JUDGMENT S.R.Singh, J. 1. Devesh Mishra, a trainee Sub-Inspector of Police at P. T. C. Moradabad has approached this Court under Article 226 of the Const of India for a writ of certiorari quashing the impugned orders of expulsion dated 2-9-82 and the order of removal dated 8-9-1982. 2. Indubitable factual matrix of the case may be recapitulated and they are that on being selected as a Cadet for training to the post of Sub Inspector of Police for the year 1981-82 the petitioner joined the Police Training College (1) Moradabad (hereinafter referred to as P. T. C) on 18-8-81 and was allotted Cadet No. 106 in the aforesaid college. In the course of training, the petitioner was granted leave and accorded permission to leave Training Centre from 7-3-82 to 14-3-82 on the occasion of holy festival obviously presupposing him to return and resume his duties/training at P. T. C. in the morning of 15th March 1982 The petitioner over-stayed his leave allegedly on the ground of some ailment as a consequence of which he was admitted to Swamp Rani Medical Hospital Allahabad after his initial treatment at Primary Health Centre Kuswapur, District Pratapgarh from 15-3-82 to 19-3-82, It is averred in the petition that the petitioner was discharged from Swarup Rani Medical College Allahabad on 31-3-82 after he had recouped and consequently, he could report at P. T. C. Moradabad and joined the Parade on 3-4-82 at 5 A.M. On 11-5-82, the petitioner was served with a show cause notice calling upon him as to why he be not removed from the aforesaid college on account of his absence from the training during the period from 15-3-82 to 3-4-82. The petitioner put in a reply to the aforesaid show cause notice and a copy of the reply is annexed to the petition as Annexure no. 2 A perusal of the reply testifies that the petitioner has tried to explain his absence for the period aforesaid on the ground of his ailment as aforesaid. Vide order dated 8-9-82 (Annexure 3 to the petition), the petitioner was sacked and removed from S.l.C.P. Training P.TC. Moradabad. The aforesaid order purports to have been passed in accordance with the provisions laid down in Clause 23 (ii) (b) of the P T.C Manual Part III. Vide order dated 8-9-82 (Annexure 3 to the petition), the petitioner was sacked and removed from S.l.C.P. Training P.TC. Moradabad. The aforesaid order purports to have been passed in accordance with the provisions laid down in Clause 23 (ii) (b) of the P T.C Manual Part III. with the approval of the Director General-cum-Inspector General of Police U. P. as contained in his UO CON-106 (311)-82 dated 16-8-82 and conveyed to the D.I.G./ Principal, Police Training College, Moradabad vide AlG's Training UO. Note No. COT/V-176-81 dated 3-9-82. Earlier the petitioner was expelled from the College by order dated 2-9-1982 under paragraph 23 (ii) (a) of the P.T.C Manual. The validity and legality of these two orders of expulsion and removal dated 2-9-1982 and 8-9-1982 respectively are in question in this writ petition. 3. I have heard and re-heard the learned counsel for the parties. Sri A. K. Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted before me that the order of expulsion is vitiated for the reason that prior approval of the Inspector General (Police) was not obtained and that the punishment of removal from the college could have been awarded only for gross misconduct or flagrant and repeated breaches of discipline, which condition, according to the learned counsel, was not satisfied in the case in hard. As regards the punishment of removal from S.I.C.P. training, Sri Sharma has contended before me that the order of removal dated 8-9-1982 is vitiated for the following reasons- (a) that the prior sanction, if any, given by the Inspector General (Police) was violative of the principles of natural justice inasmuch as the petitioner was denied a fair and effective opportunity of hearing by the Inspector General (Police) prior to sanctioning the petitioner's removal from the college in that he was not supplied with a copy of the Principal report dated 2-8-82 nor was he required to have his say in respect of the report on the basis of which the prior sanction of the removal is said to have been given by the Inspector General (Police) as per order of removal: (b) that the prior sanction allegedly given by the Inspector General of Police and the order of removal dated 8-9-82 passed by the Principal are arbitrary in that they contain no reasons for discarding the petitioner's explanation to the show cause notice; and (c) that, in any case, the punishment of removal from S.I.C.P. training was excessive and contrary to the spirit of the caution-"should ordinarily be awarded to a Cadet who in the judgment of the Principal is unlikely to become an efficient Sub Inspector of Police", contained in clause (b) of Paragraph 23 (ii) of the Manual. 4. Before appraising the legal questions involved in the case it would be useful to examine the nature and scope of paragraph 23 of the P.T.C. Manual referred to in the impugned order. The relevant portion of para 23 is quoted below for ready reference. "23. (i) Every cadet shall obey all rules of the college and all orders issued by the Principal or any member of the Staff and shall apply himself with diligence and punctuality to the performance of his duties. (ii) Cadets guilty of disobedience of orders, misconduct, subversive of discipline or remissness or negligence in the performance of their duties shall be liable to any or all of the following punishments. (a) Suspension and expulsion from the college by the Principal in anticipation of confirmatory orders from the Inspector General to whom a full report shall be submitted without delay. This punishment shall be reserved for gross misconduct or flagrant and repeated breaches of discipline. (a) Suspension and expulsion from the college by the Principal in anticipation of confirmatory orders from the Inspector General to whom a full report shall be submitted without delay. This punishment shall be reserved for gross misconduct or flagrant and repeated breaches of discipline. (b) Removal from the college with the prior sanction of the Inspector General. This punishment should ordinarily be awarded to a cadet who in the judgment of the Principal is unlikely to become an efficient Sub Inspector of Police. In such a case the Principal shall submit a detailed report to the Inspector General." Now the impugned order may also be reproduced in order to see whether it was made in due compliance of Paragraph 23 (i) (b) of the Manual. It is accordingly quoted as below. "S.I.C.P- Cadet No. 106 Devesh Misra of P.T.C. who has been expelled from this college vide this office order no. A-30 dated 2-9-82 is hereby removed from the S.I.C.P training from this college in accordance with the provisions laid down in 23 (ii) (b) of P.T.C. Manual Part III. This has got the approval of Director General-cum-Inspector General of Police, U. P., as contained in his U.O. Con-106 (311)-82 dated 16-8-82 and conveyed to this office vide AIG's Training U.O. Note No. COT/V-176-82 dated 3-9-82." No. Aa-3?/82 Sd/- B. P. Singhal, Dated 8-9-82. DIG and Principal, Police Training College (I) Moradabad." 5. Having devoted my anxious consideration to the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner, I find his submissions loaded with substance. There is nothing on record to vouchsafe that the explanation submitted by the petitioner trotting out the reasons for his absence from the Parade during the relevant period, was bestowed reasonable consideration by Inspector General of Police while giving prior sanction to the removal of the petitioner, sought for by the Principal. It is evident from the order itself which runs as below 5 Sahayak Police Mahanirikshak, Prashikchan U. P. Lucknow. Kripaya apne ardh shashkiya patr sankhya COT/Panch-17-6-81 dinank 10/11-8-1982 ka avlokan karen, jo Up Nirikshak Nagrik Police Cadet Sankhya 106 Sri Devesh Misra ko Police,Training College Moradabad se vimukta karne ke bare me hai. 2-Aapke ukta patra me ki gayi sanstuti ke aadhar par P.T.O. manual parts III ke para 23 (ii) (b) me pradatta Adhikari ek aanusar S.E.N.P Cadet no. 2-Aapke ukta patra me ki gayi sanstuti ke aadhar par P.T.O. manual parts III ke para 23 (ii) (b) me pradatta Adhikari ek aanusar S.E.N.P Cadet no. 106 Sri Devesh Misra ke Police Trainning College se vimukta karne ki anumati pradaan ki jati hai. Kripaya tadanusar agrim karyawahi karne ki vyavastha karen evam kriti kaaryawahi se avgat kareyan. Sd. Shrish Chandra Dixit Police Mahanideshak evam Mahanirikshak Uttar Pradesh 6. Removal of a S.I.C.P. Cadet under paragraph 23 (ii) (b) of the Manual has far reaching consequences as it affects his livelihood and casts stigma upon him but it may well be argued on behalf of the department, though it was not, that the power under paragraph 23 (ii) (b) of the Manual is subjectively formulated and therefore, this Court may not be justified in sitting in appeal over the 'judgment' of the concerned authority under paragraph 23 (ii) (b) and interferring with the discretion exercised by such authority for the removal of the Cadet from the college. The expression in the judgment of the Principal, the Cadet is unlikely to become an efficient Sub Inspector of Police, no doubt suggests that the power under paragraph 23 (ii) (b) of the Manual is subjectively formulated but in a system based on rule of law, as ours, unfettered governmental discretion is a contradiction in terms and it cannot be said that the exercise of the power under paragraph 23 (ii) (b) of the Manual is beyond judicial review. Following passage from 'Roberts v. Hopwood (1925) AC 576 P. 613 may be usefully quoted below - "A person in whom is vested a discretion must exercise his discretion upon reasonable grounds. A discretion does not empower a man to do what he likes merely because he is minded to do so,-he must in exercise of his discretion do not what he likes but what he ought. In other words, he must by the use of his reason, ascertain and follow the course which reason directs " 7. The 'judgment' of the Principal within the meaning of Clause (b) of Para 23 (ii) of the Manual must be reasonable and not arbitrary and capricious. In order to satisfy the test of reasonableness, it must be based upon valid material and must not be influenced by consideration of irrelevant Materials and/or must not be passed unauthorised purposes. The 'judgment' of the Principal within the meaning of Clause (b) of Para 23 (ii) of the Manual must be reasonable and not arbitrary and capricious. In order to satisfy the test of reasonableness, it must be based upon valid material and must not be influenced by consideration of irrelevant Materials and/or must not be passed unauthorised purposes. Power conferred by Para 23 (ii) (b) of the Manual is a trust in the hands of the Principal of the college and he cannot claim immunity to the accountability for its exercise merely because the provision conferring such power is subjectively worded. 8. In Kaliashwati V: State, AIR 1978 Alld. 181, a Division Bench of this Court was considering the validity of a notification under section 17 (4) read with section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act, the power where under is admittedly formulated in subjective language. The Division Bench relying upon certain earlier decisions of the High Court and a decision of the Supreme Court held as under : "Even though the power of the State Government has been formulated under section 17 (4) of the Act in subjective terms, the expression of opinion of the Sate Government can be challenged as ultra vires in a court of law if it can be shown that the State Government never applied its mind to the matter or that the action of the State Government was malafide." However the Division Bench in the above case went on to hold, relying upon the observations of the Supreme Court in Raja Ram Anand v. State of U. P., AIR 1967 SC 11081, that "the court's power of interference is confined to the grounds of non-existence of facts or non-application of mind or on the ground of malafide." It would be worthwhile to mention that the petitioner had appended medical certificates-one from Primary Health Centre Kuswapur Pratapgarh and the other from Medical College (E N.T.) Allahabad, besides copy of X-ray and also the second copy of the telegram which he had sent for information to the Principal P.T.C. Moradabad on 15-3-1982 about his ailment. It is not borne out from materials on record of the writ petition that any valid reason had been assigned to reject the explanation given by the petitioner. The reason to discard the petitioner's explanation is conspicuously absent from the impugned order. It is not borne out from materials on record of the writ petition that any valid reason had been assigned to reject the explanation given by the petitioner. The reason to discard the petitioner's explanation is conspicuously absent from the impugned order. In the counter affidavit also no reason has been disclosed why the explanation given by the petitioner for his absence from duty was not found satisfactory. I feel, it would be a travesty of justice to accept as enough the mere averments in the counter affidavit that the petitioner's explanation was not found satisfactory It was imperative on the respondents 2 and 3 to assign reason while according sanction and passing the order of removal respectively and in the absence of any valid reasons having been given for rejecting the explanation given by the petitioner to the show cause notice, the impugned order of removal is apt to be branded illegal as wearing the taint of arbitrariness. 9. This court cannot put on blinkers to overlook the requirements which presupposes the Principal of the P.T. C. Moradabad to observe by submitting a detailed report to the Inspector General of Police about the basis of his judgment that the delinquent was unlikely to transform into an efficient Sub Inspector of Police. 10. The Inspector General of Police while according sanction under Clause (D) of Para 23 (ii) of the Manual must act reasonably and not capriciously or arbitrarily. 10. The Inspector General of Police while according sanction under Clause (D) of Para 23 (ii) of the Manual must act reasonably and not capriciously or arbitrarily. In Harbhajan Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1987 SC 7 , the Supreme Court while considering the nature and ambit of Central Government's power under section 86 and 87 of the Code of Civil Procedure held - "The power given by the Central Government must be exercised in accordance with the principles of natural justice and in consonance with reasons." The fact that the principal of the P.T.C. Moradabad is required to submit a detailed report to the Inspector General of Police as contemplated in clause (b) of paragraph 23 (ii) of the P.T.C. Manual, who is supposed to accord or not to accord his approval on the proposed order of removal from the college, implies that before acting on any such report, the delinquent Police Officer must be given an effective opportunity to have his say in the matter which necessarily implies that he should be supplied with a copy of the report of the Principal before it is relied upon by the Inspector General of Police against the petitioner for the purpose of according sanction to the proposed punishment. The impugned order of removal contains a recital that the removal of the petitioner had the approval of the Director General cum Inspector General of Police, Uttar Pradesh. This necessarily means that Director General cum Inspector General of Police U. P. while according his approval, must have been influenced by the report submitted by the D I G.-Cum-Principal of Police Training College (1) Moradabad. Thus, in my opinion, the report, if any, submitted by the Principal to the Inspector General of Police ought to have been supplied to the petitioner in order to meet the requirements of natural justice in its ordinary sense of giving an opportunity of having his say before it is acted upon by the concerned authority against the petitioner. 11. Thus, in my opinion, the report, if any, submitted by the Principal to the Inspector General of Police ought to have been supplied to the petitioner in order to meet the requirements of natural justice in its ordinary sense of giving an opportunity of having his say before it is acted upon by the concerned authority against the petitioner. 11. True enough that the petitioner was given a show cause notice, but that alone is not a sufficient compliance of the principles of natural justice The concerned authorities must also bestow its thoughtful cosideration Upon the explanation and record their reasons for rejecting such explanation Giving of reasons to reject the explanation submitted by the delinquent is in fact a sterling facet of the principles of natural justice and an order of removal passed without giving valid reasons rejecting the explanation submitted by the petitioner is manifestly vitiated by error of law. In A. K. Kraipak v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 150 , the Supreme Court held as below. "The concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years. In the past it was thought that it included just two rules namely : (i) no one shall be a judge in his own cause (nemo debet esse judex propria causa), and (ii) no decision shall be given against a party without affording him a reasonable hearing (audi alteram partem) Very soon thereafter a third rule was envisaged and that is that quasi-judicial enquiries must be held in good faith, without bias and not arbitrarily or unreasonably. But in the course of years many more subidiary rules came to be added to the rules of natural justice." 12. In S. N. Mukherji v. Union of INdia, AIR 1990 SC 1984 , the Supreme Court bad an occasion to consider the question in hand and after noticing the above observations of the court made in A K. Kraipak's case (supra) and a large number of other cases and authorities it has held as under : "39. The object underlying the rules of natural justice "is to prevent miscarriage of justice" and secure "fair play in action". The object underlying the rules of natural justice "is to prevent miscarriage of justice" and secure "fair play in action". As appointed out earlier the requirement about recording of reasons for its decision by an administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions achieves this object by excluding chances of arbitrariness and ensuring a degree of fairness in the process of decision making. Keeping in view the expanding horizon of the principles of natural justice we are of the opinion that the requirement to record reason can be regarded as one of the principles of natural justice which govern exercise of power by administrative authorities. The rules of natural justice are not embodied rule. The extent of their application depends upon the particular statutory frame work where under jurisdiction has been conferred on the administrative authorities. With regard to the exercise of a particular power by an administrative authority including exercise of judicial or quasi judicial functions the legislature, while conferring the said power, may feel that it would not be in the larger public interest that the reasons for the order passed by the administrative authority be recorded in the order and be communicated to the aggrieved party and it may dispense with such a requirement. It may do so by making an express provision to that effect as those contained in the Administrative procedure Act, 1946 of U.S.A. and the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act, 1977 of Australia whereby the orders passed by certain specified authorities are excluded from the ambit of the enactment. Such an exclusion can also arise by necessary implication from the nature of the subject matter the scheme and the provisions of the enactment. The public interest underlying such a provision would outweigh the salutary purpose served by the requirement to record, the reasons. The said requirement cannot, therefore, be insisted upon in such case. 40. For the reasons aforesaid, it must be concluded that except in cases where the requirement has been dispensed with expressly or by necessary implication, an administrative authority exercising judicial or quasi- judicial functions is required to record the reasons for its decision." The order of removal, if passed, as it was without affording a fair and effective opportunity of hearing and without giving valid reasons to reject the explanation given by the petitioner in his reply to show cause notice will be vitiated. There is nothing in the counter affidavit which may pursuade me to hold that the report which purports to give some reasons good or bad, was supplied to the petitioner and that he was afforded a fair and effective opportunity of hearing. The authorities have failed to act in tune with the true spirit of the provisions, contained in paragraph 23 (ii) (b) of the P.T.C. Manual. Principle of natural justice in the sense of giving reasons as also in the sense of giving fair opportunity of hearing seems to have become a casualty both at the stage of according sanction by the Inspector General (Police) and awarding punishment of removal by the Principal-cum-D.I G. (P). The provision contained in paragraph 23 (ii) (b) of the Manual enjoins a duty both upon the Inspector General (POLICE) and D.I.G. (P) to play their respective roles in consonance with the principle of natural justice, which they have not done in the instant case. The order of removal impugned in the petition, is therefore, not sustainable in law. 13. The order of expulsion passed earlier on 2-9-1982 under clause (a) of paragraph 23 (ii) of the Manual too is vitiated for non-application of mind, either by the Principal while passing the order or by the Inspector General (Police) while confirming the same to the relevant consideration/aspect as to whether the petitioner was guilty of gross misconduct or flagrant and repeated breaches of discipline, within the meaning of clause (a) of para' 23 (ii) of the Manual. 14. If I leave the matter here the respondents would be well within their authority to proceed against the petitioner afresh in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made in the body of this judgment but looking to the facts and circumstances of the case particularly the fact that the petitioner has suffered enough punishment by way of the loss of about eight years' experience of service besides the mental agony which he) has undergone during all these years. it would but be proper and in the ends of justice, IF I quash the impugned order and direct the respondents to re-admit the petitioner as S.I (CP) Cadet No. 106 of 1981-82 batch and permit him to complete his course, if he has not already done it and give him an opportunity to prove his worth as an efficient police officer in the department. In the result, the petition succeeds and is allowed, The impugned' orders of expulsion and removal dated 2-9-82 and 8-9-82 respectively passed against the petitioner Devesh Misra, S.I. (CP) Cadet No. 106 of P T.C. (1)' Moradabad (Annexure 3 to the petition) are hereby quashed The respondents are. directed to take the petitioner back in the P.T C. college Moradabad as to enable him to complete his training course alongwith the next available batch of S.I. (CP) Cadet in accordance with law. In the circumstances of the case, I make no orders as to costs. Petition allowed.