JUDGMENT B. Dikshit, J. - By this Writ Petition the Zila Parishad Banda and its Adhyaksha have challenged the order dated 2.1.1990 passed by U.P. Public Service Tribunal-2 (referred as Tribunal) Lucknow, whereby the Tribunal has accepted claim of Mukut Bihari Respondent, a Compounder of the Zila Parishad, Banda. 2. The essential facts for the purpose of this writ petition are that respondent Mukut Bihari being a permanent employee of Zila Parishad Banda, as Compounder, was charged for the manipulation in the dispensary records, for not depositing the fee collected from the patients and removal of goods belonging to Zila Parishad Banda. The respondent faced disciplinary inquiry before Sahayak Lekhadhikari Zila Parishad Banda, who submitted inquiry report on 17.12.1988 as Inquiry Officer. The Inquiry Officer exonerated respondent of the charges levelled against him. The District Magistrate was also holding the post of Adhayaksha of Zila Parished. The District Magistrate in exercise of power of Adhyaksha Zila Parishad disagreed with the report of the Inquiry Officer. He held the respondent guilty of the charges for non-realisation and non-deposit of levy fee collected from the patients during the period 3.11.1977 to 20.11.77 and for dereliction of duty and disobedience of the order of competent authority. He ordered dismissal of petitioner from service and directed the recovery of the amount collected by the petitioner from. the patients which was not deposited. The appeal preferred by respondent Mukut Bihari was dismissed by the Commissioner, Jhansi Division, by order dated 2.1.1990. The petitioner challenged the order of dismissal as well as order passed in appeal before the Tribunal. The Tribunal by order dated 2.1.1990 has allowed the claim petition, quashed the order of Adhyaksha Zila Parishad/District Magistrate dated 3.11.1983 and the order passed by the Commissioner dated 12.10.1990, in appeal. The Zila Parishad and its Adhyaksha have filed this petition challenging the order of the Tribunal. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the appointing authority 'Adhyaksha' Zila Parishad, was well within his power in dismissing the respondent from service on receipt of inquiry report and after serving a show-cause notice on respondent, (Mukut Bihari). He argued that it was well within the power of appointing authority to have ordered the punishment and as in exercise of that power the appointing authority awarded punishment of dismissal, the Tribunal could rot interfere in the matter. He argued that it was well within the power of appointing authority to have ordered the punishment and as in exercise of that power the appointing authority awarded punishment of dismissal, the Tribunal could rot interfere in the matter. He also argued that as the Tribunal considered that the petitioner did not get the proper opportunity to defend himself, then the proper course open to the Tribunal was to send back the whole matter to the appointing authority to reconsider the same after providing adequate opportunity of hearing to respondent-Mukut Bihari and the Tribunal was not right in quashing the impugned order and setting aside appellate order without sending it back to appointing authority. He argued that the proper order which could be passed by Tribunal was to send the whole matter back to appointing authority to decide it afresh after providing adequate opportunity of hearing to respondent Mukut Bihari. All these arguments were opposed by counsel for respondent (Mukut Bihari) who justified the order of Tribunal as correct and appropriate under the circumstances of the case. 4. Considering the argument advanced by Counsel for petitioner I am of the opinion that there is no force in the argument that the appointing authority was well within his power to disagree with the finding recorded by Inquiry Officer and the Tribunal has exceeded its power in setting aside the order of punishment. On perusal of the order of the Tribunal it is clear that the Tribunal has quashed the order of appointing authority and set aside the order of appellate authority. It is apparent from the narration of facts of the case that Inquiry Officer exonerated respondent Mukut Behari from all the charges and recommended that in respect of realisation of levy fee, the matter should be examined by Adhyaksha Zila Parishad as to whether the office of Zila Parishad is responsible or the predecessor of respondent Mukut Bihari or Mukat Bihari himself is responsible for the loss of fee not realised or not deposited. The recommendation was made by the Inquiry Officer for realisation of amount from the person found responsible. The Tribunal has been of the view that Chairman Zila Parishad did not examine the matter of fixation of responsibility. The recommendation was made by the Inquiry Officer for realisation of amount from the person found responsible. The Tribunal has been of the view that Chairman Zila Parishad did not examine the matter of fixation of responsibility. The Tribunal has held that Chairman misrepresented the report of Inquiry Officer and has held the respondent Mukut Bihari responsible for the alleged loss, which was sufficient to set aside the order of dismissal passed against employee Mukut Bihari. The non-fixation of responsibility of Adhyaksha Zila Parishad fully justified quashing of order of respondents (Mukut Bihari's) dismissal. 5. In this case, besides what has been stated above the Tribunal has not only disagreed with the finding recorded by the Adhyaksha Zila Parishad but has also come to the conclusion after examining the matter that the Zila Parishad Service Rules were not complied within passing the order of dismissal. The Tribunal has taken the view that it is provided in Zila Parishad Service Rules that where punishing authority disagreed with any part or whole of the disciplinary proceedings, the point or points of such disagreement together with a brief statement of ground thereof shall be communicated to the person charged along with Copy of proceedings under Rule 36 of the above Rules. The Tribunal has held that the Inquiry Officer recommended exoneration from all the charges and recommended reinstatement of the petitioner who was under suspension and, therefore, it would have been proper on the part of the punishing authority to make compliance of this provision which has not been done, in the present case, once Rule 36 of the Zila Parishad Service Rules stood violated the Tribunal has every reason to set aside the order of the punishing authority. As the punishing authority did not comply with the requirement necessary under the said Rules in disagreeing with the report of the Inquiry Officer, the argument that the punishing authority had power to disagree with the Inquiry Officer loses its value. 6. In this case, so far the appellate authority is concerned, he did not examine the case in right perspective. The Tribunal has observed that "As regards the order of the learned Commissioner dated October 12, 1990, rejecting the appeal (Annexure-12 to the claim petition), the observation of the learned counsel for the petitioner is correct that the learned Commissioner has not been able to appreciate the facts of the case properly. The Tribunal has observed that "As regards the order of the learned Commissioner dated October 12, 1990, rejecting the appeal (Annexure-12 to the claim petition), the observation of the learned counsel for the petitioner is correct that the learned Commissioner has not been able to appreciate the facts of the case properly. The case of the petitioner mainly hinges on issue of non-realisation of levy, whereas the learned Commissioner has observed that after perusal of the record of the petitioner is found guilty of not depositing the realised levy to the 'Parishad Kosh' hence the impugned order of the Parishad is also liable to be quashed in view of the proper appreciation of the case. The bare perusal of the order of Commissioner as appellate authority was disposed of without appreciating facts material on record. The Commissioner has dismissed the appeal without even considering the material on record. He has recorded his conclusion without assigning any reason and the conclusion of Tribunal that he has not been able to appreciate facts of the case properly, is also correct, for setting aside his order. 7. Another argument advanced by the Counsel for the petitioner is that is the punishing authority was of the view that the order was passed without affording adequate opportunity of hearing to employee and it was passed not in accordance with the Zila Parishad Service Rules, then the case would have been remanded by Tribunal for re-consideration by appointing authority. He has also submitted that in the absence of reasons for disagreement, the matter could have been examined again by Punishing authority. I am not inclined to accept this argument as I have already pointed out that the order has not been set aside only on the ground of any procedural irregularity but the Tribunal has also taken the view that Adhyaksha Zila Parishad should have fixed the responsibility in respect of the non-collection of the amount. Besides this aspect, there is another reason for which the case cannot be sent back. Admittedly, petitioner attained the age of superannuation on 31.7.1988. The disciplinary proceedings started in the year 1980 and the order of dismissal was passed on 2.7.1981. It will be inequitable to allow the present litigation to restart after such a long time against a person who has attained age of superannuation about three years back. Admittedly, petitioner attained the age of superannuation on 31.7.1988. The disciplinary proceedings started in the year 1980 and the order of dismissal was passed on 2.7.1981. It will be inequitable to allow the present litigation to restart after such a long time against a person who has attained age of superannuation about three years back. Under such circumstances no useful purpose could be served in sending the case back by the trial Court. 8. Before parting with the case I will like to point out that the Counsel for the petitioner also argued that the respondent No. 2 has attained the age of superannuation on 31.7.1988 but the Tribunal have still ordered for his reinstatement while passing the order on 2.1.1990. The Counsel for the petitioner is not correct in raising such a submission. The impugned order does not say that the petitioner has to be reinstated. The counsel for the respondent has agreed that the petitioner has attained the age of superannuation on 31.7.1988 and, therefore, the reinstatement has not been ordered. In view of these facts this argument is also unsustainable and liable to be rejected. 9. For the aforesaid reasons the writ petition is dismissed summarily.