Judgement DR. B. P. SARAF, J. :- This appeal involves an important question relating to customary law of inheritance prevalent among the Kabui Tribe of Manipur. The precise question that falls for consideration is whether there prevails a custom among the Kubui Tribe whereby the daughters are excluded from inheriting immovable pro-perty left by their father even in the absence of sons and widow. 2. The appellant was the plaintiff in the suit which has given rise to this appeal. He was a purchaser of the suit land. His case was that the suit land belonged to one Kakchungai Kabui of Kakhulong village who died about four years before the institution of the suit leaving behind his daughter, defendant No. 1 (principal respondent herein). He also left behind two younger brothers who were pro forma defendants Nos. 2 and 3 in the suit. According to the plaintiff, the two pro forma defendants who were younger brothers of the deceased inherited the suit land on his death to the exclusion of his daughter according to the custom prevailing amongst the Manipuri Kabuis. The custom, according to the plain-tiff, was that females, both daughters and widow, could not inherit or succeed to any immovable property and in the absence of son, the immovable property devolved on the brothers of the deceased and in default of brothers, on the brothers male heirs. The plaintiff purchased a portion of the suit land from the defendant No. 2 under the registered deed of sale dated 18-1-60 for a consideration of Rs. 2,000/-. He also purchased the remain-ing portion of the suit land from the defen-dant No. 3 by another registered deed of sale dated 10-12-59 at a price of Rs. 1,150/-. According to him, the delivery of possession of the suit land was also made to him by the vendors soon after the sale and since then he had been in possession of the same by constructing house thereon and paying revenue in respect thereof. The plaintiff thereafter sought mutation of the land pur-chased by him in his name. The mutation was granted by the A.S. and S.O. in his favour. The same was, however, set aside by the Chief Commissioner by order dated 12-11-62 pas-sed in a revision petition filed by the Defen-dant No. 1. The revision case had been numbered as Revision Case No. 17 of 1962. The mutation was granted by the A.S. and S.O. in his favour. The same was, however, set aside by the Chief Commissioner by order dated 12-11-62 pas-sed in a revision petition filed by the Defen-dant No. 1. The revision case had been numbered as Revision Case No. 17 of 1962. The title of the plaintiff, thus, got clouded. The defendant No. 1, taking advantage of this situation, on or about 26-1-63 trespassed upon a portion of the suit land described in Schedule C to the plaint. A criminal case was started by the plaintiff against the defendant No. 1 but to no effect. The defendant No. 1 continued in her unauthorised occupation despite the criminal cases. Situated thus, the plaintiff, filed the suit for declaration of his title over the suit land, recovery of possession of a portion thereof and for permanent injunction restraining defendant No. 1 from interfering with his possession and also for mesne profit at the rate of Rs. 100/- per month. 3. The defendants 2 and 3, the brothers of the deceased owner of the suit land, who had sold it to the plaintiff, did not contest the suit. So it proceeded ea parte against them. The defendant No. 1, the daughter of the deceased owner contested the suit. Her contention was that after the death of her father Kake Homgai Kubai, who admittedly was the owner of the suit land, she inherited the suit land. The defendants Nos. 2 and 3 had no right to transfer the same, and as such, the plaintiff derived no title to the suit land on the basis of sale deeds executed by them. Her further case was that the plaintiff had never been in possession thereof as a owner. He came to occupy a portion of the suit land as she herself allowed him to occupy the same to facilitate the education of her children. She denied the existence of the alleged custom. Her case was that there existed no custom amongst the Kubui tribe of Manipur having the force of law or otherwise according to which the daughters and widows were to be excluded or debarred from inheriting the immovable properties left by the father or the husband. She denied the existence of the alleged custom. Her case was that there existed no custom amongst the Kubui tribe of Manipur having the force of law or otherwise according to which the daughters and widows were to be excluded or debarred from inheriting the immovable properties left by the father or the husband. She categorically denied that in her tribe in the absence of sons, immovable property of the deceased devolved upon the brothers and in the absence of the latter, upon the brothers male heirs. 4. On the pleadings of the parties a number of issues were framed. On considera-tion of the evidence adduced by the parties, the trial court arrived at a finding that the plaintiff failed to prove the existence of the alleged custom. It held that in the absence of custom to the contrary, according to the provisions of the Indian Succession Act, defendant No. 1 was the legal heir of her deceased father in preference to defendants Nos. 2 and 3. Consequently, it was held that the plaintiff could not derive any valid title to the suit land under the transfers executed by the defendants Nos. 2 and 3, and as such, dismissed the suit. 5. The plaintiff filed an appeal. The only point urged in the appeal was in regard to the existence of the custom. The Additional District Judge, Manipur who heard the appeal, on consideration of the evidence on record and facts and circumstances of the case, affirmed the finding of the trial court that the plaintiff had failed to establish the existence of the alleged custom. It was also held that in the absence of custom having the force of law, the provisions of Indian Succes-sion Act were applicable. The defendant No. 1 being the only child of the deceased Kachingai Kabui was entitled to inherit the properties of her father and defendants Nos. 2 and 3, not being lineal descents of deceased, had no right to inherit the suit land to the exclusion of defendant No. 1. They had, as such, no right to sell the same to the plaintiff. The plaintiff, therefore, could not derive any valid title to the suit land from the two registered deeds executed by the two defen-dants who themselves had no title. The appeal was, therefore, dismissed. The plaintiff has now come in second appeal before this court. 6. We have heard Mr. The plaintiff, therefore, could not derive any valid title to the suit land from the two registered deeds executed by the two defen-dants who themselves had no title. The appeal was, therefore, dismissed. The plaintiff has now come in second appeal before this court. 6. We have heard Mr. Priyananda Singh, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. Ibobi Singh, learned counsel for the respon-dents. The only controversy in this case relates to existence of the alleged custom. The sole point that falls for determination is whether there exists a custom among the Kubui Tribe of Manipur whereby the daughters and widows are excluded from inheriting the immovable property left by the father or husband, as the case may be. Or to be more specific and restricted, whether there is any prevailing custom in the Kubui Tribe under which daughters are excluded from inheritance in the fathers property, even in the absence of sons and widows. 7. The essential characteristics of a custom are no more res integra. It is well settled that a custom to be valid must have four essential attributes, first, it must be immemorial; secondly, it must be reasonable; thirdly, it must have continued without interruption since its immemorial origin; and, fourthly, it must be certain in respect of its nature generally, as well as in respect of the locality where it is alleged to obtain and the persons whom it is alleged to affect (Halsburys Laws of England Fourth Edition). The very four requirements have been discussed in Salmond on Jurisprudence under the four heads (i) reasonableness, (ii) conformity with statute law, (iii) observance as of right, and (iv) immemorial antiquity. These requirements were also summarised and stated by this Court in Khiteswar Phukan v. Sowala Gogoi, (1990) 1 Gauhati LR 364 (at 370) : (AIR 1991 Gauhati 61 at p.65) in following terms : "The essential attributes of a custom are that it must be ancient, certain and reasonable. It must have been observed with-out interruption. It must be uniform and obligatory. It must not be immoral or opposed to public policy. Besides it must be established by clear and unambiguous evi-dence." 8. It must have been observed with-out interruption. It must be uniform and obligatory. It must not be immoral or opposed to public policy. Besides it must be established by clear and unambiguous evi-dence." 8. Referring to one of the essential requirements, i.e. immemorial existence, it was observed by the Supreme Court in Gokal Chand v. Parvin Kumari, AIR 1952 SC 231 (at 234) that a custom, in order to be binding, must derive its force from the fact that by long usage it has obtained the force of law, but the English rule that "a custom, in order that it may be legal and binding, must have been used so long that the memory of man runneth not to the contrary" should not be strictly applied to Indian conditions. It was held that all that is necessary to prove is that the usages have been acted upon in practice for such a long period and with such invariability as to show that it has, by common consent, been submitted to as the established governing rule of a particular locality. 9. It is equally well settled that all customs of which the court do not take judicial notice, must be clearly proved to exist. The onus of establishing them is upon the parties who rely upon their existence. The usual method of proving a custom, as observed in Halsburys Laws of England Fourth Edition, is to call persons of middle or old age to state that in their time usually half a century, the custom has always prevailed. This is considered, in the absence of countervailing evidence to show that the custom has existed from all time. For countervailing evidence, other old persons may be called to show that there was an interruption during the period spoken of by the first set of witnesses. Whether the evidence supports the custom as alleged or not is always a question to be decided by the court. 10. The manner of proving a custom was also dealt with by the Supreme Court in Gokal Chand v. Parvin Kumari ( AIR 1952 SC 231 ) (supra). Whether the evidence supports the custom as alleged or not is always a question to be decided by the court. 10. The manner of proving a custom was also dealt with by the Supreme Court in Gokal Chand v. Parvin Kumari ( AIR 1952 SC 231 ) (supra). It was observed (at p. 234) : "A custom may be proved by general evidence as to its existence by members of the tribe or family who would naturally be cognizant of its existence and its exercise without controversy, and such evidence may be safely acted on when it is supported by a public record..." It was also Observed in the aforesaid case that no statutory presumption attaches to the contents of a compilation of customs, but if it is a public record prepared by a public officer in the discharge of his duties under Govern-ment Rules, the statements to be found therein in support of custom are admissible to prove facts recited therein and will generally be regarded as a strong piece of evidence of the custom. 11. In the light of the foregoing dis-cussions of the law regarding the essential attributes of a valid custom having the force of law and the manner of proving it, the facts of the present case may be analysed. The undisputed position in this case is that the suit land was the property of late Kachingai Kabui who died leaving behind his only daughter, defendant No. 1. He had no sons or wife at the time of his death. The defendants Nos. 2 and 3 are the step brothers of the deceased. They claimed right of inheritance on the basis of the alleged custom of their tribe. In the absence of the custom, the property of the deceased would not devolve upon them his daughter, defendant No. 1 would inherit the same. The defendants Nos. 2 and 3 sold the suit land to the plaintiff. The plaintiff thus claimed title by virtue of purchase from them. He would derive title only if he could establish the title of his vendors the two pro forma defendants who sold the land to him. The pro forma defendants did not even contest the case. They did not turn up to establish as to how they got title over the suit land. He would derive title only if he could establish the title of his vendors the two pro forma defendants who sold the land to him. The pro forma defendants did not even contest the case. They did not turn up to establish as to how they got title over the suit land. It is the plaintiff who pleaded on their behalf and claimed that they had a title over the suit land as in accordance with the prevailing custom of the Kabui Tribe in the absence of his sons, the property of the deceased devolved on them to the exclusion of his daughter. The burden of proving the case or existence of such custom, which deprived the daughter of the immovable properties of her father, was on him. 12. With a view to discharging this burden, the plaintiff examined a number of witnesses. He placed reliance upon the evi-dence of P.W. 1 Kamei Kakuton, P.W. 2 Mathew Hom, P.W. 3 Gaipholung, P.W. 5 Chikhong Kabui and P.W. 7 Pichungpao Kabui. According to P.W. 1 if a male Kabui dies leaving only female issues, his properties devolved upon his brothers. On the other hand, P. W. 5 said that among the brothers, the one who performs the rite (Lou Khamteng Khumei) inherits the properties of the deceased. Thus, there is a discrepancy between the evidence of P.W. 1 and P.W. 5. Besides, on consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case, P.W. 1 was found by the trial court to be an interested witness and his evidence was not accepted as truthful 13. According to the evidence of P.W. 2 Mathew Hom, the custom was that if a Kabui died leaving only female heirs his properties would devolve upon his brothers provided they performed the religious rites and cere-monies. In case the properties had to devolve upon more than one brother, the youngest brother would inherit the property. He stated that this custom was ancient and prevalent without interruption in all Kabui villages. The custom, as stated by him, is apparently inconsistent with the one described by P.Ws. 1 and 5. Moreover, in cross-examina-tion, he also admitted that one Hawaimaton of his village died leaving behind some step-brothers and one daughter and that the said daughter inherited the properties of her late father. The custom, as stated by him, is apparently inconsistent with the one described by P.Ws. 1 and 5. Moreover, in cross-examina-tion, he also admitted that one Hawaimaton of his village died leaving behind some step-brothers and one daughter and that the said daughter inherited the properties of her late father. It was about 10 years ago and there was no dispute about inheritance between the daughter of the deceased and his step brothers. This statement in the cross-exami-nation clearly goes against one of the essential requisites of a custom having the valid force of law that it is being observed without interruption. Besides, this witness in cross-examination further stated that he could not say about the custom obtaining in other Kabui villages where he had no opportunity of going. 14. According to P.W. 3 Gaipholung Kabui, the custom is that in the absence of sons, the brothers of a deceased Kabui inherit his properties and the daughters never inherit. This custom, according to him, had been in existence from the time of his fore-fathers. He also stated that it was so because only male persons and not a female can plant customary sticks on the grave of the deceased and as such, the daughter cannot inherit the proper-ties of the deceased. But in his cross-examina-tion he stated that even a distant relation (sagei male person) could plant the customary sticks on the grave of the deceased and the male person doing so must inherit the proper-ties of the deceased. There was, thus, some inconsistency in his description of the alleged custom. It also does not appear to be reasonable that a distantly related male person would inherit the properties of the deceased simply by virtue of planting the customary sticks on his grave to the exclusion of his daughter. This witness claimed know-ledge of this custom only from a person of his village who died 3 or 4 years ago. He could not cite any example of the application of the custom to any case. 15. P.W. 7 Pichungpao Kabui was 28 years of age. He also deposed of the existence of the alleged custom of the exclusion of female heirs from inheritance by the male relatives. He, however, did not speak of any conditions to be fulfilled for inheritance as was stated by some of the other witnesses. 15. P.W. 7 Pichungpao Kabui was 28 years of age. He also deposed of the existence of the alleged custom of the exclusion of female heirs from inheritance by the male relatives. He, however, did not speak of any conditions to be fulfilled for inheritance as was stated by some of the other witnesses. Thus none of the witnesses of the plaintiff, except P.W. 1 whose testimony had been rejected as not trustworthy, cited any instance in which daughters were excluded from inheritance. 16. On the other hand, it appears that direct and cogent evidence was adduced by the defendant No. 1 in support of her conten-tion that no such custom prevailed. In this connection, evidence of D.W. 1 Khang-khuireng, D.W. 2 Indugairu and D.W. 4 Gaithingpung Kabui is relevant. According to D.W. 1 there was no custom among the Kabui that a daughter could not inherit the pro-perties of a deceased Kabui who died leaving no male issue. She cited three instances where daughters inherited the properties of their father. D.W. 4 was a witness whose wife herself had inherited the properties of her father Hawaimaton Kabui. His evidence was also corroborated by the evidence of D.W. 2 and the certified copy of the dag Chitha Ext. B/4 showing that the name of his wife was mutated from the name of her father in respect of the land inherited by her on her fathers death. The evidence of the defence witnesses is very categorical and the instances given by them are direct and relevant. The evidence of these witnesses clearly go to show that no such custom prevails in the Kabui Tribe of Manipur which deprives the daughter from inheriting the immovable properties left by her father in the absence of sons and wife. 17. As earlier stated the plaintiff could not proved the existence of the custom as alleged by him, whereas, the defendants could succeed in proving the contrary. In that view of the matter, we are of the opinion that in the Kabui Tribe a daughter is entitled to inherit the property left by her father in the absence of sons and widow. 18. Before closing, it may be appropriate to observe that the learned counsel for the appellant Mr. In that view of the matter, we are of the opinion that in the Kabui Tribe a daughter is entitled to inherit the property left by her father in the absence of sons and widow. 18. Before closing, it may be appropriate to observe that the learned counsel for the appellant Mr. Priyananda Singh also referred to a Book named "The Naga Tribes of Manipur by T. C. Hodson", more particularly to the passage at page 104, where dealing with Kabui, it is stated : "We have also the same recognition of a mans right to make a distribution of his property while living, but if no such disposi-tion has been made when he dies the property is divided among the sons, the share of the youngest being larger than those of the other sons. The right of women to maintenance is liable to the same conditions as among the Maram people." 19. We have considered the aforesaid passage. We do not find that this observation helps the appellant in any manner for two reasons. Firstly, it does not deal with a situation where a man of Kabui Tribe dies leaving only daughter without any son or widow. It deals only with a case where the sons are alive at the time of his death. Secondly, the book in question is not an official compilation of he custom or the customary laws of the tribe concerned prepared by a public officer in the discharge of his duties under the Government Rules. It is as such not a public record. Such publica-tions and observations contained therein can, at the most, be treated as a piece of evidence to be considered along with other evidence on the subject. In the instant case, as discussed above, on consideration of the evidence of the members of the tribe in the light of the instances brought to the notice of the court by the witnesses, it is clear that no custom, as alleged by the plaintiff, existed in the said tribe. In that view of the matter, the casual reference about the system of inheritance amongst the members of the tribe in the said publication is not of any significance. Mr. Ibobi Singh, learned counsel for the respon-dents, on the other hand also referred to another publication named "Manipuri Customs". In that view of the matter, the casual reference about the system of inheritance amongst the members of the tribe in the said publication is not of any significance. Mr. Ibobi Singh, learned counsel for the respon-dents, on the other hand also referred to another publication named "Manipuri Customs". This publication is a compilation of the customs codified by the Codification Committee constituted by the Government of Manipur. The counsel, in support of his case, referred to Chapter IV dealing with inherit-ance, more particularly, Rules 3 and 6 thereof, which are in the following terms : "3. Daughters are excluded from inherit-ance in their fathers property in presence of the son or sons i.e. their brothers. 6. Daughters succeed and share equally the property left by their father in absence of sons and widow." 20. We have perused the aforesaid rules. We find that Chapter IV and the two rules thereof find place in Part I of the publication which deals with prevailing customs relating to the Manipuri Hindus. As such, these rules are of not any help to us in deciding the present case which relates to the right of inheritance amongst the members of Kabui Tribe of Manipur which may have its own customs different from the Manipuri Hindus on various subjects including inheritance. These two rules, at the most, may go to show that even the existence of a rule excluding daughters from their fathers property in presence of the son or sons i.e. their brothers, does not imply that they would be so excluded in the absence of sons and widow. 21. In the light of the foregoing discus-sion, we do not find any merit in this appeal and the same is, therefore, dismissed with cost. 22. H. K. SEMA, J. :- I agree. Appeal dismissed.