Remington Rand of India Ltd. v. Howrah Mills Ltd. — 1991 DIGILAW 108 (CAL)

Judgement MONOJ KUMAR MUKHERJEE, J.:- This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated April 15, 1988 passed in C.R.No.10801(W) of 1985 whereby a learned Judge of this Court allowed the writ petition filed by Howrah Mills Company Limited, the respondent No.1 herein, and quashed an order of requisition dated July 17, 1985 made under Section 3(1) of the West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948 (Act for short). By that order, the Additional District Magistrate, Howrah, requisitioned a land owned by the respondent No.1 and in occupation of Messrs. Remington Rand of India Limited, the appellant herein, for the purpose of providing proper facilities for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community and for creating employment opportunities to the people. Facts relevant for disposal of this appeal are as under. 2. By a registered deed dated September 16, 1959, the respondent No.1 granted lease of a part of its premises, where it runs a jute mill, to the appellant-Company, which is engaged in the business of manufacturing typewriters and office equipments, for a period of 20 years commencing from September 1, 1959. Since then, the appellant is running a factory in the demised premises, with 1850 employees on its pay-roll. A few months before expiry of the lease in February, 1979 to be precise - the respondent No.1 served a notice upon the appellant asking it to deliver peaceful and vacant possession of the demised premises immediately on the expiry of the lease and on the latters failure to comply with the demand, filed a suit for eviction in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Howrah on April 21, 1980. Thereafter, on November 24, 1984 the respondent No.1 made an application in this Court under clause 13 of the Letters Patent for transfer of the suit and its expeditious hearing on the ground that its proceeding was being unnecessarily and unjustifiably delayed in the Court below. This Court allowed that application by its order dated May 13, 1985 and listed the suit for final hearing on May 28, 1985. On that date, the appellant moved an application for amendment of the written statement, which was allowed. In course of the hearing of the amendment application, the learned trial. This Court allowed that application by its order dated May 13, 1985 and listed the suit for final hearing on May 28, 1985. On that date, the appellant moved an application for amendment of the written statement, which was allowed. In course of the hearing of the amendment application, the learned trial. Judge inquired as to whether the suit could be settled by the parties through grant of a fresh demise at an enhanced rate of rent, fixed on the basis of the market rate, and adjourned the matter to enable the parties to effect a settlement, if possible. Pursuant thereto, the parties tried to settle the matter but could not. Before, however, the suit could be taken up for final hearing, consequent upon such failure, the impugned order of requisition was made and symbolical possession of the suit premises was given to the appellant. Aggrieved thereby the respondent No.1 filed the writ petition. 3. In allowing the writ petition, the learned Judge held - i) that the power under Section 3(1) of the Act could not be invoked as the conditions precedent for exercising the same were wholly absent in the case in hand; ii) that the order of requisition was passed in colourable exercise of power under section 3(l) of the Act to make the suit for eviction infructuous; iii) that the power of requisition under the Act could be invoked for a public purpose, which was of a transitory character and, as such, it could not be exercised in the instant case, as the need herein was of a permanent nature; iv) that the elaborate procedure laid down in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, to acquire property for a private company could not be by-passed; and v) that the order of requisition was not served upon the respondent No.1, the admitted owner of the premises in question, before taking symbolic possession of the same and, therefore, all actions taken pursuant to the order of requisition were bad in law. 4. Mr. Gupta, the learned Advocate appearing for the appellant challenged all the above findings of the learned Judge. In assailing the first finding, Mr. Gupta submitted that the learned Judge failed to comprehend the scope and ambit of the powers exercisable under section 3(1) of the Act. To appreciate the steps of reasoning of Mr. 4. Mr. Gupta, the learned Advocate appearing for the appellant challenged all the above findings of the learned Judge. In assailing the first finding, Mr. Gupta submitted that the learned Judge failed to comprehend the scope and ambit of the powers exercisable under section 3(1) of the Act. To appreciate the steps of reasoning of Mr. Gupta in this regard, it will be appropriate at this stage to advert to section 3(1). From a plain reading thereof, it will appear that the State Government can requisition a land for - i) maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community; ii) increasing employment opportunities for the people by establishing commercial estates and industrial estates in different areas; iii) providing proper facilities for transport, communication, irrigation or drainage; iv) the creation of better living conditions in rural or urban areas by construction or re-construction of dwelling place in such areas; and v) purposes connected with any of the above or incidental thereto. 5. As has been already noticed, the order of requisition in the instant case has been made for two purposes, namely, for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of, the community and for creating employment opportunities to the people. So far as the first, is concerned, it must be said that it has no manner of application in the instant case. As has been rightly pointed out by the learned trial Judge, typewriters and other office equipments, which are being manufactured by the appellant in the premises in question cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be said to be articles, which are necessary for maintaining supplies or services essential to the life of the community so as to entitle the State Government to exercise its power of requisition of the premises in question for that purpose. Indeed, in their affidavits-in-opposition during their arguments, neither the State Government nor the appellant sought to support the order of requisition so far as it was made for that purpose. 6. Much emphasis was, however, laid by Mr. Gupta upon the other purpose mentioned in the order of requisition to support the same. Mr. Indeed, in their affidavits-in-opposition during their arguments, neither the State Government nor the appellant sought to support the order of requisition so far as it was made for that purpose. 6. Much emphasis was, however, laid by Mr. Gupta upon the other purpose mentioned in the order of requisition to support the same. Mr. Gupta submitted that though section 3(1) spoke of increasing employment opportunity for the people as a purpose for requisition and the impugned order spoke of creating employment opportunity to the people, both the phrases were synonymous and in the instant case, the exercise of the power of requisition by the State for the above purpose was absolutely necessary to continue with the employment of the people, who were working in the factory of the appellant and to increase further employment opportunity there. According to Mr. Gupta, if the appellant was evicted from the premises pursuant to any decree of eviction passed in the suit, not only the 1850 persons, who have been working there would lose their employment but further employment opportunities in the factory would also be stymied. In consideration of those facts, Mr. Gupta argued, the Government could and had legitimately exercised its powers under the Act, While on this point, Mr. Gupta next submitted that even if it was assumed that on its plain meaning the phrase continuing with employment of people was not synonymous with the phrase creating employment opportunity to the people as referred to in the order, or increasing employment opportunities for the people, as appearing in section 3(1), the Court should interpret them to be so with a view to promoting and advancing the object and purpose of the enactment. In support of this contention, Mr. Gupta relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Girdharilal and Sons v. Balbir Nath reported in AIR 1986 SC 1499 . Mr. Roy Chowdhury, the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the State, supported Mr. Gupta. 7. In combating the above contentions, Mr. Mitra, the learned Advocate appearing for the respondent No.1 first submitted that that the words increasing employment opportunity and the words creating employment opportunity had different meanings would be evident from the legislatures use of the words creation and increasing in different contexts while detailing the purposes in section 3(1). Gupta. 7. In combating the above contentions, Mr. Mitra, the learned Advocate appearing for the respondent No.1 first submitted that that the words increasing employment opportunity and the words creating employment opportunity had different meanings would be evident from the legislatures use of the words creation and increasing in different contexts while detailing the purposes in section 3(1). He next submitted that even if it was accepted that the above quoted words were synonymous, still then the State Government could not make the impugned order as there was no indication either in the order or in the affidavit-in-opposition filed by the State Government that the requisition was necessary for creating employment opportunity to the people by establishing commercial estates and industrial estates in different areas. According to Mr. Mitra, the phrase increasing employment opportunities for the people by establishing commercial estates and industrial estates in different areas, could not be dichotomized to enable and empower the Government to make an order under the Act for increasing employment opportunities in any conceivable manner, method or means. In other words, Mr. Mitra submitted, if the Government wanted to exercise its power under the Act to requisition any land for increasing employment opportunity, it must be by establishing industrial estates or commercial estates in different areas and not by any other mode or manner, howsoever laudable it might be. As there was nothing to indicate that the Government intended to create employment opportunities through establishment of such estates, the order under challenge was unsustainable, argued Mr. Mitra. Mr. Mitra lastly submitted that though the order was purportedly made for creating employment opportunity, the various averments made by the Government in its affidavit-in-opposition clearly indicated that it was made for the purpose of continuing with the employment of the people, who were working in the factory of the appellant and such a purpose could not - even, by liberal interpretation - be equated with the relevant purpose incorporated in Section 3(1). 8. To comprehend the respective contentions of the parties, it will be necessary to advert to the averments made in the affidavit-in-opposition of the State regarding the purpose for which the requisition has been made. 9. 8. To comprehend the respective contentions of the parties, it will be necessary to advert to the averments made in the affidavit-in-opposition of the State regarding the purpose for which the requisition has been made. 9. In paragraph 3 thereof, it has been stated that on or about May 29, 1985, the Minister in-charge of Land and Land Reforms Department in consultation with the Chief Minister of West Bengal decided, on behalf of the State of West Bengal, to requisition and acquire the land in question for creating employment opportunities to the people of the State of West Bengal. In paragraph 5, it has been stated that the requisition was made for providing and/or for continuing the employment of at least 2000 people in an industrial area without any break so that the industrial peace and harmony continued in sensitive industrial area. It has also been stated therein that the purpose of issuance of the notice dated July 17, 1985 (the notice of requisition) was to continue the employment potentialities of a Company, which would in fact stabilise the industrial peace and harmony in the State of West Bengal. It has further been stated therein that the main consideration of the Government was not to curtail the employment opportunities to the people of the State and was to prevent industrial unrest. Another statement that has been made therein in this regard is that the order was made to have an uninterrupted industrial production for the ultimate benefit of the State by way of revenue earnings from the production and to keep industrial harmony and peace in or around the industrial area, where the factory was situated. Lastly, in paragraph 7, it has been stated that the requisition was made for bona fide pursuing a policy of providing continuous employment to large number of labourers. 10. Culling the various averments made in the affidavit-in-opposition, we find that the real purpose for which the impugned order was made was to see that the people working in the appellants Company did not lose their employment through eviction of the appellant from the premises in question. In other words, for all intents and purposes, the State passed the impugned order of requisition to continue with the employment of the people working in the factory. In other words, for all intents and purposes, the State passed the impugned order of requisition to continue with the employment of the people working in the factory. Undoubtedly, such a purpose is a laudable one but then the question is whether it comes within the purview of the Act under which the requisition has been made. In answering this question, even if we accept the contention of Mr. Gupta, that we should not go by the letters but by the object and purposes of the enactment, as held in the case of Girdharilal and Sons (supra), and make an attempt to interpret the words increasing (or creating) employment opportunities to mean continuing with employment opportunities also, we fail to do so as such interpretation would not fit in the set-up in which the former words have been placed. 11. Juxtaposing the different purposes enumerated in Section 3(l), which have been detailed earlier, we find that while two of them do not lay down the mode and manner of achieving the purpose the other two, which include increasing employment opportunities, specifically lay down the mode and manner in which the purpose should be achieved. The conclusion is inescapable therefore that if the State Government intends to requisition land under the Act for increasing employment opportunities. It has to be by establishing commercial estates and industrial estates in different areas. Mr. Gupta submitted, that even the requirement of the above clause stood satisfied in the present case as the word establish not only meant to bring into existence but also to make firm or stable and the Government passed the impugned order to stabilise the appellants Company, which was an industrial estate, when its existence was imperilled by the suit of eviction. In support of his above contention, Mr. Gupta relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Azeez Basha v. Union of India reported in AIR 1968 SC 662 , wherein the word establish has been interpreted for the purpose of Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India: In that case, after considering the different meanings of the word establish, which include to found or base squarely, to make firm or stable, to bring into existence, the Supreme Court held that for the purpose of Article 30(1), it meant to bring into existence. 12. 12. Having considered the different clauses of sub-section(1) of Section 3 of the Act, we are of the opinion that the same meaning namely, to bring into existence, should be given here also. There is no dispute that the Act has been brought into the statute book for the purposes of requisition and speedy acquisition of land for any of the purposes mentioned therein. In that context and considering the nature of objectives, the legislature has advisedly used different words namely, maintaining, increasing, providing and creation in the various clauses. It cannot be gainsaid therefore, that when the legislature spoke of increasing - and not maintaining - employment opportunities by establishing industrial or commercial estates, it meant that such increase was to be done by bringing into existence such estates. To put it differently, the power under the above clause can be exercised through creation of something new and not by maintaining status quo. 13. For the foregoing discussion, we must hold that in the present case, the impugned order does not satisfy the purposes for which it has been made. As the first finding of the learned trial Judge has got to be upheld, we need not consider the contentions of Mr. Gupta. assailing the other findings of the learned Judge. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed but without any order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.