AGRAWAL, C.J. - This is a Special Appeal u/s. 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance against the judgment and order dated 10.2.1987 of the learned Single Judge dismissing the writ petition of the appellants on the basis of a Single Judges judgment passed in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 478 of 1985. 2. Pratap Singh, respondent no. 2 was an employee working in one of the shops belonging to Rajasthan State Industrial Development and Investment Corporation, Ltd., (hereinafter referred to as the RSIDI Corporation). He was terminated w.e.f. 9.1.1985. He preferred a petition u/s. 28A of the Rajasthan Shops and Commercial Establishment Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) for his reinstatement and setting aside the order of termination. 3. Section 28 A of the Act, in so far as its relevant provisions are concerned in this case, is quoted as under : — "(1) No employer shall dismiss or discharge from his employment any employee who has been in such employment continuously for a period of not less than 6 months except for a reasonable cause and after giving such employee at least one months prior notice or on paying him one months wages in lieu of such notice : provided...... (2) Every employee so dismissed or discharged may make complaint in writing in the prescribed manner to a prescribed authority within 30 days of the receipt of the order of dismissal or discharge on one or more of the following grounds, namely : — (a) that there was no reasonable cause for dispensing with his services; Or (b) that no notice was served upon him as required by Sub-Sec. (1)" Or (c) that he had not been guilty for any misconduct. Provided.... (3) The Prescribed Authority shall cause a notice to be served on the employer relating to the said complaint, record briefly the evidence produced by the parties, hear them and make such enquiry as may consider necessary and thereafter pass orders in writing giving reasons therefore. 4. Sub-section (3), aforesaid, confers power on the Prescribed Authority to make enquiry and pass such orders in writing, giving reasons for the same, and to give a relief by way of reinstatement or awarding money compensation or both. 5. In the instant case, the Prescribed Authority appointed under the Act, has given the relief of reinstatement by setting aside the order of termination. 5. In the instant case, the Prescribed Authority appointed under the Act, has given the relief of reinstatement by setting aside the order of termination. Against this order, the appellants preferred a writ petition in this Court, which was dismissed, as stated above, by the learned Single Judge. 6. The question that was raised before us by the learned counsel for the appellants was that S.28A of the Act did not apply to the present case and as such, the petition was liable to be rejected by the Prescribed Authority. For his submission, the learned counsel referred to the preamble of the Act, which reads as under :— "An act to consolidate and amend the Law relating to regulation of conditions of work and employment in shops and commercial establishments. Whereas it is expedient to consolidate and amend the Law relating to the regulation of conditions of work and employment in shops and commercial establishments in the State of Rajasthan. Be it enacted by the Rajasthan State Legislature in the ninth year of the Republic of India as follows :" 7. Section 3 of the Act deals with exemptions. It lays down the categories of shops and establishments to which the Act did not apply. We are concerned in the present case with the exemption mentioned in clause (a) of S.3, which reads as under :— "Offices of or under the Central or any State Govt. or local authority." 8. Learned counsel for the appellants urged that the Act does not apply to offices under the (i) Central Government; (ii) State Government and (iii) Local Authorities. He contended that the office in which respondent no.2 was working, was that of the State Government and by virtue of the same, the Prescribed Authority should have held that the Act did not apply. 9. In C.V. Raman v. Management of Bank of India (1), the question before the Honble Supreme Court was that whether provisions of Tamil Nadu Shops Act 36 of 1947, A.P. Shops Act 15 of 1966 and Kerala Shops Act 34 of 1960 were applicable to the employees of a Nationalised Bank. C.V. Raman was an employee of the Bank of India and the Supreme Court, in that case, held that the provisions of the aforesaid Acts were not applicable to the Nationalised Banks. C.V. Raman was an employee of the Bank of India and the Supreme Court, in that case, held that the provisions of the aforesaid Acts were not applicable to the Nationalised Banks. The relevant portion of the judgment is quoted below : — "If the criteria laid down above is applied to the facts of the instant case it is obvious that even though the State Bank of India and the Nationalised Banks may not be owned as such by the Central Government and its employees may not be the employees of the Central Government, they certainly will fall within the purview of the expression "under the Central Government", in view of the existence of deep and pervasive control of the Central Government over these banks." 10. In the present case as well, the argument is that the RSIDI Corporation was a body, although incorporated under the Act but because of the control of the State Government in matters of administration, by supplying all funds and other methods, it was covered by the exemption clause under S.3 (1) (a) of the Act. 11. Sri Dalip Singh, learned counsel for the appellants cited a Division Bench decision of this court in Anjanical Joseph v. The State of Rajasthan (2) in support of his contention that since RSIDI Corporation is under the State Government, the exemption clause is applicable to it. 12. For exemption, what is necessary is that the body which claims it, should be under the Central or State Government. In the instant case, the various provisions of the Scheme by which RSIDI Corporation was created go to show that the State Government has the control over the same and for all intents and purposes, RSIDI Corporation was working under its directions. It is the State Government, which has the power to post or transfer an officer of RSIDI Corporation whenever and wherever it desires. In C.V. Ramans case (supra), the Honble Supreme Court held that as the Central Government had pervasive control over the affairs of Nationalised Banks, the employees of such Banks will fall within the purview of the expression "under the Central Government." Similar was the view of the Division Bench in D.B. Writ Petition No. 1260 of 1989 (Supra). In C.V. Ramans case (supra), the Honble Supreme Court held that as the Central Government had pervasive control over the affairs of Nationalised Banks, the employees of such Banks will fall within the purview of the expression "under the Central Government." Similar was the view of the Division Bench in D.B. Writ Petition No. 1260 of 1989 (Supra). In that case their Lordships of this Court held that the expression offices used in clause (a) and (b) of sub-section (1) of sec 3 covers commercial establishment and shops also. In the instant case, although the body claiming exemption is not a Nationalised Bank but from the foregoing discussion, we find that RSIDI Corporation was under the control of the State Govt. The Article of Association expressly provided that the final control, flow of funds to the Corporation was to the borne by the State Government and the account was to be audited by the Central Government on the advice of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India. 13. For what has been said above, we find that the RSIDI Corporation was liable to be exempted u/s. 3 (1) (a) of the Act and Section 28A was not applicable in this case. The entire proceedings taken under Section 28A of the Act are liable to be quashed. 14. In the result, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The entire proceedings drawn under Section 28A of the Act are quashed. It is, however, open to the aggrieved party to take up proceedings under the Industrial Disputes Act or any other proceeding in accordance with law. The stay order granted by this court on 21.5.1987 is hereby vacated. In the circumstances of the case, the parties shall bear their own costs.