S. C. MOHAPATRA, J. ( 1 ) IN these three writ applications under Art. 226 of the Constitution, petitioners have sought for quashing of the order dated 10-1-1991 (Annexure-1) of opposite party No. 1 by issue of writs in the nature of certiorari. As the points involved in all the three writ applications are the same, parties are the same and Annexure-1 is a common order, these three writ applications are heard together and are disposed of by this judgment. ( 2 ) PETITIONER No. 1 is a firm and petitioner No. 2 is a partner thereof. Opposite party No. 4 is a new firm constituted by partners as described in cause title. These two are also partners of the petitioners firm. Petitioner No. 1 applied for granting quarry leases under R. 6 of the Orissa Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1983 (hereinafter called 'the Rules') on 27-6-1989. No order in respect of the application was communicated to the petitioners for more than three months. Treating the same to be refusal under Rule 8, petitioners preferred appeals under Rule 29 on 6-12-1989. Opposite Party No. 1 dismissed the appeals as barred by limitation. Petitioners preferred revision before opposite party No. 2 which have been dismissed on 26-2-91 by order (Annexure-2 ). Aggrieved by the same, petitioners have preferred these three writ applications. ( 3 ) IN the counter affidavit filed on behalf of opposite party No. 4, it has been disclosed that petitioner No. 2 has filed a suit in the court of Subordinate Judge, Sambalpur registered as Title Suit No. 155 of 1989 where he has sought the relief of appointing an arbitrator to decide whether lease granted to opposite party No. 4 is the lease to petitioner No. 2, to declare the leases in favour of opposite party No. 4 to be illegal and to direct for grant the same in favour of petitioner No. 1, for dissolution of petitioner No. 1 firm and for rendition of its accounts and to indemnify the loss of petitioner No. 1 by partners of opposite party No. 4 amongst other reliefs. In view of the suit, it is submitted that lease having been granted in favour of opposite party No. 4 to knowledge of petitioners and no appeal having been filed against such grant of lease, relief sought for in the appeal by petitioners cannot be granted and as such whether appeals are barred by limitation is academic. Added to it, it submitted that opp. party No. 1 has rightly dismissed the appeals as barred by limitation. In these writ applications, question to be examined is whether appeals filed by petitioners are barred by limitation. We need not examine the maintainability of the appeals at this stage since the appellate authority has not considered the same in right perspective and petitioners have opportunity to prefer appeals against lease in favour of opposite party No. 4 if so advised by applying for condonation of delay. ( 4 ) UNDER Rule 8, an application for a quarry lease is to be disposed of by competent authority within three months from the date of its receipt and in case it is not so disposed of within that period, the application shall be deemed to have been refused. Under R. 10, order of refusal or deemed refusal shall be intimated to the applicant stating reasons for such refusal. Under R. 29 (1) appeal lies against the order of refusal within one month from the date of communication of the order. Rules 8, 10 and 29 (1) which are material for consideration in these writ applications are quoted below. "8. Disposal of applications : every application for a quarry lease shall be disposed of by the competent Authority within three months from the date of its receipt and if it is not disposed of within the period, the application shall be deemed to have been refused. ""10. Intimation of refusal : if the application for a quarry lease is refused, or is deemed to be refused, the Competent Authority shall inform the applicant stating the reasons for such refusal. ""29. ""10. Intimation of refusal : if the application for a quarry lease is refused, or is deemed to be refused, the Competent Authority shall inform the applicant stating the reasons for such refusal. ""29. (1) Any person aggrieved by an order of the Competent Authority may, within one month from the date of communication of the order, file an appeal against such order to the Sub-Divisional Officer, if the order is passed by the Revenue Inspector of Tahsildar, to the Conservator of Forests, if the order is passed by the Forester or Divisional Forest Officer to the Joint Director of Mines, if the order is passed by the Mining Inspector or Assistant Mining Officer or Mining Officer or Senior Mining Officer. " (2) to (5) xx xx xx ( 5 ) THERE is no dispute that applications were received on 22-6-1989. Those applications are required to be disposed of on or before 22-9-1989. When they were not so disposed of within the time limit, they shall be deemed to have refused as provided under Rule 8. Competent Authority is required under Rule 10 to inform the applicant about the refusal with reasons for the same. As the appellate authority has found, such order of deemed refusal has not been communicated to the applicant. ( 6 ) LANGUAGE of Rule 29 (1) is clear that any person aggrieved can file an appeal within thirty days of communication of the order. Right of appeal to an aggrieved person cannot be denied by non-communication of an order. Such right being a beneficial provision for the person aggrieved is to be liberally construed. Thus, an appeal can be filed before communication of the order. Every Tribunal has ancillary power to grant stay of the impugned order when there is no specific prohibition for the same in the statute giving right of appeal. This has been clearly laid down in the decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1969 SC 430 (Income-tax Officer, Cannanore v. M. K. Mohammed Kunchi ). When another authority has been given the power to consider the question of stay, appellate authority would have no such ancillary power as has been held in ILR (1971) Cut 1325 : (1972 Tax LR 1735) (State of Orissa v. Member, Sales Tax Tribunal ). When another authority has been given the power to consider the question of stay, appellate authority would have no such ancillary power as has been held in ILR (1971) Cut 1325 : (1972 Tax LR 1735) (State of Orissa v. Member, Sales Tax Tribunal ). Similarly, appellate authority shall have no power of stay on account of specific bar as has been provided in S. 74 (3) of the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1952. Therefore, if an interpretation is given then an appeal cannot be filed without communication of the order, in some situations appeal filed after communication of order may become infructuous. As in this case, applications of petitioners have been deemed to be refused and leases have been granted to opp. party No. 4, if no order of stay would have been passed, opposite party No. 4 would have worked out the lease and petitioners would have been helpless, since they could not have preferred appeal without communication of order. Therefore, preferring of appeal under Rule 29 (1) without communication of the order cannot be objected to. ( 7 ) NEXT question is whether appeal not filed within thirty days of knowledge of the order would be barred by limitation. Provision of limitation restricts a right of appeal vested in a person. Any provision which restricts rights is to be interpreted strictly. Where the language does not lend to the only conclusion that the restriction has operated, an interpretation is to be given that the restriction imposed does not operate. Examining language of Rule 29 (1), it will be seen that limitation runs from the date of communication of the order. Rule 10 provides for communication of order. Therefore, until the order is not communicated to the applicant, period of limitation fixed in Rule 29 (1) does not begin to run and appeal can be filed any time. ( 8 ) QUESTION is whether on account of non-communication of order to the applicant whose application has been refused, lease granted to another would be affected even when he has invested money to work out the lease. If the lease granted is not in accordance with law or refusal of application is on account of bias or prejudice of competent authority or grant of lease is outcome of favour or other extraneous consideration, no authority can support such refusal and grant. If the lease granted is not in accordance with law or refusal of application is on account of bias or prejudice of competent authority or grant of lease is outcome of favour or other extraneous consideration, no authority can support such refusal and grant. However, where the applicant has known about the lease and has accepted the same without murmur, permitting the person to whom lease has been granted to operate the quarry appellate court may in a given case refuse to give relief to the appellant on the ground of acquiesence. It would depend upon facts and circumstances of a case. But an appeal cannot be refused to be entertained on merits on the ground of being barred by limitation. ( 9 ) ACCORDINGLY, Annexures-1and 2 in each of the writ applications is quashed. Appellate authority is directed to consider the appeals on merits. Parties are at liberty to raise all available points before the appellate authority which shall be considered and decided on their merits. All the parties are directed to appear before the appellate authority on 29/04/1991 on which day appellate authority shall fix a date of hearing. ( 10 ) IN the result, writ applications are allowed. No costs. Requisites for issue of writ in all the three writ applications to opposite party No. 2 only shall be filed by tomorrow separately. ( 11 ) J. M. MAHAPATRA, J. : -. I agree. Applications allowed.