JUDGMENT Ravi S. Dhavan, J. - A set of tenants complains that the landlord is under contempt as he has breached the undertaking that certain premises would be made available but this has not been done. The undertaking to which they refer is on record by an affidavit in writ petition No. 5221 of 1985 : Rafiq Ahmad and others v. IInd Addl. District Judge and others. 2. If the controversies in the present matter are to be appreciated, a brief introduction to the litigation in question is necessary. The matter which was in issue between the landlord and tenants was under Section 24 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972). 3. There was an old building which had reached the state of dilapidation and the landlord felt that he ought to reconstruct at the same place another building so that he could put his real estate to better investment. The law permits owners of properties with sitting tenants under the Act, aforesaid, to do so by seeking permission from the Court of first instance under the Act i.e. the Prescribed Authority. The accommodation was purchased by the wife of the present landlord in 1979. The tenants have been in the accommodation before the present landlords and since a very long time and on this there is no issue. The present landlord Mr. Chandra Prakash is an Advocate from Saharanpur. He is the landlord, today, as the building was originally purchased by his wife Smt. Urmila Gupta. She died. Thus, Mr. Chandra Prakash Gupta stepped into her shoes as owner of the property. 4. Smt. Urmila Gupta had moved an application before the Prescribed Authority under Section 21(1)(b) read with Section 24 of the Act. The District Judge permitted the release of the accommodation, in effect, granting permission to the landlord to demolish the old structure and construct a new building on its site. The tenants resisted this permission and filed writ petition No. 5221 of 1985 : Rafiq Ahmad and others v. IInd Additional District Judge and others, in effect, seeking a relief that permission granted by the District Judge permitting the landlord to put up a new building at the site of the old once be denied implying thereby that they would continue as tenants in the old building. On record of the writ petition the landlord gave an assurance and faith to the Court by an affidavit that his intention to put a new building at the site of the old one was bonafide and there need be no apprehension in the minds of the tenants that the intention of the landlord was a ruse to keep them out. The affidavit, in effect, submitted that upon the new building being constructed it would be ensured that the tenants would have on the ground floor the same floor area which they occupied. Thus the Court did not feel inclined that it ought to invoke a writ of certiorari to certify the order of the District Judge granting permission to landlord to demolish the old structure and put up a new one instead and further there was an undertaking on a affidavit, assuring the tenants' return. It was premature at that stage to comment on anything that there may be a disinclination in the mind of the landlord to not make the accommodation available to the tenants. The logic of this was that the old building had yet to go and the new one had yet to come up and the occasion to test the undertaking would arrive when the new building was constructed. 5. The Court, thus, parted with the record of the writ petition so that the landlord pursues the permission granted to him to put up a new structure instead of the old one. 6. The building which the landlord was constructing was delayed. By this time the writ petition had been decided by the order of this Court dated July 8, 1986, and a schedule for reconstruction had been given. The landlord thought it necessary that he would apply to the Court to seek further time to construct the building within the extended period so permitted by the Court. The application of the landlord seeking further time was filed in the writ petition on May 12, 1989. The prayer was that the Court extend the time upto January, 1990. The issues in the application, thus, were not on merits regarding whether the landlord could construct the new building or not as that matter had been settled that he could. The application of the landlord seeking further time was filed in the writ petition on May 12, 1989. The prayer was that the Court extend the time upto January, 1990. The issues in the application, thus, were not on merits regarding whether the landlord could construct the new building or not as that matter had been settled that he could. The only aspect was that the landlord desired the record to be straight that as he could not construct the building whatever be the cause he thought it proper to have the time extended from the Court. While the application lay pending it came to be considered on November 3, 1989. Before this Court today learned Counsel on both sides contend that this application remains pending for being considered for further orders. On this the Court shall see the record. The order was passed on November 3, 1989. It refers to this application. The order is thus :- "The petition was dismissed on 8 July, 1989 in the light of certain observations, which had been made by the Court. The issues were that the petitioner claims a writ of re-entry under Section 24 of the U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972. Before the Court an undertaking was filed by an affidavit by the respondent No. 3 to the effect that at the place where shop now exists a big room on the ground floor of the same size and area is being set apart and would be available to the petitioner should they exercise their option of re-entry under Section 24 of the Act, aforesaid, and that the respondents will divide the said room in the new accommodation to carve out two shops to the two petitioners. The undertaking is on record. An application was filed on behalf of the respondent No. 3 that the time for completing may be extended until 31st January, 1990. This application was listed before this Court on 26th July, 1989 and the petitioner was granted one week's time to file a reply. The petitioner filed a reply by a counter affidavit on 5th September, 1989. The respondent, aforesaid, sought a fortnight's time to file a rejoinder affidavit. The rejoinder affidavit has not been filed. Today there is an illness slip on behalf of learned Counsel for the said respondents. The petitioner filed a reply by a counter affidavit on 5th September, 1989. The respondent, aforesaid, sought a fortnight's time to file a rejoinder affidavit. The rejoinder affidavit has not been filed. Today there is an illness slip on behalf of learned Counsel for the said respondents. Learned Counsel for the petitioner contends that while the said respondents may have sought further time for construction of the building until 31st January, 1990, the fact of the matter is that the building is complete. A photograph has been placed as Annexure 3 with the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the petitioner. Today because of the illness slip of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 3, the matter cannot proceed for consideration. Lest there will be further complications the accommodation on the ground floor, in reference, to which the undertaking was given, shall not be let out to any other person and shall be kept vacant until further orders of the Court. List this matter peremptorily when this Court convenes next." 7. Two aspects need to be noticed in reference to the context of this application (a) whether on moving the application the writ petition was being revived, and (b) are any further orders to be passed on the application. 8. Now two conditions are available to the Court. The writ petition was limited to the extent of the permission permitting the landlord to construct a new building which have not been interfered with the issues on the writ petition are not to be reopened. Further, whereas the landlord had put a time schedule on the record of the writ petition that new building would be complete by July 1989, the application was limited to the purpose of seeking extension of this time. While this application was being considered and taken up it was brought to the Court's notice by an affidavit of the tenants that the building was heading towards completion. While the landlord contended that it is yet to be completed the tenants claim that the building is complete. Between these two issues the Court noticed a photograph filed with the tenants' counter affidavit (in reply to the application) showing the state of construction of the building. While the landlord contended that it is yet to be completed the tenants claim that the building is complete. Between these two issues the Court noticed a photograph filed with the tenants' counter affidavit (in reply to the application) showing the state of construction of the building. Let there be any further complication in so far as the ground floor was concerned, an undertaking being on record that the ground floor will remain vacant for occupation by the tenants, the Court passed a prohibitive order compatible with the undertaking that the ground floor would not be let out to strangers. Impliedly, the tenants cannot contend that there has been any violation of Court's order upon extension of time not being granted to the landlord that he did not construct the building within the period within which he had assured the Court i.e. before July, 1989. The prohibitive order of the Court itself implies that the application of the landlord was not rejected. Today the question of rejecting the application of the landlord does not arise as the building is complete. It has been contended by the learned Counsel for the landlord that the building was completed on November 5, 1989. Learned Counsel submits that the completion of the building was also reported on the same day to the municipal authorities. 9. The matter ought to have closed when the building stood completed as there ought not to have been any issue as the one which has now been raised regarding whether the tenants should be accommodated in the building which now stands reconstructed. On January 4, 1990 this Court had an occasion to pass an order to the effect that the accommodation in question shall be sealed, forthwith, subject to further orders of this Court, by the Prescribed Authority Munsif, Haveli, Saharanpur. The occasion to pass this order arose when the tenants placed facts before this Court to the effect that this very accommodation which was to become the subject-matter of accommodation to them is also the subject-matter of an advertisement by a property dealer as an agent of the landlord. A photograph was placed before the Court that one of the shutters on the ground floor advertised that the shops are available for being put on rent, the printed announcement gave the same of the property dealer. Reference was not to any one shop but it was plural. A photograph was placed before the Court that one of the shutters on the ground floor advertised that the shops are available for being put on rent, the printed announcement gave the same of the property dealer. Reference was not to any one shop but it was plural. The reference was not to 'Dookan' but 'Dokaney'. 10. Further this was an effort to invite applications and solicit tenants in the accommodation which was the subject-matter of an undertaking. No issue has been raised before this Court on this and it is accepted that such an advertisement was made. Learned Counsel appearing for landlord explained the situation that before the Amin sealed the establishment, this advertisement was wiped off from the shutters and he has also shown to the Court that since the establishment has been sealed this advertisement is now not on the shutters at all. Learned Counsel explained that this advertisement was put on shop No. 3 only, to which the Court has observed that the advertisement was in generality for all the shops and not for shop No. 3 as the expression was in plural and not singular so that there may be no misunderstanding that it was an effort to put shops on rent, given a chance, by passing the tenants, hence the contempt petition. 11. Upon the contempt petition three submissions have been made in defence. One is on merits to the effect that the landlord is not obliged to return the shops to the tenants as their need will have to be considered under sub-clause (2) of Section 24 of the Act by the Prescribed Authority. The second submission is that upon such a heavy investment put into the new building the landlord must have a return so that he can receive premium on the shops, secondly the tenants will not pay the premium, and thirdly that the landlord has as of date abided on his undertaking and has not parted with the shops and would do honour to his undertaking. 12. The Court permitted these submissions to be raised as a person under judgment for contempt must be given an opportunity to take up his defence, whatever it may be. 13. 12. The Court permitted these submissions to be raised as a person under judgment for contempt must be given an opportunity to take up his defence, whatever it may be. 13. The Court would judge the landlord thus :- If contempt is to be a rule of strict liability, violation of the undertaking itself was prevented by the Court, notwithstanding that the landlord may have intended otherwise. If the landlord had succeeded in obtaining tenants and inducted them into the accommodation the violation of the Court's order, an undertaking not excluded, would have been complete. This would have brought the landlord into an embarrassing situation as he otherwise happens to be an Advocate and member of the Bar. Then considering that he must be knowing his rights in that position, he was equally aware of his obligations on the undertaking he gave to the Court by an affidavit. However, the Court had protected the situation by : 1 Preventing the letting out of the shops to strangers by the first order, & (2) the shops being sealed so that if they were intended to be settled by violating the Court's orders, it could not. 14. It must have been wise counsel to the landlord by his attorneys not to forget his undertaking to the Court, and the consequence of its breach. The landlord is after all a lawyer too and the standards to judge a violation of a breach of an undertaking are the same. In fact, a lawyer should comprehend the situation better. 15. The Court will also consider the second submission to the effect that the tenants have to proceed before the Prescribed Authority to prove their requirement of bonafide need for the shops. In the facts and circumstances specific to the present case, this in itself has two aspects. First is that this issue ought not to be raised though, unfortunately it has when the landlord gave faith to the Court that upon receiving permission to demolish the old building and construct a new one, after construction he will set apart a comparable floor area for the two sets of tenants. Thus the faith given to the Court must not be eroded. Thus the faith given to the Court must not be eroded. As it is as a practical measure it is difficult to get buildings released and if the landlords are to improve their properties, the sooner their plans are to be put into execution, the better it would be and Courts will continue to consider faith which the landlords give effect to the legislature's intent so that tenants will not be resisting, without cause, with the permission granted to the landlord within the meaning of this section. If the Courts were to lose faith in landlords as an institution, Section 24 for the benefit of the landlord will become unworkable. 16. In so far as the second aspect is concerned it leads to the interpretation of Section 24, in reference to the context. If the tenant was not to exercise his opinion to enter a new building, the question to accommodate him does not arise, and the landlord is free to settle shops outside the purview of the Act. But if the tenant exercises his option for the accommodation then the intent of sub-clause (2) of Section 24 is mandatory. The only thing which has to be considered by the Prescribed Authority is the computation of the new rent, in the manner prescribed. This interpretation finds support from one of the cases cited by the learned Counsel for the landlord but for another purpose. It is in the matter relating to Gyan Chand and another v. Ramesh Chand, reported in 1985(1) ARC 516. 17. Thus, consistent with the undertaking which the landlord gave from which he cannot resile as far as status of the tenants is concerned he is obliged to deliver the accommodation to them of an area proximate to which the area they occupied. It is true that on the ground floor today there are three shops but the two shops which correspond to the area of the two previous shops are shop Nos. 1 and 2. On this there is no issue. These shops, thus, upon the undertaking of the Court will become subject matter of allotment by the Prescribed Authority to the two petitioners. 18. As learned counsel for the landlord has assured the Court that his client shall abide by the undertaking. Shop Nos. 1 and 2. On this there is no issue. These shops, thus, upon the undertaking of the Court will become subject matter of allotment by the Prescribed Authority to the two petitioners. 18. As learned counsel for the landlord has assured the Court that his client shall abide by the undertaking. Shop Nos. 1 and 2 stand settled in favour of the two sets of petitioners and those shops shall be allotted to them by the Prescribed Authority and the shops sealed in pursuance of the order dated 3rd November, 1989, shall be released to the tenants so named in the writ petition. All the seals on the shops shall be removed. 19. In so far as the computation of the rent is concerned the landlord will file the final costs of construction within one month before the prescribed Authority under intimation to the tenants. The Prescribed Authority upon the cost of construction being received will call upon the tenants to give them an opportunity to make their comments in case they want to and then accordingly compute the rent for the accommodation. Rent which will be so computed shall become the allotted rent. Learned Counsel for the tenants upon instructions desires to submit that six months rent shall be deposited in advance, in so far as the tenants are concerned within one month of its being determined by the Prescribed Authority. 20. Paper book of the contempt petition as was reconstructed by the registry reveals that it carried an order of notice of motion on November 21, 1989. The matter was to be listed thereafter in Court but it was not. The paper book apparently disappeared. It was reconstructed upon permission from the Hon'ble the Chief Justice on August 18, 1990. Notice of motion was issued. A counter-affidavit had been filed by the landlord Chandra Prakash Gupta on August 5, 1991. The notice of contempt to the landlord, upon it being reiterated before the Court that undertaking shall be honoured, is discharged. 21. Costs on the parties.