JUDGMENT M.P. Konia, J. - This case was called out twice and even after the list was revised, it was kept back. After waiting for considerable time, however, nobody has chosen to remain present on behalf of respondents Nos. 3 and 4. Standing Counsel was present on behalf of respondents Nos. 1 and 2, and so was Counsel for the petitioner. 2. The petitioner M/s. East India Rubber Works Private Limited had employed Devi Kant Jha, Respondent No. 3 in the concerned and it appears that Sri Jha tendered his resignation on the 23rd of February, 1980, doing so in writing. This resignation was accepted on the 29th of February, 1980. This case followed by a reference under Section 4-K read with Section 2-N of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, for adjudication of an industrial dispute between the employers and the individual workmen, the third respondent. 3. It is during the pendency of this dispute, which came to be numbered as adjudication No. 4 of 1982, before the Industrial Tribunal (III) U. P., that the Presiding Officer was pleased to pass an order on the 31st of May, 1982, copy whereof is enclosed herewith as Annexure 5' to the petition, inter alia, coming to the conclusion that the employers (petitioner herein) should lead evidence in the case about the resignation by the workman or whatever evidence the employer considered necessary to establish that the workman's services were not terminated improperly or illegally and it is, thereafter, that the workman will be required to produce his evidence. It is against this order that the petitioner has approached this Court to seek, inter alia, a writ of certiorari quashing the aforesaid order. 4. One has only to go through the text on the order, Annexure 5 to the petition, to realise that the learned Presiding Officer has taken note of the fact that, in substance, it is an admitted position that the resignation in writing of the workman is with the employer. It is not the case of the workman that the resignation is a forgery or is fabricated. It is not the case of the workman that the resignation is a forgery or is fabricated. The workman admits the existence of the resignation but challenges its legality or its enforcibility against him on the ground that he was made to sign the resignation under duress and, therefore, the termination of the services as a consequence of the aforesaid resignation which he was made to sign under duress is not lawful and should be set aside. The factum of the signature on the resignation is not under any dispute. It seems to me to be elementary that the worker who admits that his signature is affixed on the resignation but alleges that it was so done under duress, must lead evidence in support oi his plea or fail, obviously in a case of this nature, the employer cannot be required to produce his evidence first. The written resignation is not disputed. It is because of a set of circumstances alleged by the worker petitioner under which according to him the aforesaid written resignation was extracted out of him that he claims that this resignation should not be held binding upon him and his services should not be permitted to be termined as a consequence thereof. If this evidence is not led the worker's plea must fail. It is difficult to understand as to on what basis the learned Presiding Officer has pursuaded himself to take the view requiring the employers to produce their evidence first. 5. Mr. J. N. Tewari, learned Counsel for the petitioners cited the decisions of this Court in the case of Airteck Private Limited v. The State of U. P. and others, reported in 1984 (49) FLR 38, and the decision of a Division Bench of this Court (the judgment being delivered by Mr. Justice K. N. Singh, as he then was) in the case of V. K. Raj Industries v. Labour Court, reported in 1981 (43) FLR 194, in support of his case that the order impugned is illegal and the procedure sought to be followed by the learned Presiding Officer is entirely erroneous and wrong. It is not necessary to go into details of the aforesaid decided cases as to my mind the above discussion itself should suffice for the conclusion that the order dated 31st of May, 1982, is gressly erroneous and deserves to be set aside. 6. It is not necessary to go into details of the aforesaid decided cases as to my mind the above discussion itself should suffice for the conclusion that the order dated 31st of May, 1982, is gressly erroneous and deserves to be set aside. 6. In the circumstances, the petition is allowed in terms of prayers (a) thereof and the order passed on 31st of May, 1982, by the Presiding Officer in adjudication Mo. 4/82 before the Industrial Tribunal (III), U.P., Kanpur is set aside and reversed and the said Presiding Officer is directed to proceed further which the reference on the basis of the observations herein contained. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.