Padam Chand Goyal v. State of Uttar Pradesh — 1991 DIGILAW 1064 (ALL)

JUDGMENT : S.D. AGARWALA, J. 1. This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 2. The land in dispute is an area of 252 Sq. yards of open nazul land, situate in Phatak Suraj Bhan, Belanganj, Agra. This land is adjoining to the house of the petitioner Padam Chand Goyal as well as to Kanhaiya Lal, respondent No. 3. 3. On 19th November, 1946, the Collector, Agra, granted a lease of the land is dispute in favour of Kanhaiya Lal, who was then a minor along with his mother Smt. Angoori Devi, wife of Munni Lal Vaish, the father of the respondent No. 3, for a period of thirty years with effect from 15th May, 1946. A lease deed was, thereafter, executed in favour of the respondent No. 3 and Smt. Angoori Devi. 4. A dispute in regard to the land arose after the lease expired on 15th May, 1976. Initialy, Kanhaiya Lal applied for renewal of the lease. By an order dated 20th May, 1978, the Collector, Agra, ordered renewal of the lease in favour of Kanhaiya Lal, but before the lease deed could be executed and registered an application was made by the petitioner Padam Chand Goyal objecting to the grant of the lease in favour of Kanhaiya Lal and on 27th August, 1980, he also made an application before the Collector. Agra, not only for cancellation of the order granting lease in favour of Kanhaiya Lal, but also seeking renewal of the lease of the land in his favour. 5. It appears, thereafter the Collector Agra, get a report from the Administrator, Nagar Mahapalika, Agra, in regard to the land in dispute After examining the relevant facts and the recommendations made by the Administrator. Nagar Mahapalika, Agra, the Collector, Agra by his order dated 8th December, 1980, cancelled his previous order dated 20th May, 1978, and further directed that the lease of the land is dispute shall not be given to Kanhaiya Lal or to anybody else but the land shall be kept as a vacant land for public use on the basis of a recommendation of the Administrator, Nagar Mahapalika, Agra. 6. Kanhaiya Lal, respondent No. 3, challenged the order dated 5th December, 1980, before the Secretary, Local Self Government Department, Lucknow. 6. Kanhaiya Lal, respondent No. 3, challenged the order dated 5th December, 1980, before the Secretary, Local Self Government Department, Lucknow. The petitioner also on 16th April, 1981, filed an application before the Secretary, Local-Self-Government Department, Lucknow, for an opportunity of hearing before passing final orders in regard to the land in dispute. The State Government by its order dated 18th December, 1981, cancelled the order of the Collector dated 8th December, 1980, and restored the order dated 20th May, 1978, for renewal of the lease on certain conditions. It is this order dated 18th December, 1981, which has been impugned in the present writ petition. 7. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and the learned Standing Counsel. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner has raised two contentions before us to challenge the order dated 8th December, 1991. His first contention is that on 16th April, 1981, the petitioner had filed an application before the Secretary, Local Self Government, Lucknow, requesting him to give him a notice of the proceedings pending before him and he be afforded an opportunity of adducing evidence. In effect, the application, according to the petitioner, was to afford an opportunity of oral hearing to the petitioner and since no oral hearing had been granted to the petitioner before passing the impugned order, the order is vitiated in law. 9. The second submission of the learned Counsel is that the impugned order does not contain any reasons whatsoever as to why the order of the Collector, Agra, dated 8th December, 1980, had been set aside and, consequently, the contention is that the order is wholly arbitrary and void in law. 10. In so far as the first contention of the learned counsel is concerned, it is, no doubt, true that from a perusal of the order dated 8th December, 1980, passed by the Collector, Agra, it is clear that the order had been passed after the proceedings were initiated on an application having been moved by the petitioner for grant of a lease in his favour. The order was also based on the report of the Administrator, Nagar Mahapalika, Agra It is also clear from the order that the petitioner had filed evidence before the Collector, Agra to establish his case that the lease be granted in his favour. The order was also based on the report of the Administrator, Nagar Mahapalika, Agra It is also clear from the order that the petitioner had filed evidence before the Collector, Agra to establish his case that the lease be granted in his favour. The Collector, Agra had passed the order after considering the evidence filed by the petitioner as well as after considering the recommendations made by the Administrator, Nagar Mahapalika, Agra, In the last paragraph of the order it has been specifically stated that a copy of the order be sent to the Administrator, Nagar Mahapalika, Agra, the District Registrar, Agra, the Sub-Registrar, Agra, Kanhaiya Lal Agarwal and Padam Chand Goyal, the petitioner. 11. In paragraph 26 of the petition, it has been stated that the petitioner was never informed by the State Government of any date when the matter would be taken up for consideration. No notice or information of any kind whatsoever was given to the petitioner and the order dated 18th December, 1981 was ex-parte. The contention, consequently, is that the order dated 18th December, 1981 is violative of principles of natural justice, as no oral hearing had been afforded. 12. In paragraph 22 of the counter affidavit given in reply to paragraph 26 of the petition, it has been averred on behalf of the State Government that it is not necessary for the State Government to give any personal hearing to the petitioner. It has been further stated that on receipt of the representations of the petitioner as well as of the respondent No. 3, namely, Kanhaiya Lai, a report was called for from the Collector, Agra, and therefore, the matter was considered at great length and the Government passed the impinged order directing the Collector to grant renewal of the lease in favour of Kanhaiya Lai. The application, which was made by the petitioner on 16th April, 1981, was for granting him of an opportunity of adducing evidence. It is consequently admitted by the State Government that it did not grant either oral hearing or an opportunity to the petitioner to file a representation and his evidence in support of the same. 13. It is not disputed that proceedings before the Collector was initiated because of the filing of an application by the petitioner and thereafter the Collector had passed the order dated 8th December, 1980. 13. It is not disputed that proceedings before the Collector was initiated because of the filing of an application by the petitioner and thereafter the Collector had passed the order dated 8th December, 1980. The order was also passed after consideration of the evidence produced by the petitioner. Since the petitioner was a party to the proceedings before the Collector. Agra, and the order was passed after giving him an opportunity of producing evidence in support of his case, in our opinion, it was incumbent upon the State Government before finally disposing of the proceedings challenging the order dated 8th December, 1980, to give an opportunity to the petitioner to make a representation so that all the facts may be brought to the notice of the State Government-Granting of an opportunity of representation was, in our view, necessary because of the fact that the basis of the order of the Collector, Agra, dated 8th December, 1980, was the evidence produced by the petitioner. We, however, do not agree with the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner that it was incumbent upon the State Government to give an oral hearing before passing the impugned order. 14. In Union of India (UOI) Vs. Jyoti Prakash Mitter, AIR 1971 SC 1093 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that personal hearing is not necessarily an incident of the rules of natural justice and it must be given to a party likely to be affected by an order except in proceedings in courts. A mere denial of an opportunity of making an oral representation will not, without more, vitiate the proceedings. A party likely to be affected by a decision is entitled to know the evidence against him and to have an opportunity of making representation. He, however, cannot claim that an order made without affording an opportunity of personal hearing is invalid. In view of this dictum of the Supreme Court, it cannot be accepted that the impugned order is vitiated because no oral hearing was given to the petitioner, but, as observed above, it was necessary for the State Government to give an opportunity to the petitioner of making a representation before passing the impugned order. 15. In the circumstances, though no oral hearing was required, but yet the petitioner was entitled to an opportunity to file his representation. 15. In the circumstances, though no oral hearing was required, but yet the petitioner was entitled to an opportunity to file his representation. Consequently, the order though not bad on the ground of not giving an opportunity of personal hearing, but the petitioner was entitled to file his representation in support of his case. This opportunity, admittedly was not granted to the petitioner. In the circumstances, so far as the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner is concerned in regard to the grant of oral hearing, it cannot be accepted, but, in our opinion, the petitioner was entitled at least for an opportunity for making his representation in support of his case. 16. In regard to the second submission, we have examined the order and we find that in fact, no reason have been given at all as to why the order of the Collector dated 8th December, 1980, be set aside. The Collector had given specific reasons that it was in public interest not to lease the land to any body else and keep the land as open land for the benefit of the public. This order was passed in view of the recommendation made by the Administrator, Nagar Mahapalika, Agra. It was also stated in the order of the Collector that the respondent No. 3 had violated the conditions of the lease and as such, he was not entitled to renewal of the lease in his favour. None of the findings given by the Collector have been set aside. No evidence has been considered which was filed by the petitioner as well as by the respondent No. 2. The report of the Administrator, Nagar Mahapalika, Agra has also not been considered. It was incumbent upon the State Government before setting aside the order of the Collector dated 8th December, 1980, to give reasons as to why the State Government did not agree with the findings recorded by the Collector, Agra. 17. In S.N. Mukherjee Vs. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 1984 , it has been specifically laid down by the Supreme Court that even in the case of a decision by an administrative authority, reasons must be recorded except in cases where the requirement is dispensed with, expressly or by necessary implication. In the instant case, the impugned order of the State Government affects civil rights of the petitioner. In the instant case, the impugned order of the State Government affects civil rights of the petitioner. The order of the Collector which was a reasoned order was reversed in the circumstances, it was incumbent upon the State Government to have given reasons as to why it did not agree with the order passed by the Collector, Agra. The order is clearly arbitrary and void in law. The second submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner, in our opinion, is well founded. 18. We, consequently, allow the petition, set aside the order dated 18th December, 1981 and direct that the State Government shall pass a fresh reasoned order after giving an" opportunity to the petitioner to make a representation in writing stating his case and the evidence which he wants to rely in support of his case. The State Government will also consider the application of the petitioner for grant of lease in favour of the petitioner. In the circumstances of the case, the parties are directed to bear their own costs.