M. R. MALLICK, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioners who are the defendants in the Title Suit No. 61/84 pending in the Court of Asst. District Judge, 1st Court Alipore, 24-Pgs. (South) has moved this Revision Application u/s. 115 of Code of Civil Procedure challenging the order of amendment passed by the Ld. Trial Judge allowing the plaintiff/opposite party's application for amendment of the plaint. ( 2 ) FACTS which are necessary for disposal of this amendment petition, may be stated as follows :-the plaintiff-opposite party filed the present suit for partition in April 1984 against the original defendant who is dead and now substituted on her by the present petitioners for partition of the suit property claiming that the suit property belonged to Mrs. Harnam Kaur and the opposite party and the original defendant being the two daughters of Harnam Kaur had inherited the said property into equal shares. ( 3 ) THE original defendant on entering appearance and filed written statement on 29th August, 1984 contesting the suit and claiming to be the exclusive owner of the suit property by virtue of a Deed of Gift executed and registered by Harnam Kaur on 29th August, 1984. ( 4 ) IN March, 1986 the present opposite party filed an application for amendment challenging the Deed of Gift and making some new allegations in the plaint. The same was allowed by the Ld. Trial Judge on April 10 1987. The original defendant moved a Revision Application before this Court and during the pendency of the said application the opposite party prayed for withdrawl of the amendment application and the same was allowed by the Division Bench of this Court with the direction that this would not prevent the plaintiff/opposite party from making a fresh application for amendment. Thereafter, on 2nd December, 1987 the present application amendment has been filed in the meantime the original defendant died on February 24, 1988 and she has been substituting by the present petitioners. Thereafter on 11th September, 1990 Order no. 70 the Ld. Trial Judge allowed the opposite party's application for amendment. Being aggrieved the Petitioners have moved this Court in revision. Thereafter on 11th September, 1990 Order no. 70 the Ld. Trial Judge allowed the opposite party's application for amendment. Being aggrieved the Petitioners have moved this Court in revision. ( 5 ) ON behalf of the petitioners two points have been raised, namely - that first part of the amendment namely in which the plaintiff seeks to make out a new and inconsistent case that it is the father of the plaintiff/ opposite party who is the real owner of the property and that he has purchased the property with his own money and in the name of his wife, Harnam Kaur is clearly barred u/s. 4 (1) of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 could not have been allowed by the Ld. Judge. Secondly, that portion of the amendment by which the Deed of Gift is challenged as vitiated by fraud and misrepresentation and a relief of declaration that the said Deed of Gift is void having been filed on December 2, 1987 that is more than three years after the original defendant filed written statement on 29th August, 1984 the amendment seeking the relief is a relief which has already been barred by limitation and the present petitioners' interest will now be affected if the opposite party is allowed to make such a new case and to seek a new relief which by efflux of time has become barred by limitation. ( 6 ) THE Revision petition is contested by the plaintiff/opposite party by filing an affidavit-in-Opposition. It is contended that section 4 of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 is not attracted to the amendment sought for in para 31 (a) of the plaint and as regards the relief for declaration that the Deed of Gift is void and the allegations that have been made in paragraphs 10 (a), 10 (b) and 10 (c) to the plaint it is contended that the present opposite party filed the application for amendment well within the period of limitation and as there was some formal defect, the same was withdrawn and as the Division Bench of this Court gave liberty to the present opposite party to file a fresh petition for amendment that was done in December, 1987 immediately after the matter was disposed of by the Division Bench and as such a claim cannot be treated to be barred by limitation. ( 7 ) WE find from the petition for amendment filed by the opposite party that it had two distinct parts. In the first part of the amendment a new and inconsistent case was sought to be made out that it was not Harnam Kaur but her husband who was the real owner of the property and Harnam Kaur was the benamdar. ( 8 ) IN order to do that paragraph 3 (a) has been sought to be inserted by which it is specifically alleged that the father of the plaintiff/opposite party purchased the property with his own money in the name of his wife, Harnam Kaur. The plaintiff, therefore, traces her the to the property through her father. But the Sale Deed was admittedly in the name of Harnam Kaur. Therefore, the plaintiff had to allege in paragraph 3 (a) a case that her father was a real owner and her mother was the Benamdar even though the property stood in her name. But section 4 of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 clearly states that no suit to enforce any right in respect of any property held Benami against the persons in whose name the property is held or against any other person shall lie by or on behalf of a person claiming to be the real owner of such property. The present opposite party is a person who has filed a suit on behalf of a person claiming to be the real owner of the property alleging to be one of his heirs. Therefore, suit or claim on the plea that Mrs. Harnam Kaur is his father's Benamdar, is clearly prohibited by section 4. It is true that when the suit was filed or even when the petition for amendment was filed the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 did not come into force but when the amendment petition was considered by the Ld. Trial Judge the above Act came into force. But, the Supreme Court in AIR 1989 SC 1247 has clearly held that the prohibition of section 4 would attract a suit or proceeding pending in a Court on the date when the Act came into force. Therefore this amendment, cannot be allowed in a pending suit filed on behalf of the alleged real owner against the defendants who are tracing the title through the mother, the alleged Benamdar. Therefore this amendment, cannot be allowed in a pending suit filed on behalf of the alleged real owner against the defendants who are tracing the title through the mother, the alleged Benamdar. ( 9 ) ON behalf of the opposite party my attention has been drawn to a Division Bench Judgement reported in 19831 (1) CLJ 163 in which the Division Bench presided over by Anil Kumar Sen, J. while interpreting the provision of section 281a of the Income Tax Act has observed that such a suit by the legal representatives of the person claiming to be the real owner will not attract section 281a of the Income Tax. ( 10 ) ON considering the above decision of the Division Bench we are of the view that section 281a did not prohibit the Benami transaction absolutely nor did it constitute any absolute bar against filing a suit by the real owner against the Benamdar claiming to be the real owner. Such real owner had to fulfil certain conditions before filing such a suit. In the context of the above provision of the Act that the Division Bench have observed that the legal representatives of the alleged real owner can maintain a suit and in such case u/s. 281a of the Income Tax Act will not be attracted. But when section 4 clearly prohibits a suit by the real owner or by anybody on behalf of real owner including his legal representatives to file a suit claiming his predecessors-in-interest to be the real owner and the predecessors-in-interest of the defendants to be the Benamdar then in our view the amendment as sought for in paragraph 3 (a) could not have been allowed by the Ld. Trial Judge as the plaintiff cannot make out such a case because making out such a case is clearly prohibited by section 4 of the Benamdar Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988. Mr. Banerjee has drawn my attention to section 3 of the Act where it has been stated that this Act will not apply when a person purchased the property for the benefit of his wife or minor daughter. But the plaintiff has not made out the case in paragraph 3 (a) that her father purchased the property for the benefit of her mother. Therefore, section 3 of the Act will not come to the opposite party's rescue in this respect. But the plaintiff has not made out the case in paragraph 3 (a) that her father purchased the property for the benefit of her mother. Therefore, section 3 of the Act will not come to the opposite party's rescue in this respect. ( 11 ) SO far as the amendment in paragraphs 10 (a), 10 (b) and 10 (c) as well as the amendment in the prayer portion of the plaint in which for the first time a declaration that the Deed of Gift in question is invalid and void is sought for, the contention of the petitioner is that such a relief has been barred by limitation as the opposite party came to know of the Deed of Gift when the written statement was filed by the original defendant on 29th August, 1984 and the amendment was filed on 2nd December, 1987 more than three years of the date on which the plaintiff admittedly came to know about the Deed of Gift. ( 12 ) IT is true that the amendment seeking a relief which has become barred by limitation should not be allowed because in the meantime by efflux of time the defendant has acquired a valuable right and if such an amendment is allowed, the defendant will be adversely affected. ( 13 ) EVEN though the general rule is that the amendment seeking anew relief which has by efflux of time become barred by limitation is not to be allowed generally but there are series of decisions of Supreme Court as well as our High Court in which the view has been expressed that even though the relief sought for by amendment has become barred by limitation in suitable exceptional circumstances the same can be allowed. ( 14 ) IN AIR 1957 SC 363 P. M. Patil v. K. S. Patil, the Supreme Court has held that the amendment taking away fight accrued to a party by lapse of time cannot be allowed. But Supreme Court in several decisions thereafter has modified this principle. In Shanti Kumar v. Insurance Co. , New York, AIR 1974 SC 1719 , (1984) 3 SCC 352 , Vineet Kumar v. M. S. Wadhera, AIR 1969 SC 1267 , Monoharlal v. N. B. M. Supply, the Supreme Court have clearly held that in exceptional cases even amendment relief for which is barred by limitation can be allowed. In Shanti Kumar v. Insurance Co. , New York, AIR 1974 SC 1719 , (1984) 3 SCC 352 , Vineet Kumar v. M. S. Wadhera, AIR 1969 SC 1267 , Monoharlal v. N. B. M. Supply, the Supreme Court have clearly held that in exceptional cases even amendment relief for which is barred by limitation can be allowed. In the High Court also in AIR 1979 Cal. 12 Chandi Charan v. Mahendra Nath, AIR 1968 Cal, 213, Bisewsar v. Jogeshwar and 60 CWN P. 840, Panchubala v. Nikhil have also observed that the amendment may be allowed even that the relief may have been barred by limitation when the application for amendment is filed. ( 15 ) HOWEVER, in this case we find that original petition for amendment seeking such relief was made in 1986 well within the period of limitation. As there was some formal defect, it was withdrawn and the Division Bench gave the opposite party liberty to file a fresh application for amendment and thereafter this application for amendment has been filed. Therefore, in such circumstance in order that the dispute between the parties will be finally resolved, the amendment of paragraphs 10 (a), 10 (b) and 10 (c) to the plaint as well as the prayer portion (ai) has rightly been allowed by the learned Trial Judge and we are not inclined to interfere that part of the order of the learned Trial Judge allowing the amendment of paragraphs 10 (a), 10 (b) and 10 (c) and prayer portion (ia) of the plaint. But the learned Trial Judge was not justified in allowing the amendment to paragraph 3 (a) to the plaint. as well as some consequential amendments in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 7 of the schedule to the amendment petition. The said portion of the amendment petition should be rejected in view of our findings in the above. ( 16 ) THE revision petition is therefore allowed in part. The application for amendment is allowed in part save and except the amendment as per the schedule of the amendment being paras 10 (a), 10 (b) and 10 (c) an the prayer portion of the plaint bring para (ai) all other amendments as per the schedule of the petition of the amendment are disallowed. The application for amendment is allowed in part save and except the amendment as per the schedule of the amendment being paras 10 (a), 10 (b) and 10 (c) an the prayer portion of the plaint bring para (ai) all other amendments as per the schedule of the petition of the amendment are disallowed. The prayer for deleting paragraph 7 and the renumbering of the subsequent paragraphs is also rejected and as a result the amendment of the paragraph 10 (a), 10 (b) and 10 (c) shall be treated as the amendment of the paragraphs 11 (a), 11 (a) and 11 (a) of the original plaint. The learned Trial Judge, therefore, shall direct the amendment to be made in the original plaint in terms of the order passed by this Court and the present opposite party shall submit before the learned Trial Judge a fresh amended plaint in terms of the order passed by this Court. In the circumstances no order for cost is passed. ( 17 ) THE present petitioner shall file addl. written statement against the amendment allowed by this Court within a period of four weeks from the date of communication of this order. M. N. Roy, J.- I agree. Appeal allowed.