JUDGMENT : S.K. Mookerji, J. Heard learned Counsel for the parties. 2. Briefly stated the facts of the case are that i the Petitioners are the tenants of the disputed house No. 119, Balupura, Ramteram Road, Ghaziabad, on a monthly rent of Rs. 52/- . The Respondent No. 2 is the landlord. After giving a notice by the Respondent No. 2 landlord to the Petitioner tenants, u/s 106 of the Transfer of Property Act read with Section 20 of the U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972, hereinafter referred to as the Act, the Respondent No. 2 landlord Sled a suit No. 77 of 1977 in the court of the Judge Small Causes, Ghaziabad on 25-8-1977. The suit was filed for arrears of rent, ejectment and mesne profits for use and occupation. A written statement was also filed on 4-11-1977 and on the same date, it is averred in paragraph 14 of the written statement that full compliance of Section 20(4) of the Act was made by the Petitioners tenants. In the replication the Respondent No. 2 landlord had stated that originally Sri Nand Kishore, husband of Smt. Vidyawati, Petitioner No. 5, and father of other Petitioner-tenants was the tenant of the portion of the house in dispute. After his death the Defendants inherited tenancy rights and as such, they became the tenants in common and are living together. It is also averred in the replication that the Defendants, have got their ancestral house Mohalla Pakki Mori, Ghaziabad. Moreover, they have constructed a building No. 13/52, plot No. II-A105, at Nehru Nagar in the Municipal limits of Ghaziabad In view of the above" facts, it was also averred in the replication that the Petitioner--tenants were not entitled to the benefit of Section 20(4) of the Act. The suit was also based on account of structural alteration. 3. The matter came up before the Judge Small Causes Court, Ghaziabad and the suit of the landlord was dismissed by his judgment dated 11-7-1979. A perusal of the judgment of the trial court shall make it clear that following issues were framed for decision in the suit: 1. Whether the Defendants are entitled for the relief of Section 20(4) of the U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972? 2. Whether Defendants have materially and structurally altered the disputed property causing the disfiguration of the same? If so, its effect? 3. Whether the Defendants are entitled for the relief of Section 20(4) of the U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972? 2. Whether Defendants have materially and structurally altered the disputed property causing the disfiguration of the same? If so, its effect? 3. To what relief, if any, the Plaintiff is entitled? 4. While deciding 'issue No. 1 the trial court has held "It is admitted fact, as transpired from record, that Defendants have deposited an amount of Rs. 3605/- on account of arrears of rent from 1-9-1973 to 31-10-1977, amount of interest and cost of the suit on 4-11-1977, which was the first date of hearing." The trial court further recorded the argument of the counsel for the landlord that the amounts deposited by the tenants were short by Rs. 11/- but later on this plea was waived as this amount was also offered to the Plaintiff on 4-11-1977, which was not accepted by the Plaintiff. The case of the Defendants was that they wanted to pay in cash on 4-11-1977 itself to the Plaintiff before the court to make good the shortage but the amount was not accepted and ultimately on 9-11-1977 the Petitioner-tenants deposited the balance amount of Rs. 11/- in the court. However, the trial court did not enter into the question whether the shortage of Rs. 11/- was tendered to the landlord on 4-11-1977, i.e., the alleged first date of hearing and the landlord had not accepted the same. The trial court proceeded, as pointed out above, on the basis of the alleged waiver by landlord in respect of the shortage of Rs. 11/-. In this view of the matter, the trial court came to the conclusion that the amount deposited in the trial court u/s 20(4) of the Act was sufficient as required under the law. Proviso to Section 20(4) of the Act is as under: Provided that nothing in this sub--section, shall apply in relation to a tenant, who or any member of whose family has built or has otherwise acquired in a vacant state or has got vacated after acquisition, any residential building in the same city, municipality, notified area or town area. 5. It was urged before the trial court that the Petitioner-tenants were not entitled to get benefit of Section 20(4) of the. Act in view of the above. quoted proviso. 5. It was urged before the trial court that the Petitioner-tenants were not entitled to get benefit of Section 20(4) of the. Act in view of the above. quoted proviso. It was urged on behalf of the Respondent No. 2 landlord that the disputed house was originally under the tenancy, of Sri Nand Kishore. It was also urged that he had expired and tenancy right devolved upon the Petitioner-tenants. It had also come on record that the wife of Sri Devendra Kumar, Petitioner No. 4, had constructed one house in Ghaziabad. The plea of the learned Counsel for the Respondent No. 2 landlord was that in view of the proviso, the Petitioner-tenants were not entitled to get benefit of Section 20(4) of the Act. This plea of the Respondent No. 2 landlord was repelled by the trial court. The trial court held, after discussing some case law, that the aforesaid proviso is not applicable to the facts of the present case. It was held that the wife of one of the Defendants did not fall under the definition of 'family' under the Act and her act of new construction will have no effect on the tenancy rights of other Petitioner-tenants. The trial court also repelled the argument of Respondent No. 2 landlord that the Petitioners having failed to deposite the house and water tax on 4-11-1977 u/s 20(4) of the Act shall become a defaulter in the eyes of law. The trial court also repelled the argument raised on behalf of the Respondent No. 2 landlord on the question of material alteration or disfiguration of the building in suit. In view of the above findings, the suit was dismissed. Aggrieved, the Respondent No. 2 landlord, filed a Revision, which was numbered as J. S.C.C. Revision No. 203 of 1979, in the court of the District Judge, Ghaziabad. This revision, ultimately, came before the IV Additional District Judge, Ghaziabad, who allowed the revision in favour of the Respondent No. 2 landlord, by his judgment dated 22-1-1981, Annexure 5 to the writ petition. Consequently, the Additional District Judge decreed the suit of the Plaintiff for arrears of rent, ejectment and mesne profits. The Additional District Judge held that the amounts deposited by the tenants was short by Rs. 11.50, as such, the Petitioner tenants could not be relieved of eviction by giving benefits of Section 20(4) of the Act. Consequently, the Additional District Judge decreed the suit of the Plaintiff for arrears of rent, ejectment and mesne profits. The Additional District Judge held that the amounts deposited by the tenants was short by Rs. 11.50, as such, the Petitioner tenants could not be relieved of eviction by giving benefits of Section 20(4) of the Act. Further, the Additional District Judge held that, in this case, the wife of the tenant, Devendra Kumar, Petitioner No. 4, has built a residential house at Ghaziabad and therefore, the proviso to Section 20(4) of the Act, quoted above, was not applicable to the facts of the present case and the Petitioner tenants were not entitled to the benefits of Section 20(4) of the Act. On the above two findings, the revision was allowed by the impugned order dated 22-1-1981. I have heard, at length, the learned Counsel for the parties and examined the materials on record. 6. Before dealing with the points raised in the case it is necessary to point out that the trial court, in the present case, had framed issues. In this context the provisions of Order 1 Rule 1 CPC may be noticed. The settlement of issues shall not extent to courts constituted under the Provincial Small Causes Court Act, 1987. Order 20 Rule 4 CPC deals with "judgments of Small Causes Courts." From the reading of -this provision it is clear that the judgments of a court of Small Causes need not contain more than the points for determination and the decision there on. 7. Learned Counsel for the Petitioners vehemently urged that the impugned judgment of the Additional District Judge dated 22-1-1981 has been passed without giving any opportunity to the Petitioners and the impugned judgment shall be deemed to be an ex parte judgment. This argument has no legs to stand. A certified copy of the order sheet of the court of the IV Additional District Judge, Ghaziabad, in respect of this case has been filed. The order dated 20-10-1980 on the said order sheet is clear to indicate that the Petitioners were represented by a lawyer before the revisional court and, therefore it cannot be said that the Petitioners were not given any opportunity. The order dated 20-10-1980 on the said order sheet is clear to indicate that the Petitioners were represented by a lawyer before the revisional court and, therefore it cannot be said that the Petitioners were not given any opportunity. I have no doubt in my mind that a revision u/s 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Court Act, can be decided on merits even if a party to the revision fails to address the court for his own lapses. 8. The main argument of the learned Counsel for the Petitioners is that the revisional court did not apply its mind to the facts of the case and, therefore, has failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it by law. The case of the Petitioners was that no doubt, the amount deposited on 4-11-1977 on behalf of the Petitioners, in compliance of the provisions of Section 20(4) of the Act was short by Rs. 11/. It is alleged that the plea of the Petitioners was that on the very date, i.e. 4-11-1977, the Petitioners tendered the balance amount of Rs. 11/- to the Respondent No. 2 landlord but it was not accepted. This plea was not at all examined by the revisional court and the Petitioner tenants were held to be defaulter as the amount deposited was short. The revisional court had held that since the amounts deposited did not cover the entire amount, as such, the Petitioners could not be relieved of the eviction by giving benefit of Section 20(4) of the Act. Even the trial court has not examined this plea properly and proceeded with the matter on the basis of the alleged waiver, in respect of shortage of Rs. 11/-, by the Respondent No. 2 landlord. Even the trial court has not examined this plea properly and proceeded with the matter on the basis of the alleged waiver, in respect of shortage of Rs. 11/-, by the Respondent No. 2 landlord. u/s 20(4) of the Act, it is provided that in any suit for eviction on the ground of default of payment of arrears of rent, if at the first hearing of the suit the tenant unconditionally pays or tenders to the landlord or deposits in the court the entire amount of rent and damages for use and occupation of the building due from him (such damages for use and occupation being calculated at the same rate as rent) together with the interest there on at the rate of 9% per annum and the landlord's costs of the suit in respect there of, after deducting there from any amount already deposited by the tenant under Sub-section (1) of Section 30, the court may, in lieu of passing a decree of eviction on this ground pass an order relieving the tenant against his liability for vacation on this ground. Thus, the amount mentioned in Sub-section (4) of Section 20 of the Act, may be paid to the landlord or tendered to the landlord or deposited in the court. The amount means part of the amount also. In the present case, the plea of the Petitioners-tenants is that on 4-11-1977 the amount was deposited in the court but the amount was alleged to have fallen short and on the same date, the amount alleged to have fallen short, was tendered to the landlord, but the landlord refused to accept the same. The court below was obliged to record a finding, in case, above plea was raised and in support of such plea evidence was brought on record. The court below was thus required to decide whether the alleged amount, which had fallen short, was tendered to the Respondent No. 2 landlord on the first hearing of the suit. The expression of first hearing has been defined as 'the first date for any step or proceeding mentioned in the summons served on the Defendant". It is also relevant to mention here that expression 'cost of suit' includes one half of the amount of counsel's fee taxable for a contested suit. The expression of first hearing has been defined as 'the first date for any step or proceeding mentioned in the summons served on the Defendant". It is also relevant to mention here that expression 'cost of suit' includes one half of the amount of counsel's fee taxable for a contested suit. 'It is also relevant to mention here that u/s 20(4) of the Act, the Petitioner tanants were not obliged to deposit the house and water tax. The revisional court has held that admittedly the amount deposited by the contesting Petitioner tenants was short by Rs. 11.50. This finding is vitiated and the court below" has failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it by law. It has not examined whether the amount was tendered to the landlord as mentioned above. This plea of tendering the balance amount to the landlord on 4-11-1977 deserves to be examined provided there is any material on record which may include oral evidence also. This Court cannot decide this point as relevant materials have not been filed in this writ petition. Further, the revisional court has failed to exercise its jurisdiction in as much as it proceeded on the basis that admittedly the amount deposited by the contesting Petitioner tenants in this case was short. Thus the finding recorded by the revisional court u/s 20(4) of the act is vitiated as it has considered only the amount deposited in court and failed to examine the plea regarding the amount tendered by Petitioners to the landlord on the first date of hearing. The revisional court has also reversed the finding of the trial court in respect of the proviso, mentioned above, to Section 20(4) of the Act. The trial court, after discussing the matter at length and examining the case law, had come to the conclusion that the Petitioner tenants were not barred from making the deposit u/s 20(4) of the Act. The revisional court came to the conclusion that in this case the wife of the tenant, Devendra Kumar, Petitioner No. 4, has built a residential house at Ghaziabad and therefore, proviso to Sub-section (4) of Section 20 of the Act was attracted and the Petitioners were not entitled to the benefit of Section 20(4) of the Act. This finding has been recorded in a very inappropriate manner without referring the law on the point or evidence on record. This finding has been recorded in a very inappropriate manner without referring the law on the point or evidence on record. No doubt, this point is purely legal and revisional court is quite competent to decide the point and record its own finding. The revisional court has recorded finding of reversal against the finding recorded by the trial court and, therefore, the revisional court was obliged to give detail reasons. However, the revisional court has again on above point failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in him under law. The revisional court has not discussed anything on the point of material alteration. 9. It is necessary to point out that in case a tenant claims the benefit of Section 20(4) of the Act and gives break-up details of the deposits made there under the court below, before recording a finding that the deposits were not sufficient, is bound to demonstrate it by furnishing relevant dates in his judgment for necessary scrutiny by higher court. The revisional court, in the present case, has proceeded on the assumption that there is admission of shortage after deposit by Rs. 11/- . Before this Court also materials have not been furnished from which it could be scrutinised or examined how the deposits made u/s 20(4) of the Act, was calculated and the shortage of Rs. 11/- was arrived at. The revisional court has failed to exercise its jurisdiction in not giving a clear finding in respect of the shortage in respect of the deposits made u/s 20(4) of the Act. 10. Before passing final order, it is necessary for this Court to observe that the suit giving rise to this petition was filed some time in the year 1977 and therefore, on the basis of the materials on record, this Court, in exercise of its power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, may also examine the materials on record and determine the controversy finally. In the present case, the relevant details are not before this Court for recording its finding in respect of the points discussed above. In view of the above facts and circumstances, this writ petition deserves to be allowed and the entire revision, should be remanded back the court below for fresh decision. 11. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. In view of the above facts and circumstances, this writ petition deserves to be allowed and the entire revision, should be remanded back the court below for fresh decision. 11. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The judgment of the IV Additional District Judge, Ghaziabad, passed in J.S.C.C. Revision No. 203 of 1979 Amar Nath v. Virendra Nath dated 22-1-1981 is quashed. The entire revision is remanded back to the court below for fresh decision expeditiously, as far as possible within three months from the date a certified copy of the judgment of this Court is produced before the revisional court, keeping in view the observations made in this judgment. However, there shall be no order as to costs.