JUDGMENT : R.K. GULATI, J. 1. This writ petition is directed against an order dated 24-8-1990 passed by III Additional District Judge, Basti. In way back January, 1981, the Petitioner filed a suit for permanent injunction, demolition and possession against the Defendant-Respondents, arrayed as Respondents 2 to 5 in these proceedings. The suit was initially dismissed on 27-3-1982. However on appeal, the matter was remanded for fresh trial which was again dismissed on 26-3-1987. When the matter came up in appeal for the second time, the Petitioner moved an application to amend his plaint. The amendment was sought, as stated in the impugned order after the arguments in the appeal were almost over. The application for amendment was rejected on the ground amongst other that the same was moved with mala fide intentions. It is against this order that the present writ petition has been filed. 2. I have heard learned Counsel for the parties. For the Petitioner it was argued that the amendment application could not have been rejected without recording any finding that the amendment sought for will change the nature of the suit and cause of action. Further, on the facts and circumstances of the case, the amendment deserved to be allowed, inasmuch as the Defendant-Respondents could be compensated by costs. 3. Having considered the matter carefully, I regret my inability to accept anyone of these contentions. Now the provisions contained in Order 6, Rule 17 of the CPC give wide discretion to the court to allow amendment in the pleadings, if necessary, for the purpose of determining the real matter in controversy between the parties. The discretion allowed to the court is judicial and cannot be exercised on whims or fancies. The purport of the rule is to allow amendment of the pleadings in order to promote ends of substantive justice and to facilitate its course. It is settled by now that the court should be extremely liberal in granting the prayer for amendment provided the court observes the well-known principle subject to which amendment of pleadings is normally granted. Whether a particular amendment should or should not be allowed largely depends on the facts of each case. It is not in dispute that there is no impediment or bar against the appellate court permitting amendment of pleadings if a case is made out in that behalf. 4. Whether a particular amendment should or should not be allowed largely depends on the facts of each case. It is not in dispute that there is no impediment or bar against the appellate court permitting amendment of pleadings if a case is made out in that behalf. 4. Now in the present case the lower appellate court rejected the application seeking amendment of the plaint for variety of reasons and substantially on the ground that the attempt to seek amendment in the plaint was not in good faith and was mala fide, with ulterior motive to prolong the litigation which was already almost a decade old. The suit was filed on 2nd January 1981 which was initially dismissed on 27-3-1982 as noticed earlier. The matter was remanded for fresh trial by the appellate court with the direction to afford opportunity to the parties to produce such further evidence as they might like to produce. On 26-3-1987, for the second time the trial court dismissed the suit. It was against this judgment when the matter was being argued in appeal that the amendment in the plaint was sought, i.e. after 3 1/2 years the appeal remained pending and after nine years of filing of the suit, for the amendment application came to be dismissed on 24-8-1990 by the impugned order. The lower appellate court remarked that one of the proposed amendments relates to fact prior to Zamindari abolition (i.e before the year 1952) and another of the proposed amendments relates to the fact which existed at the initial stage of the suit. No reason even worth the name, was mentioned in the amendment application as to why these facts could not be pleaded or why the amendment was not sought earlier particularly when the Petitioner had two innings before the trial court and one before the appellate court when the case was remanded and all the necessary facts throughout had been in the knowledge of the plaintiff-Petitioner In the absence of any explanation forthcoming for such a gross negligence and inordinate delay, the application for amendment was rejected for want of bona fides, the propose of seeking amendment being to prolong the litigation somehow. 5. 5. Now delay by itself in moving the application for amendment may not be fatal or a good ground for refusing the amendment, but different considerations may arise if gross negligence prejudices the other side to the litigation. It is one of the necessary conditions for the exercise of the court's discretion in dealing with an amendment application that the applicant had acted in good faith. An amendment can legitimately be refused if there are reasons to think that it is mala fide and is designed to delay the proceedings or prolong the litigation. In Zafarullah Khan v. IV Additional District Judge Faizabad 1986 ALJ 359, a learned single judge of this Court has held that for an amendment of written statement even at the appellate stage liberally allowing the same is to be the guiding factor, but such amendment could be allowed only if there is reasonable explanation for delay in making the application and the reasons why it was not sought in the trial court should be assigned provided further that the amendment does not work any serious injustice or irreparable loss to the other side besides consideration of the other relevant factors. In Aisha v. State of Jammu and Kashmir AIR 1978 J & K 34, an application for permission to amend the plaint was rejected with the observations: It was only after more than one and a half years of filing of the second appeal that for the first time an application for permission to amend the plaint was made on 8-11-1976. These facts manifestly reveal that the plaintiff-Appellant has been responsible for deliberately causing such delay in applying for an amendment of the plaint. The lack of bona fides on the part of the Appellant was quite apparent. 6. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner could not dispute that the pleadings of fact now sought to be introduced by the amendment application had all along been in the knowledge of the plaintiff Petitioner and the amendment, if allowed, would necessitate re-trial of the suit. No attempt was made in these proceedings to explain the conduct as to why for almost a decade the amendment could not be sought earlier. In fact the matter does not end there. No attempt was made in these proceedings to explain the conduct as to why for almost a decade the amendment could not be sought earlier. In fact the matter does not end there. It is pertinent to observe that in the appeal proceedings in which the present application for amendment was made, the plaintiff-Appellant had earlier moved another application for amendment of his plaint which was rejected by the then Presiding Officer on 14th December, 1989 and in that application also the fact now sought to be incorporated had not been included. This speaks definitely about the conduct of the Petitioner which disentitles him to the discretionary relief by the court. That apart it was not explained to me as to how the amendments were necessary for purposes of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties. The plaintiff is not entitled to amend his pleadings for mere asking nor the amendment can be claimed as a matter of right or in all circumstances alleging that the amendment will not cause any prejudice to the Respondents or they can be compensated by costs. Before amendments in the pleadings could be allowed, it had to be satisfied that the requirements of Order 6, Rule 17 of the CPC are made out. The peculiar circumstances of the present case do not entitle the Petitioner to the discretionary benefit while on this subject it may be observed that no inflexible rule can be spelled out The amendment on facts, was rightly not allowed by the lower appellate court and its discretion judiciously exercised, in my opinion, is not liable to interference in these proceedings. Normally it is the discretion of the court to which an application for amendment is made to allow or reject the same. This Court will not interfere with the discretion in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution unless it was exercised illegally or inequitably. The Petitioner was guilty of gross negligence and slept over the matter for nearly ten years when he suddenly woke up, as it were from slumber, and sought to amend his plaint when the case was at the final stage and the arguments in the appeal had been closed. The Petitioner was guilty of gross negligence and slept over the matter for nearly ten years when he suddenly woke up, as it were from slumber, and sought to amend his plaint when the case was at the final stage and the arguments in the appeal had been closed. The gross remissness to say the least, on the part of the plaintiff Petitioner in seeking amendment at a late stage with a tricky touch was motivated with ulterior purpose and to drag on the litigation somehow. In these circumstances, the court below rightly refused to put a premium on this delay and laxity on the part of the Appellant Petitioner. The case is more than ten years old. There exists no justification at this stage in allowing the Petitioner to raise a new factual plea and give it a fresh lease of life. 7. In view of the above discussion, this petition is without merit and is accordingly rejected. The stay order dated 13-9-1990, is hereby discharged.