 15 days from the date of receipt of this order. If necessary, the Inspector of Schools may call both the parties or may visit the place for this purpose. I have given this direction as a peculiar situation has arisen inasmuch as both the plaintiff and the proforma respondent No. 7 are attending the same school claiming themselves to be Head Pundit of the School and as result of which the education of the student has been suffering. 17. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, I leave the parties to bear their respective costs.