JUDGMENT Devinder Gupta, J.—Petitioner has by filing this petition under section 481 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter called as the Code) has sought quashing of an order passed on June 17, 1989 by Additional Sessions Judge, Mandi, allowing the respondents revision and thereby quashing an order passed on June 8, 1988 by Judicial Magistrate First Class, Sundernagar. 2. The petitioner, who is a duly registered Medical Practitioner under the Himachal Pradesh Ayurvedic and Unani Medical Practitioners Act, 1968 was challaned for having committed an offence under the provisions of Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 in the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Sundernagar on the basis of a complaint preferred by respondent, a Drug Inspector. On April 8, 1988, the said complaint was stated to be fixed for recording the statement of accused-petitioner, it is the case of the petitioner that he used to appear in Court on every hearing but the case used to be adjourned for want of appearance of respondent and this happened more than 7 or 8 occasions. On April 8, 1988, learned Counsel for the petitioner requested the Court that due to the absence of respondent the case was frequently being adjourned thereby putting the petitioner to harassment. It is further the case of the petitioner that at that very moment, the respondent in order to lower the petitioner in the estimation of the persons present in Court room and others made derogatory remarks about him and stated that he was cot a Medical Practitioner but was a quack. On these allegations, the petitioner on the same day, that is April 8, 1988, presented a complaint before the same Presiding Officer stating that as the respondent has committed an offence, by uttering the aforementioned words, under section 499 I. P. C, punishable under section 500, I. P. C, therefore, he be tried and punished in accordance with law. 3. The Magistrate directed the complaint to come on May 2, a988, for preliminary evidence. 3. The Magistrate directed the complaint to come on May 2, a988, for preliminary evidence. On the said date he submitted the file to the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Mandi, who recorded the statement of the complainant on June 2, 1988 alongwith two other witnesses in support of the complaint and later on made over the file to Judicial Magistrate First Class (2), Mandi Complainant put in appearance aloogwith his Counsel before the said Presiding Officer and he on June 8, 1988, recorded the following order:— "Case received by assignment. It be checked and registered. I have gone through the preliminary evidence. There are sufficient grounds to proceed against the accused persons under section 500, I. P. C. Accused person be summoned for 7-7-1988........." 4. The respondent thereafter challenged this order of summoning him as an accused in the case by filing a revision petition before the Sessions Judge, Mandi, who assigned the same for disposal to the Additional Sessions Judge, Mandi The said revision was accepted and the order passed on June 8, 1988 by the Court below was quashed and set aside. The Additional Sessions Judge, simultaneously, recorded an order acquitting the respondent. It is this order which has been challenged by the petitioner in this petition. 5. The petition was admitted for final hearing on October 19, 1989, Respondent was duly served, who remained unrepresented. The actual date notice was sent to the respondent under registered AD cover. The AD receipt has been received back duly acknowledged. None has put in appearance on behalf of respondent. I have heard the learned Counsel for the petitioner. 6. It has been contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the revisional Court has dealt with the matter as if it was hearing an appeal against final order of conviction. The trial Magistrate had in accordance with the provisions of section 204 of the Code taken cognizance of an offence after forming an opinion that there was sufficient ground for proceeding in the matter against respondent, which order had been passed on the basis of material available on record. The accused had neither put an appearance nor there was any material before the revisional Court to come to a conclusion that there was no intention on the part of the accused to defame the petitioner. The accused had neither put an appearance nor there was any material before the revisional Court to come to a conclusion that there was no intention on the part of the accused to defame the petitioner. It was further urged that the remarks made by the revisional Court that the complaint was a counter blast to the prosecution launched by the respondent was unwarranted as there was no material on record to justify making of such remarks. It is further contended that the material on record was sufficient enough to support the order passed by the trial Magistrate and no interference was called for by a revisional Court in exercise of its jurisdiction. I find much force in the submissions made by the learned Counsel. 7. The material which was available on the record of the trial Magistrate was a complaint made on the same day on which the respondent is alleged to have uttered defamatory remarks about the complainant and statement of complainant as PW 1 alongwith the statement of one Bharat Bhushan PW 2 and Himat Ram Saini, PW 3, The complainant supported the entire averments made in the complaint and he in his turn was duly supported by PWs 2 and 3, who stated that they were present in Court when the respondent in their presence and in the presence of the Counsel for complainant and to the hearing of the Presiding Officer uttered the words that the petitioner was not a registered Medical Practitioner but was a quack, which words according to them were highly derogatory. Besides the statements of these three persons, the other evidence on record consisted of documents Ex. PA photostat copy of the registration certificate, Ex. PB, a certificate issued by the Branch Manager, State Bank of Sundernagar, Ex. PC, a letter received by the petitioner from the Station Director, All India Radio, Shimla, inviting to a radio talk on the topic of Megnetic Medical Therapy and Ex PD is the copy of certificate issued by Registrar of the Himachal Pradesh Board of Ayurvedic and Unani System of Medicines certifying the renewal of the registration of the petitioner upto 21-1-1990. 8. The procedure, which is to be followed by a Magistrate on private complaints is contained in Chapter XXV of the Code. 8. The procedure, which is to be followed by a Magistrate on private complaints is contained in Chapter XXV of the Code. The Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence on a complaint is required to examine the complainant and his witnesses on oath and if after considering the statements of the complainant and his witnesses and the report of investigation, in case any enquiry or investigation is directed to be made under section 202 of the Code, the Magistrate is of the opinion that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding, he can dismiss the complaint but in such a situation he is required to record briefly his reasons for doing so, as per the provision of section 203 of the Code. However, section 204 provides that if in his opinion, there is sufficient ground to proceed against the accused, he may issue either summon or warrant, as the case may be, for causing the accused to be brought or to appear at certain day and time before him A bare reading of section 204 of the Code shows that it is not the capricious or the fiat of the Magistrate which would work at the time of issuing of process because before issuing the process the Magistrate has to form an opinion as to whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding in the matter. This opinion is obviously a judicial opinion which rules out any capricious or whim. The question, however, is whether for evidencing that the Magistrate has acted on the formation of judicial opinion, is it necessary for him to appreciate the allegations and evidence and to record his detailed reasons before issuing any process ? In case any reason is recorded at the time of formation of opinion, which would prima facie show the application of judicial mind in forming such an opinion, it would obviously be prima facie evidence of application of judicial mind but can in the absence of any reason it could be said that there was no application of judicial mind when on the basis of material on record, it is otherwise possible to say that there was in fact application of mind. It has to be noted that section 204 of the Code follows immediately after section 203, which empowers the Magistrate to dismiss the complaint in case, in his opinion, there is no sufficient ground for proceeding further. It has to be noted that section 204 of the Code follows immediately after section 203, which empowers the Magistrate to dismiss the complaint in case, in his opinion, there is no sufficient ground for proceeding further. Section 203 do enjoins upon the Magistrate to record his reasons for dismissal of complaint but there is no such corresponding mandate provided in section 204 of the Code. The contrast between the two provisions, which provides for the result of consideration of evidence of a complaint clearly brings about the intention of the legislature that for the purpose of dismissal of the complaint recording of reasons is mandatory but not so if the complaint is to be proceeded further by issuance of process. The obvious reason for making this distinction appears to be that if the complaint is dismissed under section 203, the order of dismissal is final since it disposes of the complaint finally but if the process is issued under section 204 of the Code and the complaint is not dismissed, the person against whom process is issued has still got a chance, after having put in an appearance to pray for discharging him under section 245 of the Code. A single Judge of this Court in Gopal Chauhan v. Smt. Satya and another, 1979 Cr Li 446, while considering the scope of sections 203 and 204 of the Code has held that on proper construction of section 204 though it is obligatory for the Magistrate while issuing process to formulate judicial opinion, which can never be a capricious one, he is not bound to record his opinion for the same. 9. The question which now arises is whether the Court while exercising revisional jurisdiction could go into the question of legality and propriety of an order passed under section 204 of the Code summoning an accused when on the basis of the material on record, it is not at all possible even 10 prima facie form an opinion that filing of complaint was an abuse of the process of Court. The revisional Court in its order has nowhere recorded a finding that the allegations made against the respondent in the complaint as well as the evidence recorded did not constitute an offence or that the evidence adduced in support of the case by the complainant was not sufficient to support the trial Magistrates view The order was quashed merely on the ground that there was no intention on the part of the respondent to defame the petitioner and the act of filing of complaint was a counter-blast to the prosecution launched by the respondent against the petitioner The proceedings before the trial Magistrate were still at the initial stage. The evidence adduced by the respondent had remained unrebutted. It is not understandable as to on what material or basis the revisional Court formed such an opinion. On perusal of the entire record it is not at all possible to support such conclusions about the intention of the accused-respondent or that ttie complaint was a counter-blast to the prosecution. In case the evidence, as adduced, continues to remain unrebutted there is no manner of doubt that in normal course a conviction is likely to follow. The findings/conclusions of revisional Court are on the face of it perverse. Even powers of the High Court to quash proceedings under section 482 of the Code are wider enough than the revisional power. Such powers could only be exercised to quash the proceedings in a proper cases either to prevent abuse of the process of the Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It has been held in R P Kapur v. State of Punjab AIR i960 SC 866, that criminal proceedings instituted against the accused person must be tried under the provisions of the Code and the High Court would be reluctant to interfere with such proceedings at a interlocutory stage. While dealing with the scope of inherent powers of the High Court under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 189 , now corresponding to section 482, it further held as under:— "Before dealing with the merits of the appeal it is necessary to consider the nature and scope of the inherent powers of the High Court under section 561-A of the Code. The said section saves the inherent power of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice There is no doubt that this inherent power cannot be exercised in regard to matters specifically covered by the other provisions of the Code, In the present case the Magistrate before whom the police report has been filed under section 173 of the Code has yet not applied his mind to the merits of the said report and it may be assumed in favour of the appellant that his request for the quashing of the proceedings is not at the present stage covered by any specific provision of the Code. It is well established that the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be exercised to quash proceedings in a proper case either to prevent the abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Ordinarily criminal proceedings instituted against an accused person must be tried under the provisions of the Code, and the High Court would be reluctant to interfere with the said proceedings at an interlocutory stage. It is not possible, desirable or expedient to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of this inherent jurisdiction However, we may indicate some categories of cases where the inherent jurisdiction can and should be exercised for quashing the proceedings. There may be cases where it may be possible for the High Court to take the view that the institution or continuance of criminal proceedings against an accused person may amount to the abuse of the process of the Court or that the quashing of the impugned proceedings would secure the ends of justice. If the criminal proceedings in question is in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed by an accused person and it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the said proceeding the High Court would be justified in quashing the proceeding on that ground. Absence of the requisite sanction may, for instance, furnish cases under this category. Absence of the requisite sanction may, for instance, furnish cases under this category. Cases may also arise where the allegations in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged ; in such cases no question of appreciating evidence arises ; it is a matter merely of looking at the complaint or the First Information Report to decide whether the offence alleged is disclosed or not> In such cases it would be legitimate for the High Court to hold the it would be manifestly unjust to allow the process of the Criminal Court to be issued against the accused person A third category of cases in which the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be successfully invoked may also arise. In cases falling under this category the allegations made against the accused person do constitute an offence alleged but there is either no legal evidence adduced in support of the case or evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge In dealing with this class of cases it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is manifestly and clearly inconsistent with the accusation made and cases where there is legal evidence which on its appreciation may or may not support the accusation in question In exercising its jurisdiction under section 5oi-% the High Court would not embark upon an enquiry as to whether the evidence in question is reliable or not. That is the function of the trial Magistrate, and ordinarily it would not be open to any party to invoke the High Courts inherent jurisdiction and contend that on a reasonable appreciation of the evidence the accusation made against the accused would not be sustained......” 10. In the proceedings before the trial Magistrate, the accused had merely been summoned to appear. The accused could have put in an appearance and availed of the opportunity to get an order of discharge under section 245 of the Code on the grounds available under law by placing sufficient material on record or even on the basis of the evidence adduced on behalf of the petitioner. The accused could have put in an appearance and availed of the opportunity to get an order of discharge under section 245 of the Code on the grounds available under law by placing sufficient material on record or even on the basis of the evidence adduced on behalf of the petitioner. It was surely not a case for exercise of revisional jurisdiction which is only exercised to rectify any illegality, irregularity, impropriety or mistake appearing on the face of record, It is not every illegal order or error that will be set right but only when there has been injustice or the accused has been prejudiced The material on record on the face of it was sufficient to suggests the application of mind by the trial Magistrate and there was no scope for the revisional Court to have exercised its jurisdiction for quashing the order. Another irregularity, which the revision court committed, is of making an order of acquittal. There could be no acquittal till a charge had been framed. The impugned order for the aforementioned reasons is liable to be quashed and set aside. 11. In the result, the petition is allowed. The impugned order passed by the revisicnal court on June 17, 1989, is quashed and set aside. The trial Magistrate is directed to make further inquiry into the complaint of the petitioner in accordance with law as expeditiously as possible. It shall proceed further from the stage when the respondent had been summoned. Petition allowed.