JUDGMENT S.R.Singh, J. 1. Guru Govind Singh Inter College, Bareilly briefly called the College, is a minority institution The petitioner was appointed clerk on permanent basis in the said institution. His services were terminated by an order contained in letter dated 5-7-1986 (Annexure-10 to the writ petition) issued by the Manager of the College by way of punishment. The writ petition in hand seeks the quashing of the said order by means of a writ of certiorari and the issuance of a writ of mandamus directing the respondents no. 1 to 3 to treat the petitioner in continuous service and pay the salary and other emoluments due to him. 2. The facts necessary to high light the controversy involved in the 7ase, in so far as these facts are not in dispute, are these ; By letter dated c-2-1985 the principal of the College asked the petitioner to deposit in the relevant account of sum Rs. 3,923-48/- as per detail given therein. The latter purports to have been issued on the premises that the amount referred to therein was the fees collected from the students by the class teachers and handed over to the petitioner to be deposited in the relevant account, but the petitioner failed to deposit the same ever since August, 1984. The amount was allegedly embezzled by the petitioner. Accordingly he was not only asked to deposit the amount in the relevant account but was further called upon to show cause why disciplinary action be not taken against him. A copy of the letter was endorsed to the Manager of the College with a respect to take necessary action against the petitioner. On receipt of the letter dated 7-2-1985, the petitioner, it is alleged, submitted his reply to the principal the same day stating therein that whatever collection of fees was received by him from the class teachers, was deposited by him with the principal in the evening of the very same day he received collections from the class teachers. He denied the charge of having embezzled the money. 3. He denied the charge of having embezzled the money. 3. From the material placed on the record of the writ petition, it transpires that the Manager by his letter dated 6-5-1985 constituted as Enquiry Committee consisting of Sri Sulakhan Singh (member of the Managing Committee) and Sri D. K. Singh, a lecturer in the college to enquire into the financial irregularity alleged to have been committed by the petitioner and to submit a report at the earliest. FROM the record it further appears that the Enquiry Committee submitted certain reports to the Manager, where upon a notice dated 20-12-1985 was issued to the petitioner calling upon him to show cause within 15 days of the receipt of the notice why his services be not terminated. In his reply to the show cause notice the petitioner seems to have raised objections to the effect that he was not given reasonable opportunity by the Enquiry Committee and that the evidence nought to be relied upon against him was also not made available to him and further that the copy of the enquiry report had not been supplied to him which resulted in denial of opportunity. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended before me that the order impugned in the writ petition is not sustainable in law firstly, because the order terminating the petitioner's services was passed by the Manager and not by the Committee of Management, which alone is vested with the power of punishment by virtue of Regulation 13 of Chapter-I of the Regulations made under the U. P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), secondly that the petitioner was denied fair and effective opportunity to defend himself and that at no stage of enquiry he was told of the evidence, if any, against him and further that neither the enquiry report was made available to him, nor was he given any opportunity to have his say before the Committee of Management, which alone was vested with the power to punish him and thirdly because the services of the petitioner were terminated by means of the impugned order without prior approval of the District Inspector of Schools, which was a must in view of Regulation 31 read with Regulation 37 of the Regulations. 4. 4. Regulation 13 of Chapter-I of the Regulations vests the power of appointment and punishment (including removal and dismissal) of Head Master, principal, teacher, Matron, clerk or librarian in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the Regulations. Regulation 28 of Chapter-Ill of the Regulations provides that the Committee of Management shall not propose to the Inspector the termination of services of a confirmed employee unless resolution to this effect has been passed as its meeting specially convened for the purpose and by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting. Learned Counsel for the respondents, however, placed reliance upon the resolution dated 4-5-1985 passed by the Committee of Management authorising the Manager to constitute an Enquiry Committee to go into the financial irregularity alleged to have been committed by the petitioner, obtain its report and to take necessary action against the petitioner on the basis of such report. This resolution to my mind is of no avail. The power to terminate the services of the petitioner vests in the Committee of Management and in absence of any express provision in the Act or Regulation made thereunder authorising the delegation of the power to the Manager the later had no authority in law to terminate the services of the petitioner. As a matter of fact the provisions enacted in Regulation 28 of Chapter-Ill of the Regulations impliedly prohibit the exercise of power of termination by Manager, for such a decision can be taken only in the meeting of the Committee of Management specially convened for the purpose and by two thirds majority of the members present and voting. Accordingly in absence of any Statutory provision regarding delegation of power, the resolution dated 4-5- 1985 authorising the Manager in advance to take necessary action against the petitioner impliedly there by to terminate the petitioner's services, if necessary, according to the report of the Enquiry Committee without a decision being taken in this regard by the Committee of Management in the manner prescribed by Regulation 28 (supra), is ultra vires, illegal and void. The resolution did not in law confer any power upon the Manager to terminate the services of the petitioner even if it be assumed or held that the enquiry was held fairly in tune with the principles of natural justice and the report warranted termination of the petitioner's services. The resolution did not in law confer any power upon the Manager to terminate the services of the petitioner even if it be assumed or held that the enquiry was held fairly in tune with the principles of natural justice and the report warranted termination of the petitioner's services. H. W. R. Wade on Administrative law 4th Edn. p. 305 observed as below ; "An element which is essential to the lawful exercise of power is that it should be exercised by the authority upon whom it is conferred, and by no one else, this principle is strictly applied even where it causes administrative inconvenience except in cases where it may reasonably be inferred that the power was intended to be delegated. Normally the Courts are rigorous in requiring the power to be exercised by the precise person or body state in the Statute and in condemning as ultra vires action taken by the agents, Sub-Committees or delegates, however expressly authorised by the authority endowed with the power." 5. From the principle extracted above, it is clear that the authority given to the Manager by the Committee of Management vide its resolution dated 4-5-1985, if taken as an authority to terminate the services of the petitioner's without prior decision of the Committee of Management, it void being ultra vires the Act. 6. On the basis of various authorities on Administrative Law it can be propounded as a well settled law that the general rule, as regards the question in hand, is that where Statute directs that certain acts shall be done by a specific person, their performance by any other person is impliedly prevented. This principle applies whether the act is discretionary or quasi- judicial. In Hindustan Brown Bovori Limited v. Their Workman, 1968 (I) Lab. L. J. P. 571, it was held that where the power to dismiss an employee is vested in the 'Company' by standing Order Certified in the Industrial Employment (Standing Order) Act, 1946, it cannot be exercised by the Manager or any other officer of the Company in absence of an appropriate delegation. This rule is embodied in the general maxim-delegatus non notest delegate, which means that the delegatee cannot delegate his power unless he is expressly authorised to do so. 7. This rule is embodied in the general maxim-delegatus non notest delegate, which means that the delegatee cannot delegate his power unless he is expressly authorised to do so. 7. The next question to be considered is whether the order impugned in the writ petition is vitiated for non-compliance of the principles of natural justice. It is not disputed before me that the petitioner was not afforded opportunity of hearing by the Committee of Management and that the report, if any, of the Enquiry Committee was not supplied to him nor any evidence which could be read against him was made available to him. This in my considered view has violated the principles of natural justice besides the procedural safe guard contemplated by Regulation 37 of Chapter HI of the Regulations made under the Act. The action on the part of the respondents was not in consonance with the principles of fair play. As such the impugned order is liable to be quashed on this ground as well. 8. As regards the third question that the services of the petitioner were terminated without prior approval of the District Inspector of Schools as contemplated by Regulation 31 of Chapter-III of the Regulations made under the Act, suffice it to say that in view of the conclusions arrived at by me on the first two submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner, I do not consider it necessary to go into this question. In the result the writ petition succeeds and in accordingly allowed. The impugned order dated 5-7-1986 (Annexure-10 to the writ petition) is quashed. The petitioner is held entitled to consequential benefits regarding payment of his salary and other emoluments and continuity in service. 9. On the facts and circumstances of the case the petitioner would be entitled to his cost which I assess to be Rs. 1.000/- (Rupees one thousand only) from the respondent committee of management. Petition allowed.