JUDGMENT S.B. Sinha, J. This application is directed against an order dated 12.9.1990 passed by the 3rd Subordinate Judge. Chaibasa in Title Suit No. 10 of 1982, whereby and whereunder the .aid learned court allowed an application for amendment. of plaint filed by the plaintiffs-opposite parties. 2. The fact of the matter lies in a very narrow compass. 3. The plaintiffs filed the aforementioned suit inter alia, for a decree of declaration in relation to their right, title and interest over the suit plot and a decree for permanent injunction against the defendant from transferring the suit plot in any manner to anybody. 4. According to the plaintiffs, the land in suit was purchased by a deed of sale dated 21.10.1938 by Ratneswar Roy in the name of benami of the mother of the defendant. 5. According to the plaintiffs, the said benamdar had never been in possession of the lands in question. 6. On the other hand, the calc of the petitioner was that his mother was the real owner of the property and not a benamdar of the said Ratneshwar Roy. 7. It was contended by the defendant that Ratheshwar Roy and consequently the plaintiffs were in inpermissive possession of the property in suit and the right, title and interest as also the legal possession thereof bad all along been with his mother and after her death be has been in possession. 8. On 5.12.1990, an application was filed by the petitioner praying therein that the suit instituted by the plaintiffs be dismissed, in view of the provision of Benami Transactions (prohibition of the right to recover Property) Act. 1988 (hereinafter caned as the Act). 9. On 19.4.1989, the opposite parties filed an application for amendment of plaint praying therein that they be allowed leave to amend the plaint contending inter alia, therein that as they had been in possession of the property in suit openly, continuously and within the knowledge of the defendant as adverse to his interest, the plaintiffs had perfected their right, title and interest by adverse porsession, even if it be held that the defendant had legal title in relation to the property in suit. 10. By reason of the impugned order, the learned court below, as noticed hereinbefore, has allowed the said application. 11. Mr. 10. By reason of the impugned order, the learned court below, as noticed hereinbefore, has allowed the said application. 11. Mr. P.K. Sihna, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submitted that a claim of right titls and interest in a property by adverse possession is ant thesis of a claim of lawful title by the plaintiffs at originally claimed by them in the suit. 12. The learned counsel contended that by reason of the amendment of the plaint, the plaintiffs hive altered the nature and character of the suit which is imeprssible. The learned counsel, in this connection has strongly relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in A.K. Gupta & Sons Ltd. vs. Damodar valley Corporation (AIR 1967 S.C., page 96). 13. It was further submitted by the learned counsel that even such a subsequent event could not have been permitted to be brought on records under Order 7 Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In this connection, the learned counsel has relied upon in Frem Raj vs. The D.L.F. Housing & Construction (Pvt.) Ltd. and another (AIR 1968 S.C. page-1355). 14. Mr. S.C. Chhatopadhyay, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the opposites parties submitted that plea put forth by the plaintiff by way of the amendment of the plaint is alternative in nuture and bat been taken in view of coming into force of the said Act. 15. The learned counsel further submitted that it is not correct to contend that a plea of adverse possession can not co-exist with the plea of title Claimed by the plaintiffs. The learned counsel, in this connection, has relied upon in S.M. Karim Vs. Mst Bibi Sakina AIR 1964 S.C., 1254) Appa Trimbak Deshpnde and anr. vs. Waman Govind Despande and others (AIR 1941 P.C. 85), Mottu Bhimudu vs. Guggirala Pitchayya AIR 1946 Madras 497), Gulwant Kaur vs. Mahinder Singh and ors, AIR 1972 Punjab and Haryana 260), and in Nair Service Society Ltd. vs. K.C. Alexander and ors. ( AIR 1968 S.C. 1165 ). 16. Prior to coming into force of the said Act, the benamai transactions were recognised in India. Some Statutes, e.g., Section 66 of the Civil Procedure Code, however, prohibited filing of a suit of recovery of property on the ground that the same had been acquired in benami. 17. ( AIR 1968 S.C. 1165 ). 16. Prior to coming into force of the said Act, the benamai transactions were recognised in India. Some Statutes, e.g., Section 66 of the Civil Procedure Code, however, prohibited filing of a suit of recovery of property on the ground that the same had been acquired in benami. 17. In Mithlesh Kumari and another vs. Prem Behari Khare (AIR 1989 S.C. Page 1247), the Supreme Court held that the said Act, is retro active in operation and the coming into force thereof being a subsequent event, the same can be taken note of in a pending suit and/or appeal and in view of the provisions contained therein, a suit coming within the purview thereof must be held to be not maintainable. 18. ‘Benami transaction' has been defined in Section 2(a) of the Act, as meaning any transaction in which property ill transferred to one person for a consideration paid or provided by any other persons. Section 3 of the said Act, prohibits benami transaction. Section 4 prohibits the right to recover the property held benami. 19. The Supreme Court in Mithilesh Kumari's case (supra) held that once the property is found to be held benami, no such claim or action to enforce any right in respect thereof shall lie. It further held : "When the law nullified the defences available to the real owner in recovering the benami property from the benamidar the law must apply irrespective of the time of the benami transactions" 20. The question which however arises for consideration is as to whether the plea of the plaintiffs to the effect that he is the real owner in respect of the suit property is inconsistent with the plea that in the event if it be held that he is not the real owner thereof, has acquired title by adverse possession. In Appa Trimbak Deshpande and anr. Vs. waman Govind Deshpande and ors. (AIR 1941 P.C., 85), the Privy, Council was considered the effect of its decision in Bhimabai Jivandouda Patil and anr, Vs. Gurunathgouda Khandappagouda Palil (AIR 1933 P.C.1), wherein two long standing decision of the Bombay High Court relating to the power of widow to adopt a son unless the expressly forbidden by husband came for consideration and it was held that her husband died undivided and that she had not obtained the consent of his surviving coparceners. Gurunathgouda Khandappagouda Palil (AIR 1933 P.C.1), wherein two long standing decision of the Bombay High Court relating to the power of widow to adopt a son unless the expressly forbidden by husband came for consideration and it was held that her husband died undivided and that she had not obtained the consent of his surviving coparceners. In view of the alteration in the case law proceeded to decide the question of adverse possession as to whether in such a situation the defendant had been in possession of the property in suit adverse to the interest of the plaintiffs. 21. In S.M. Karim Vs. Mst. Bibi Sakina ( AIR 1964 S.C. 1254 ) the Supreme Court was considering a case under Section 66 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In that case, having held that the suit was barred under Section 66 of the Code, the Supreme Court considered the plea of adverse possesion on merits, but in the facts of that case held that such a plea of adverse possession can not he entertained. It further held : "As an alternative, it was contended before us that the title of Hakir Alam was extinguished by long and uninterrupted adverse possession of Syed Aulad Ali and after him of the plaintiff. The High Court did not accept this case. Such s case is, of course, open to a plaintiff to make if his posession is disturbed. If the possession of the real owner ripens into title under the Limitation Act, and be is dispossessed, he can sue to obtain possession, for he does not rely on the benami nature of the transaction. But the alternative claim must be clearly made and proved." 22. In Mettu Bhimudu Vs. Duggirala Pitchayya (AIR 1946 Madras. 497), it was held that when necessity for amendment of plaint arises out of the circumstances which happened after filling of the suit, certain subsequent events which may be necessary in the changed circumstances but which does not alter the fundamental character of the suit, amendment of plaint should he allowed. The Madras High Court further held that: "The statutory test, therefore, is whether the alteration of the pleadings or amendment thereof that is asked for is just or whether it is necessary for the purpose of determining the real question in controversy between the Party. The Madras High Court further held that: "The statutory test, therefore, is whether the alteration of the pleadings or amendment thereof that is asked for is just or whether it is necessary for the purpose of determining the real question in controversy between the Party. Inter-poeting and applying this rule the Courts have applied from time to time various tests. While it is recognised that, in order to avid multiplicity of suits and to enable the final determination of all questions arising in the litigation, the rule should be administered in a fairly liberal manner, it has at the same time been emphatically laid down that under the guise of alteration or amendment of the pleadings, a party should not be allowed to substitute one cause of action for another or to change the subject matter." 23. In Sribhagwan Singh and ors. Vs. Rambasi Kuar and ors, (AIR 1957 Patna, 157), a Division Bench of this Court has held that a transferee having acquired title under an invalid transaction, and continuing in possession for more than twelve years, would be deemed to have acquired a perfectly good title to the property. 24. In Gulwant Kaur Vs. Mohinder Singh and ors. (AIR 1972 Punjab & Haryana, 260), a learned Single Judge held that when the defence under the original plea as also under the new plea sought to be introduced by the amendment being that the defendant is the owner of the property and is in possession of the same from a particular date to the exclusion of her husband, it cannot be said that there is any change in the front in defence on the part of the defendant. 25. In Nair Service Society Ltd. Vs. K.C. Alexander and ors., ( AIR 1968 S.C. 1165 ), the Supreme Court held that sometimes subsequent event taken into consideration an amendement should be allowed to shorten the litigation and avoid circuity of action. 26. From the decision aforementioned, there can not be any doubt that in a given case, the claim of title of the plaintiff in respect of the suit property or in the alternative the plea that he has acquired an indefeasible title thereof by prescription cannot be said to so inconsistent with each other that they can not stand together. 27. From the decision aforementioned, there can not be any doubt that in a given case, the claim of title of the plaintiff in respect of the suit property or in the alternative the plea that he has acquired an indefeasible title thereof by prescription cannot be said to so inconsistent with each other that they can not stand together. 27. Such a plea of adverse possession in certain circumstances may be held to be alternative to the plea of general title. 28. It is further well known that the question as to whether a person has acquired title in himself by prescription or not is a question of fact. Such a question has to be answered upon consideration of the evidences adduced by the parties to the case. 29. It is farther well known that an application for amendment of pleading should be allowed liberally. 30. In Jai Jai Ram Manohar Lal Vs. National Building Material Supply, Gurgaon ( AIR 1969 S.C. 1267 ), the Supreme Court held that : “Rules of procedure are intended to be a handmaid to the administration of justice. A party cannot be refused just relief merely because of some mistake, negligence, inadvertence or even infraction of the Rules of procedure. The Court always gives leave to amend the pleading of a Party, unless it is satisfied that the party applying was acting mala fide, or that by his blunder, he had coused injury to his opponent which may not be compensated for an order of costs.” 31. It is further well known that where provisions of law has come into being with retrospective effect, a Court should exercise its judicial discretion in allowing the amendment. Reference, in this connection may be made to Smt. Ashalata Dey and ors. vs. Kamal Kumar Bose (AIR 1980 Calcutta, 271). In Mihir Dutta Vs. Anadi Lal Mukherjee and on (A.I.R. 1980 Calcutta, 339), the Calcutta High Court relied upon the decision of Supreme Court in Shikharchand Jain Vs. Digamber Jain Prabhand Korini Sobha and Ors. (AIR 1974 S.C., 1178) and in Ishwardas vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh and ors., (AIR 1979 S,C. 551), hold that an application for amendment of pleading should be allowed in order to bring on the records subsequent events. 32. In Panchdeo Narain Srivastava Vs. km. Digamber Jain Prabhand Korini Sobha and Ors. (AIR 1974 S.C., 1178) and in Ishwardas vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh and ors., (AIR 1979 S,C. 551), hold that an application for amendment of pleading should be allowed in order to bring on the records subsequent events. 32. In Panchdeo Narain Srivastava Vs. km. Jyoti Sahay and another ( AIR 1983 S.C 462 ), the Supreme Court allowed an amendment, whereby and earlier admission was sought to be taken away. 33. The courts have also allowed amendment of the plaint even if the cause of action is barred under the law of limitation. (See-Pirgonda Hangonda Patil vs. Kalgonda Shidgonda Patil and ors. 1957 Supreme Court Reporter, 595: AIR 1957 S.C. 363 .) In Shikarchand Jain Vs. Digambar Jain reported in AIR 1974 S.C. page-1178, the Supreme Court allowed an amendment in the pleading in order to shorten litigation. 34. In A.K. Gupta and sons Ltd. Vs. Damodar Valley Corporation ( AIR 1967 S.C. 96 ). upon which strong reliance has been placed by Mr. P.K. Sinha, the Supreme Court bas merely reiterated the general rule that a party is not allowed by amendment to set up a new case or a new cause of action particularly when a suit In new cause of action was barred. 35. The Supreme Court, however held that the amendment sought for therein did not constitute alteration of a new cause of action and a different cause hut amounts merely to a different and additional approach to the same facts, the amendment has to be allowed even after the expiry of the statutory period of limitation. 36. The Supreme Court held : "The expression" cause of action" in the present contest does not mean "every fact which it is material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed" as was said in Cooke Vs. Gill (1873) 8 CP 107 (116), in a different context, for it were soma no material fact could ever be amended or added and, of course, no one would want to change or add an immaterial allegation by amendment. The expression for the prevent purpose only means, a new claim made on a new basis constituted by new facts." (Underlining is mine for emphasis). 37. In this case, the plaintiff, by reason of the amendment are not intending to bring new facts. The expression for the prevent purpose only means, a new claim made on a new basis constituted by new facts." (Underlining is mine for emphasis). 37. In this case, the plaintiff, by reason of the amendment are not intending to bring new facts. Even in the original plain, they had pleaded that they came in possession the suit properties in their own right. 38. As noticed here in before, the case of the difendant-petitioner was that the possession of the plaintiffs was permissive in nature. In that view of the matter, an issue with regard to the nature of possession of the plaintiffs would fall for determination in the suit. 39. In the event, if it be held that the plaintiffs have been exercising acts of possession over tile suit properties in their own right, it may be open to them to contend that they have acquired title by adverse possession, subject of course, to their proving necessary ingredients thereof. 40. In Mathura Prasad and ors. Vs. Badri Dass Chela Mahanth Bhagawan Dass and ors. (F.A. No. 272 of 1978) disposed of on 17th December, 1990, it was held that:- "So far as animus possidendi is concerned the same being an intention on the part of the person to possess adversely, such a fact can be proved by bringing evidence on records and by attending circumstances. Reference in this connection may be made to Abdur Rahman kha Vs. Ahmad Khan AIR 1939 oudh Page-427 B. Budoraj Vs. Bakarai Rai and ors.AIR 1943 Allahabad 31 : Machingal Pottal Vesttu & Thakko Vestti Seetha Naithyar Amma and ors. Vs. Machingal Putte Veetu Patinhars Veetil Karnwan Kalu Menon and ors. AIR 1939 Madras Page 564.” 41. In Prem Raj Vs. The D.L.F. Housing and Construction (Pvt.) Ltd, and anr. (AIR 1968 S.C., 1355. upon which strong reliance was also placed by Mr. P.K. Sinha, the Supreme Court in view of the Sections 35 and 37 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 held that there is no previsions therein that a plaintiff suing for racission of the agreement may sue in the alternative for specific performance It was held but such plea cannot be justified under Order 7 Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure as although under this provision it is competent for the plaintiff to pray for inconsistent reliefs, it must be shown that each of such pleas is maintainable. 42. 42. Before coming into the force of the said Act, suit based on the plea that the defendant's mother was their benamdar was maintainable. 43. Even in such a case, an alternative pleading of acquisition of title by adverse possession was permissible. 44. For the reasons aforementioned, there is no merit in this application, which is accordingly dismissed. However, in the facts anti circumstances of the case, there will be mo order as to costs. Application dismissed.