JUDGMENT R.R.K. Trivedi, J. - Petitioner by means of this writ petition has questioned the legality of the ex parte award dated 31.1.1979 passed against it by Industrial Tribunal (IV) U.P., at Lucknow respondent No. 1. 2. The facts in brief, giving rise to the aforesaid industrial dispute are that respondents 3 to 9, who were employed under petitioner in various capacities were terminated from service in 1977 on different dates. The State of U.P. by order dated 4.3.1988 referred the Industrial dispute for adjudication to Industrial Tribunal (IV) Lucknow on which basis Adjudication case No. 29 of 1977 was registered. Parties filed their written statements etc. and rejoinder affidavits and other documents. It appears that on 16.1.1979 oral evidence was adduced by the respondents and two witnesses were examined. They were cross-examined by Shri R.R. Gupta, representative of petitioner. The case was adjourned for 17.1.1979. However, no body could appear on 17.1.1979 on behalf of petitioner. The Tribunal proceeded ex parte against petitioner and fixed 18.1.1979 for further evidence of the Union representative. On 18.1.1979 at about 1.00 P.M. a telegram was received from petitioner stating that their representative Shri R.R. Gupta slipped from the bus in the morning and has received injuries. This telegram was sent to the Tribunal on 17.1.1979. However as no formal application for adjournment or for setting aside the order dated 17.1.1979 proceeding ex parte against petitioner was moved, Tribunal proceeded ex parte, heard arguments and the award was reserved on 18.1.1979. On 25.1.1979 an application supported by an affidavit was moved on behalf of petitioner for setting aside the order to proceed ex parte against petitioner and to provide opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses and to adduce oral evidence. This application was rejected by the Tribunal vide order dated 31.1.1979. The order has been filed as Annexure XII to the writ petition. The same day the Tribunal gave its award aggrieved from which petitioner filed the present writ petition. 3. Counter affidavit and supplementary counter affidavit and rejoinder affidavit and supplementary rejoinder affidavit have been filed by the parties. 4. I have heard Shri Ashok Khare, learned Counsel for petitioner and Shri K.K. Tiwari, learned Counsel appearing for respondents. The same day the Tribunal gave its award aggrieved from which petitioner filed the present writ petition. 3. Counter affidavit and supplementary counter affidavit and rejoinder affidavit and supplementary rejoinder affidavit have been filed by the parties. 4. I have heard Shri Ashok Khare, learned Counsel for petitioner and Shri K.K. Tiwari, learned Counsel appearing for respondents. Shri Ashok Khare has submitted that the affidavit filed by petitioner in support of the application No. 25B, dated 25.1.1979 remained uncontroverted and there was nothing on record on which basis it could be said that it contained any wrong averment. The Tribunal committed manifest illegalities in not accepting this uncontroverted affidavit. It has been further submitted that the telegram was sent on 17.1.1979 itself and admittedly the name of Shri R.R. Gupta, representative of petitioner, was mentioned therein. Then in paragraph 4 of the affidavit, it was disclosed that Shri R.R. Gupta, representative of petitioner, fell from the bus and was injured and could not appear before respondent No. 1. The fact that name of Shri R.R. Gupta was not mentioned in the application was immaterial in these facts and circumstances and the view taken by the Tribunal for rejecting the application on this ground is arbitrary and illegal. It has further been submitted that petitioner had no branch office at Lucknow equipped with Telex and telephone facilities. The Tribunal proceeded on assumptions and wrongly rejected the application. It has been further submitted that petitioner never sought adjournment of the case on previous dates and in any view of the matter the post conduct of petitioner was not relevant for determining the sufficient cause mentioned by petitioner for absence on the date fixed, namely 17.1.1979. The last submission of Shri Ashok Khare was that in any view of the matter the Tribunal was under obligation to consider the case of petitioner stated in written statement fully supported by affidavits and rejoinder affidavits and the documentary evidence filed. The Tribunal has given award without considering the case of petitioner and the material filed and such as award cannot be sustained in law. The award has been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice and is liable to be set aside. The Tribunal has given award without considering the case of petitioner and the material filed and such as award cannot be sustained in law. The award has been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice and is liable to be set aside. Shri Khare has cited in support of his submissions Grindelys Bank Limited v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal 1981(42) FLR 88 (SC), Ram Raj v. D.D.C. 1988 (3) SCD 85, Tarsem Kumar Sood v. The Chief Engineer H.P.P.W.D. 1984 (11) SLJ 104, Sangam Finishing Works Vs. Labour Court and Others, (1989) 58 FLR 888 . 5. Shri K.K. Tiwari, learned Counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, has submitted that the Tribunal has considered all the material on record and was not satisfied with the cause shown by petitioner for his absence on the date fixed. Shri Tiwari submitted that it was incumbent on petitioner to file medical certificate to corroborate the allegation that his representative Shri R.R. Gupta had actually met with the alleged accident and received injuries, in absence of which the Tribunal was perfectly justified in not accepting the case set up by petitioner. It has been further submitted that the order is concluded by findings of fact and do not suffer from any error of law. 6. I have thoroughly considered the rival contentions advanced by learned Counsel for parties and have perused the impugned order dated 31.1.1979 passed by the Tribunal rejecting application of petitioner for setting aside the order to proceed ex parte. It will not be out of place to mention here that petitioner has not sought relief for setting aside the order dated 31.1.1979 filed as Annexure III to the writ petition by means of which the application was rejected and thereafter award has pronounced and was sent for publication to the Government. Relief in respect of this order should also have been claimed by petitioner separately. However, since this writ petition was filed in 1979, in my opinion, instead of postponing the decision of the writ petition on this ground and asking petitioner to rectify the mistake the writ petition should be decided on merits as the legality of the order dated 31.1.1979 has been challenged in narration of facts and in the ground raised in the writ petition. 7. Hon'ble Supreme Court in case Collector Land Acquisition Anantnag v. Mst. 7. Hon'ble Supreme Court in case Collector Land Acquisition Anantnag v. Mst. Kati Ji AIR 1987 SC 1553, while considering the words "sufficient cause" has observed as under: The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on 'merits'. The expression "sufficient cause" employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which sub-serves the ends of justice that being the life purpose for the existence of the institution of courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiable liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on Principle as it is realized, that: 1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging on appellate. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. "Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that "pendentle approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay. The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred. For the other side cannot claim to have rested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, of on account of culpable negligence, or on account of malafides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. Making a justice-oriented approach from this perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of the appeal. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. Making a justice-oriented approach from this perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of the appeal. The fact that it was the 'State' which was seeking condonation and not a private party was altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of equality before the demands that all litigants including the State as a litigant, are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even-handed manner. There is no warrant for according a step-motherly treatment when the 'State' is the applicant praying for condonation of delay. In fact experience shows that on account of an impersonal machinery (no one incharge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought to be subjected to appeal) and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbused with the note making, file pushing, and passing on the buck ethos, delay on its part is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve. In any event, the state which represents the collective cause of the community, does not deserve a litigant non grate status. The Courts therefore have to be informed with the spirit and philosophy of the provision in the course of the interpretation of the expression "sufficient cause". So also the same approach has to be evidenced in its application to matters at hand with the end in view to do when handed justice on merits in preference to the approach which scuttles a decision on merits. It cannot be disputed that the Tribunal has power to set aside the ex parte. award as well as its order to proceed ex parte against the party absent on the date of hearing. In Grindlays Bank Ltd. Vs. Central Government Industrial Tribunal and Others, AIR 1981 SC 606 , Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the Tribunal has power to set aside ex parte award in the interest of justice. It is true that there is no express provision in the Act or the Rules framed thereunder giving the Tribunal jurisdiction to do so. Central Government Industrial Tribunal and Others, AIR 1981 SC 606 , Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the Tribunal has power to set aside ex parte award in the interest of justice. It is true that there is no express provision in the Act or the Rules framed thereunder giving the Tribunal jurisdiction to do so. But it is a well known rule of statutory construction that a tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. Thus, in view of the legal position enunciated by the aforesaid judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. It has to be seen whether the learned Tribunal was justified in rejecting the application of petitioner filed on 25.1.1979. In my opinion, the Tribunal became too technical in taking the view that in the application name of the representative who fall down from the bus and suffered injuries had not been mentioned. The learned Tribunal failed to notice that in the affidavit filed in support of this application, name of the representative was mentioned and it was also mentioned in the telegram received by the Tribunal as noticed in the order sheet dated 19.1.1979 which is Annexure I to the writ petition. The view taken by the Tribunal cannot be sustained in law. 8. The second objection taken by the Tribunal for not accepting the application is that the application did not accompany a medical certificate or injury report. In my opinion, the Tribunal was not justified in taking this view in view of the fact that the affidavit filed in support of the application remained uncontroverted. In number of cases, it has been held that uncontroverted affidavit should normally be believed unless there was something on record falsifying the facts mentioned in the affidavit. The learned Tribunal has not pointed out any such material on record for not accepting the affidavit. Learned Counsel for respondents has also not been able to point out any such material on which basis it could be said that affidavit filed by petitioner should not be believed. In the facts and circumstances of the case The Tribunal committed a manifest illegality in rejecting the application on the ground that medical certificate or injury report was not filed. 9. In the facts and circumstances of the case The Tribunal committed a manifest illegality in rejecting the application on the ground that medical certificate or injury report was not filed. 9. Learned Tribunal has also disbelieved the case of petitioner on the ground that on 17.1.1979 and 18.1.1979 some other person could be deputed to conduct the case. It is not disputed that Shri R.R. Gupta cross-examined the witness on 16.1.1979 and he was fully briefed with the facts of the case. If Shri R.R. Gupta had become incapable of attending the case, it could not be reasonably expected from petitioner to handover the case to other representative immediately. It is well known that before cross-examining a witness lot of preparation and mastery over the facts is required. In my opinion, the Tribunal was not justified on this account also to disbelieve the case of the petitioner. 10. So far as the past conduct of petitioner is concerned, Shri Ashok Khare has relied on a case decided by this Court Ram Rai v. Dy. Director of Consolidation 1988 (2) SCD 88, wherein it has been held that the fact that the applicant has previously been negligent or has failed to prosecute the proceedings diligently would not be material. Thus the order of the learned Tribunal is also based on irrelevant considerations. In my opinion, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the Tribunal ought to have permitted petitioner to participate in the proceedings and allowed him to cross-examine the remaining witnesses and should have permitted to examine his witnesses. So far as the respondents employees were concerned, they could be compensated in terms of money for the loss and inconvenience which they suffered on account of the adjournment of the case. Time and again it has been stated by this Court as well as by the Apex Court of the country in number of decisions that the approach of the courts and authorities should be to avoid ex parte orders unless the absence was malafide and deliberate to delay the proceedings. From the material on record there is nothing to suggest that petitioner in any way acted with malafide or tried deliberately to delay the proceedings. From the material on record there is nothing to suggest that petitioner in any way acted with malafide or tried deliberately to delay the proceedings. In view of the fact that on 16.1.1979 the authorized representative of petitioner participated and cross-examined the witnesses examined for employees, it cannot be assumed that petitioner had any design to delay the proceedings. It was due to the unfortunate incident that petitioner's representative could not participate. In my opinion in the interest of justice, the Tribunal ought to have allowed the application. This writ petition has been pending in this Court for the last about 12 years. This delay could be avoided by the Tribunal by permitting petitioner to participate in the proceedings and to give its award on merits after hearing both sides. In fact, the approach adopted by the Tribunal cannot be justified in any manner. 11. Shri Ashok Khare also challenged the award on the ground that material filed by petitioner already on record has not been considered. However, since I am not satisfied that the Tribunal was justified in rejecting the application dated 25.1.1979 of petitioner, it is not necessary to examine this aspect of the case. The award of the Tribunal is liable to be set aside on the ground that the Tribunal illegally and in arbitrary manner did not permit petitioner to participate in the proceedings by rejecting application 25-D. 12. Now, since the ex parte award passed against petitioner has to be set aside for the reasons mentioned above, it is necessary in the interest of justice to compensate the respondents employees and the Union. Respondent No. 2 Shri K.K. Tiwari informed that an amount of Rs. 12019/- has been deposited by petitioner in compliance of the interim order of this Court dated 11.9.1979. According to Shri Tiwari this amount has not yet been paid by Tribunal to respondents. In my opinion, respondents shall be suitably compensated if this amount is directed to be paid to them for contesting the litigation upto this stage. Thus the amount deposited by petitioner in pursuance of the interim order passed by this Court shall be payable to the respondents as costs for setting aside the order dated 31.1.1979 and the ex parte award of the same date. 13. Thus the amount deposited by petitioner in pursuance of the interim order passed by this Court shall be payable to the respondents as costs for setting aside the order dated 31.1.1979 and the ex parte award of the same date. 13. For the reasons stated above, this writ petition is allowed and the order dated 31.1.1979, Annexure XII to the writ petition and award dated 31.1.1979 published on 9.3.1979 in the Gazette, Annexure XII to the writ petition, are hereby quashed. Parties shall stand relegated to the stage of the case which was on 16.1.1979 and the Tribunal shall proceed with the case from that stage and allow the petitioner to cross-examine the witnesses and to adduce such evidence oral or documentary for which he may be advised. Since the case is pending since 1978, it is also directed that the Tribunal shall adjudicate the dispute as far as possible within six months from the date a certified copy of this order is filed before it. The amount of Rs. 12010/ - deposited by petitioner shall be paid to the respondents in the following manner: (a) Rs. 2010/ - shall be paid to the Union, respondent No. 2, and (b) the remaining amount of Rs. 10,000/ - shall be distributed equally at the rate of Rs. 1250/ - each amongst the eight employees whose services were terminated by petitioner.