JUDGMENT B.P. Jeevan Reddy, CJ. - This writ petition is filed by as many as ten rice mills situate in Baheri town in District Bareilly, for number of reliefs, viz : (i) Restraining the Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti, Baheri from realising the market fee from the petitioners on transactions of sale and purchase of specified agricultural commodities within the market area of Baheri. (ii) To quash sub-clause (c) of clause (iii) of S. 17 of the U.P. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Adhiniyam, 1964, which sub-clause was inserted by U.P. Ordinance No. 40 of 1983 with effect from 4-10-1983. (iii) Restraining the Mandi Samiti from demanding and realising additional market fee of 1`%0 on sales of agricultural commodities. (iv) For issuing a Mandamus directing the Mandi samiti to refund the market fee already realised from the petitioners on sales of rice effected within the area of Baheri Mandi Samiti. (v) The refund the amount of market fee collected from the petitioners from 1974 upto 1983. 2. The petitioners have come forward with the following averments; The petitioners-rice mills are located in Baheri town. They are dealing in agricultural produce. which is a notified produce under the Act. Baheri town has been declared as a market area under section 6 but no notification has been issued under section 7 declaring it as a market yard. No services are being rendered by the Mandi Samiti. It does not have any plans even for rendering such services in future. Construction of buildings necessary for rendering such services is not even contemplated. In such a situation, the Mandi Samiti has no right to levy or collect any market fee. In May, 1983, the petitioners protested against such levy, but to no avail. Though the petitioners have paid the market fee since 1974, it was under a mistake of law. They arc entitled to refund of the same. The entire transactions of sale and purchase of notified agricultural produce take place within he premises of the rice mills, and not in the market yard, if any. In such circumstances. there would be no occasion for levying or collecting market fee in respect of such transaction By U.P. Ordinance No. 40 of 1983, the Legislature has directed that all the powers of the Mandi Sarniti shall be exercised by ad-hoc committees. Such a provision is unconstitutional. The very constitution of the Mandi Sarniti is contrary to law. In such circumstances. there would be no occasion for levying or collecting market fee in respect of such transaction By U.P. Ordinance No. 40 of 1983, the Legislature has directed that all the powers of the Mandi Sarniti shall be exercised by ad-hoc committees. Such a provision is unconstitutional. The very constitution of the Mandi Sarniti is contrary to law. The levy of additional market fee by virtue of the amendment in clause (iii) of S. 17 is unconstitutional and incompetent. Mandi Samiti has accurate huge amounts. Without spading the same on providing services, it cannot recover the market fee. It is on the basis of these averments that the aforementioned reliefs are sought. 3. The writ petition was filed on 28-11-1983 and on the stay application. a Bench of this Court passed the following order :- "Issue notice. We direct that until further orders, the respondents are restrained from realising any market fee from the petitioners, Petitioners are, however, liable to pay the licences fee." Dated 28-1I-83. Sd. HNS, J. AB, J." However, on an application filed by the Mandi Samiti, the said stay order was vacated on 10th August, 1984. The petitioners were directed to pay all the arrears of market fee within two months from the date of the said order (dated 10th August, 1984) and to continue to pay the market fee regularly in accordance with law. The counsel for the Mandi Samiti, however, gave an undertaking that in case of the petitioners succeeding in this writ petition, the entire fee realised from them shall be refunded with interest at the rate of 18% per annum. 4. A counter-affidavit has been filed sworn to by Gulabchand, secretary, Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti. Baheri, wherein the following statements are made; Under S. 6 of the Act. Bareilly has been declared as a market area. Baheri has been declared as a sub-market yard under S. 7. The Mandi Samiti, Bareilly, is rendering appropriate services to all the traders in the market yard as well as in sub-market yards including Baheri sub-market yard. The Mandi Samiti has drawn up plans to construct a market complex at Baheri also. Land has been purchased at a cost of Rs. 7,40,000/-. Some more land is proposed to be purchased and constructions are shortly to begin. It is untrue that no services are being rendered. The Mandi Samiti has drawn up plans to construct a market complex at Baheri also. Land has been purchased at a cost of Rs. 7,40,000/-. Some more land is proposed to be purchased and constructions are shortly to begin. It is untrue that no services are being rendered. The Mandi Samiti has already constructed link roads connecting several villages. It has provided tripals, petromax, sheaves, winnowers and other equipment. It is also taking up construction of godowns. bridges, culverts and plans are afoot to render other services to the trading community. If any particular service is not rendered, it is always open to the petitioners to demand the same. The market fee has been validly levied and being collected. The mills of the petitioners are situated in the sub-market area, Baheri and, therefore, they are bound to pay the market fee. It is of little consequence whether the transaction of sale and purchase takes place within the mill premises or outside the premises. Since the mills themselves are situated within the sub-market area, Baheri, they are bound to pay the market fee on such transaction in accordance with law. Ordinance 40 of 1983 is perfectly valid and competent and no objection can be taken to it on any ground. The appointment of ad hoc committees is equally unobjectionable. The amendment to S. 171 iii) is equally valid and the levy of additional market fee cannot be objected to. It is not required of the Mandi Samiti that it should start rendering services first and then demand the fees. 5. A rejoinder-affidavit has been filed by the writ petitions, reiterating the contentions made in the writ petition. In particular. it is averred that village Baheri has not been notified either as principal market yard or as a sub-market yard under S. 7. It is also submitted that construction of culverts and link roads is not a permissible activity and that the market fee cannot be utilised for those purposes. It is again reiterated that no services are being rendered at Baheri. 6. The Uttar Pradesh Krishi Utapadan Mandi Adhinivam. 1954 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) was enacted by the U.P. Legislature in 1964 to provide for the regulation of sale and purchase of agricultural produce and for the establishment, superintendence and control of markets therefor and it has been amended from time to time. 6. The Uttar Pradesh Krishi Utapadan Mandi Adhinivam. 1954 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) was enacted by the U.P. Legislature in 1964 to provide for the regulation of sale and purchase of agricultural produce and for the establishment, superintendence and control of markets therefor and it has been amended from time to time. S. 5 provides for the declaration of intention to regulate and control sale and purchase of certain specified agricultural produce in any area and to declare that area as a market area. S. 6 provides for declaration of an area as a market area while S. 7 provides for declaration of principal market yard or sub-market yards, as the case may be, Market yard sare smaller areas within the market area. S. 9 provides for the effects of the declaration of an area as market area. With effect from the date of such declaration, no person can establish or continue any place for sale, purchase, storage, etc. of the specified agricultural produce except under and in accordance with a licence granted by the Mandi Samiti. Chapter 111, which contains Sections 12 to 21, provides for constitution of committee, their functions and duties, S. 17 is relevant for our purposes. Clauses (ii and (ii) of S. 17 provide for grant of licences, their renewal, suspension and or cancellation as the case may be. Clause. (iii) provided for levy and collection of market fee. In so far as it is relevant, S. 17(iii) reads as follows :- "17. Powers of the Committee : a Committee shall for the purposes of this Act, have the power to - (i) ............ (ii) ........... (iii) levy and collect : (a) such fees as may be prescribed for the issue off renewal of licences. and (b) market fee. which shall be payable on transactions of sale or specified agricultural produce in the market area at such rates, being not less than one per centum and not more than one and half per centum of the price of the agricultural produce so sold, as the State Government may specify by notification, and such fee shall be realised in the following manner (1) if the produce is sold through a commission went. the commission agent may realise the market fee from the purchaser and shall be liable to pay the same to the Committee : (2) if the produce is purchased directly by a trader from a producer, the trader shall be liable to pay the market fee to the committee : (3) if the produce is purchased by a trader from another trader, the trader selling the produce may realise it from the purchaser and shall be liable to pay the market fee to the Committee. and (4) in any other case of sale of such produce, the purchaser shall be liable to pay the market fee to the Committee: Provided that no market fee shall be levied or collected on the retail sale of any specified agricultural produce where such sale is made to the consumer : 7. Mr. S.P. Agrawal, learned counsel for the petitioner, has urged as many as five contentions, which we now proceed to deal with in their proper order. The first contention is that Baheri has not been notified as a market yard under S. 7 of the Act and until and unless this is done, no market fee can be levied. For a proper appreciation of this contention, it is necessary to notice the precise averments in the writ petition and the counter - affidavit in this behalf. In paragraph 6 of the writ petition. the petitioners have made the following averments : "6. That Baheri District Bareilly has been declared as Market Area under S. 5 of the act which consists of Ricchha. Bhaura, Tanda and some other villages and various other places. Them ills of the petitioners are located at Baheri. Baheri Mandi Samiti has not been notified under S. 7 of the Act as market yard." In paragraph 21 of the writ petition, the petitioners have stated : "That under S. 7 of the Act, the State Government declares Market Yards and sub-market yards in each market area. Baheri has not been notified as market yard under S. 7 so far." In the counter affidavit filed by the respondents, they have met the above averments in the following manner. It is stated in paragraph 6 of the counter affidavit. "6. That the contents of paragraph No. 6 of the writ petition are denied as stated. Baheri has not been notified as market yard under S. 7 so far." In the counter affidavit filed by the respondents, they have met the above averments in the following manner. It is stated in paragraph 6 of the counter affidavit. "6. That the contents of paragraph No. 6 of the writ petition are denied as stated. Bareilly has been declared as market area under S. 6 of the Act which includes Bareilly and other places as well. Baheri has been declared as sub-market yard under S. 7 of the Act. It is wrong to say that Baheri has not been notified as market yard or sub-market yard under S. 7 of the Act." In paragraph 21 of the counter affidavit, it is stated : "21. That the contents of paragraph No. 21 of the writ petition are not admitted as stated. Baheri has been notified as sub-market yard under S. 7 of the Act." 8. From the above pleadings, it is clear that while the petitioners' case is that Baheri Mandi Samiti; Baheri has not been declared as a market yard under S. 7 of the Act, the respondents' case is that Baheri has been decal red as it sub-market yard under S. 7. According to the respondents, Bareilly is the principal market yard whereas Baheri is a sub-market yard. The learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the counter affidavit contains inconsistent statements. He wants us to hold paragraph 6 of the counter affidavit as containine such self-contradiction. It is in view of this argument that we have taken care to set out paragraphs 6 and 21 of the counter affidavit herein above. We are unable to find any inconsistency either in paragraph 6 or in paragraph 21 of the counter-affidavit. The respondents' case is clear. According to them, Baheri has been declared as a sub- market yard under S. 7. Learned counsel fort the petitioners then argued that when a, separate Mandi Samiti is constituted for, Baheri, there must be an independent market; yard in Baheri. According to him, Baheril cannot he a sub-market yard, nor can Bareilly) he the principal market yard. But there is no factual basis for this submission. No material' has been placed before us to hold that a separate Mandi Samiti has been constituted for Baheri and if so, when ? According to him, Baheril cannot he a sub-market yard, nor can Bareilly) he the principal market yard. But there is no factual basis for this submission. No material' has been placed before us to hold that a separate Mandi Samiti has been constituted for Baheri and if so, when ? Even if it is assumed that a Mandi Samiti had been separately constituted for Baheri, no illegality is involved, Baheri is within the district Bareilly. According to the respondents, Baheri was declared as a sub-market yard. If subsequently a separate Mandi Samiti has been constituted for Baheri, Baheri will still continue to be a market yard. It is of little consequence whether it is a market yard or a sub-market, yard. For the purposes of levy and collection of market fee or in the matter of rendering of services, there is no distinction between a market yard and a sub-market yard. Even in the rejoinder affidavit, specific date on which a separate Mandi Samiti was constituted for Baheri is not given, nor any notification issued in that behalf has been produced. We cannot, therefore. hold that there is no notification declaring Baheri as a market yard/sub-market yard under S. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner insisted that the respondents should be called upon to produce the notification declaring Baheri as a market yard or sub-market yard. as the case may be. Indeed, he suggested repeatedly that he would advance his further arguments only after the respondents produced such notification. We, however, indicated to the learned counsel for the petitioners that we cannot hear the writ petition piecemeal and whatever arguments he has, he must advance at one stretch. Accordingly, the arguments in the writ petition were concluded. We do not think it necessary to call upon the respondents to produce the notification declaring Baheri as a sub-market yard. At no point of time from 1974 to 1983 did the petitioners raise this objection before the Market Committee. Specific averment has been repeatedly made in the counter affidavit that Baheri has been declared as a sub-market yard. Except a general denial in the rejoinder-affidavit, no material has been placed to hold that Baheri has not been declared either a principal market yard or a sub-market yard. We see no reason not to accept the averment made in the counter-affidavit, which has been sworn to by a responsible official. Except a general denial in the rejoinder-affidavit, no material has been placed to hold that Baheri has not been declared either a principal market yard or a sub-market yard. We see no reason not to accept the averment made in the counter-affidavit, which has been sworn to by a responsible official. namely, the secretary of the Mandi Samiti. Indeed, if the petitioners' case is that a separate Mandi Samiti has been constituted for Baheri, they ought to have produced that notification, which is turn may have contained a provision for a sub-market yard already declared as such. 9. The learned counsel for the petitioner raised an objection that copy of the counter - affidavit served upon him does not specifically say as to which paragraphs of the counter - affidavit are sworn to by the deponent on his personal knowledge and which on the basis of legal advice. We. however, find that the counter-affidavit filed in the court does :contain such verification. The omission to fill up the appropriate blanks in the copy supplied to the learned counsel for the petitioners, no doubt inappropriate, cannot constitute a ground for rejecting counter-affidavit altogether. 10. The second contention urged by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the Act must contain a provision for quantification of the fee payable by the dealer. In other words, according to him, there ought to be a provision for assessment of fees and in the absence of such quantification/ assessment, no fee can be recovered. He submitted that clause /iii) of S. 17 of the Act is unenforceable and ineffective for this reasons. It is not possible to agree. This very contention has been rejected by the Supreme Court in its decision in Ram Chandra Kailash Kumar v. State of U.P., AIR 1980 SC 1124 dealing with this very enactment. This is what the Court says in paragraph 10 of the judgment dealing with an identical contention But the levy and collection of fee by the temporary Market committees is not illegal as argued on behalf of the appellants. A machinery for adjudication of disputes is necessary to be provided under the rules for the proper functioning of the market committees. We have already observed and expressed our hope for bringing into existence such machinery in one form or the other. A machinery for adjudication of disputes is necessary to be provided under the rules for the proper functioning of the market committees. We have already observed and expressed our hope for bringing into existence such machinery in one form or the other. But it is not correct to say that in the absence of such a machinery, no market fee can be levied or collected. If a dispute arises, then in the first instance the Market Committee itself or any sub-committee appointed by it can give its finding which will be subject to challenge in any court of law when steps are taken for enforcement of the provision's for realisation of the market fee." The learned counsel for the Mandi Samiti has explained that there is indeed no occasion or necessity for an assessment inasmuch as the market fee is calculated on the basis of the entries made in the bills issued by the dealer himself. He also clarified that if at any point of time any dispute is raised, the market committee will examine the same in accordance with law. In this connection. it would be appropriate to refer to Rules 66, 68 and69 framed under the Act. Under Rule66. the levy is upon the seller. Rule 68 declares that "market fee on specified agricultural produce shall be payable as soon as such produce is sold in the principal market yard or sub-market yards in accordance with the terms of and conditions specified in the bye-laws". Sub-rule (2) of Rule 68 prescribes the manner of realisation. while Rule 69 provides for issuance of receipt by servants of the Market Committee for the market fees received from any person. From 1974 to 1983, the petitioners have been paying the market fee in accordance with the said rules and the bye-laws. and no difficulty was over envisaged. It is evident that this contention is raised in this writ petition merely for the purpose of avoiding the payment of market fee. In this connection, we think it permissible to point out that market fee is an indirect levy. It is passed on to the consumer. The levy is normally upon the seller except where the seller happens to be the producer himself. The impost is passed on to the consumer. though omission or failure to pass on is no ground for avoiding the payment of fee. It is passed on to the consumer. The levy is normally upon the seller except where the seller happens to be the producer himself. The impost is passed on to the consumer. though omission or failure to pass on is no ground for avoiding the payment of fee. The situation is no different, broadly speaking, from Sale Tax. The second contention is accordingly rejected. 11. The third contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that no services are being rendered in Baheri Market Yard/Sub-Market Yard and hence no fee can be collected. Certain observations from judgments of this court are relied upon in support of this contention. There can be no dispute about the proportion that in case of a fee of this nature, element of quid in case of a fee of this nature, element of quid pro quo ought to he there. We. however. think it necessary to clarify the position. Mandi Samiti constituted under the Act is in the nature of a local authority. It is State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the constitution. It is a statutory body. created in accordance with the provisions of the Act, to perform certain statutory duties, in particular, regulation of sale and purchase of agricultural produce and establishment, superintendence and control of markets therefor. Mandi Samiti is not a business proposition. It cannot be postulated that before Mandi Samiti is entitled to levy and collect any market fee. it ought to acquire and provide all the requisite paraphernalia to render the services which it is contemplated to provide by the Act. To be more precise, it is not expected of the Market Committee to acquire land, construct buildings, recruit all the necessary staff, purchase all instruments, etc, and start rendering services before it can levy and collect the market fee. No such pre-condition can be stipulated or contemplated. What happens is that after the constitution of the Market Committee, it starts rendering services with the limited staff and equipment it has acquired and starts collecting moneys and expanding its services. As and when the money flows in, it will acquire buildings, purchase the necessary equipment and so on. It is a gradual process. We must also take into account the normal difficulties of such committees. Obstructions are placed at every stage. For example, if the land is sought to be acquired. As and when the money flows in, it will acquire buildings, purchase the necessary equipment and so on. It is a gradual process. We must also take into account the normal difficulties of such committees. Obstructions are placed at every stage. For example, if the land is sought to be acquired. there will be writ petitions or other proceedings to stall and/or delay the proceedings. Construction of buildings may also take time. Even recruitment of staff would not be free from problems. All these present day difficulties must be taken into account while examining a plea of the nature advanced herein that the market Committee is not rendering all the services. May be that it is not rendering all the services, which it is supposed to render. This may be for the reason that it has not yet constructed the requisite buildings or that it has not recruited all the necessary staff and so on. But, some services it is rendering and it intends to expand and provide more and more services as and when it constructs buildings and acquires other necessary paraphernalia. This is what exactly the Mandi Samiti has stated in its counter-affidavit. It has detailed the services which it is already providing. It has offered to provide such services as are demanded by the dealers. in so far as its capacity permits. It has acquired land. It proposes to construct buildings and it is then that it will be in a position to render all the necessary services. The dealers would not he justified is saying that from the very inception of the Committee t Market Committee) all the services should be rendered and then alone, they would pay the fees. We do not think that any such plea can be countenanced. It is in the light of these observations that we have to examine the several cases cited at the Baron behalf of the petitioners. 12. Particular reliance was placed upon certain observations in Ram Chandra Kailash Kumar (supra), which in a general way tend to support the petitioners' argument. We do not think that any such plea can be countenanced. It is in the light of these observations that we have to examine the several cases cited at the Baron behalf of the petitioners. 12. Particular reliance was placed upon certain observations in Ram Chandra Kailash Kumar (supra), which in a general way tend to support the petitioners' argument. We do not think it necessary to set out the said observations because in a subsequent judgment of the Supreme Court in Sreenivasa General Traders v. State of A.P., AIR 1983 SC 1246 , these very observation's have been expressly referred to and explained as not laying down any legal principle of general application (vide paragraphs 28 to 32). Faced with these observations in Sreenivasa General Traders (supra) the learned counsel for the petitioners took the stand that inasmuch as Ram Chandra Kailash Kumar (supra) and Kewal Krishan Puri, (1979) 3 SCR 1217 : AIR 1980 SC 1008 were decided by a constitution bench and Sreenivasa General Traders (supra) by a Division Bench (comprising three Judges) a smaller Bench cannot lay down a proposition contrary to the decision of a larger Bench. The observations in the earlier cases continues to be a good law and is binding upon this court is preference to the observations in Sreenivasa General Traders says the counsel. We are afraid, we cannot give effect to this argument. It is not a case of inconsistency between the judgments of the Supreme Court, in which case different rules apply. It is a case where an earlier judgment, no doubt, rendered by a constitution Bench, is explained in a subsequent judgment. rendered by a smaller bench, as not laying down any rules of universal application, and also explaining the context in which they were made. This understanding of the earlier decision by the ,,subsequent smaller Bench is binding upon us: a High Court cannot say that this understanding of the subsequent smaller bench is incorrect or unwarranted. The learned counsel then submitted that Sreenivasa General Traders (supra) was decided with reference to the Andhra Pradesh Act and whatever is said therein cannot hold good in respect of the Uttar Pradesh enactment. It is not possible to agree. We are referring to those observations in Sreenivasa General Traders where they have explained the observations in earlier judgments which were of course, rendered with reference to the U.P. enactment. It is not possible to agree. We are referring to those observations in Sreenivasa General Traders where they have explained the observations in earlier judgments which were of course, rendered with reference to the U.P. enactment. It cannot be said that those observations are confined A.P. Act. It is not as if those observations were made while construing a provision peculiar to A.P. Act. They were dealing with the very same argument of fee and service. A mechanical explanation that since Sreenivasa General Traders is rendered within reference to the A.P. Act, everything said therein is irrelevant in the case of the U.P. Act is to ever simplify the matter and ignore the essence and dicta of the judgment of the Supreme Court. 13. Before proceeding further, it would be appropriate to point out the distinction between regulatory fee and compensatory fee. In the case of former. the concept of service to payer is absent, while in the latter, there ought to be element of service. It is true that even a regulatory fee ought to be reasonable, but the requirement of service to person paying the fee is not there. The regulation may really be in the interest of the general public or a section thereof: even so, fees can be collected from the person subjected to regulation. Byway of illustration. we may take the case of foodgrains licensing. Dealing in foodgrains is a fundamental right. It is, however, regulated by orders made under the Essential Commodities Act. The place of storage, the books to be maintained. the hours of business - are sometimes. even the price - is regulated. Violation of these provisions renders not only the foodgrains liable to confiscation but the dealer may also be sent to jail on conviction. Here there is no service to him. The regulation is in the interest of general public. Yet a fees is charged for grant of such licence. Even under t:. 0 Mandi Samiti Act, there is a licence fee apart from market fees. In the case of latter, service concept ought to be there, broadly speaking. In this behalf reference may be had to the law laid down in para 8 of the judgment of Supreme Court in Corporation of Calcutta v. Liberty Cinema, AIR 1965 SC 1107 . 14. 0 Mandi Samiti Act, there is a licence fee apart from market fees. In the case of latter, service concept ought to be there, broadly speaking. In this behalf reference may be had to the law laid down in para 8 of the judgment of Supreme Court in Corporation of Calcutta v. Liberty Cinema, AIR 1965 SC 1107 . 14. Learned counsel for the petitioners placed particular reliance upon curtain judgments of this Court, which we think necessary to deal with at this juncture. The first case relied on is Shree Mahalakshmi Vyapar Kendra v. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti, Powayan, 1984 UPLBEC 1213 , that was a case where the dealer was carrying on business in a village which was not situated within a Market yard or a sub-market yard. The village was, no doubt, situated within the market area. Market fee was demanded from him in respect of his transactions. It was held by the Court that unless service is rendered in the Market area as distinguished from Market yard/sub-market yard, no fee can be demanded. In that connection, the Court distinguished, the fact and contentions in Sreenivasa General Traders (supra). The learned counsel relied upon this decision to hold that Sreenivasa General Traders having been rendered with reference to A.P. Act is not relevant in a case arising under the U.P. Act, but no such proposition was enunciated by the Division Bench in Shree Mahalakshmi Vyapar Kendra. 15. The next case relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner is U.P. Forest Corporation v. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti, 1985 UPLBEC 1192. In particular, paragraphs 13 to 19 of the judgment are relied upon. In the said paragraphs, the Division Bench reiterated the principles enunciated in Ram Chandra Kailash Kumar and Kewal Krishna Puri (supra). This decision does not lay down any proposition that unless the services are rendered first, by acquiring all the necessary paraphernalia, no fee can be levied. It was also held to the said decision that provision for lighting, cleaning, sweaping etc. are not services contemplated by the Act, since these are the services rendered by the Municipality/local authority of the area. But, as pointed out hereinbefore, in the Baheri Sub Market Yard, several distinct services are being rendered and steps are also being taken to construct buildings on the land already acquired for providing more and more services as contemplated by the Act. But, as pointed out hereinbefore, in the Baheri Sub Market Yard, several distinct services are being rendered and steps are also being taken to construct buildings on the land already acquired for providing more and more services as contemplated by the Act. 16. We may in this connection refer to a very instructive decision of the Supreme Court in ITC v. State of Karnataka, 1985 SCC Supp. 476, decided under the Karnataka Act. The decision discusses elaborately the changing concept and meaning of compensatory fee and quid pro quo. In particular, it holds that levy imposed by the Market committees on sellers in the markets for making a contribution to the State Roads and Bridges Fund maintained under the State Motor Vehicles Taxation Act for construction and maintenance of roads and for providing transport facilities for the markets is a valid levy and is for purposes relevant to the Act. This decision approves the reasoning of an earlier decision of the Supreme Court in Municipal Corporation v. Mohammed Yasin, (1983) 3 SCC 229 : AIR 1983 SC 617 . where it was held that mere fact that there were several others besides those paying the fees who were also benefited did not detract from the character of the fee. It was further observed that the benefit and advantage to the payers of the fee might even be secondary as compared with the primary motive of regulation in the public interest. It was observed that all that was necessary is that there should be a broad co-relationship between the impost and the services. 17. Yet another case relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners is Om Prakash Agarwal v. Giri Raj Kishori, AIR 1986 SC 726 , a case arising under the Haryana Rural Development Fund Act. On an examination of the relevant facts and circumstances, it was found by the Court therein that there is absolutely no quid pro quo and hence levy of fee cannot be sustained nor can it be sustained as a tax. We are unable to see any relevance of the decision in the facts of the instant case. 18. The fourth contention urged by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that where the paddy is produced within the Baheri Market area and is milled and the resultant rice sold within the same market area, no market fee can be levied. We are unable to see any relevance of the decision in the facts of the instant case. 18. The fourth contention urged by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that where the paddy is produced within the Baheri Market area and is milled and the resultant rice sold within the same market area, no market fee can be levied. He submitted that even in such cases, fee is being levied. So far as the proposition goes, it is not disputed by Sri B.D. Madhyan, learned standing counsel for the Market Committee. He agrees with the correctness of the said proposition. What he, however, submits is that in each case it is a question of fact. If the trader proves that rice being sold is hulled from the paddy which has already suffered market fees within the same Market area, no market fee will be charged thereon. In view of this stand taken by the learned standing counsel for the Mandi Samiti, we do not think it necessary to dilate upon this contention. As and when any levy is made contrary to the said proposition, it is always open to the trader concerned to raise a dispute in that behalf in accordance with law. 19. The last and final contention of Sri S.P. Agarwal, learned counsel for the petitioners, is that the Mandi Samiti has not passed its budget, as required by Rule 469' and that the District Magistrate in whom the powers of the Mandi Samiti has been invested has not delegated these powers to SDMs. It is also submitted that Mandi Samiti was not competent to spend any part of the market fee collected by it on construction of culverts, link roads, kharanjas. The first two submissions have been denied in the counter/ affidavit and so far as the third aspect is concerned, we cannot say that construction of culverts and link roads does not ultimately serve and promote the objects for which the Act was made. It is not submitted that these constructions have been made outside the Market Yard. So long as these constructions are made within the Market Yard/Sub Market Yard no abjection can be taken thereto. The judgment of the Supreme Court does not say that even within the notified market yard, such construction cannot be undertaken. 20. For the above reasons, the writ petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. So long as these constructions are made within the Market Yard/Sub Market Yard no abjection can be taken thereto. The judgment of the Supreme Court does not say that even within the notified market yard, such construction cannot be undertaken. 20. For the above reasons, the writ petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.