JUDGMENT A.N. Varma, J. - These two petitions are being disposed of by a common judgment as the issues involved therein are identical. Indeed both the learned counsel for the parties concede that the basic issue, namely, whether Regulation 10(2) of the Staff Service Regulations, 1980 framed for the staff of Prathama Bank, which is a bank established under the Rural Banks Act, 1976 (Act No. 21 of 1976) is constitutionally valid, stands concluded by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of M. K. Agarwal v. Gurgaon Gramin Bank reported in AIR 1989 Supreme Court 286 : (1988 Lab IC 380), where in an identical regulation framed in relation to Gurgaon Gramin Bank was struck down. The Supreme Court ruled that the banks established under the Rural Banks Act are an instrumentality of the State, and, therefore, subject to all the restrictions and implications that flow from the concept of an instrumentality of the State. Their Lordships observed that a provision (such as Regulation 10(2) in the present case) which vests such sweeping and unguided powers on the Bank authorising it to terminate the services of confirmed officers and employees by a simple one month's notice is constitutionally wholly impermissible being contrary to Article 14 of the Constitution. It was further observed that Article 14 frowns upon conferment upon the State or its instrumentality such sweeping, arbitrary and unbridled powers on them. Counsel for both the parties, therefore, agree that Regulation 10(2) under which the petitioner's services have been terminated, must in view of this decision be held to be void. 2. Regulation 10(2) of the Staff Regulations framed with 'respect to the Prathama Bank vests power in the bank to terminate the services of an officer or an employee after giving him a notice or pay in lieu there of in the case of officers, 3 months' notice, and, in the case of employees, one month. It is not disputed that the services of the petitioner in each of the two cases were terminated by the Bank in the purported exercise of powers under Regulation 10(2)(a)(i). It also stands conceded to the Bank that both the petitioners were confirmed officers being at the relevant time Branch Managers of their respective branches. 3. It is not disputed that the services of the petitioner in each of the two cases were terminated by the Bank in the purported exercise of powers under Regulation 10(2)(a)(i). It also stands conceded to the Bank that both the petitioners were confirmed officers being at the relevant time Branch Managers of their respective branches. 3. In view of the above position, it is apparent that the order of termination cannot be sustained and must be quashed and the petitioners be reinstated. The question that, however, next calls for consideration is whether the petitioners should be granted full back wages and all the consequential benefits flowing from quashing of the orders of termination passed against them. This aspect of the matter had also received the attention of the Supreme Court in the case of M.K. Agarwal (supra). One of the contentions raised there on behalf of the respondent bank was that the petitioner in that case worked in a managerial cadre and he should not, there-fore, be thrust upon the Administration. It was contended that the position held by a Branch Manager is one of trust and confidence which the Administration has in the Officer and that for satisfactory discharge of the functions and duties the trust and confidence of the Administration are essential. Consequently, it was urged, reinstatement should not be ordered even if Regulation 10 was being struck down along with the order of termination passed against the officer. Monetary compensation, it was contended, rather than reinstatement should be ordered in that case. 4. On a consideration of all these aspects, the Supreme Court held that while there was no good ground for refusing reinstatement, the relief of back salary to the petitioner should be restricted to 50% of what would otherwise be payable with liberty to the Bank, if it still thought it necessary and worthwhile, to hold disciplinary enquiry against the petitioner. Counsel for the respondent bank has repeated the submissions which were urged before the Supreme Court. It was contended that the Bank has in the case of both the petitioners lost confidence in them. 5. Having given the matter my anxious consideration I am of the opinion that the factors which were taken into account by the Hon'ble Judges of the Supreme Court for restricting the back wages to 50% are present in the instant case also. 5. Having given the matter my anxious consideration I am of the opinion that the factors which were taken into account by the Hon'ble Judges of the Supreme Court for restricting the back wages to 50% are present in the instant case also. It is indisputable that Branch Managers hold a key position in the working of a bank and consequently the Branch Manager should be one in whom the Bank has absolute and implict trust and confidence which is, it is alleged by the Bank a counsel, lacking in both the petitioners. It is significant that the petitioners do not allege that the impugned action has been taken against them on account of any malice or collateral motive. In the absence of such allegations, the assertion of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the Bank has lost confidence in these officers may have some substance. I, however, refrain from expressing any final opinion on whether the termination of services of the petitioner was legally proper and justified. The observations made above may, therefore, be only in the context of the issue whether the petitioner should be awarded full back wages or only a part thereof, as was done in the case of M.K. Agarwal (supra). 6. Sri S. C. Budhwar, learned counsel for the petitioners, however, placed strong reliance on another decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Prathama Bank, Moradabad v. Vijay Kumar Goel reported in AIR 1989 Supreme Court 1977: (1989 Lab IC 2016), and submitted that in this case the Supreme Court had approved payment of full back wages even though the officer concerned was a Branch Manager. Sri Budhwar submitted that it will, therefore, be not right and proper to refuse full back wages wherever the termination of services of a Branch Manager is concerned. 7. I am unable to agree with this contention. In the first place, all material aspects highlighted in M. K. Agarwal's case (supra) for awarding only 50% of back wages are present in the instant petitions in view of what was urged by counsel for the Bank. Secondly, that was a case where a decree passed in a civil suit granting full back wages was being affirmed. In the first place, all material aspects highlighted in M. K. Agarwal's case (supra) for awarding only 50% of back wages are present in the instant petitions in view of what was urged by counsel for the Bank. Secondly, that was a case where a decree passed in a civil suit granting full back wages was being affirmed. Principles relevant for the exercise of the discretion under Article 226 of the Constitution were not involved in that case, the appeal before the Supreme Court having arisen out of a civil suit. I should, therefore, think that the decision in M. K. Agarwal's case would be mere apposite. 8. I am of the opinion that taking all aspects of the case, for the present, the petitioners should be awarded only 50% of back salary etc. in a addition, of course to the relief of reinstatement. 9. In the result, the petitions succeed and are allowed. The impugned orders of termination are quashed. The respondent Bank is directed to reinstate the petitioners in service immediately and, further, for the present, to pay to each petitioner 50% of his back salary and other emoluments admissible to him provided that in the event of the Bank deciding to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the petitioners and, in the event further, of the petitioners being cleared of the charges at the end of such proceedings, the remaining 50% of the past salary and other emoluments shall also be paid to each of the petitioners within 3 months of the passing of the order absolving him of the charges framed against him. Our order may not, however, be construed as precluding the Bank from instituting disciplinary enquiry against the petitioners in accordance with law, if it considers it necessary and worthwhile to do so. There will be no order as to costs.