JUDGMENT : Om Prakash, J. Confirmation plays a vital role in Government service, but very often the Central and State Legislature do not specify the point of time of confirmation and such omission invariably gives rise to inevitable litigation by the Government servants when an order of termination simpliciter is passed against them. In this context this petition throws up a question for consideration whether the Petitioner, who was appointed a police constable in the Uttar Pradesh Police Department on 7th October, 1977, continued to be temporary until 8-10-1987, that is for about a decade when his services were terminated. 2. It is averred by the Petitioner that Regulation 541 of the U.P. Police Regulations has fixed the probation period of a recruit in police force at 2 years and, therefore, on the expiry of that period if his services are not terminated on account of unsuitability or misconduct, then he will stand confirmed by implication. 3. The Petitioner was first suspended by the order dated 18-8-1987 (Annexure "1" to the writ petition) on the charge that he handed over a licensed gun belonging to his brother, Sri Raj Kumar, to one Sri Dinesh Kumar, alias Achhan, which was later recovered by the Kotwali Police and thereafter the Petitioner reached Kotwali Fatehgarh in a drunken state to persuade the police not to take any action in the matter. Such suspension order was passed in contemplation of an enquiry, but without initiating any enquiry against the Petitioner, the Senior Superintendent of Police, Respondent No. 2, revoked the suspension order and reinstated the Petitioner by the order dated 7-10-1987 (Annexure "2" to the writ petition) and the next following day, i.e., on 8th October, 1987, he passed termination simplioter order against the Petitioner. The contention of the Petitioner is that he having been confirmed by implication on the expiry of fixed probationary period of two years, his services could not have been terminated by passing an order of termination simpliciter, but he could be removed from the service on the aforesaid charge only after a regular enquiry. 4. It is stated in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the Respondent No. 2 that the Petitioner was temporary and he was never confirmed and, therefore, the impugned order of termination simpliciter is perfectly legal and no enquiry was required in his case. 5. 4. It is stated in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the Respondent No. 2 that the Petitioner was temporary and he was never confirmed and, therefore, the impugned order of termination simpliciter is perfectly legal and no enquiry was required in his case. 5. The question for consideration, therefore is whether the Petitioner continued to be temporary for a decade. 6. Regulation 541(1) of the U.P. Police Regulations clearly states that a recruit will be on probation from the date he begins to officiate in a clear vacancy. The period of probation will be of two years. It further states that if at the end of the period of probation the conduct and work have been satisfactory and a recruit has been approved by the Deputy Inspector General of Police for service in the force, the Superintendent of Police will confirm him in his appointment. Regulation 541(2) states that in any case, in which either during or at the end of the period of probation, the Superintendent of Police is of opinion that a recruit is unlikely to make a good police officer, he may dispense his services. From Regulation 541(1) it is amply clear that there is fixed period of probation of two years in the case of a recruit, who is appointed in a clear vacancy and if at the end of the said period conduct and work of the recruit are found to be satisfactory and if he is approved by the Deputy Inspector General of Police for service in force, then it is incumbent on the Superintendent of Police to confirm such recruit in his appointment. There is no case in the counter-affidavit that the Petitioner did not satisfactorily complete his fixed period of probation of two years. Also, there is no averment in the counter-affidavit that the Superintendent of Police was of the opinion that the Petitioner was unlikely to make a good police officer either during or at the end of the probationary period. The Petitioner Cleary averred in paragraph 14 of the writ petition that he was appointed in a clear vacancy. Paragraph 14 of the writ petition is simply denied in paragraph 12 of the counter-affidavit without furnishing further details as to what was the state of vacancies when the Petitioner was appointed. Therefore, the contention of the Petitioner that he was appointed in a clear vacancy, may be unhesitatingly accepted. Paragraph 14 of the writ petition is simply denied in paragraph 12 of the counter-affidavit without furnishing further details as to what was the state of vacancies when the Petitioner was appointed. Therefore, the contention of the Petitioner that he was appointed in a clear vacancy, may be unhesitatingly accepted. The Petitioner having been appointed in a clear vacancy on 7-10-1977 and no opinion having been formed by the Respondent No. 2 during or at the end of the probationary period that the Petitioner was not likely to shape a good police officer, it must be held that the Petitioner satisfactorily completed the probationary period of two years. That being so, under Regulation 541(1) the Respondent No. 2 was under a legal obligation to confirm him with the approval of the Deputy Inspector General of Police. No confirmation order was, in fact, passed and, therefore, the question is as to what is the effect of such omission? Can the Petitioner be said to have continued temporary throughout the period of 10 years, because no confirmation order was passed by the Respondent No. 2 Considering the provisions of Regulation 541 and the facts and circumstances of the case, the only inference that can be drawn in this case is that the Petitioner was confirmed by implication, inasmuch as he satisfactorily completed his probationary period of two years and as the Respondent No. 2 never formed an opinion either during or at the end of the probationary period that the Petitioner would not have shaped as a good police officer. 7. Precisely the same question came up before the Supreme Court in State of Punjab Vs. Dharam Singh, AIR 1968 SC 1210 , when a Constitution Beach enunciated: Where, as in the present case, the service rules fix a certain period of time beyond which the probationary period cannot be extended, and an employee appointed or promoted to a post on probation is allowed to continue in that post after completion of the maximum period of probation without an express order of confirmation, he cannot be deemed to continue in that post as a probationer by implication. The reason is that such an implication is negatived by the service rule forbidding extension of the probationary period beyond the maximum period fixed by it. The reason is that such an implication is negatived by the service rule forbidding extension of the probationary period beyond the maximum period fixed by it. In such a case, it is permissible to draw the inference that the employee allowed to continue in the post on completion of the maximum period of probation has been confirmed in the post by implication. 8. The Supreme Court was again be set with the same problem in Om Prakash Maurya v. U.P. Cooperative Sugar Factories Feberation 1987 UPLBEC 50 . In this case the order of appointment promoting the Appellant on the post of Commercial Officer merely indicated that his probationary period could be extended and he could be reverted to the post of Office Superintendent without any notice. On the expiry of the Appellant's initial probationary period of one year, the appointing authority extended the same for another period of one year, which also expired on 4-9-1982. During the period of probation Appellant's services were neither terminated, nor was he reverted to his substantive post, instead he was allowed to continue on the post of Commercial Officer. On these facts, the Supreme Court following the dictum of the case of Dharm Singh (supra) ruled down that on the expiry of the maximum probationary period of two years, the Appellant could not be deemed to continue on probation, instead he stood confirmed in the post by implication and that the Appellant acquired the status of a confirmed employee on the post of Commercial Officer and the appointing authority could not legally revert him to the lower post of Office-Superintendent. 9. The facts of the case at hand are better than the case of Maurya (supra), as Regulation 541 prescribes a fixed period of probation of two years, in which the Petitioner was never found to be unsatisfactory by the Respondent No. 2. Otherwise also, it is wholly inconceivable and unwarranted to hold that the Petitioner, whose probationary period was fixed under Regulation 541, continued to be temporary for about 8 years after having successfully completed the probation. Though no order of confirmation was passed by the Respondent No. 2, but on the facts and circumstances of the case; the only legitimate inference that can be drawn is that the Petitioner stood confirmed on the expiry of fixed probationary period by implication. 10. Though no order of confirmation was passed by the Respondent No. 2, but on the facts and circumstances of the case; the only legitimate inference that can be drawn is that the Petitioner stood confirmed on the expiry of fixed probationary period by implication. 10. This being so, the impugned termination simpliciter (Annexure "3" to the writ petition) is surely invalid as it was passed without holding inquiry. 11. The case can be looked from another angle also. The Petitioner was suspended on 18-8-1987 and the suspension was followed by the order of reinstatement dated 7-10-1987. Right on the next following day, i.e. on 8-10-1987, an order of termination simpliciter was passed. Sequence of these facts lead to unerring conclusion that the termination simpliciter is merely a cloak to the order of punishment. The suspension order was passed in contemplation of enquiry but no enquiry was initiated. Having the belief that the Petitioner being temporary his services can be terminated by passing an order of termination simpliciter, the Petitioner was reinstated on 7-10-1987 and then the Respondent No. 2 hastened to pass the impugned order. Respondent No. 2 might have taken recourse to reinstatement and then pass simpliciter discharge order to escape the fulfledged enquiry which the authorities generally feel, does not bring good results. This belief is misconceived and often lead to the authorities to commit legal error, as it has happened in this case. If the enquiry is properly conducted, there is no reason for the courts to setting aside the same flippantly. 12. In the result, the Petitioner succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order dated 8-10-1987 (Annexure "3" to the writ petition) is quashed and the Respondents are directed to reinstate the Petitioner and pay the arrears of his emoluments in accordance with the law.