JUDGMENT R.K. Agrawal, J. - Writ Petition No. 233 of 1991 has been filed for quashing the notice issued by the District Magistrate, Unnao for holding a meeting on 19-1-1991 to consider the no-confidence motion against the petitioner and to issue a writ of mandamus for restraining the opposite parties from holding the meeting on 19-1-1991. Further prayer has been made for quashing the resolution of meeting of 19-1-1991. The petitioner is the Chairman of the Nagarpalika, Bangarmau, district Unnao. On 13-4-1990 the petitioner received a notice from the District Magistrate, Unnao intimating that the motion of no-confidence against the petitioner would be considered in the meeting on 5-5-1990, The petitioner filed Writ Petition No. 4267 of 1990 challenging the said notice of no-confidence motion and the court has passed the order that the said meeting would not be held on 5-5-1990 and therefore the said meeting was not held. Thereafter 12 members of the Nagar Palika submitted another motion of no-confidence against the petitioner to the District Magistrate. Unnao and the District Magistrate on that basis had convened the meeting for considering the said no-confidence motion on 19-1-1991(Annexure 5). The petitioner thereafter filed this another Writ Petition No. 233 of 1991 with the allegations that in spite of the repeated requests, he was not supplied with the certified copies of the no-confidence motion and other documents. The District Magistrate could not convene the fresh meeting within one year from the date of earlier meeting which could not be held on 5-5-1990 for want of quorum. The District Magistrate herself has not fixed 19-1-1991 as the date for consideration no-confidence motion. The notices were also not issued to the members of the Nagar Palika under the signature of the District Magistrate. 2. Several members of the Nagarpalika were impleaded as opposite parties 3 to 11. The opposite parties have filed counter affidavit in which it has been mentioned that the meeting could not be held on 5-5-1990 on account of the interim order passed by this Court in Writ Petition No. 4267 of 1990 and not on account of want of quorum. It has also been alleged that the District Magistrate herself had fixed 19-1-1991 as the date for the meeting to be held under the Chairmanship of a Judicial Magistrate nominated by the District Judge. It has also been alleged that the District Magistrate herself had fixed 19-1-1991 as the date for the meeting to be held under the Chairmanship of a Judicial Magistrate nominated by the District Judge. It was also alleged that since the District Magistrate was on leave, the Additional District Magistrate was officiating as District Magistrate and. therefore, any noting and orders passed by him would be deemed to have been passed by the District Magistrate as he was discharging the duties of the District Magistrate and that there was no provision for giving copies of no-confidence motion. Rejoinder affidavit has been filed reiterating the allegations made in the writ petition. It was further alleged therein that the District Magistrate has no authority to appoint any Judicial Officer to preside over the meeting. It was only the District Judge who could nominate the Judicial Officer for the said purpose. The second meeting could not be called on 19-1-1991 as two years' period had not elapsed since 5-5-1990. The District Magistrate had not in fact fixed the date for holding the meeting. 3. Writ Petition No. 4267/90 was filed by the petitioner, as mentioned above, against the proposed meeting to be held on 5-5-1990. This Court by an order dated 3-5-1990 had restrained the opposite parties from holding any meeting on 5-5-1990 and therefore, the meeting was not held on 5-5-1990. The said petition has also been connected with the Petition No. 233/91, but in view of the fact that no meeting was held on 5-5-1990, this Petition No. 4267/90 has become infructuous. 4. Argument has been advanced on behalf of the parties in Writ Petition No. 233/91. The first point argued on behalf of the petitioner was that since on 5-5-90 the meeting could not be held for want of quorum for considering the non-confidence motion the second notice for no-confidence motion could not be taken up within two years. 4. Argument has been advanced on behalf of the parties in Writ Petition No. 233/91. The first point argued on behalf of the petitioner was that since on 5-5-90 the meeting could not be held for want of quorum for considering the non-confidence motion the second notice for no-confidence motion could not be taken up within two years. For this reliance has been placed on the provisions contained in Section 87 of the U. P. Municipalities Act the relevant portion so far as it relates to this controversy reads as follows : "(13) If the motion is not carried by a majority as aforesaid, or if the meeting cannot be held for want of quorum which shall not be less than two-thirds of the total number of members of the Board, for the time being, no notice of any subsequent motion of no confidence in the same President shall be received until after the expiry of a period of two years from the date of the meeting." (Prior to U. P. Act No. 41 of 1976 this period was twelve months.) 5. The meeting which has to be held on 5-5-90 for considering the no-confidence motion was not at all held as this Court in writ petition No. 4267 of 1990 had restrained the opposite parties for holding such a meeting. The order passed in that case reads as follows : ".... we direct that the meeting proposed to be held on 5-5-1990 for considering the no-confidence motion shall not be held until further orders of the Court. It will, however, be open to the members of the Nagarpalika, Bangarmau to sponsor a fresh no-confidence motion in accordance with law, if they are so advices." 6. In view of the aforesaid order the meeting could not at all be held on 5-5-90. In the counter-affidavit filed by opposite party Nos. 1 and 2 it was clearly mentioned that the meeting was not held on 5-5-1990 as the said order was passed by the Hon'ble High Court in writ petition No. 4267/90. The learned counsel for the petitioner has, however, contended that the motion of no-confidence could not be considered on 5-5-1990 for want of quorum. There is, however, nothing on record to show that any meeting was held on 5-5-1990 and the same was adjourned for want of quorum. The learned counsel for the petitioner has, however, contended that the motion of no-confidence could not be considered on 5-5-1990 for want of quorum. There is, however, nothing on record to show that any meeting was held on 5-5-1990 and the same was adjourned for want of quorum. Since this Court in writ petition No. 4267/90 had already held that no meeting should be held on 5-5-1990 for considering the no-confidence motion the argument of the petitioner cannot be accepted that any such meeting was held and was adjourned for want of quorum. The prohibition for submitting the notice of any subsequent motion of no-confidence within the period of two years from the date of the earlier meeting would apply only when the earlier meeting could not be held for want of quorum as the motion was not carried by a majority as mentioned in Section 87A. If the meeting was not held at all on any other ground or on account of any stay order passed by the Court the prohibition contained in sub-section (13) of Section 87-A of the Municipalities Act quoted above would have no application. Sub-section (13) of See. 87A was also considered in a case reported in 1968 All LJ 704, Jugul Kishore Paliwal v. District Magistrate. In that case a single Judge of this Court has observed : "Sub-section (13) of Section 87-A bars the entertainment of subsequent notice of no confidence in the same president for a period of 12 months from the date of the meeting convened to consider the previous motion of no-confidence, in two situations, namely, if the motion is not carried by a majority or if the meeting cannot be held for want of quorum. None of these two situations arise in the present case. The motion originally lodged has become infructuous for other reasons. Consequently, sub-section (13) would be no bar to the reception of another notice of a motion of no confidence in the same president." In the aforesaid Jugul Kishore Paliwal's case the meeting of no-confidence was held on 21-3-68 and the motion of no-confidence was carried. The said motion was challenged on the ground that proceedings of that meeting were totally void and unenforceable. The Court held that the meeting was not validly held and quashed the resolution passing no-confidence motion. The said motion was challenged on the ground that proceedings of that meeting were totally void and unenforceable. The Court held that the meeting was not validly held and quashed the resolution passing no-confidence motion. In that context a question arose as to whether any fresh direction should be given by the Court for permission to hold another meeting so as to overcome the prohibition contained in sub-section (13) of Section 87-A of the Act. It was in that context the single Judge of this Court made the observations quoted above. 7. The purpose of putting this prohibition in sub-section (13) of Section 87-A of the Act is obvious. The legislature did not want that if the motion was not carried by a majorities or would not be deemed to be carried for want of quorum in the meeting, the members must not be allowed to bring frivolous motion of non-confidence against the same president during a particular period. Bringing such no-confidence motion frequently would certainly put hindrance in the smooth working of the local bodies. If, however, the motion is not carried or is deemed to have not been carried for any other reasons, the prohibition contained in sub-section (13) of Section 87-A of the Act would have no application. 8. In our view, therefore, since the meeting could not be held on 5-5-90 on account of the stay order passed by the Court, the prohibition contained in sub-sec. (13) of Section 87-A of the Act would have no application and the second motion of no-confidence could be brought within two years from the date of the earlier proposed meeting. 9. It was contended on behalf of the petitioner that the letter Annexure 5 issued by the District Magistrate, Unnao shows that she herself has appointed Sri Jogesh Chandra Tripathi, Munsif-Magistrate to preside over the meeting, but the District Magistrate has no authority to appoint any Civil Judicial Officer for presiding the meeting to consider the no-confidence motion. The District Magistrate has to request the District Judge for nominating such officer for that purpose. The District Magistrate has to request the District Judge for nominating such officer for that purpose. In the counter-affidavit filed by the opposite parties l and 2 in paragraph 8, it has clearly been mentioned that letter No. 207/XXI/90-91 LBC dated 22-12-90 was sent by the District Magistrate requesting the District Judge to appoint a Judicial Magistrate for holding the meeting as a Presiding Officer, and on that, the District Judge passed the order appointing Sri Jogesh Chandra Tripathi, Munsif Magistrate for the purpose. It is thus clear that the District Magistrate had arranged with the District Judge for a Judicial Officer to preside at the meeting convened for considering no-confidence motion, and after the District Judge had nominated a Judicial Officer, the District Magistrate had intimated the petitioner vide Annexure 5 that Sri Jogesh Chandra Tripathi, Munsif-Magistrate was appointed to preside over the meeting on 19-1-1991. There is, therefore, absolutely no illegality in nomination of Sri Jogesh Chandra Tripathi, Munsif-Magistrate for presiding over the meeting. 10. It was next argued on behalf of the petitioner that the District Magistrate herself did not fix the date of the meeting for considering the no-confidence motion and for this he has placed reliance on the office noting. copy of which has been filed as Annexure 6. In support of this contention reliance has been placed on the case reported in 1970 All LJ 978, Kishore Goswami v. District Magistrate. In that case, single Judge of this Court has held that the function of fixing the date and time of meeting or determining the manner of publication of notice has to be performed by the District Magistrate himself and the same cannot be delegated to anyone else. There is no dispute to this proposition of law as the same view was taken by the Full Bench of this Court, reported in AIR 1975 All 315 (FB), Gyan Singh v. District Magistrate, Bijnora. It is to be seen in the instant case if the District Magistrate himself/ herself had fixed the date, time and place of the meeting or not. 11. The opposite parties in their counter-affidavit alleged that Annexure 6 is not a true copy of the entire noting. Annexure GA1 has been filed by the opposite parties as the copy of the full official noting regarding the notice given to the District Magistrate for convening the meeting for considering the non-confidence motion. 11. The opposite parties in their counter-affidavit alleged that Annexure 6 is not a true copy of the entire noting. Annexure GA1 has been filed by the opposite parties as the copy of the full official noting regarding the notice given to the District Magistrate for convening the meeting for considering the non-confidence motion. This Annexure GA1 indicates that the office had put a note mentioning that the District Judge had nominated Sri Jogesh Chandra Tripathi for presiding over the meeting of no-confidence motion and requested the District Magistrate to fix the date, time and place for the said meeting. The officer-in-charge had suggested to the District Magistrate that if approved, the meeting may be held on 19-1-1991. On this noting the officiating District Magistrate on 28-12-1990 approved the said date and thereafter the said noting was placed before the District Magistrate Unnao who made certain enquiries. In paragraph 8 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the opposite parties 1 and 2, it has been mentioned that the opinion was sought by the District Magistrate from the District Government Counsel (civil) on this point and on getting the opinion of the District Government Counsel (Civil) on 7-1-1991, the District Magistrate had fixed 19-1-1991 as the date for holding the meeting in the office of the Municipal Board at I1 a.m. 12. A Annexure 5 is the copy of the letter issued by the District Magistrate to the petitioner intimating him that the meeting of no-confidence against him would be held at 11 a.m. on 19-1-1991 in the office of the Municipal Board and the said meeting would be presided over by Sri Jogesh Chandra Tripathi, Munsif-Magistrate, Unnao. The original was summoned from the office of the Municipal Board Unnao and the said record was produced before the Court on 10-41991. The original record shows that the letter, copy of which is Annexure 5, bears the date, time and place of the meeting as well as the name of the Magistrate who was to preside over the meeting and the said letter did contain the signature of Smt. Zohra Chaterjee. the then District Magistrate Unnao. It is, therefore, clear that it was the District Magistrate herself, who had fixed the date, time and place of the meeting and had also intimated the petitioner that the said meeting would be presided over by Sri Jogesh Chandra Tripathi. Munsif-Magistrate. 13. the then District Magistrate Unnao. It is, therefore, clear that it was the District Magistrate herself, who had fixed the date, time and place of the meeting and had also intimated the petitioner that the said meeting would be presided over by Sri Jogesh Chandra Tripathi. Munsif-Magistrate. 13. Much emphasis has however, been laid on behalf of the petitioner that the office noting Annexure 6 and CA-1 indicated that it was the officiating District Magistrate, who had given the approval for fixing a date of the meeting and, therefore, even if the District Magistrate had fixed the date of the meeting subsequently, that would mean that the date was not in fact fixed by the District Magistrate herself, but was fixed by the officiating District Magistrate. This contention is devoid of force. If the District Magistrate had fixed a date even on the suggestion of any subordinate officer that would not mean that the date had not been fixed by the District Magistrate. In Writ Petn. No. 4777 of 1990 Brijendra Bahadur Singh v. The District Magistrate, Gonda and others, the Division Bench on 30-5-1991 (reported in 1992 (1) UPLBEC 248) of which we were the members, after considering the provisions of Section 87(3) of the Act had observed (Para 37) : "The mandatory requirements of Section 87A(3) may now he summarised as follows :- (1) The meeting for consideration of the motion of no-confidence must be convened by the District Magistrate himself; (2) The District Magistrate must himself fix the date and time of meeting. However fixation of date and time will not be vitiated merely because they were suggested by some other officer or off tout: (emphasis supplied) (3) The date fixed must not be earlier than thirty days and not less than thirty five days from the date of delivery of motion of no-confidence to the District Magistrate; (4) Having fixed the date and time the District Magistrate must take steps which will ensure communication of the date and time to members. These steps need not be identical to the steps mentioned in Section 87A(3). Other modes of communication are not barred; and (5) The meeting must be held in the office of the Board." In view of this, it cannot, therefore, be said that in this case the District Magistrate herself had not fixed the date. time and place for holding the meeting. 14. Other modes of communication are not barred; and (5) The meeting must be held in the office of the Board." In view of this, it cannot, therefore, be said that in this case the District Magistrate herself had not fixed the date. time and place for holding the meeting. 14. Learned counsel for the petitioner has, however placed reliance on the case reported in (1989) 2 UPLBEC 313 , Radhey Shyam v. Municipal Board Kasganj. In that case it was in dispute that the date of the meeting was not fixed by the District Magistrate and the District Magistrate had also not arranged with the District Judge for a stipendiary Civil Judicial Officer to preside at the said meeting for considering the no-confidence motion. In that context the Division Bench of this Court had declared the meeting invalid. In the instant case, as mentioned above, the District Magistrate had arranged with the District Judge for a Judicial Magistrate to preside over the meeting and the District Magistrate herself had fixed the date, time and place for holding the meeting. 15. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also argued that the District Magistrate had not supplied copies of relevant documents. Section 87-A of the Act which relates to the motion of no-confidence against the president, does not at all provide that thee copies of the documents or the notice of no confidence submitted by the members of the Board to the District Magistrate shall also be served on the president against whom the motion of no-confidence was going to be considered. 16. It has also been argued on behalf of the petitioner that the notice issued to several members of the Board did not hear the signature of the District Magistrate. Annexure 6 is one of the such notices issued to the members of the Board. In the aforesaid Full Bench Gyan Singh's case ( AIR 1975 All 315 ). It has been held that the purpose of sending notice is to give intimation to the members to attend the meeting convened for the purpose of considering the motion of no-confidence and once it is established that the members had notice and had acquired knowledge of the date and time of the meeting, the purpose for which the notice was required to be sent would be fulfilled. 17. 17. In the instant case it has been held above that the date, time and place have been fixed by the District Magistrate herself and the District Magistrate was required to send information about the said meeting to the members of the Board. Sending of notices is in fact a ministerial act. We are fortified in this view by a case reported in 1961 All LJ 226, Krishna Chandra Gupta v. Prayag Narain. In that case a Bench of this Court has observed : "The absence of his (District Magistrate) signature on the notice has no effect on its validity if it is otherwise satisfies the conditions regarding the date, time etc. Moreover, the duty of sending a notice provided in sub-section (3) is an administrative act to be done by him. In exercising such acts it is usual that subordinate are deputed to carry out the ministerial part which cannot possibly be done by the superior authority himself. The ministerial part which has not been done by the authority itself but has been done by a subordinate in pursuance of the order and direction of the superior authority, is to all intents and purposes the act of the superior authority itself which in performing that part acts through its subordinates." It is, therefore, not at all necessary that the notices informing the members of the Board about the date, time and place must also be signed by the District Magistrate. It is not required that the District Magistrate must sign all the notices which are sent to the members of the Board just merely to inform the members about the date and time of the meeting which has already been fixed by the District Magistrate herself. In our view, therefore, the absence of signature of the District Magistrate on the notices issued to the members failed to render the notice invalid as it was not at all mandatory for her to sign all the letters and notices herself. 18. All said and considered, we are, therefore, of the view that there is no illegality in the notice Annexure 5 issued by the District Magistrate for convening the meeting on 19-1-1991 for considering the no-confidence motion against the petitioner. Therefore, Writ Petition No. 233 of 1991 has no force and is dismissed. Writ Petition No. 4267 of 1990 has become infructuous and is dismissed as such. Therefore, Writ Petition No. 233 of 1991 has no force and is dismissed. Writ Petition No. 4267 of 1990 has become infructuous and is dismissed as such. There is no order as to costs.