Judgment :- The petitioner in R.C.O.P.No.27 of 1981 on the file of the Rent Controller Mun-sif), Krishnagiri, is the petitioner in this civil revision petition. The respondents said R.C.O.P. are the respondents in this civil revision petition. For the sake of convenience, the parties are referred to in this order by the nomenclature given to them in the R.C.O.P. 2. The petitioner filed an application R.CO.P.No27 of 1981 for eviction against respondents under Secl0(3)(a)(iii) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) XVIII of 1960, hereinafter called the Act. The case of the petitioner is as follows: “The two shops bearing door Nos.79 and 80 which are described in the schedule appended the petition belonged to the petitioner. The first respondent took door No.80 for rent about 1968 and door No.79 in 1969 on a monthly rent of Rs.80 and Rs.100 respectively occupied them. At present the rent for both the shops is Rs.500 per month. The petitioner has got three major sons of whom the youngest is studying in the Engineering College he would be completing his course soon. The other two sons are graduates. One of them engaged in the motor transport business and the other is without any job. The petitioner need of the petition mentioned shops for the auto parts, hardwares and electric business of his sons. The requirement of the petition mentioned shops for the business second and third sons is bona fide.” 3. The respondents resisted the application for eviction contending that the petitioner has idea of starting any business in auto parts or any other business for his sons. The petitioner is having many buildings, both residential and nonresidential, suitable for the business sons. The petitioner ’ s requirement of the shops is not bona fide. 4. The Rent Controller, on a consideration of the entire evidence on record, found that petitioner ’ s requirement of the petition mentioned shops for the business of his sons is fide. Consequently the Rent Controller allowed the petition for eviction. As against the of the Rent Controller the respondents filed an appeal, R.C.A.No.3 of 1986 on the file of Appellate Authority, Krishnagiri. The Appellate Authority reversed the findings of the Controller, allowed the Rent Control Appeal and dismissed the petition for eviction filed the petitioner. Aggrieved by the judgment in R.C.A.No.3 of 1986 the petitioner has filed present civil revision petition. 5. The Appellate Authority reversed the findings of the Controller, allowed the Rent Control Appeal and dismissed the petition for eviction filed the petitioner. Aggrieved by the judgment in R.C.A.No.3 of 1986 the petitioner has filed present civil revision petition. 5. The question we have to examine in this civil revision petition is: “ Whether the petitioner is entitled to an order of eviction under Sec.l0(3)(a)(iii) of the Act? 6. The petitioner’s case is that he requires the petition mentioned shops for the his sons. In such circumstances, the petitioner, in order to obtain an order of eviction the respondents under Sec.10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act, must satisfy the following four (a) The petition mentioned shops must be non-residential; (b) The petitioner’s sons for whose business the petitioner requires the petition shops must carry on a business; (c) The petitioner’s sons for whose business the petitioner requires the shops occupying for the purpose of such business a nonresidential building of their own; (d) The petitioner’s requirement of the petition mentioned shops for the business must be bona fide. 7. Admittedly the petition mentioned shops are non-residential portions in the building regard to the second condition, the settled position of law is that the landlord actually carry on the business when he makes an application for eviction of a tenant ground that he requires the building for his business. In Thiru Chelliah Pandithan Tmt.Anthoniammal, 98 L.W. 666, this Court, while dealing with the question whether landlord should actually carry on business in order to maintain the petition for against a tenant under Sec.10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act held as follows: “It appears to me that having regard to the later decisions, the fact that the landlords actually carrying on the business when they make an application for eviction of the ground of requirement for their business would not be fatal to their claim under (a)(iii) of the Act.” In P.N.Raju Chettiar v. The State of Tamil Nadu represented by the Secretary, Department (Accommodation Controller) and others, (1970)1 M.L.J. 249 (D.B.), Bench of this Court, while dealing with the meaning of the expressions ‘ carrying on business’ used in Sec.l0(3)(a)(iii) of the Act held as follows: “Carrying on business’ within the meaning of Sec.10(3)(a)(iii) may consist of a series of and even if one step is proved, the requirement of the section would be satisfied. But, there is no step at all whatever, and the matter is only in the state of intention, it is difficult to bring such a case under Sec.l0(3)(a)(iii).Thus, short of any tangible concrete indication commencement of a business, mere intention to carry on business will not enable landlord to resort to Sec.l0(3)(a)(iii).” The evidence in this case discloses that the petitioner’s sons have taken series of steps starting a business of their own. Exs.A-3 to A-22 go to show the various steps taken by petitioner’s sons to start their business. The evidence in this case also discloses that petitioner’s second son is carrying on business under the name and style of ‘Tata Oil Soap Agencies’ in Door No.78, which belongs to the petitioner and where the petitioner himself is carrying on his transport business. Further, the documents filed as additional evidence in this civil revision petition in C.M.P.No.9045 of 1990 also go to show that during the pendency of the present proceedings the third son of the petitioner Anantaraman started a business under the name and style of ‘Danapal Motors’ at door No.340, Bangalore Road, Krishnagiri, which belongs to his mother. In the said premises at Door No.340, Bangalore Road, Krishnagiri, the third son is carrying on business as an authorised dealer Kinetic Engineering Limited. The above subsequent event also goes to show that petitioner’s third son is carrying on business as an authorised dealer of Kinetic Engineering Limited. In these circumstances, the reasoning of the Appellate Authority that the petitioner sons are not carrying on any business nor they have taken any steps for starting a business and, therefore, they have not satisfied the second ingredient of Sec.l0(3)(a)(iii) is clearly erroneous. 8. Now let us examine whether the petitioner has satisfied the third condition viz., whether the petitioner’s sons for whose business the petitioner requires the petition mentioned are not occupying for the purpose of such business a non-residential building of their The learned counsel for the respondents would contend that Sec.l0(3)(a)(iii) of the requires that neither the landlord nor the family member for whose benefit the premises required should carry on business in a building of his own and as the shop No.78 in which petitioner is carrying on his own transport business, is his own, he cannot ask for the petition mentioned shops even though it was intended for the business of his sons. There is no in the above contention of the learned counsel for the respondents. As observed by Pad Jesudurai, J., in the decision inA.S.Raman v. S.C.N.Zakaria, 100L.W. 213, this Court uniformly held that when the premises are sought for by the landlord for the benefit of member of his family it is only that member of the family for whose benefit the premises required who should not occupy premises of his or of her own. The fact that the landlord occupies premises of his own would not disentitle him from claiming eviction for the benefit of a member of his family, who does not occupy any premises of his own. Chandurkar, in Indian Plywood Manufacturing Company v. Balaraman Chetty, 99 L.W. 49, has held under Sec.l0(3)(a)(iii) of the Act, the landlord can apply for eviction if the person for whose benefit the non-residential premises are required is not already in occupation of a residential building of his own. 9. Then we have to examine whether the petitioner has satisfied the last condition whether his requirement of the petition mentioned shops for the business of his sons is fide. The learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the petition for eviction filed in the present case in the year 1981 and if he had any idea of starting a business of sons and if the petitioner ’ s requirement was bona fide, he could not have sold several buildings of his own in the year 1979. There is no substance in the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents. The evidence in this case discloses that under Ex.B 30.3.1979 the petitioner has sold one building for the purpose of improving his transport business. Such a solitary sale under Ex.B-1 made in the year 1979, two years prior to filing of the petition for eviction will not go to show that the petitioner’s requirement of petition mentioned shops for the business of his sons is not bona fide. The evidence in this case clearly discloses that on the date filing of the petition for eviction the petitioner was not owning any other non buildings except shop No.78 where the petitioner is admittedly carrying on his transport business and the petition mentioned shops bearing door Nos.79 and 80. The evidence in this case clearly discloses that on the date filing of the petition for eviction the petitioner was not owning any other non buildings except shop No.78 where the petitioner is admittedly carrying on his transport business and the petition mentioned shops bearing door Nos.79 and 80. The learned counsel for the respondents further contended that the petition for eviction was filed by the petitioner because the respondents refused to pay enhanced rent and that they have filed a petition before the Rent Controller for fixation of fair rent. This contention of the learned counsel the respondents cannot be countenanced because the claim of a higher rent by the landlord on an earlier occasion and the respondents filing a petition for fixation of fair rent by will not go to show that the petitioner’s requirement of the petition mentioned shops for business of his sons is not bona fide. In Aishath Najiya v. M/s.Lal Chand Kevalram others, (1989)2 L.W. 123 (KB.), a Full Bench of this Court has held that a demand for higher rent at an early stage will not debar the landlady from claiming eviction on the ground bona fide requirement of the premises for her own use. 10. The last submission of the learned counsel for the respondents is that during pendency of the proceedings the third son of the petitioner Anan-taraman has started business under the name and style of Danapal Motors at Door No.340, Bangalore Krishnagiri, which belongs to his mother; when the need of the petitioner’s third son satisfied, the requirement ceased to exist and, therefore, the requirement is not bona fide. am unable to accept the above contention of the learned counsel for the respondents. case of the petitioner is that the petition mentioned shops are needed for the business sons who are admittedly not owning any non-residential building of their own. The counsel for the respondents cannot contend that the petitioner’s requirement of the mentioned shops for the business of his sons is not bona fide, because, one of his sons started his business in the premises of his mother and, therefore, the petitioner not in need of the petition mentioned shops for their business. The counsel for the respondents cannot contend that the petitioner’s requirement of the mentioned shops for the business of his sons is not bona fide, because, one of his sons started his business in the premises of his mother and, therefore, the petitioner not in need of the petition mentioned shops for their business. In Aishath Najiya Chand Kevalram and others, (1989)2 L. W. 123 (F.B.), a Full Bench of this Court, dealing with a similar contention, has observed as follows: “I am of the view that the need is not dictated by necessity. That is something contemplated by the provisions of the Act.” In the above circumstances, it has to be held that the petitioner’s requirement of the mentioned shops for the business of his sons is bona fide and that the petitioner is entitled an order of eviction in this case. The infirmity in the judgment of the Appellate Authority that it failed to draw proper inference from the evidence available on record and apply the principles laid down by this court in the decisions referred above in deciding issue involved in this case and, therefore, the judgment of the Appellate Authority R.C.A.No.3 of 1986 is liable to be set aside. The above discussion of mine obliges interfere with judgment of the Appellate Authority in this revision. Accordingly, the revision petition is allowed, the judgment in R.C.A.No.3 of 1986 is set aside and the Rent Controller in R.C.O.P.No.27 of 1981 is restored. No costs. R.S. .....- Petition allowed.