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Gujarat High Court · body

1991 DIGILAW 10 (GUJ)

BABUJI v. STATE

1991-01-15

K.R.VYAS, V.H.BHAIRAVIA

body1991
BHAIRAVIA, J. ( 1 ) [his Lordships after stating the facts of the case, further observed :]7. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Therefore, there can be conviction on the basis of dying declaration and it is not at all necessary to have a corroboration provided the Court is satisfied that the dying declaration is a truthful and genuine dying declaration. In our, view once the dying declaration recorded by the Executive Magistrate is proved by the oral evidence and inspires confidence of the Court, it is admissible in evidence and conviction can be based on dying declaration alone in absence of any direct or corroborative evidence. . . . . . . . . . . . . 10. . . . . . . . . . . . . In our view, the learned Judge has committed an error in admitting post mortem note without examining Doctor by applying the provisions of Sec. 294 of the cr. P. Code. It was the duty of the prosecution to secure the attendance of the Doctor who had performed post mortem and would be an abuse of the provisions contained in Sec. 294 of the Cr. P. Code for bringing on record the documents which are to be proved by examining a witness whose presence the prosecution has without proper effort failed to secure. Even by consent, such important documents cannot be admitted and it was obligatory for the prosecution to examine medical officer to prove post mortem note. Therefore, we agree with the submission of the learned Counsel for the appellant that the post mortem note is required to be proved by oral evidence of the Doctor who performed post mortem examination and that the procedure prescribed under Sec. 294 of the Cr. P. Code for proving certain documents is not applicable in the case of post mortem note. It is obligatory for the prosecution to prove the post-mortem note even if the otherside admits the same. Therefore, the procedure adopted by the learned Judge in admitting post mortem note (Exh. 31) without examining dr. Udani who had performed post mortem examination, is illegal and, therefore, it cannot held to be proved and the direct result of this infirmity would be that the cause of death is not proved. . . . . . . . . . . . 31) without examining dr. Udani who had performed post mortem examination, is illegal and, therefore, it cannot held to be proved and the direct result of this infirmity would be that the cause of death is not proved. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . BUT, in our view, the appellant accused cannot escape from the responsibility of such a heinous and serious offence of attempting to commit murder of his own wife. Technically, though the offence under Sec. 302 of the I. P. Code may not be proved, but looking to the evidence on record; particularly at the earliest point of time in the hospital, we do not have any doubt about the accused having been guilty and in our view, none-else but the appellant accused alone did this heinous act with an intention to commit murder of his wife and there is definite attempt to commit murder of his wife. However, in absence of oral evidence of the medical officer who performed post mortem on the dead body, it is not proved that the cause of death is the direct consequence of the attempt of the appellant-accused. We, therefore, hold that the offence under Sec. 302 of the I. P. Code, though technically not proved, the appellant-accused did attempt to commit murder of his wife and, therefore offence falls under Sec. 307 of the I. P. Code. .