This is an appeal of the plaintiff whose suit for mandatory injunction was decreed by the trial Court and, on appeal by the defendants, dismissed by the first appellate Court. 2. The facts that have given rise to this appeal are as follows : The appellants filed a suit in the Court of the Munsiff at Mangoldai for mandatory injunction against the defendants. The case of the plaintiff was that they had earlier filed a title suit against the defendants for recovery of khas possession of the suit land and for perpetual injunction which was numbered as Title Suit No. 12/70. The said suit was decreed in their favour on 14.8.70. The first appeal of the defendants as well as second appeal before the High Court were both rejected and the judgment and decree of the trial Court were affirmed. Thereafter, the decree was executed in Title Execution Case No. 13 of 1972 and khas possession of the suit land was delivered to the plaintiffs, who were minor at the relevant time, through their guardian. An order to that effect was passed on 30.11.72. The order of perpetual injunction was also duly served on the defendants and an order was also passed in the title execution case on 29.1.73 recording the same. The further case of the plaintiffs was that though they got possession of the suit land, the land remained fallow for sometime. They were minor at the relevant time and both their father and mother had died during the pendency of the title suit. Taking advantage of this situation, the defendants violated the perpetual injunction and on 15th Bhadra, 1380 entered the land, ploughed it and sowed mustard crops thereon. Situated thus, the suit, which has given rise to the present appeal, was filed praying for mandatory injunction against the defendants. 3. The defendants contested the suit. In their written statement they denied the execution of perpetual injunction and also its violation. Their contention was that they were in continuous posses­sion of the suit land for more than 25 years and the plaintiffs or their predecessors never possessed it nor got the delivery of possession in title execution case No. 13/72 as claimed in the plaint. The defendants also contended that the annual patta in the name of the plaintiffs had been cancelled and, as such, they had no right, title and interest in the suit land. 4. The defendants also contended that the annual patta in the name of the plaintiffs had been cancelled and, as such, they had no right, title and interest in the suit land. 4. A number of issues were framed by the trial Court. Four witnesses including Md. Hasim Ali, who was the guardian of the minors at the relevant time, were examined on behalf of the plai­ntiffs. A number of documents were also exhibited in support of their claim. The defendants on the other hand, neither examined any witness nor adduced any documentary evidence in support of their case. The trial Court, on consideration of the evidence and the documents on record, found that the possession of the suit land had been delivered to the plaintiffs on 16.11.72 and the injunction notice had also been duly served on the defendants on 29.1.73. The trial Court, therefore, rejected the claim of the defendants that they were in continuous possession of the suit land for 25 years without inte­rruption. The Court observed that evidently the defendants were not in possession after 16.11.72 when the delivery of possession was given to the plaintiffs in execution of the decree in the earlier title suit" till they trespassed thereon in violation of the perpetual injunction. The trial Court also observed that the issue regarding possession having been already decided in the earlier suit between the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs and the defendants against the def­endants, they were estopped from raising the very same issue again, in the subsequent suit. The claim of continuous possession raised by the defendants was, therefore, held to be barred by res judicata. 5. The trial Court also rejected the contention of the defen­dants that the suit land being in their possession at the time of" filing the suit, the suit for mandatory injunction under section 39' of the Specific Relief Act was not maintainable. The Court also rejected the contention of the defendants that the annual patta in the name of the plaintiffs had been cancelled and they had no right, title and interest in the suit land. It observed that no evidence had been adduced by the defendants to prove this contention. In view of these findings of fact, the trial Court decreed the suit of the plaintiffs and granted mandatory injunction in their favour. 6. The defendants went in appeal. It observed that no evidence had been adduced by the defendants to prove this contention. In view of these findings of fact, the trial Court decreed the suit of the plaintiffs and granted mandatory injunction in their favour. 6. The defendants went in appeal. The Assistant District Judge who heard the appeal reversed the judgment and decree of the trial Court and dismissed the suit. The appellate Court did not affirm the finding of the trial Court regarding delivery of possession of the suit land to the plaintiffs in execution of the decree in the earlier suit. It was done on the basis of a statement of P. W. 1, who was the guardian of the plaintiffs at the relevant time, that he never possessed the suit land. It may be pertinent to mention that this finding was arrived at by the first appellate Court without consid­ering the context in which this statement was made and also the various orders passed in the title execution case which were duly available on record as relevant evidence wherein it was clearly rec­orded that delivery of possession had been given to the plaintiffs. It was observed that the annual patta was in the name of the mother of the plaintiffs who died during the pendency of the suit in the year 1971. As there is no heritable interest in the annual patta land, the plaintiffs did not acquire any title over the said Und on the death of their mother. In that view of the matter, the Court held that the plaintiffs had neither title nor possession over the suit land and, as such, they were not entitled to any relief by way of mandatory injunction. While arriving at this finding the learned appellate Court also observed that ''the delivery of possession in execution of a dec­ree in the earlier suit was only in name and the defendants rem­ained in possession of the said land even after execution of the decree". In view of these findings, the appeal was allowed and the suit which had been decreed by the trial Court was dismissed. The plaintiffs have come in second appeal before this Court against the order of reversal. 7. In view of these findings, the appeal was allowed and the suit which had been decreed by the trial Court was dismissed. The plaintiffs have come in second appeal before this Court against the order of reversal. 7. Before dealing with the merits of the contentions raised in this appeal, I feel it necessary to state that in course of arguments an application was filed on behalf of the respondents under Order 41 Rule 27 of the Civil Procedure Code. By this application the respondents sought to file certified copies of the order of the Reve­nue Court dated 21.3.74 and the application dated 13.7.73 filed by the plaintiffs before the Revenue Authority for issue of annual patta to them on the basis of their predecessors' previous title. As earlier stated, one of the contentions of the the defendants before the trial Court was that the annual patta in the name of the plaintiffs had been cancelled. The defendants howevef, failed to produce any evidence whatsoever in that behalf before the trial Court nor any eviden­ce was sought to be adduced before the first appellate Court. Even before this Court, though the second appeal was filed as back as in 1948, this application was filed only in course of hearing on 13.12 1990. The certified copy of the order sought to be produced as additional evidence was obtained on 21.3.74 and had been in their possession all throughout. But the defendants decided to withhold production of the same for reasons best known to them. It was ind­icated by me in course of hearing that it would not be possible for me to permit this additional evidence to be adduced at this st­age as there was no reason whatsoever as to why it could not be adduced before the courts below or even before this court earlier. 8. I now propose to elaborate the reasons for not permitting the additional evidence. Order 41 Rule 27 deals with production of additional evidence in Appellate Court. It reads : 27.Production of additional evidence in Appellate Court.-(1) The parties to an appeal shall not be entitled to produce additional evidence, whether oral or documentary, in the Appellate Court. 8. I now propose to elaborate the reasons for not permitting the additional evidence. Order 41 Rule 27 deals with production of additional evidence in Appellate Court. It reads : 27.Production of additional evidence in Appellate Court.-(1) The parties to an appeal shall not be entitled to produce additional evidence, whether oral or documentary, in the Appellate Court. But if- (a) the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred has refused to admit evidence which ought to have, been admitted or (aa) the party seeking to produce additional evidence, estab­lishes that notwithstanding the exercise of due diligence, such evidence was not within his knowledge or could not after the exercise of due diligence, be produced by him at the time when the decree appealed against was passed, or (b) the Appellate Court requires any document to be prod-cued or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce judgment, or for any other substantial cause. the Appellate Court may allow such evidence or document to be produced or witness to be examined. (2) Wherever additional evidence is allowed to be produced by an Appellate Court, the Court shall record the reason for its admission." 9. From a bare reading of this rule it is evident that the par­ties to an appeal are not entitled to produce additional evidence, whether oral or documentary, in the appellate Court. It is the Court which has been vested with the power to allow such additional evi­dence to be produced, if the exceptional circumstances mentioned in any of the three clauses of sub-rule (1) exist. It is well settled by a series of decisions of the Privy Coun­cil and the Supreme Court that additional evidence should not be permitted at the appellate stage in order to enable one of the par­ties to remove certain lacuna in presenting its case at the proper stage, and to fill in gaps. It is not the business of the appellate court to supplement evidence adduced by one party or the other in the lower court. 10. It is not the business of the appellate court to supplement evidence adduced by one party or the other in the lower court. 10. So far as requirement of clause (aa) is concerned, it is man­ifest from the language of this clause itself that the party seeking to produce additional evidence has to establish that notwithstanding the exercise of due diligence, such evidence was not within his kno­wledge or could not, after the exercise of due diligence, be produced by him at the time when the decree appealed against was passed. A party who had ample opportunity to produce certain evidence in the lower court but failed to do so or elected not to do so does not fall under clause (aa) of sub-rule (1) and cannot have it admitted in appeal. 11. The discretion vested in the appellate Court to admit add­itional evidence is not an arbitrary one, but is a judicial one circumscribed by the limitations specified in order 41 rule 27 and it has to be exercised accordingly. This power should not be exercis­ed in favour of a party who has deliberately withheld evidence from the Courts below. Leave should be refused also to a party who could not produce the same in the lower Court because of his own negligence. 12. Turning to the facts of the present case, it is clear that this is not a case where the defendant can claim the benefit of any of the exceptions. There is no manner of doubt that they were neg­ligent in not producing the documents. This is not a case where they were prevented from producing the additional evidence before the Courts below or that they have now discovered a fresh piece of evidence. The documents in question were all throughout in their pos­session. They were withheld from the Courts below. No satisfact­ory explanation has been put forward for doing so. In these circ­umstances, leave to produce additional evidence at this later stage cannot be granted. 13. I shall now deal with the rival contentions of the parties on the merits of the appeal. 14. The contention of Mr. P. K. Baruah, learned counsel for the appellants is that the first appellate court proceeded on an erroneous presumption that on the death of their mother, the plaint­iffs lost their right and interest over the suit land which was an annual patta land in her name. 14. The contention of Mr. P. K. Baruah, learned counsel for the appellants is that the first appellate court proceeded on an erroneous presumption that on the death of their mother, the plaint­iffs lost their right and interest over the suit land which was an annual patta land in her name. According to the counsel, even in the case of anuual patta land the right of user can be transferred. On the death of pattadar, the successor is to be preferred to strangers Reference was made in this conrection to the decisions of this Court in Bahuna Deka v. Srikanta Deka, ILR 1949 I (Assam) 382; Md. Hajat Khan v. Kandarpa, 1 Unreported Cases (Assam) 104; Kashiram Das v. State of Assam, 1956 ILR 8 Assam 160; Abdul Has en v. Haji Mahiuddin, AIR 1967 Assam 9; Mustt. Safatun Nessa y. Gitarani Kundu, (1987) 2 GLR 64; Tanuram Keot v. Padoram Kalita (1983) 1 GLR 497 and in Pradip Chandra Borah v. Assam Board of Revenue, (1990) 1 GLR (NOC) 1. The counsel also referred to a decision of this Court in Maheswar Talukdar v. Bhupendra Kalit a AIR 1953 Assam 90 in support of a submission that even in de-facto transfer, possession of transferee is legal. 15. Based on these contentions, the submission of the counsel is that the appellants-plaintiffs undoubtedly had better title than the defendants and the same had been established in the suit between the parties earlier which was decreed in favour of the plaintiffs and a perpetual injunction was granted restraining the defendants from interfering with the possession of the plaintiffs. Counsel submits that the dispute regarding the right and interest of the parties has already been settled in the earlier suit and the delivery of possess­ion of the suit land had also been made to the plaintiffs in execu­tion of the decree which had become final after being appealed aga­inst upto the High Court. The plaintiffs had to file the suit for mandatory injunction only because the defendants, after the delivery of possession was complete and the perpetual injunction had been duly served, violated the same and trespassed into the suit land. 16. Mr. B. K. Goswami, learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, submits that the suit of the plaintiffs for mand­atory injunction under section 39 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 was not maintainable. 16. Mr. B. K. Goswami, learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, submits that the suit of the plaintiffs for mand­atory injunction under section 39 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 was not maintainable. His submission is that if the decree in the earlier suit was executed and the possession of the land was delivered to the plaintiffs and perpetual injunction served on the defendants, there was nothing more to be done. If the defendants violated the injun­ction, the plaintiffs had remedy under order 39 rule 2A. According to him, the suit is hit by the bar created by section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code read with order 21 rule 32. The further submission of the counsel is that whatever right the plaintiffs had over the suit land got extinguished on the death of their mother as the land in question was annual patta land which is not heritable. 17. IB reply, Mr. Baraah, learned counsel for the appellants submits that the suit is only for getting relief awarded earlier by issue of mandatory injunctioa. His further submission is that if the defendants subsequent to the decree in the earlier suit and execut­ion thereof had acquired any title over the suit land, they may seek remedy by filing a separate suit. That does not in any way entitle them to violate the perpetual injunction and forcibly occupy the land possession of which had been delivered to the plaintiffs in exe­cution of the decree of the Court. So far as O. 21 R. 32, and sect­ion 47 of the C. P. C. is concerned, the submission is that these provisions have no application to the facts of the present case. 18. I have carefully considered the rival submissions. Two points emerge for consideration. One is what is the position of the plaintiffs on the death of their mother in respect of the annual patta land held by her, vis-a-vis, third parties or encroachers. The second point that would arise for consideration is whether in the case of the present nature mandatory injunction can be granted under section 39 of the Specific Relief Act. 19. I shall deal with the point relating to the position of successors of patta holder of annual patta land first. The second point that would arise for consideration is whether in the case of the present nature mandatory injunction can be granted under section 39 of the Specific Relief Act. 19. I shall deal with the point relating to the position of successors of patta holder of annual patta land first. An annual lease has been defined in rule 1(c) of the Settlement Rules framed under the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation as follows : "1(c) An Annual Lease means a lease granted for one year only and confers no right in the soil beyond a right of user for the year for which it is given. It confers no right of inheritance beyond the year of issue. It confers no right of transfer or of sub-letting and shall be liable to cancellation for any transfer of sub-letting even during the year of issue : Provided that the State Government may waive their right to cancel an annual lease and may allow its renewal auto­matically till such time as the State Government may direct in those cases in which the land is mortgaged to Government or to a State-sponsord Co-operative Society." 20. The position of a transferee of annual patta land was considered by a Division Bench of this Court in Jainur Alt vs. Mt. Chafina Bibi, AIR 1951 Assam 20 where it was held by Thadani, C. J. : "It is clear that R. 1(c) does not prohibit transfer of annual pattas. Indeed, it permits transfers but transfers are limited in their duration to the period covered by the annual patta. The correct interpretation, in our view, of S. 11 and R. 1(c) framed under the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation is that when an annual patta holder purports to transfer his ownership in such land for consideration, the transferee takes good title to the property subject only to the paramount title of the Government, that is to say, if the Government so chooses it may, at the expiry of the period of the annual patta, refuse to grant an annual patta to the transferee. That however, is a matter between the Government and the trans­feree and not a matter between a transferor and a transferee." In Maheswar Talukdar vs. Bhupendra Kalita, AIR 1953 Assam 90, it was held : "…the law does not surely recognise a transfer by an annual patta-holder as binding but where there has been a 'de facto' transfer and some body has come into possession by virtue of such a transfer, the possession of the transferee is undoubtedly legal possession and that should be taken into account while the Sub-Deputy Collector has to come to a finding as to 'bonafide' possession......" Reference may be made to a decision of this Court in Bahuna Deka vs. Srikanta Deka, 1949 ILR 1 Assam 382. In that case the Court was called upon to determine the position of the successor in interest of the pattadar of an annual patta land and to persons not related to the deceased but living in his house. It was held by Lodge C. J. (at pp. 384-85): "As between a person living in the house with no relation­ship with the deceased annual pattadar and another person who was the successor in interest of the annual pattadar, it seems to me that the successor in interest is the person to be preferred." All these decisions were discussed in Safatun Nessa vs. Gitarani Kundu, (1987) 2 GLR 64. Referring to the decision of Jainur Ali (supra) it was held : "The ratio of the judgment speaks that the annual lease holder can only transfer the right to use the land and that transfer is valid. But the validity of the transfer shall con­tinue till the annual lease is not cancelled or converted into a periodic one either in the name of annual lease holder or in the name of somebody else.'' Reference may be also made to a latest decision of this Court in Pradip Chandra Borah vs. Assam Board of Revenue, (1990) I GLR (NOC) 1 where the Court took judicial notice of the preva­lent practice of transfer of possessory right over the annual patta lands and observed : "It is common knowledge in this part of the country that possessory right over annual patta lands is disposed of. Such a purchaser can enjoy that right even if the' land be covered by annual patta. Such a purchaser can enjoy that right even if the' land be covered by annual patta. Se, it cannot be said that no body would like to purchase annual patta land." 21. From the aforesaid decisions it is clear that the limited right of user or the possessory right of the patta holdor in annual patta and can be transferred and such transfers are valid between the parties. It will only be subject to the paramount title of the State. The right acquired by the transferee would expire with the expiry of the lease in favour of the transferor. So far as the possession -of the successors of the deceased pattadar of annual patta land is concerned, the settled legal position appears to be that on the death of an annual pattadar, his successor in interest has to be preferred as against strangers or persons not related to him. This view also gets support from the definition of annual lease given in Rule 1 (c) of the Settlement Rules, more particularly the proviso thereto which refers to "mortgage of annual patta land to the State Government or to a sponsored Co-operative Society." From this provision, it is clear that the limited right of user can be transferred by the annual patta-holder as otherwise question of mortgage thereof would never arise. 22. It is equally well-settled that an annual patta, until it is cancelled or notice of non-renewal is given to the patta holder by the authorities concerned, confers good title upon the person whom the patta is issued. That being so, the limited rights of user acquired by a transferee (or successors of patta holders) would also continue until the cancellation of the annual patta in favour of the transf­eror. The possession of the transferee would be good as against the transferor and all other persons except the State which has the paramount title over the land. 23. It is also well accepted general proposition of law that if any person gets any right on the basis of events subsequent to the decree of the court, he may enforce the same by filing a suit. He cannot, on the basis of such assumed right, disobey the decree of the Court of violate the same. 24. 23. It is also well accepted general proposition of law that if any person gets any right on the basis of events subsequent to the decree of the court, he may enforce the same by filing a suit. He cannot, on the basis of such assumed right, disobey the decree of the Court of violate the same. 24. On consideration of the facts of the present case in the light of the principles emerging from the foregoing discussion, I am of the opinion that the first appellate court was not correct in holding that the plaintiffs-appellants lost their right and interest in the suit land on the death of their mother in whose name the annual patta in respect thereof stood. Besides, the respondents had no right or title in the suit land. Admittedly, the plaintiffs-appellants were the successors in interest of their mother who was the annual patta holder. The earlier suit filed by their mother had been decreed in her favour and delivery of possession of the suit land had been given to them;' in execution of the decree as their mother had died in the meantime. There is enough evidence on record to prove delivery of possession. The respondents were also restrained by issue of perpetual injunction not to disturb the possession of the plaintiffs - appellants. Under the circumstances, the respondents had no legal justification to dispossess the appellants from the said land in violation of perpetual injunction. Even if the respondents got any right on the basis of events subse­quent to the decree of the court, the only course open to them was to enforce their right by a suit which they did not do. It is, the­refore, a clear case of acting in contravention of the perpetual injunction. 25. Therefore, the next question that arises for consideration is whether mandatory injunction can be granted under section 39 of the Specific Relief Act in such circumstances. Section 39 of the Sp­ecific Relief Act reads as follows : " 39. Mandatory injunction.- When, to prevent the breach of" an obligation, it is necessary to compel the performance of certain acts which the Court is capable of enforcing, the Co­urt may in its discretion grant injunction to prevent the br­each complained of, and also to compel performance of the requisite acts. '' 26. Mandatory injunction.- When, to prevent the breach of" an obligation, it is necessary to compel the performance of certain acts which the Court is capable of enforcing, the Co­urt may in its discretion grant injunction to prevent the br­each complained of, and also to compel performance of the requisite acts. '' 26. The facts of the case and the reliefs sought for in the instant case may be scrutinized in the light of the requirements of section 39 set out above. The suit which has given rise to this app­eal is only for getting relief awarded in the earlier suit. This is in fact a suit for possession though couched in terms of a suit for mandatory injunction. The earlier suit of the plaintiffs was decreed in their favour and recovery of possession from the defendants was ordered. Perpetual injunction was also granted directing the defenda­nts not to disturb the possession of the plaintiffs. The decree was executed and delivery of possession was given to the plaintiffs. The perpetual injunction was also duly served on the defendants. The defenants, thus had an obligation not to disturb the possession of the plaintiffs. The defendans, however, committed a breach of the said obligation. The court, under such circumstances has definitely the power to grant mandatory injunction under section 39 of the Specific Relief Act. The existence of a remedy under Order 39 Rule 2A of the Civil Procedure Code, in my opinion, does not stand on the way of a party approaching the court for a mandatory injunction. Order 39 Rule 9A, which deals with the consequence of disobedience or breach of injunction, provides for penalty for disobedience. The property of the person guilty of such a disobedience may be attached and such person may also be detained in civil prison for a period upto three months ; but under this provision the court cannot give any immediate relief to the party aggrieved by the breach of the injunction, ("here are cases where the courts have invoked their in­herent power in case of violation of interim injunction and granted temporary mandatory injunction. Reference may be made, in this connection, to a decision of the Calcutta High Court in Sujit Pal v. Prabir Kumar Sen, AIR 1986 Calcutta 220 wherein a suit filed by the plaintiff for declaration of his tenancy and for a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the possession of the premises, an interim injunction was granted restraining the defe­ndants from interfering with the possession of the plaintiff. The defendan­ts forcibly dispossessed the plaintiff and took possession thereof in utter violation of the interim injunction. The Calcutta High Court took the view that if the opposite party is asked to pursue the remedy under Order 39 Rule 2A it will be doing a great injustice to him inasmuch as under the said provision the court cannot grant imme­diate relief to the opposite party. It was held that in a case like this where "restoring things to their former condition is the only remedy", the court has to take steps for the purpose in exercise of its inherent power. In view of these findings, it was held that the lower court was justified in passing the order of mandatory injunction under section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code by directing the police to restore possession to the opposite party of the room in question. Reference may also be made to the decisions of the Rajasthan High Court in Manga vs. Rust am, AIR 1963 Raj. 3 and Allahabad High Court in Hari Nandan vs. S.N. Pandita, AIR 1975 All. 48 . The Allahabad High Court in Hari Nandan (supra) held that when a party had been dispossessed in disobedience of the order of in junction, the Court can in exercise of its inherent power pass such order for ends of justice as would undo the wrong done to the aggrieved party. 27. Relief in exercise of inherent powers was also granted by the Supreme Court in Manchar lal vs. Seth Hiralal, AIR 1962 SC 527 . 27. Relief in exercise of inherent powers was also granted by the Supreme Court in Manchar lal vs. Seth Hiralal, AIR 1962 SC 527 . Speaking for the majority, Raghubar Dayal, J. observed (at p. 532) : "It is well-settled that the provisions of the Code are not exhaustive, for the simple reason that the Legislature is inca­pable of contemplating all the possible circumstances which may arise in future litigation and consequently for providing the procedure for them." Referring to the language of section 151 of the Code, it was observed (at p. 533) : "The section itself says that nothing in the Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect that inherent power of the Court to make orders necessary for the ends of justice. In the face of such a clear statement, it is not possible to hold that the provisions of the Code control the inherent power by limiting it or otherwise affecting it. The inherent power has not been conferred upon the Court ; it is a power inherent in the Court by virtue of its duty to do justice between the parties before it." It was further observed : "When the Code itself recognises the existence of the inhe­rent power of the Court, there is no question of implying any powers outside the limits of the Code." The following note of caution in regard to exercise of inherent powers by the Courts was also given (at p. 534) : "The inherent powers are to be exercised by the Court in very exceptional circumstances, for which the Code lays down no procedure." Reference may also be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in Sant lal Jain vs. Avtar Singh, AIR 1985 SC 857 . It was a case arising out of a suit for mandatory injunction. It was observed (at p. 860) : "The suit is in effect one for possession though couched in the form of a suit for mandatory injunction as what would be given to the plaintiff in case he succeeds is possession of the property to which he may be found to be entitled. It was observed (at p. 860) : "The suit is in effect one for possession though couched in the form of a suit for mandatory injunction as what would be given to the plaintiff in case he succeeds is possession of the property to which he may be found to be entitled. There­fore, we are of the opinion that the appellant should not be denied relief merely because he had couched the plaint in the form of a suit for mandatory injunction." It was further observed that though the relief of mandatory injunction is discretionary and may be denied by the court in case of delay, attempt should be made to avoid multiplicity of suits and the plaintiff should not be driven to file another round of suit with all the attendant delay, trouble and expense. In that view of the matter it was held that the appellant, who was a licensor, was entitled to recover possession of the property from the licensee. 28. Applying the principles laid down in the aforesaid decisions to the facts of the present case, I am of the opinion that it is one of those oases where relief by way of mandatory injunction is the only suitable remedy. The appellants cannot get due relief by resorting to Order 39 Rule 2A. They went through one round of litigation to establish their right and title over the land and to get possession thereof. They succeeded in all the courts, and got the decree which was also duly executed. But, thereafter, they were again dispossessed in violation of the perpetual injunction by the same persons against whom the decree had been obtained earlier. Under these circumstances, no other order except a mandatory injunction can undo the breach of obligation committed by the defendants and give due relief to the plaintiffs. That being so no technicality should be allowed to come on the way of the court in doing justice. Relief should, therefore, be granted under section 39 of the Specific Relief Act which specifically provides for issue of such injunction to prevent the breach of an obligation or to compel the performance of certain acts which the Court is capable of enforcing. Relief should, therefore, be granted under section 39 of the Specific Relief Act which specifically provides for issue of such injunction to prevent the breach of an obligation or to compel the performance of certain acts which the Court is capable of enforcing. Under the facts and circumstances of the case, I am therefore of the clear opinion that neither Order 39 Rule 2A of Order 21 Rule 32 or section 47 would operate as a bar to the exercise of power of the Court under section 39 of the Specific Relief Act to grant a mandatory injunction. 29. In view of the foregoing discussions, I am of the opinion that the trial Court was justified in granting mandatory injunction to the plaintiffs. The first appellate Court was not right in rever­sing the same. I, therefore, set aside the judgment and decree of the first appellate Court and restore that of the trial Court. 30. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The respondents shall pay the cost to the appellants.