Judgment :- Petitioner (now represented by her legal heirs) challenges acquisition proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act evidenced by Ext. PS. A building belonging to her "Ingredient" situated at Vellayambalam in the Trivandrum City, was rented to the 'Rocket Recreation Club' for running a club and a guest house. Members of the Club are the officers of the third respondent Vikram Sarabhai Space Centre, called "the V.S.S.C." hereinafter. Petitioner states that on the persuasion of certain prominent citizens of Trivandrum, the building was rented on the understanding that it would be vacated, if need arose for petitioner. In 1984, petitioner requested second respondent to vacate the building stating that she needed it for her occupation. It is said that the place where she was residing was acquired for a public purpose, and also that she was not in a position to live there as it was not a healthy locality. by Ext.P4 dated 31-8-86, the office bearers of the club, informed her that they would try to vacate the premises by 31-12-86. It was not vacated by that date, and by Ext.P6 series letters she reiterated her request. The letters did not elicit any reply. Upon that,. she filed an application, under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act on 7-7-87, R.C.P. 70I.87. In a matter of days, Ext.P8 notification dated 31-7-87 under S.4(1)read with S.17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act called 'the Act' hereinafter was issued, taking immediate possession of the property, dispensing with the enquiry under S.SA of the Act. Necessity for a place to park vehicles belonging to the V.S.S.C., and necessity for setting up a polyclinic, are the public purposes stated in Ext. PS. 2. Petitioner would submit that the acquisition is vitiated by malafide. The sequence of events was highlighted to support this contention. Within days of filing the petition for eviction, Ext.P8 was issued. There could be no urgency when another place was available for parking the vehicles even on the day of the notification, and there was one hospital under the V.S.S.C, submits petitioner. She states that acquisition is only a guise to retain the club and the guest house. By Ext.P9(a), the Government of India had conveyed the concern of the Prime Minister to all the State Governments about reported extravagance in acquiring lands, also requesting State Governments to exercise restraint in the matter, considering scarcity of resources. She states that acquisition is only a guise to retain the club and the guest house. By Ext.P9(a), the Government of India had conveyed the concern of the Prime Minister to all the State Governments about reported extravagance in acquiring lands, also requesting State Governments to exercise restraint in the matter, considering scarcity of resources. Ignoring these, land in the most expensive area of Trivandrum was acquired to retain the recreation club and guest house at enormous cost to the exchequer, and to spite the petitioner, submits counsel. It is also submitted that parking the vehicles of the V.S.S. Cat a place ISK ms. away (it is so stated by counsel for third respondent) from their premises would add to recurring fuel costs. These are features which demonstrate colorable exercise of power, according to petitioner, 3. In answer, the third respondent V.S.S.C. submits that petitioner has no need for the building, that the illness put forward by her is pretended, and that any promise given by the officials of the club could only be the result of "pestering" by the petitioner. It is stated that the area (50 cents) available with the V.S.S.C. for parking vehicles, was insufficient and that the land of petitioner (35 cents) is needed to meet the requirements. The State in a brief counter affidavit submits that they were satisfied about the existence of a public purpose, apparently because the V.S.S.C. told them that a public purpose existed. 4. The State can exercise its power under the Act only for a public purpose. The power cannot be used in disguise, as a cloak to cover up other purposes. Exercise of power cannot be a camouflage, to sweep the real purpose under the carpet. The decision regarding the nature of purpose is not appealable, but the decision making process is amenable to judicial review. In the words ofLordBrightmaninCI.7I.efConsfaWeof North Wales Police v. Evans ((1982) 3 All E.R.141). "Judicial review is concerned, not with the decision, but the decision making process It is a review of the manner in which the decision was made". (emphasis supplied) This view was approved by the Supreme Court in Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India (AIR 1987 SC 2386). In the words ofLordBrightmaninCI.7I.efConsfaWeof North Wales Police v. Evans ((1982) 3 All E.R.141). "Judicial review is concerned, not with the decision, but the decision making process It is a review of the manner in which the decision was made". (emphasis supplied) This view was approved by the Supreme Court in Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India (AIR 1987 SC 2386). The Court observed: "The doctrine of proportionality, as part of the concept of judicial review would ensure that even on an aspect, which is within the exclusive province of the Court Martial Irrationality and perversity are recognised grounds of judicial review". That, the State exercises its prerogative of eminent domain, will not take the decision making process beyond the pale of judicial review. An array of authority supports this view. In R. v. Secretary, Home Department ((1977) 3 All.E.R.452) Denning. MR. stated: "If the body concerned has acted unfairly, then the courts can review the proceedings so as to ensure as far as may, be that justice is done". The parameters of judicial review are indeed wide. In Council of Civil Service Unions & Ors. v. The Minister for the Civil Service ((1984) 3 All E.R.935), the House of Lords indicated the heads of review. Dip lock, L.J. stated: "The three grounds justifying judicial review are illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety". The principle stated by the House of Lords was endorsed by the Supreme Court of India in J.R. Reghupathy v. State of A.P. (AIR 1988 S.C.1681). Surveying the law on the point the Court held that irrationality would be a ground to exercise the power of judicial review. agaiawkumarishrilekha Vidyarthi&Ors. v. State o fU.P. and Others ((19991) 1 S.C.C. 212), the position was reiterated: "all State actions "whatever their mien', are amenable to constitutional limitations,' the alternative being to permit them to flourish as an emporium in imperio Where there is arbitrariness in State action, judicial review strikes such an action down Conferment of the power together with the discretion is coupled with the duty to shun arbitrariness in its exercise and to promote the object for which the power is conferred, which undoubtedly is public interest and not individual or private gain, whim or caprice of any individual". Thus, arbitrary action, even when State privilege is claimed, is amenable to the controlling jurisdiction of certiorari. 5. Thus, arbitrary action, even when State privilege is claimed, is amenable to the controlling jurisdiction of certiorari. 5. There are precedents where exercise of power under the Land Acquisition Act had been interdicted by the Supreme Court, on the ground of colourable exercise. In State of Punjab v. Gurdlal Singh (AIR 1980 S.C. 319) recourse to the emergency provisions in the Land Acquisition Act without justifiable reason, was prohibited. Krishna Iyer, J. stated: "it is fundamental that compulsory taking of a man's property is a serious matter Hearing him before depriving him is both reasonable and pre-emptive of arbitrariness Save in real urgency where public interest does not brook even the minimum time needed to give a hearing land acquisition authorities should not, having regard to Arts.14 (and 19), burke an enquiry under S.17 of the Act". Again, in Collector (District Magistrate) Allahabad and another v. Rajaram Jaiswal (AIR 1985 SC 1622), a case of acquisition under the Act, the Court observed: "Where a power is conferred to achieve a purpose, it has been repeatedly reiterated that the power must be exercised reasonably and in good faith to effectuate the purpose. In this context good faith means, 'for legitimate reasons'. Where power is exercised for extraneous or irrelevant considerations, it is a colorable exercise or fraud on power, and is vitiated", (emphasis supplied) 6. Irrationality impelling the action, or arbitrariness accompanying it, would be valid grounds to interdict the action. 7. If the action under Ext.P8 is viewed in this background and judged by these yardsticks, it is liable to be struck down. One of the grounds stated by the V.S.S.C. (Para. ll of the counter) to make out a public purpose; is that the area available with them is only 50 cents and that it is not enough to meet their needs. It is not the case that the land is acquired, to supplement the existing facility. It is in substitution. In its anxiety to find a reason, third respondent overlooked the fact that the area of land belonging to petitioner was 14 Ares, roughly 35 cents, while the area with them and considered insufficient, was 50 cents 20.2342 Ares. State Government also readily found a public purpose in acquiring 35 cents, on the basis that 50 cents was insufficient. This shows the manner in which, an onerous responsibility was discharged by the respondents. State Government also readily found a public purpose in acquiring 35 cents, on the basis that 50 cents was insufficient. This shows the manner in which, an onerous responsibility was discharged by the respondents. The State Government should have examined the matter with greater care, instead of allowing itself to be guided by the views of V.S.S.C. Every power is coupled with a duty, even when the statute does not specifically state so. Where, even a safeguard like S.SA is not available, greater was the responsibility inhering in the Government. Government should have applied its mind to the facts, and decided if a public purpose existed or not. It did not. The counter affidavit reveals, that the State Government acted, because the V.S.S.C. wanted them to. 'Acting under dictation', without, application of mind, renders the action illegal (H. Lavender & Son Ltd. v. Minister of Housing and Local Govt. - (1970) 1 W.L.R.1231). The Government missed even the obvious, when it agreed with the requisitioning authority in thinking that 35 cents was sufficient when 50 was not. 8. V.S.S.C, which had a place to park its vehicles even on the day of Ext. P8, suddenly found the need to take immediate possession of the petitioner's land. Within three weeks of the filing the petition for eviction, possession was taken invoking the emergency power. Even assuming that proceedings had been initiated earlier, the precipitous turn of events cannot be easily explained. The argument of petitioner, that the power was exercised for a collateral purpose, gains support from the course of events. In Lynch v. Commissioners of Sewers for City of London ((1886) 32 Ch. D. 72) the House of Lords held that exercise of power to acquire land, for a purpose other than the stated purpose is illegal. In Re Burns & Township of Haldiment ((1966) 52 D.L.R.2d 101) it was held that acquisition of property, to overreach pending litigation suggests exercise of power for a collateral purpose. These cases offer a parallel to the present case. 9. The V.S.S.C. is 18 Kms. away from petitioner's property (counsel for third respondent states so). Bringing the vehicles every day to the parking lot and taking them back the next day, covering long distances, is not a rational act. There are 219 vehicles (para ll of the counter affidavit). By this venture much fuel will be wasted. 9. The V.S.S.C. is 18 Kms. away from petitioner's property (counsel for third respondent states so). Bringing the vehicles every day to the parking lot and taking them back the next day, covering long distances, is not a rational act. There are 219 vehicles (para ll of the counter affidavit). By this venture much fuel will be wasted. Neither notions of good management, nor concerns of economy counseled by Ext.P9(a), justify such conduct on the part of a public body. The choice of land in a locality admitted at the hearing to be the most expensive in the City, for a parking lot or even for a hospital, also does not appear to be consistent with reasonable conduct, or financial discipline, more so, when such extravagances have been advised against in Exts.P9(a) to P9(d). The further fact that by Ext.P10 dated 16-9-88 another piece of land has been acquired for one of the purposes indicated in Ext.P8, is also a circumstance probabilising petitioner's case, that the stated purpose is not the real purpose. The need for a polyclinic, in addition to one hospital under the third respondent in the same City cannot be considered as anything but a luxury, in the prevailing state of public finances and notions of priorities. A public sector undertaking, cannot look for the ultimate in luxury, at the cost of State exchequer ignoring national priorities. Legitimacy of princely luxuries, belong to a bygone day. Audit of State expenditure by a constitutional functionary like Comptroller and Auditor General of India, and other agencies like Public Accounts Committees, illustrate that financial discipline is a core principle in public administration. Extravagence with public funds/tax payers money constitutes colourable exercise of authority. In Daymond v. Plymouth City Council (1976 A.C. 609), in Congreve v. Home Office (1976 Q.B. 629) and in other cases it was held that mis-spending rate payers money is, a valid ground for judicial intervention. the action of authorities under the Land Acquisition Act is thus liable to judicial audit, in the form of judicial review. 10. Malafides are transparent from stated reasons. During the course of hearing, counsel for V.S.S.C., prayed for time to file an additional affidavit. Though the request was belated, I granted time. Then an additional affidavit was filed, apparently to reinforce the plea of public purpose. Reasons not mentioned earlier, and not placed before the acquiring authority are stated. 10. Malafides are transparent from stated reasons. During the course of hearing, counsel for V.S.S.C., prayed for time to file an additional affidavit. Though the request was belated, I granted time. Then an additional affidavit was filed, apparently to reinforce the plea of public purpose. Reasons not mentioned earlier, and not placed before the acquiring authority are stated. Some of the reasons lend support to the' contentions raised by petitioner. It is said that there is need for a guest house. The petitioner stated that the real purpose was that. Again it is said that medical facilities have to be extended to a group, not stated earlier. The State in a further affidavit dated 27-2-91, admits that these purposes were not brought to its notice, before Ext.P8 was issued. Thus, the clumsy disguise falls. Exercise of power for a collateral purpose vitiates the acquisition. 11. The attitude adopted by the third respondent also does not redound to its credit. It has gone to the extent of denying the illness pleaded by petitioner, insinuating that the certificate Ext. Plisabogus one. It would further say that any promise that might have been given by office bearers of the club "is not binding", "when there was pestering from petitioner's side" (para.6 of the counter). - Third respondent is even reluctant to concede that establishment of a club is not a public purpose. Cautiously, it is said that a private club, "probably may not be a public purpose". 12. Such conduct, unbecoming on the part of a public body, reveals that it was actuated by collateral reasons and malafides. Malafides can be gathered from the circumstances. Petitioner is not required to demonstrate what is in another's mind. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Ramjilal & Ors. (AIR 1971 S.C.1228). "The State Government has to act through its officers. What matters were considered-are all within the knowledge of the State Government, and it would be placing an intolerable burden in proof of a just claims to require a party alleging malafide of State action to aver in his petition and to prove by positive evidence that a particular officer was responsible for misusing the authority of the State by taking action for a collateral purpose". 13. Colourable exercise of power for a collateral purpose, malafide and non-application of mind by the authority stamp Ext.PS with vice on its forehead. 13. Colourable exercise of power for a collateral purpose, malafide and non-application of mind by the authority stamp Ext.PS with vice on its forehead. Ext.PS and proceedings in pursuance thereof are quashed. The Writ petition is allowed. Third respondent will pay the costs of the petitioner, which I fix at Rs.1,500/- (One thousand and five hundred).