JUDGMENT S.K. Dhaon, J. - The petitioner alleges himself to be the lease holder of plot No. 1211 (area 1.14 acres) situation village Garhi, Pargana and district Dehradun (hereinafter referred to as the land in question). He has challenged the legality of the notification dated 28th April, 1986 published in the U. P. Gazette dated 21st June, 1986, and the notification dated 1st September, 1986 published in the U. P. Gazette dated 1st November, 1986, respectively issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). 2. A composite notification under Section 4, sub-section (1) of Section 17 and sub-section (4) of Section 17 of the Laud Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) was issued on 28th April, 1986 and was published in the U. P. Gazette dated 21st June, 1986. The purpose of the acquisition is shown : "For the construction of hospital for the employees of the Oil and Natural Gas Commission, Dehradun." 3. The only contention advanced on behalf of the petitioner is that the nature of the urgency was not such as to obviate an enquiry under Section 5-A. In furtherance of this argument it is contended that the State Government has not been able to discharge the burden cast upon it to demonstrate that it directed its mind towards formation of an opinion on the need to dispense with the inquiry under Section 5-A. 4. The notification aforementioned may be extracted in its entirety. It reads : "Under sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (Act No. 1 of 1894), read with the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, Notification No. 20/1/55-Judicial-1, dated May 14, 1955, the Governor is pleased to notify for general information that the land mentioned in the schedule below is needed for a public purpose, namely, for the construction of Hospital for the employees of the Oil and Natural Gas Commission, Dehradun. 2. 2. Being of the opinion that the provisions of sub-section.(1) of Section 17 of the said Act are applicable to the said land inasmuch as the said land is urgently required for the construction of Hospital for the employees of the Oil and Natural Gas Commission, Dehradun and that in view of the pressing urgency, it is as well necessary to eliminate the delay likely to be caused by an enquiry under Section 5-A of the said Act, the Governor is further pleased to direct under sub-section (4) of Section 17 of the said Act that the provisions of Section 5-A of the said Act shall not apply." We have read the aforequated notification more than once and we feel that there cannot be any escape from the conclusion that in it there is a clear recital that the urgency is of such a character which necessitates the doing away, of the inquiry under-Section 5-A, The recital also discloses that mind had been directed towards the formation of an opinion on the need to adopt the exceptional course departing from the normal rule as envisaged in Section 5-A. 5. We may now refer to the averments made in the writ petition to find out if any challenge has been made with regard to accuracy of the aforementioned recital in the notification. We have also to examine whether the petitioner has made any averment which may give an indication that an attempt has been made to rebut the presumption attached to the notification and as embodied in section 114 (e) of the Evidence Act. 6. Counsel for the petitioner has very fairly stated that paragraphs 18 and 19 of the writ petition alone are relevant for the purposes of the present controversy. It will be profitable to extract the contents of the said paragraphs verbatim "18. That the O.N.G.C. already has a hospital running for the last 28 years in a huge building on Subhash Road (Old Lytton Road), Dehradun, presumably to have a most modern and fully equipped Hospital the Commission acquired 10,33 acres of land in 1984 in village Garhi, just adjacent to the petitioners' held land, and constructed a huge hospital building which is to be equipped now. It is beyond imagination as to what is the justification of acquiring fresh 1.14 acres of petitioners held land and factory just for the same purpose viz. It is beyond imagination as to what is the justification of acquiring fresh 1.14 acres of petitioners held land and factory just for the same purpose viz. for the construction of Hospital for the employees of the O.N.G.C. These facts were never brought to the notice of the State Government while recommending the acquisition of the petitioners held Khasra No. 1211 and as such the State Government was not posted with facts and never applied its mind for invoking the urgency provisions. Besides this, it was never brought, to the notice of the State Government that Khasra number 1211 was not waste or arable land but was studed with buildings as old as 25 years with a running Industry having costly machines run by power. Besides there are about 100 trees of all species on the land." "19; That in the context of the O.N.G.C. having already acquired 10.33 acres of land specifically for the construction of Hospital and the Hospital building already having been constructed, there is absolutely no 'public purpose' for acquisition of petitioners land and factory much less any urgency to apply Sections 17 (1) and 17 (4) and do away with the statutory right to hear objections under Section 5-A of the Act. Had opportunity been given to hear objections under Section 5-A of the Act, the petitioner would have revealed the un-justifiability of further acquisition' for Hospital Construction." 7. Had opportunity been given to hear objections under Section 5-A of the Act, the petitioner would have revealed the un-justifiability of further acquisition' for Hospital Construction." 7. Having given a througthful consideration to the averments made in paragraphs 18 and 19 afore quoted our view is that the trust or the burden of the song in the afore quoted averments is that the land in question is really not required for the purposes of constructing a hospital or at any rate there is no urgent necessity of acquiring the land in question, it is neither the case of the petitioner, nor can it be, that the land in question is not being acquired for public purpose we, therefore, hold that there is no challenge in this petition that the recital in the notification is either defective or there was no application of mind to the question that, the urgency was of such a character that it could not brook the delay of the period of inquiry under section 5-A or the necessity of holding an inquiry under Section 5-A had been dispensed with on mala fide considerations or the opinion had been formed without any application of mind or the opinion had been formed on no material or evidence or the same had been formed on irrelevant or extraneous considerations. 8. In Emperor v. Sibnath Banerjee and another, AIR 1945 PC 156 at page 161 the Judicial Committee quoted with approval the view of the learned Chief Justice of the Federal Court, viz. : "It is quite a different thing to question the accuracy of a recital contained in a duly authenticated order, particularly where that recital purports to state as a fact the carrying out of what on the record has a condition necessary to the valid making of that order. In the normal case the existence of such a recital in a duly authenticated order will, in the absence of any evidence as to its inaccuracy, be accepted by a Court as establishing that the necessary condition was fulfilled. The presence of the recital in the order will place a difficult burden on the tetenue to produce admissible evidence sufficient to establish oven a prima facie case that the recital is not accorate." 9. The presence of the recital in the order will place a difficult burden on the tetenue to produce admissible evidence sufficient to establish oven a prima facie case that the recital is not accorate." 9. In Barium Chemical Ltd. v. Company Law Board, AIR 1967 SC 295 at page 309 it was again held ; "...No doubt the formation of opinion is subjective but the existence of circumstances relevant to the inference as the sine quanon for action must be demonstrable. If the action is questioned on the ground that no circumstances leading to an inference of -the kind contemplated by the section exists, the action might be exposed to interference unless the existence of the circumstances is made out. Since the existence of the 'circumstances' is a condition fundamental to the making of an opinion, the existence of the circumstances, if questioned, has to be proved at least prima facie..." 10. In Sibnath Banerjee's case as well as in Barjum Chemicals Ltd. v. Company Law Boards' case (supra), it is implicit that there must be a challenge as to the existence of the circumstances leading to an inference. Of course, in Shibnath Banerjee's case their Lordships went to the extent of laying down that the detenn should produce admissible evidence sufficient to establish even a prima facie case that the recital was inaccurate. Here, in the present case, we have already indicated, there is neither any evidence nor any challenge in respect of the accuracy of the recital in the notification. Again in Jaicband Lal Sethia v. Suite of West Bengal, AIR 1967 SC 483 at page 486, it was held that in a normal case the existence of such a recital in a duly authenticate order will, in the absence of any evidence as to its inaccuracy, be accepted by the Court as establishing that the necessary condition was fulfilled. In other words, in,a normal case the existence of such a recital in a duly authenticate order that the State Government was satisfied will, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, be accepted by the Court as establishing that the State Government was so satisfied. In other words, in,a normal case the existence of such a recital in a duly authenticate order that the State Government was satisfied will, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, be accepted by the Court as establishing that the State Government was so satisfied. If the order of detention itself suffers from any lacunae it is open to a Court in a proper case to call for an affidavit from the Chief Minister, or to call for the relevant file from the State Government in order to satisfy itself as to the accuracy of the recital made in the order of detention. Evidence apart, we have already indicated that there is not even a whisper in the averments made by the petitioner that there is any inaccuracy in the recital as contained in the notification. 11. in Swadeshi Cotton Mills case, AIR 1961 SC 1381 , it was held that in a case where a general order contains a recital on the face of it, the Court will presume the legality of the order including the fulfilment of the conditions precedent, and then it will be for the party challenging the order to show that the recital was incorrect and that the conditions precedent were in fact not complied with by the authority. 12. In Narayan Govind Gavate etc. v. State of Maharashtra and others, AIR 1977 SC 183 , the case on which strong reliance is placed by the Counsel for the petitioner, speaking through Beg, J, the Court disapproved the opinion of the Bombay High Court that the presumption of regulating to an order containing a technically correct recital did not operate in cases where Section 106 of the Evidence Act was applicable. Their Lordships held that an order or injunction containing a recital, technically correct on the face of it, raised a presumption of fact Section 114, illustration (e) of the Evidence Act). If it is an optional presumption it can be displaced by the circumstances indicating that the power lodged in an authority or officer has not been exercised in accordance with law. If it is an optional presumption it can be displaced by the circumstances indicating that the power lodged in an authority or officer has not been exercised in accordance with law. The original or stable onus laid down by Section 101 and Section 102 of the Evidence Act cannot be shifted by Section 106, although the particular onus of proving facts and circumstances lying especially with the knowledge of the officials who formed the opinion which resulted in the notification under, sub-section (4) of Section 17 of the Act rests upon that official. The recital, if it is not defective, may obviate the need to look further. In the case before us we feel that the petitioner has not been able to discharge the origin or stable onus as laid down by Sections 101 and 102 of the Evidence. This, in our opinion, is a case where the recital, not being defective, there is no need to look further. 13. In Adarsh Cooperative Housing Society v. State of U. P. and others, AIR 1983 Allahabad 103, a Division Bench of this Court, presided over by Hon'ble Mr. Justice N. D. Ojha (as he then was) it has been held that in the absence of any averment in the writ petition that the satisfaction of the acquiring authority in regard to urgency of the matter was based on no evidence and was mala fide or that there was no application of mind by the said authority, the primary onus under Sections 101 and 102 of the Evidence Act, which lay upon the petitioner, as emphasised by the Supreme Court in Narayan's case (supra) remained undischarged. 14. In Narayan's case (supra) emphasis had been laid on the burden of proof in a case where neither in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the acquiring body, nor in the notification issued, there was any material showing that the State Government had applied its mind to the question that, there existed urgency which warranted the elemination of the inquiry contemplated by Section 5-A of the Act. In that case, therefore, their Lordships applied Section 106 of the Evidence Act and held that since certain facts were in. In that case, therefore, their Lordships applied Section 106 of the Evidence Act and held that since certain facts were in. the special knowledge of the acquiring authority or the State Government and they having failed to disclose those facts, the dispensing with the inquiry under Section 5-A by invoking sub-section (4) of Section 17 of the Act was bad in law. For coming to that conclusion, their Lordships also took into account the purpose of acquisition. In our opinion, their Lordships did so because there was neither any averment in the counter-affidavit throwing any light on the question of urgency nor was there any recital in the notification. On the contrary, the specific stand taken in the counter-affidavit was that the question of urgency was not justifiable. So far as the present case is concerned, even if the purpose of the acquisition is seen, although in view of the recital in the notification it cannot be seen, there appears to be an element of urgency in so far as the land in question was acquired for the purpose of constructing a hospital for the employees of the Oil and Natural Gas Commission. It will be presumed that the Commission is an aver expanding organisation. The petitioner cannot, therefore, derive any benefit from the decision of the Supreme Court in Narayan's case. 15. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on a number of decisions of this Court. They are Ajadul Bux and others v. State of U. P. and others, 1982 Alld. 435 ; Vinod Kamar Gupta and others v. State of U.P. and others, 1990 (2) UPLBEC 766; Smt. Maheshwari Devi v. State of U. P. and others, 1987 UPLBEC 372 ; and Raj Kishore and others v. State of U.P. and others, 1990 ALJ 728. All the aforementioned decisions are really based upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Narayan's case (supra). In each one of them this Court held that there was no material before the State Government to enable it to come to the conclusion that the urgency was of such nature so as to dispense with the summary enquiry under Section 5-A. These cases are not at all helpful to the petitioner and are distinguishable. 16. The relevant record has been produced before us by the State Government. 16. The relevant record has been produced before us by the State Government. We have perused the same, it transpires that on 14th November, 1985 the State Government had called for a report from the Collector as to whether it was necessary to acquire the land in question for the purpose of constructing a hospital by the Commission. On 4th January, 1986 a communication was sent on behalf of the commission to the Collector to the effect that the land in question was urgently required for the purpose of the hospital. It was also stated therein that the matter was so urgent so as to obviate the necessity of holding an inquiry under Section 5-A. On 6th January. 1986 the Collector, sent a communication to the State Government annexing thereto the said communication of the commission dated 4th January 1986. Having seen the relevant papers, we cannot get away from the fact that before tire State Government there was some material to enable it to come to the conclusion that the urgency was of such a nature as to apply the provisions of sub-section (4) of Section 17 so that an enquiry as contemplated under Section 5-A may not be held. 17. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon the contents of Paragraph 8 of the counter-affidavit filed by one Sunil Kumar, a counter cleric in the office of the Special Land Acquisition Officer, Dehradun. The contents of the said paragraph purport to be replies to the averments made in Paragraphs 18 and 19 of the writ petition. In it, it is, inter alia, stated that there are large number of employees of the commission and for constructing a hospital for the said employees on an area of 10.33 acres of land, which was acquired in J 984, the construction work was in progress. A huge amount has already been spent on the construction of different departments of the hospital. It may not be out of place to mention here that it is necessary that this Department and hospital is connected by the main road of Dehradun Chakrata Road. Now the land in Khasra No. 1211, area 1.14 acres is very urgently needed and therefore, being acquired under the urgency clause of Section 17. There is no way out to get the hospital connected with the main road in a urgent way......... 18. Now the land in Khasra No. 1211, area 1.14 acres is very urgently needed and therefore, being acquired under the urgency clause of Section 17. There is no way out to get the hospital connected with the main road in a urgent way......... 18. We have already emphasised that in Paragraphs 18 and 19 of the writ petition it is not alleged that the urgency was not of such a nature so as to do away with the summary proceedings under Section 5-A. The contents of Paragraph 8 of the counter-affidavit, therefore, cannot be pressed into service by the petitioner for either rebutting the presumption attached to the recital in the notification under Section 4 or for minimising the relevance of the material which was before the State Government, a reference to which has been made by us. Although it is not stated in Paragraph 8 of the counter-affidavit that the land in question was acquired not for the hospital but for constructing a link road, yet, even if the averments therein are construed in that manner, nothing will turn to the advantage of the petitioner. If such an averment has been made, obviously it has happened under some misconception. The material referred to above sud the recital in the notification under Section 4 clearly indicate that the laud in question is required for the construction of the hospital. The petitioner cannot derive any advantage from an apparent error committed by a clerk. 19. This petition fails and is dismissed but without any order as to costs. The interim order dated 31st October, 1986 is vacated.