JUDGMENT B.L. Yadav 1. By the present petition under Article 226 of the constitution of India, the order dated 24-9-90 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation in revision under section 48 of the consolidation of Holdings Act, (for short the Act), condoning the delay in filing the objection under section 20 of the Act by the respondent, is sought to be quashed. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the Consolidation Officer has rejected the application of petitioner under section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay in filing the objection under section 20 of the Act by order dated 10-5-90 and against that order a revision was filed. In that even though an observation was made that there was no justification to interfere in the reasons assigned by the Consolidation officer for condonation of delay which requires interference, but the delay has been condoned by stating some more facts inter alia, that during consolidation operations fresh rights are created the tenure holders are deprived of their original holdings. Reliance was placed on Collector v. Mst Katiji 1987 RD 416, where the delay was condoned with the observation that a lenient view should be taken in considering the expression 'sufficient cause'. Ram Charan v. Dy. Director of consolidation, 1982 RD 109 was also referred. The material aspect is that the petitioner's affidavit for condonation of dday has been filed where he has made grievance about the allotment of chak and as he was in service, consequently he could not know the progress during consolidation operations and he filed appeal when he came to know about the distribution of CH form 23 and he was advised on 29-8-88 by his counsel that he must have filed objection under section 20. He has filed objection on this advice and is making the application for condonation of delay. The main ground taken in the affidavit was that on account of insufficient legal advice he could not file objection earlier. This ground was not relied upon by the consolidation officer while rejecting the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act. Even though insufficient legal advice by the counsel does constitute a ground for condonation of delay, but the same was not accepted by the Consolidation Officer. This ground was not relied upon by the consolidation officer while rejecting the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act. Even though insufficient legal advice by the counsel does constitute a ground for condonation of delay, but the same was not accepted by the Consolidation Officer. One additional ground, however, has been given by the Deputy Director of consolidation that during consolidation operation a lenient view may be taken in the matters pertaining to the condonation of delay and the expression 'sufficient cause' has to be considered in a liberal manner so as to advance substantial justice. Similar view has been taken in 1987 RD 216. 3. In Ram Charan v. D.D.C. (supra) the following observations on page 112 may be noticed : "I, therefore, find substance in the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners, and I am of the opinion that since the earlier objections filed by the petitioners was rejected by the Consolidation Officer on the aforesaid technical ground instead of deciding it on merits after calling report on it from the Assistant consolidation officer to meet the technical objection in the manner or alternatively returning it to the petitioners for presentation before the Assistant consolidation officer, it would be qute just and proper that the delay be condoned and the petitioners, who had bona fide filed their objection before the consolidation officer on legal advice, he permitted to get their claim in respect of land in dispute determined on merits by condoning the delay in filing the objection under section 5 of the limitation Act." 4. I am in respectful and complete agreement with the observations made in the aforesaid cases. In Ram Charan v. D.D.C. (supra), the decision of the Supreme Court in AIR 1954 SC 411 was referred. In that case it was observed that the expression 'sufficient cause' should be given liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice. In State of West Bengal v. Howrah Municipality, AIR 1972 SC 749 , it was observed that where a party has acted in a particular manner under the wrong advice given by his advisor, he could not be held to be guilty of negligence so as to disentitle the party to get benefit of the expression 'sufficient cause' under section 5 of the Limitation Act. 5. 5. In Kunwar Rajendra Singh v. Raj Rajeshwar Beli, AIR 1937 privy council 276, it was held that if a party has acted in a particular manner on a wrong advice given by his legal advisor, he cannot be held guilty of neglivence so as to disentitle the party to plead sufficient cause under section 5. In the present case also insufficient legal advice by the counsel was also taken a ground but that ground was rejected by the consolidation officer and the same has been accepted by the Deputy Director of consolidation. In revision a fresh ground has been taken that during the consolidation operation records are finally prepared. Consequently by taking a different view the delay in filing the revision has been condoned. Even if some sufficient ground like the one taken by the Deputy Director of consolidation was taken in account, that cannot be said to be irrelevant consideration. Even though the Deputy Director of consolidation has taken note of this fact that final records are prepared, consolidation proceedings are statutorily and compulsorily imposed litigation, this aspect cannot be said to be irrelevant. In case parties, prefer litigation on their own volition and not on the basis of State compulsion there the consideration for in action on their part may take different shape. But where the litigation is statutorily and compuslotily imposed, in that case the particular party might not have been dragged in litigation, but for the State action or administrative decision. Under section 20 (1) the relevant extract from the provisional consolidation scheme was issued and served on the tenure holders. But as the petitioner was in service outside hence notices could not be served on him; He was further given wrong advice of filing an appeal instead of preferring an objection under section 20 (2). Under these circumstances as the petitioner was given a wrong advice and also the litigation was not voluntary, rather state imposed and a compuslory litigation. The rights were going to be finally decided. The tenure holder would be deprived of his original plots. The ends of justice would, be met if a lenient view is taken and delay in filing the objection is condoned. The Dy. Director of consolidation did not commit any mistake in condoning the delay. 6. In view of the premises aforesaid, the petition is devoid of merits and the same is dismissed summarily. Petition dismissed.