JUDGMENT 1. Durga Prasad Nigam, respondent No. 7 was the owner and landlord of premises No. 172, Lookerganj, Allahabad. He had executed a power of attorney in favour of one Brij Nath Tripathi, son of Kalka Prasad Tripathi on 6983. He got suit No. 417 of 1983 filed through him. It was a suit for recovery of arrears of rent and for eviction. The suit was filed on the ground of default as contemplated under section 20 (2) (a) of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 (hereinafter referred to as Act.) 2. During the pendency of the suit Durga Prasad Nigam executed a sale deed in favour of Smt. Janki Pandey on 16184 with regard to the premises in dispute. 3. Smt. Janki Pandey became the owner and landlady on the basis of the sale deed. But she did not choose to get herself impleaded as a party in the suit. She allowed it to proceed in the name of Durga Prasad Nigam. 4. The suit was decreed on 10186 for ejectment and recovery of Rs. 1530/ as arrears of rent. The court further ordered for recovery of mesne profit at the rate of Rs. 45/ per month, 5. The defendant filed a revision no 22 of 1986 under section 25 of the Small Causes Court Act against the decree dated 10186. 6. In the meantime the plaintiff had filed execution case No. 5 of 1986 but the defendant got a conditional stay order from the revision court. The condition was not complied with. He committed default with the result that the decree became executable. After the defendant had committed default the plaintiff filed an application on 17786 praying that the court may pass an order for the execution to proceed. This application was allowed on 21486. Against this order the defendant filed a revision in the court of learned District Judge on 25486. In that revision the following stay order was passed: It has been conceded before me that the amount of damages for use and occupation for the period pendente lite and future has not been deposited in pursuance of the order of the Court. This amount is definitely decretal amount and ha? To be deposited. In that revision the following stay order was passed: It has been conceded before me that the amount of damages for use and occupation for the period pendente lite and future has not been deposited in pursuance of the order of the Court. This amount is definitely decretal amount and ha? To be deposited. Therefore, in the circumstances of the case it is directed that the proceedings in execution case No. 5 of 1986 shall remain stayed subject to the revisionist depositing the entire decretal amount which also includes the damages for use and occupation for the period pendente lite and future, within 15 days hereinafter failing which the stay o shall stand automatically vacated. 7. In the meantime Brij Nath Tripathi, behind the back of respondent No. 7 and Smt. Janki Pandey, filed a suit No. 503 of 1984 for declaration that he has got half share in the property in dispute. By practising fraud on the court he got an exparte decree in his favour on 311285. When Smt. Janki Pandey came to know about the decree so passed, she filed; an application for setting aside the decree, this application was registered as misc. Application No. 31 of 1985. The application was allowed on 2286 and the exparte decree in favour of Brij Nath Tripathi was set aside. 8. Looking to the dishonest intention of Brij Nath Tripathi the power of attorney executed in his favour was cancelled by Durga Prasad Nilam on 21486. With effect from that date Brij Nath Tripathi ceased to have any power to act on behalf of Durga Prasad Nigam. 9. Despite the fact that the power of attorney was cancelled on 21486 Brij Nath Tripathi entered into a compromise on 8586 with the defendant and on the basis of that compromise the execution was struck of on 7586. 10. When Smt. Janki Pandey came to know about this fraudulent compromise entered into between Brij Nath Tripathi and the defendant she filed an application on 20586 for recalling the order dated 7586 This application was registered as case No. 78 of 1986. This application was allowed on 24890 against which the petitioner has filed a revision No. 192 of 1990 and simultaneously filed a restoration application No. 162A. 11. This application was allowed on 24890 against which the petitioner has filed a revision No. 192 of 1990 and simultaneously filed a restoration application No. 162A. 11. The petitioner filed an objection stating that Smt. Janki Pandey had not chosen to get herself impleaded as a party, therefore, she has got no right to move an application under order 22 rule 10 or section 146 of the Civil Procedure Code. She does not have any right to proceed in the matter. She is bound by the doctrine of lis pendens. The order dated 7586 binds her. Durga Prasad Nigam, respondent No. 7 had executed an irrevocable power of attorney in favour of Brij Nath Tripathi. It gave him a right to enter into a compromise as well. Since the application dated 20586 filed by Smt. Janki Pandey is based on the ground of fraud, the remedy lay by filing a regular suit. So long as the compromise decree is not set aside through proper court it is binding on respondents no. 3 to 6. 12. Both these revisions were dismissed on 7191 against which the present two writ petitions have been filed. 13. Heard Sri Dinesh Dwivedi, learned counsel for the petitioners and Sri K. M. Dayal, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents. 14. In these writ petitions three points arise for consideration; (1) Could the suit proceed in the name of Durga Prasad Nigam when he had transferred the property in dispute in favour of Smt. Janki Pandey on 16184 during the pendency of the suit? (2) Could Brij Nath Tripathi enter Into a compromise on 7586 when the power of attorney which was executed in his favour has already been cancelled on 21486 ? (3) Could Smt. Janki Pandey file an application for setting aside the order dated 7586 ? 15. In order to decide the first question the scope and object of section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act has to be considered. It creates a bar in transferring the property during the pendency of the shit or proceeding which is not collusive or in which any right to immovable property is directly and specifically in question. 16. 15. In order to decide the first question the scope and object of section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act has to be considered. It creates a bar in transferring the property during the pendency of the shit or proceeding which is not collusive or in which any right to immovable property is directly and specifically in question. 16. The requirements of the section are as follows: (1) Pendency of the suit, (2) Noncollusive character of the suit, (3) Any right to immovable property being in question directly and specifically in that suit, (4) Other party (other than party making the transfer pendente lite having some right Under the decree in the suit. The consequence of the doctrine is that the transaction pendente lite shall not allow to affect the right under the decree. 17. This section is an expression of the principle of maxim Ut lite pendente nihil innovatur which means that during pending litigation nothing new should be introduced and provides that the pendente lite neither a party to the litigation can alienate or otherwise deal with such a property so as to affect his opponent. It is intended to protect the parties to litigation against alienation by their opponent during the pendency of the suit The law of lis pendens is anextension of law of resjudicata and make Adjudication in the, suit binding on the alienee. Ordinarily the decree of the court binds the parties to the suit but he who purchases during the pendency of the suit is bound by the decree that may be made against the person from whom he derives title. 18. The true scope of section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, therefore, is that it does not prevent the vesting of title in a transferee in a sale pendente lite but only makes it subject to the rights of other parties as decided in the suit. In other words, the effect of section 52 is not to wipe out a sale pendente lite altogether but to subordinate it to the rights based on the decree in the suit. 19. The broad purpose of section 52 is to maintain statusquo unaffected by the action of the parties to the litigation pending its determination. 20. The law created no bar in the way of Durga Prasad Nigam to proceed with the suit. 19. The broad purpose of section 52 is to maintain statusquo unaffected by the action of the parties to the litigation pending its determination. 20. The law created no bar in the way of Durga Prasad Nigam to proceed with the suit. The decree will have a binding effect on the vendee Smt. Janki Pandey though she was not a party in the suit. 21. Now I come to the second question about the revocation of the power of attorney executed in favour of Brij Nath Tripathi. 22. Durga Prasad Nigam had executed a power of attorney in favour of Brij Nath Tripathi before filing the suit. This was cancelled on 21486. The compromise was entered into between the defendants and Brij Nath Tripathi on 6586. As a result thereof the execution was struck off on 7586. What right he had to enter into the compromise when the power itself had already been cancelled on 21486. 23. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the power of attorney was irrevocable and could not be cancelled. I do not find any substance in it. 24. Section 201 of the Contract Act provides that an agency can be terminated by a principal revoking his authority or by the agent renouncing the business of the agency, or by the business of agency being completed or by either the principal or agent dying or becoming of unsound mind. Section 202 of the Contract Act has its own importance for the purposes of this case and it runs as follows: Where the agent has himself an interest in the property which forms the subject matter of the agency, the agency cannot, in the absence of an express contract, be terminated to the prejudice of such interest. 25. Applying the said provision, the worth of the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner can be tested. He has failed to show that Brij Nath Tripathi himself had any interest in the property which formed the subject matter of the suit. Absence of this important ingredient makes the power of attorney revocable. It has rightly been revoked by Durga Prasad Nigam on 21486. With effect from that date he ceased to have any power to act on behalf of Durga Prasad Nigam. He could not enter into a compromise on 6586. The execution could not have been struck off on 7586. 26. It has rightly been revoked by Durga Prasad Nigam on 21486. With effect from that date he ceased to have any power to act on behalf of Durga Prasad Nigam. He could not enter into a compromise on 6586. The execution could not have been struck off on 7586. 26. The scope of section 202 of the Contract Act has been considered by Supreme Court in the case of Seth Loon Koran Sethia Vs. Ivan E. John and others ( AIR 1969 SC 73 ) and it was held that if power given was coupled with the interest then the document became irrevocable. In that case the appellant was indebted to the bank. He executed a power of attorney in favour of the bank authorising it to execute a decree obtained by him against third person and credit the realisation to his account. The bank filed an application for execution in the name of the decreeholder but it was signed by the Manager of Bank as holder of power of attorney. This execution was objected. The court held that the power of attorney given to the bank was a power coupled with the interest. It was irrevocable power of attorney. The execution proceedings were held to be valid. 27. In the instant case the power was not coupled with any interest in favour of Brij Nath Tripathi. It was revocable. 28. Accordingly I find that Brij Nath Tripathi could not enter into an agreement after revocation of his power on 21486. Consequently the order dated 7586 by which the entire execution was struck off becomes an invalid order. 29. I take up the third question, whether Smt. Janki Pandey could file an application for setting aside the order dated 7586 by which the execution was struck off. 30. Durga Prasad Nigam has brought it on record that after filing the suit he executed a sale deed in favour of Smt. Janki Pandey on 16184. This fact is not disputed. The only question is whether Smt. Janki Pandey had any right to file the application on 20586 for setting aside the compromise decree. 31. Section 146 of the Civil Procedure Code reads as follows. This fact is not disputed. The only question is whether Smt. Janki Pandey had any right to file the application on 20586 for setting aside the compromise decree. 31. Section 146 of the Civil Procedure Code reads as follows. Save as otherwise provided by this Code or by any law for the time being in force, where any proceeding may be taken or application made by or against any person, then the proceeding may be taken or the application may be made by or against any person claiming under him. 32. There is no dispute that Smt. Janki Pandey never chose to proceed with the suit after the sale deed was executed in her favour. She was watching her interest and felt that it was safe in the hands of Durga Prasad Nigam but it did not debar her from coming in the picture at the time of the execution of the suit. Execution proceedings were the continuation of suit in proceeding as contemplated under section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. 33. Order 22 rule 10 of the Civil Procedure Code which provides for procedure in case of assignment before final order in the suit runs as follows: In the case of an assignment, creation or devolution of any interest during the pendency of a suit, the suit may, by leave of the court, be continued by or against the person to or upon whom such interest has come or devolved. 34. It empowered her to proceed with the execution proceeding. 35. Accordingly I agree with the view of the trial court that Smt. Janki Pandey had a right to file an application for setting aside the order dated 7586 and the order has been rightly set aside. 36. No other point was pressed for consideration. The impugned orders have resulted into substantial justice between the parties. I do not find any error of law apparent on the face of record. Accordingly the writ petitions are dismissed with cost. (Petition dismissed)