JUDGMENT K. P. Singh, J. 1. This is a plaintiff's First appeal from order against the judgment of the trial court dated 21-4-90 whereby the plaintiffs suit has been returned for presentation before a competent court. 2. One of the ticklish questions relating to jurisdiction of Civil Court or Revenue Court is under our consideration in the present case. There are three plots numbered as 147 measuring 16 decimals 292 measuring 5 decimals and 293 measuring 6 decimals, situate in village Bhawanpur alias Khudahna, Pargana Kol Asla, district Varanasi According to the plaint allegations there are constructions over the aforesaid plots and the plaintiffs wants partition of the constructions as well as the disputed land. In short, the allegations of the plaintiffs in the plaint are that the constructions were made with joint family fund. Therefore, the plaintiffs have half share in them and they have prayed for partition keeping in view the convenience and easmentary rights (See Annexure RA 1 copy of the plaint attached with the rejoinder affidavit). 3. The claim of the plaintiffs has been contested by the defendants as, is evident from Annexure RA. 2 The main claim of the defendants appears that according to them there has been partition in the family and that the disputed land fell in the share of the defendants' ancestors and that the constructions existing over the disputed land were built with their own income and that the plaintiffs had no interest in the building or the disputed land or the trees existing thereon and that the defendants had been owner in possession over the disputed property since more than 20 years. Vide paragraphs 33 and 34 of the written statement pleas have been raised to the effect that the suit for plot no. 147, measuring 16 decimals is barred by the provisions of section 49 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act and the civil court has no jurisdiction to try the suit. (See written statement annexure RA 2). 4. On the pleadings of the parties, issues were framed by the trial court and through the impugned judgment the trial court has arrived at the conclusion that the suit is not cognizable by the Civil Court. Aggrieved by the judgment of the trial court the plaintiff-appellant has approached this court through the above noted First Appeal From Order. 4. On the pleadings of the parties, issues were framed by the trial court and through the impugned judgment the trial court has arrived at the conclusion that the suit is not cognizable by the Civil Court. Aggrieved by the judgment of the trial court the plaintiff-appellant has approached this court through the above noted First Appeal From Order. The learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant has contended before us that the trial court has patently erred in returning the plaint in the facts and circumstances of the present case. According to him the division of the constructions existing over the disputed land was involved which could be granted by the civil court alone. But, the trial court has a.-ted illegally in holding that the civil court had no jurisdiction to try the suit. It has also been emphasized before us that the disputed land is really in the nature of Abadi land and even according to the defendants they have claimed the disputed land being their own as by way of alleged partition the disputed land had fallen to their share and the constructions over the disputed land are existing for more than 20 years. Therefore, according to the plaintiffs the land had lost the use for agricultural purposes and had acquired the nature of Abadi land. Therefore, the suit was cognizable by the Civil Court. It has also been emphasized that according to the rulings of this court, division of Abadi land can take place only in civil court and in consolidation papers two of the disputed plots have been shown as Abadi and Achak land. Therefore, the trial court had pattently erred in returing the plaint for presentation before a competent court. 5. The learned counsel for the defendant-respondents has tried to refute the contentions raised on behalf of the plaintiff appellant. According to him the disputed plots have been shown in revenue papers as well as consolidation records as Bhumidhari land. A Bhumidhar can use his land for any purpose whatsover. Therefore by existence of constructions over the disputed plots they did not loose their character as agricultural land unless relevant declarations had been sought under section 143 of the UP ZA and LR Act. Therefore, the trial court rightly held that the division of the disputed buildings involved the division of Bhumidhari Land. Therefore by existence of constructions over the disputed plots they did not loose their character as agricultural land unless relevant declarations had been sought under section 143 of the UP ZA and LR Act. Therefore, the trial court rightly held that the division of the disputed buildings involved the division of Bhumidhari Land. Therefore, in view of the provisions of Section 176 read with section 331 of the UP ZA and LR Act the trial court has rightly arrived at the conclusion that the civil court had no jurisdiction to try the suit. According to the learned counsel for the defendant respondents, the appeal has no merits and should be dismissed. 6. The learned counsel for the defendant-respondents has placed reliance upon the rulings of this court, Baiju v. Shambhu,Saran, 1963 ALJ 1064, Mewa v. Baldeo, AIR 1967 Alld. 358, Alauddin alias Makki v. Hamid Khan, 1971 ALJ 367, Kamla Shankar v. Dy. Director of Consolidation, 1979 RD 78 and Magnu Ahir v. Mahabir, 1988 RD 301 and has emphasized before us that the trial court is right in returning the plaintiff's plaint in the facts and circumstances of the present case. According to him and the authorities, cited by him, it is evident that the disputed plots which have been shown in revenue records and consolidation records as Bhumidhari land, would not lose its agricultural character merely because constructions exist thereon unless the Bhumidhar had got declaration under section 143 of the UP ZA and LR Act for non agricultural use. At this stage it is noteworthy that the defendants had taken omnibus plea that the civil court had no jurisdiction and had not mentioned the facts and reasons why the civil court had no jurisdiction to try the suit. On the basis of revenue records and consolidation records it appears that an argument had been advanced to the effect that Bhumidhari land had not lost the character of agricultural land due to existence of constructions thereon. Therefore, the partition of the constructions claim by the plaintiff appellant cannot be entertained by the civil court. In this connection the authorities, cited by the learned counsel, do give support to the contention raised on behalf of the defendant-respondents to some extent that Bhumidhari land does not lose its character unless declaration under section 143 of the UP ZA and LR Act had been granted in respect thereof. In this connection the authorities, cited by the learned counsel, do give support to the contention raised on behalf of the defendant-respondents to some extent that Bhumidhari land does not lose its character unless declaration under section 143 of the UP ZA and LR Act had been granted in respect thereof. None of the authorities deals with the division of buildings existing on Bhumidhari land. In our opinion the trial court has failed to examine the pleadings of the partis and has failed to record a categorical finding as to whether the disputed land, subject-matter of partition suit, is not used for agricultural purposes. However, in the facts and circumstances of this case a difficulty does arise as to whether civil court will have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit as claimed by the plaintiff-appellant. If the division of construction existing over the disputed plots would mean nothing but the division of the land beneath the constructions which is Bhumidhari land, the contention of the learned counsel for the defendant-respondents might be sustainable. It is note worthy that there exists contructions over all the three plots and the plaintiff has prayed for division of the constructsons which might involve the division of the land lying beneath the constuctions as well as the land appurtenant to the constructions which might be Bhumidhari land. In the facts and circumstances of this case a difficult question is to be answered as to whether the reliefs claimed by the plaintiff can be granted by the revenue court ? On behalf of the plaintiff-appellant our attention has been drawn to a ruling Hasmat Khan v. Imami, 1983 ALJ 1204 wherein a learned Single Judge of this court has observed that a suit for partition of houses and the land appurtenant thereto forming part of the abadi would lie in civil court. Before us, the learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant has contended that in consolidation records two of the disputed plots have been shown as Abadi. Therefore, the constructions standing thereon and division thereof would lie in civil court alone. During the course of arguments, the learned counsel for the plaintiff appellant has not been able to satisfy us that the disputed land had lost the character of agricultural land in view of the facts and circumstances, involved in the case. Therefore, the constructions standing thereon and division thereof would lie in civil court alone. During the course of arguments, the learned counsel for the plaintiff appellant has not been able to satisfy us that the disputed land had lost the character of agricultural land in view of the facts and circumstances, involved in the case. In the aforesaid ruling it was not disputed that the disputed land was abadi but in the present case it has been seriously contended before us by the counsel for the defendant-respondents that the disputed plots have been shown in the revenue records and consolidation records as Bhumidhari. Therefore, we think that the plaintiff-appellant will not be able to derive any benefit out of the ruling Hasmat Khan v. Imami, 19X3 ALJ 1204. The facts involved in the aforesaid ruling are dissimilar to the facts under our consideration. 7. Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides as below :- "The courts shall (subject to the provisions herein contained) have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred". 8. The reading of the plaint giving rise to the above appeal would indicate that the plaintiff want partition of the constructions existing over the disputed plots on the ground that it is a joint property. The defence in the case is that the constructions existing over the disputed plots have been built with the separate income of the defendants' after alleged partition. Therefore, the plaintiffs have no share in the disputed constructions. No doubt, the defendants have taken a plea of want of jurisdiction in the civil court without giving reasons therefore or setting up the grounds. If the pleadings of the parties are read between lines, the dispute between the parties appears to be of civil nature which can be tried by the civil court alone unless its cognizance can be said to have been expressly or impliedly barred. As back as the year 1924 a Division Bench of this Court was faced with some what similar question which is under our consideration at present. Though under land Revenue Act. In the present case the partition of the constructions claimed by the plaintiff appellant involves the partition of the Bhumidhari land lying beneath the constructions as well as appurtenant to the constructions. Though under land Revenue Act. In the present case the partition of the constructions claimed by the plaintiff appellant involves the partition of the Bhumidhari land lying beneath the constructions as well as appurtenant to the constructions. During the course of arguments the learned counsel for the defendant respondents was called upon to cite any case law wherein it might have been indicated that the division of building could be done by the revenue courts. As yet, no case law has been produced by the learned counsel for the defendant-respondents. In our search, we have found out the case, Multan Singh v Pudhan Man Singh, AIR 1924 Alld. 854 wherein the Division Bench has observed as below :- "Civil court can be allowed to partition the buildings before the Revenue courts have first partitioned the sites on which they stand though the Revenue courts alone can partition the sites." The aforesaid ruling has also placed reliance upon an earlier ruling. Ashiq Husain v. Muhammad Jan, ILR Alld. (Vol. XXII) 329, wherein it has been held that the Revenue Courts are incompetent to partition the buildings. Viewing from this angle when we examine the scheme of UP ZA and LR Act, we find no provision under the Act authorising the Revenue courts to partition the buildings. Therefore, in our opinion the trial court has erred in returing the plaintiff's plaint in the facts and circumstances of this case without deciding the real pleas, raised by the parties, whether the constructions in suit were built by joint family fund as alleged by the plaintiff-appellant or the constructions are self acquisitions of the defendants and their ancestors. The trial court has also failed to give categorical finding whether the disputed land on the spot is in the shape of Abadi land or it is being used for the agricultural purposes. On the basis of reported cases to the effect that the declaration under section 143 had not been claimed. Therefore, the disputed land did not lose the character of agricultural land. The trial court has given judgment for the defendants without paying due regard to the prayer for partition of the constructions existing over the disputed land claimed by the plaintiff- appellant. In view of the discussions above, we are of the view that the Revenue Courts cannot partition the buildings existing on the disputed plots, mentioned in the plaint. The trial court has given judgment for the defendants without paying due regard to the prayer for partition of the constructions existing over the disputed land claimed by the plaintiff- appellant. In view of the discussions above, we are of the view that the Revenue Courts cannot partition the buildings existing on the disputed plots, mentioned in the plaint. Therefore, the order for return of the plaint for presentation before the Competent court is bad in law and is liable to be set aside. 9. It is a different matter that the plaintiffs suit may fail if the plaintiffs fail to establish joint nature of the disputed property and that the defendants succeed in establishing their claim of self-acquisition. But, returning the plaint for presentation before a competent court for division of the buildings, claimed by the plaintiffs, which cannot be granted by Revenue Courts in view of the rulings mentioned above, would deprive the plaintiffs of getting the relifs in law. In the facts and circumstances of this case, the ends of justice demand that the civil court should be allowed to partition the buildings claimed by the plaintiffs in the suit irrespective of the question that the land lying beneath the constructions can be partitioned by the Revenue courts under the provisions of UP ZA and LR Act. 10. It is note worthy that according to the rulings mentioned in Multan Singh v. Pudhan Man Singh, AIR 1924 Alld. 854, Ashiq Husain v. Muhammad Jan, ILR Alld. (Vol XXII) 329 and the case of Abdul Rahman v. Mushina Bibi (extract of judgment is at page 331 of ILR Allahabad (Vol. XXII)) wherein Banerji, J. has also held that the partition of buildings by Revenue courts is not possible and the Revenue court acts ultra vires in doing so. Therefore, we think that in law there is presumption that the legislators knew the trend of the authorities of this court debarring revenue courts from partitioning the buildings standing on the site which could be partitioned by the Revenue courts alone yet nothing has been said in the U. P. Zamindari Abolition Act entitling the Revenue Courts for partition of the buildings standing on agricultural land. In our opinion the order of the trial court rehiring the plaint for partition of the buildings standing on the agricultural land is bad in law and cannot be sustained. In our opinion the order of the trial court rehiring the plaint for partition of the buildings standing on the agricultural land is bad in law and cannot be sustained. In the result, the above noted First Appeal From order against the judgment of the trial court dated 21-4-90 succeeds and is hereby allowed. The judgment of the trial court returning the plaint through its order dated 21-4-1990 is hereby set aside and the case is sent back to the trial court for decision on merits of the claims put forward by the parties in the suit. Parties are directed to bear their own costs of this appeal. --- Appeal allowed.