JUDGMENT S.K. Lakhtakia, J.M. - These are two connected second appeals filed by Smt. Naseeban against the order of Addl.Commissioner, Kumaun Division, Nainital dated 14.11.1983 dismissing the appeals filed by Nanhey, the father of the present appellant Smt. Naseeban against the judgment and decree of the Assistant Sub-Divisional Officer, Kashipur, District Nainital dated 8.1.1981 decreeing the plaintiff's suit. 2. Heard the learned counsel for both the parties, persuade the record. 3. Learned counsel for the appellant argued that even though the learned Addl. Commissioner mentioned in the order-sheet that the appeal was dismissed and that a detailed judgment was being given separately but no such judgment was ever recorded by him and the order of the dismissal of the appeal remained only on the order-sheet. It was contended that this order on the order-sheet is not a judgment in the eye of law and cannot be maintained because it has not dealt with any question of law and fact. It is further argued that the appellant Nanhey in spite of best endeavours could not know the result of the appeal and hence he could not filed the appeal and died and so after his death the present appellant being his daughter and heir preferred this appeal when she also could not lay her ends on any judgment as it was not prepared nor any decree thereof was prepared. An application for condonation of delay has, therefore, been filed by her under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 4. Learned counsel for the respondent contended that the order on the order-sheet on the file of the learned Addl. Commissioner is sufficient to indicate that the appeal has been dismissed and the period of limitation started running from 14.11.1983 itself and when the original appellant Haji Nanhey did not file any appeal his daughter namely the present appellant also has no locus-standi to prefer the appeal and the appeal being highly belated is barred by Limitation and so there is no question of the condonation of delay. 5. I have carefully gone through the record of the lower appellate court and I find that these appeals were not properly handled by the learned Addl. Commissioner. 5. I have carefully gone through the record of the lower appellate court and I find that these appeals were not properly handled by the learned Addl. Commissioner. He heard argument on 28.1.1983 and fixed date for judgment on 11.3.1983 which is against the spirit of Order 20, Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code which provides that the judgment should either be pronounced immediately or on some future date the due notice of which shall be given to the parties or the pleaders and such judgment should be delivered within 15 days from the date on which the arguments are concluded. But, again, if it is not practicable to do so the date for pronouncement of judgment should not be beyond 50 days, unless there are very strong reasons for granting a longer date. In the instant case the learned Addl. Commissioner did not give any reasons for fixing a date after 30 days. The judgment however remained pending for a very long time and 12 adjournments were given for the purpose and ultimately on the 13th day of adjournment the following order was noted in the order sheet. vkns'k vihydrkZ ds izLrqr vihy vk/kkjghu gksus ds dkj.k fujLr dh tkrh gSA foLr`r fu.kZ; i`Fkd ls gSA There is no doubt that a left thumb impression of Mehndi Hasan the pleader of the original appellant and husband of the present appellant is marked on the side of the order sheet but this note cannot be said to be a detailed judgment nor can it be called a judgment in the eye of law. Such order is merely an intimation about the result of the appellant but it cannot be called a judgment as required under order 20, Rule 4 (ii) of the Civil Procedure Code which prescribed the manner in which the judgments of the courts other than Small Causes court are to be written. Ordinary the appellant expected a judgment and decree apart from the aforesaid order on the order-sheet so that he could make up his mind about the filing of the appeal which could be made only on question of law as required under Section 100 of Civil Procedure Code read with Section 31 of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act. Ordinary the appellant expected a judgment and decree apart from the aforesaid order on the order-sheet so that he could make up his mind about the filing of the appeal which could be made only on question of law as required under Section 100 of Civil Procedure Code read with Section 31 of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act. Consequently even if the appellant came to know from the order-sheet that the appeal had been dismissed yet he had every reason to wait for the pronouncement of a regular judgment so' as to prepare the grounds of appeal which could be only on the questions of law and which could not be done unless a proper judgment was before him. Consequently if the original appellant could not prefer any appeal during his life time it cannot be said that he had no intention to prefer any appeal. The delay in filing the appeal by his daughter is, therefore, easily understandable and must be condoned. 6. Accordingly the delay in filing the present appeal is condoned. The order passed by the learned Addl. Commissioner on the order-sheet being no judgment in the eye of law cannot be maintained and set aside and both the appeals deserves to be remanded back to the learned Commissioner to be reheard and re-decided by him on merits. 7. In the result these appeals succeed and are allowed. The impugned order dated 14.11.1983 passed by the learned Addl. Commissioner is set aside and the appeals are remanded back to him to be heard and decided on merits according to law expeditiously. This order shall govern S.A. No. 55/56 of 1987-88, Nainital.