JUDGMENT M. P. Kama, J. - The petitioners, 'Balwant Educational Society, Agra', runs an institution called the 'Balwant Vidyapith Rural Institute'(referred in a brevity form 'BVRI'). which is an institution affiliated to the University of Agra under the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh State Universities Act, 1973. The Committee of Management of this institution who alongwith one K. P. Singh, the Honorary Secretary are the petitioners before the Court, came to the conclusion that the Principal of the aforesaid institution, the BVRI, one Dr. H.P. Singh, who is the third respondent herein, be removed from service on a variety of grounds and that the said resolution be reported to the Vice-Chancellor, Agra University for his approval under Section 35 (2) of the Uttar Pradesh State Universities Act, 1973 (hereinafter for the sake of brevity, referred to as 'the said Act'). The Vice-Chancellor, Agra University, who is the second respondent, herein, passed an order dated 25th Apnl, 1985, according his approval under Section 35 (2) of the said Act to the proposal of the first petitioner regarding termination of services of Dr H.P. Singh (the third respondent herein) as the Principal of BVRI Against this order granting approval under Section 35 (2) of the said Act, the third respondent, the Principal of the institution, made a representation to the Chancellor of the University under Section 68 of the said Act and the Chancellor, who is also the Governor of the State of Uttar Pradesh, and who is cited as respondent No. 1 in the present petition, passed an order dated 3rd of June, 1986, inter alia allowing the reference made to the Chancellor under Section 68 setting aside the impugned order of the Vice-Chancellor dated 25th of April, 1985 granting approval to the removal of Dr. H. P. Singh from service as Principal and remanding the matter to the Vice-Chancellor for fresh consideration in its entirely after affording reasonable opportunity to both the parties and for passing a detailed and speaking order in accordance with law. It is this order of the Chancellor of the Agra University that is the subject-matter of challenge in the present petition, by which the petitioner has sought the issue of writ of certiorari calling for the records of the case and quashing the aforesaid order of the Chancellor passed on 3rd of June, 1986. It is this order of the Chancellor of the Agra University that is the subject-matter of challenge in the present petition, by which the petitioner has sought the issue of writ of certiorari calling for the records of the case and quashing the aforesaid order of the Chancellor passed on 3rd of June, 1986. The petitioners have also sought a writ of mandamus directing respondent No. 3, Dr. H. P. Singh, not to interfere, in any manner, with the functioning of the BVRI. 2. The case of the petitioners was represented before me by Shri A. K. Yog and the third respondent was represented by Shri Sushil Harkauli. 3. Shri Yog, learned Advocate for the petitioners, challenged the order, the subject-matter of the present petition, on three grounds, namely : (i) that the Chancellor did not have the power to order a remand of the proceedings of approval before the Vice Chancellor under Section 35 (2) of the said Act. (ii) that the provisions of Section 35 (2) of the said Act do not require the Vice-Chancellor to pass a reasoned order, and, (iii) that the Chancellor's order is liable to be set aside on the ground that it has not made any reference to the representation of the management, which was before him. 4. It will be convenient first to take a quick look at the two orders one passed by the Vice-Chancellor approving the action of the approval under Section 35 (2) of the said Act and the other passed by the Chancellor disposing of the representation made before the Vice-Chancellor under Section 35 (2) of the said Act and directing a remand, thereafter it will be appropriate to review the provisions of the law and the pronouncements of the Court with regard to the effect of the said provisions. It is the case of the college that it held a detailed enquiry into the various charges levelled against the third respondent, who was the Principal, which enquiry was concluded on the 4th of April, 1984 by findings adverse to the Principal, as a result of which the first petitioner passed resolution dated the 5th of July, 1985 resolving that the third respondent be removed from services on the various grounds mentioned in the resolution dated the 5tli/6th of July, 1984 and further resolving that the copy of the said resolution by communicated to Dr H. P. Singh and reported to the Vice-Chancellor, Agra University for his approval (presumably under Section 35 (2) of the said Act). The approval has been granted by the Vice-Chancellor by his order, which was communicated by the Registrar by his letter dated 25th of April, 1985, addressed to the second petitioner. The said communication dated 25th of April, 1985, which has. repeatedly, been referred to by the petitioners as the order of approval by the Vice-Chancellor under Section 35 (2), is a cryptic order, which is quoted in its entirely below : "With reference to your letter No 616 dated 7-7-1984. I am directed to inform you that the Vice-Chancellor has been pleased to accord his approval under Section 35 (2) of the U. P. State Universities Act, 3973 to the proposal of the Managing Committee of your college containing in its Resolution dated 3-7-1984 regarding termination of the services of Dr. H. P Singh as the Principal of Balwant Vidyapith Rural Institute, Bichpuri, Agra." 5. It was against this order that the third respondent made a representation under Section 68 to the Chancellor of the University, who. as stated above, is also the Governor of the Uttar Pradesh. His representation was disposed of by the Chancellor vide order dated 3rd of June, 1986. This order is to be found at Annexure-7 to the writ petition and it recites, inter alia, that Dr. H. P. Singh, Principal, B. V. Rural Institute, Bichpuri, Agra, has filed a representation dated 18th June, 1985. The petitioner is aggrieved by the order of the Vice-Chancellor, whereby he accorded approval to the proposal of the management removing the third respondent from service. The comments have been obtained from the University and other relevant records have been perused. H. P. Singh, Principal, B. V. Rural Institute, Bichpuri, Agra, has filed a representation dated 18th June, 1985. The petitioner is aggrieved by the order of the Vice-Chancellor, whereby he accorded approval to the proposal of the management removing the third respondent from service. The comments have been obtained from the University and other relevant records have been perused. In the body of the order, the Chancellor has taken note of the various grounds of objections on the part of Dr. H. P. Singh, which include, inter alia, grounds that the provisions of sub-section (I) (iii) of Statute 16-06 of the First Statute of Agra University have not been complied with and the sole defence/witness, videlicit, Dr. S N. Singh, in whose period as Secretary of the Committee of Management, most of the lapses are said to have occurred, was not called for testifying before the enquiry officer. The enquiry conducted by the management was ex-parte conducted in hurry and with bias and only a show of enquiry has been made with the result that the enquiry held was nothing but a window dressing on the part of the management, who has decided to get rid of the petitioner and because the Vice-Chancellor, inspite of request from the petitioner, has failed to hear the petitioner but proceeded to pass the impugned order in a hurry. The Chancellor, in his order, has noted that clear findings of the enquiry officer, as well as the replies of the petitioner, were available before the then Vice-Chancellor, who may not have thought it necessary to give him a chance of personal hearing. The University has. however, failed to mention anything about the allegation of the petitioner that in regard to decision of removal also he had desired hearing from the Vice-Chancellor vide his letter dated 20th of January, 1983, 21st of February, 1983, 4th of August, 1984, 2nd of February, 1985, 12th of February, 1985 and 19th of February, 1985, but the Vice-Chancellor failed to respond. The order of the Chancellor then goes on to point out that considering the petitioner's case on merits, it does appear that the petitioner has pressed legal and factual points in order to challenge the validity of the resolution passed by the Managing Committee as well as impugned approval granted by the Vice-Chancellor vide his order dated 25th of April, 1985. These points, the Chancellor has observed, did require close examination with reference to the evidence available on record and, if need be, a personal hearing to the concerned parties in order to elicit true facts. The order of the Chancellor goes on to note that the perusal of the impugned order passed by the Vice-Chancellor shows that it is a perfunctory order and fails to discuss points made out by the petitioner. Since, the order of the Vice-Chancellor is sketchy and non-speaking, therefore, it is not possible to say whether the vital points raised by the petitioner were duty considered by him and he applied his mind to the facts and law. The principles of natural justice involve a bona fide hearing of both the parties and in the ultimate result presume a speaking order from-the authority concerned, which does not seem to have been done in the present case. The order notes that the Vice-Chancellor has not even complied with the basic requirement of expressing his satisfaction that the provisions of the Act and the Statutes have been followed in the matter of completion of enquiry by the Managing Committee, in the circumstances, the Chancellor has passed the said order giving a finding that the decision of the Vice-Chancellor, Agra University dated 25th of April, 1985 is not sustainable in law and deserves to be set aside. In the operative part of the order the Chancellor has set aside the aforesaid order of the Vice-Chancellor dated 25th of April, 1985, remanded the matter to the Vice-Chancellor for fresh consideration in its entirely after affording reasonable opportunity to both the parties and for passing a detailed and speaking order in accordance with law. 6. Mr. Yog, appearing on behalf of the petitioners, invited my attention to the provisions of the said Act, more particularly, of Sections 35 and 68 thereof. 6. Mr. Yog, appearing on behalf of the petitioners, invited my attention to the provisions of the said Act, more particularly, of Sections 35 and 68 thereof. Section 35 (2), which is relevant to the subject-matter of the present petition, may be reproduced herein below : Section 35 (2) : (2) Every decision of the Management of such college to dismiss or remove a teacher or to reduce him in rank or to punish him in any other manner shall before it is communicated to him, on reported to the Vice-Chancellor and shall not take effect unless it has been approved by the Vice-Chancellor : Provided that in the case of colleges established and administered by a minority referred to in Clause (1) of Article 30 of the Constitution of India, the decision of the management dismissing removing or reducing in rank or punishing in any other manner any teacher shall not require the approval of the Vice-Chancellor, but, shall be reported to him and unless he is satisfied that the procedure prescribed in this behalf has b en followed, the decision shall not be given effect to. Reference may also be made of sub-section (3) and the proviso, which is as follows : The provisions of sub-section (2) shall also apply to any decision to terminate the services of a teacher, whether by way of punishment c r otherwise but shall not apply to any termination of service on the expiry of the period for which the teacher was appointed: Provided that in the case of colleges established and administered by a minority referred to in Clause (1) of Article 30 of the Constitution of India, the decision of the Management terminating the service of any teacher shall not require the approval of the Vice-Chancellor, but shall be reported to him and unless he is satisfied that the procedure prescribed in this behalf has been followed, the decision shall not be given effect to. 7. Section 68 of the aforesaid Act provides for a reference to the Chancellor by any person aggrieved and the substance of the section is that if any question arises whether any decision of any authority or officer of the University is in conformity with this Act or the Statutes or the Ordinance made thereunder the matter shall be referred to the Chancellor and the decision of the Chancellor thereon shall be final. As reference has been made of the aforesaid provision in the Statutes and the Ordinance, Mr. Yog invited my attention to the provisions of the First Statutes of the Agra University and more particularly to the provisions of Chapter XVI Part I thereof. The various clauses have been referred by parties as Statutes so-and-so. Under Statute 16 04 a teacher of an affiliated college (other than a Principal) may be dismissed or removed or his services may be terminated on the grounds set out in the Statute. Sub-clause (2) whereof says that a Principal of an affiliated college may be dismissed or removed, or his services terminated on grounds mentioned in Clause (1) or on the ground of continued mismanagement of the college. Under Statute 16.06 u is provided that no order dismissing, removing or terminating the services of a teacher on any ground mentioned in Clause (1) or Clause (2) of the Statute 15.04 shall be passed unless a charge has been framed against the teacher and communicated to him with a statement of ground on which it is proposed to take action and he has been given adequate opportunity of submitting a written statement of his defence : of being heard in person and calling and examining such witnesses in defence as he may desire. It further provides that the Management or the officer authorised by it to conduct an enquiry may for sufficient reasons to be recorded in writing refuse to call any witness. Clause (2) of Statute 16 60 further provides that the Management may, at any time, ordinarily within two months of the date of the Enquiry Officer's report pass a resolution dismissing or removing the teacher concerned or terminating his service mentioning the grounds of such dismissal, removal or termination, which resolution shall forthwith be communicated to the teacher concerned. Finally, at the end of the aforesaid Statute it is specifically provided that the resolution of the Management inflicting punishment shall be reported to the Vice-Chancellor and shall be operative only when and to the extent approved by the Vice-Chancellor. 8. Mr. Yog argued that while disposing of the reference under Section 68 of the said Act, the Chancellor did not have the power to remand or to ask for a better order from the Vice-Chancellor. As a corollary Mr. 8. Mr. Yog argued that while disposing of the reference under Section 68 of the said Act, the Chancellor did not have the power to remand or to ask for a better order from the Vice-Chancellor. As a corollary Mr. Yog argued also that under Section 35 (2) of the Act the Vice-Chancellor is not required to pass a reasoned order. On the first aspect, namely, that the Vice-Chancellor did not have the power to pass an order of remand, Mr. Yog cited the case reported in Supreme Court Notes Item No 489 at page 347 The Head Note says that : "A first appeal is a re-hearing and if the parties have led all the evidence they desired, it is the duty of the First Appellate Court to give its own conclusion upon the evidence before it If a trial court does not properly understand the pleading of the parties or it does not decide according to the evidence led upon these pleading, it is for the appellate court to reverse the findings and give its own findings again if an issue has been decided by the trial court in a very perfunctory manner, it is for the first appellate court to give its decision. The High Court has ample powers of remand in cases where the ends of justice so demand. But in the instant case there is no scope for a fresh trial and throw away all the costs which have been incurred up to-date". Based on this decision Mr. Yog argued that the Chancellor had no power to remand, but he ought to have decided the various issues, which arose for consideration, himself. I am afraid this argument proceeds on an incorrect appreciation of the scope and the purpose of the provisions contained in Section 35 (2) and Section 68 of the said Act. Based on this decision Mr. Yog argued that the Chancellor had no power to remand, but he ought to have decided the various issues, which arose for consideration, himself. I am afraid this argument proceeds on an incorrect appreciation of the scope and the purpose of the provisions contained in Section 35 (2) and Section 68 of the said Act. The entire object of the provisions of Section 35 (2), in substance, seems to be effectively controlling and regulating the actions of the affiliated college, particularly, in the context of teachers, employees or servants Section 35 (2) provides that every decision of the Management dismissing a teacher shall first have to be reported to the Vice-Chancellor and shall not take effect unless it has been approved by the Vice-Chancellor Interestingly, the proviso to sub section (2) add that in the case of colleges established and administered by a minority referred to in Clause (1) of Article 30 of the Constitution of India, the decision of the management dismissing any teacher shall not require the approval of the Vice-Chancellor, but, shall be reported to him and unless he is satisfied that the procedure prescribed in this behalf has been followed, the decision shall not be given effect to The distinction brought out by the contents of sub section (2) and those of the proviso is significant. It is to be noted that whereas in the case of institution administered by minority by mode of Clause (1) of Article 30 of the Constitution of India is concerned the decision of the management dismissing has to be reported to the Vice-Chancellor, but all that he has to satisfy himself is that the procedure prescribed in the matter of dismissal has been followed. This is not so in the case of sub-section (2) itself, which, in terms, provides that the decision shall not take effect unless it has not been approved by the Vice-Chancellor. This seems to clearly indicate that the approval contemplated here is much more than a more satisfaction that the procedure prescribed in the matter of dismissal has been followed. Indeed, that needs consideration. Section 13 of the said Act prescribes the powers and duties of the Vice-Chancellor. This seems to clearly indicate that the approval contemplated here is much more than a more satisfaction that the procedure prescribed in the matter of dismissal has been followed. Indeed, that needs consideration. Section 13 of the said Act prescribes the powers and duties of the Vice-Chancellor. Sub-Section (4) thereof provides that it shall be the duty of the Vice-Chancellor to ensure the faithful observance of the provisions of this Act, the Statutes and the Ordinance and the Vice-Chancellor shall possess all such powers as may be necessary in that behalf One realises that the approval provided for in sub-section (2) of Section 35 is far from a mechanical approval but presupposes the approval granted or approved after a careful application of mind and conscious consideration being given to the points that arose and after being satisfied not only with the Ordinances and the Statutes and the procedure prescribed in the matter of dismissal has been followed but also that no injustice has been caused to the party against whom the order has been proposed to be made. Section 35 (2) of the aforesaid Act in this context is sweeping and fairly all inclusive. It should be noted that in each and every case of dismissal, reporting under Section 35 (2) is a must and unless approved by the Vice-Chancellor, the dismissal cannot take effect, as against this Section 68 is not a matter of course. Undoubtly, the Chancellor has the power to look into the relevant papers to satisfy himself that the order impugned, is in conformity with the Act. Statutes and Ordinances made thereunder and his decision is stated to be final in the matter The entire scheme would suggest that in a manner of speaking an order reference under Section 68 is sought to speak to the pater families of the University and obtain guidance, which may be forthcoming from him whether by way of setting aside an order in question or by way of remand There is nothing in Section 68 to indicate that the Chancellor is obliged to decide the matter himself and has no power to remand Indeed the power to remand the matter is implicit in a power to decide wherever the facts and circumstances of the case so warrant. The case cited by Mr. The case cited by Mr. Yog, which refers to the duty of the Court when baring first appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure, can have no possible application to a case covered by the provisions to reference under Section 68 of the said Act. There set ms to be no analogy applicable to the instant case. The Vice-Chancellor certainly does not act as a court of first appeal and indeed, there is no question of the throwing away of the costs incurred by the Vice-Chancellor while passing his order granting his approval under Section 35 (2). Indeed, if one turns to the order passed by the Chancellor on the 3rd of June, 1986 one cannot but appreciate the dignified approach spirit and the restraint in language which marked out this outstanding order, cry briefly, the order has taken notice of the various complaints made by the petitioner, particularly, the complaint that the order passed against him has, indeed, been an ex-parte order and that the show of enquiry made by the college authorities is nothing more than a window dressing and, in fact, the provisions of the Act and the Statutes and Ordinance made thereunder or principles of natural justice have not been followed or complied and farther that inspite of repeated requests the Vice-Chancellor has not only refrained from hearing the petitioner or even replying to the various letters addressed requesting for a personal hearing, but seems to have passed the order in a hurry. Having noted briefly some of the points raised by the petitioner, the order goes on to notice that whereas whichever material was available before the Vice-Chancellor it is not clear whether it goes on the material before him and whereas request was made for approval. The order of the Chancellor then stresses the fact that the points raised by the petitioner are points of law and fact, which do require close examination with reference to the material available on record and, if need be, a personal hearing to the concerned parties in order to elicit true facts. The Chancellor's order notices that the Vice-Chancellor's order under scrutiny before him is rather perfunctory and fails to discuss points made out by the petitioner. The Chancellor's order notices that the Vice-Chancellor's order under scrutiny before him is rather perfunctory and fails to discuss points made out by the petitioner. (Indeed when one refers to the order of the Vice-Chancellor, copy whereof is annexed as exhibit 5 to the petition, it is nothing more than a cryptic communication, which indicates that the Vice-Chancellor has accorded his approval to the proposal contained in the resolution of the institution regarding the termination of Dr H. P. Singh as Principal, BVRI, and is far from being explicit so as to lend assurance that the case of the Principal has been properly considered by him. Not a slightest indication is available from the said order in this regard). The Vice-Chancellor has not even given his formal finding on the basic requirement of his satisfaction that the provisions of the Act and Statutes have been followed in the matter by completing enquiry by the Managing Committee, though, obviously just this much could not possibly suffice considering the provisions of Section 35 (2) of the said Act, which seem to require that the Vice-Chancellor must be satisfied that justice has been done before granting of his approval. It seems to me that the Chancellor was wholly justified in coming to the conclusion that it was not possible to make any head or tail out of the order that the Vice Chancellor has chosen to pass by purporting to grant his approval much less whether the Vice-Chancellor has indeed applied his mind to the various questions raised by the petitioner before him and to the basic question whether justice has been done in the instant case. With regard to the remand there is no justification in the argument that the Chancellor is not entitled to pass an order of remand. Indeed the power is implicit in the provisions of Section 68 of the said Act. What is important to note is the dignified language in which the Chancellor has passed his order even leaves it to the Vice-Chancellor to decide whether or not to grant approval to the order passed by petitioner. Though, if one reads in between the lines it is not difficult to gather the feelings of the Chancellor. What is important to note is the dignified language in which the Chancellor has passed his order even leaves it to the Vice-Chancellor to decide whether or not to grant approval to the order passed by petitioner. Though, if one reads in between the lines it is not difficult to gather the feelings of the Chancellor. Obviously the Chancellor has felt rather let down by the summary and mechanical manner in which the Vice-Chancellor has give about the matter of granting his approval, but has nevertheless been dignified in expressing his views on the subject. Apart from the question whether the Vice-Chancellor is bound, while passing an order under Section 35 (2) to give reasons in his order, which question I shall take up hereinafter, there is no doubt, the Chancellor has. in view of the provisions of Section 68 of the Act and the basic and fundamental objects under lying the various provisions of the said Act, the power to require the Vice Chancellor, while remanding the matter to hint for reconsideration to pass a speaking order on remand. Irrespective of the consideration, therefore, as to whether the Vice-Chancellor is, as a matter of law, required, to give reasons when granting his approval under Section 35 (2). I have no hesitation in holding that the Chancellor is within his rights in a given case to call upon the Vice-Chancellor to place before the Chancellor the reasons which have impelled him to pass a particular order This brings us to the question as to whether the Vice-Chancellor, when passing an order under Section 35 (2) of the said Act, is required to pass a reasoned order. 9. Mr. Yog submitted that the order passed by the Vice-Chancellor under Section 35 (2) of the Act is not required by any law to be reasoned or speaking order. Our courts have held that it is not necessary to give reasons in support of the order. Mr. Yog invited attention to a decision of this Court in the case of The Managing Committee of the Digambar College, Dubai v. The Vice-Chancellor, Meerut University and another, (AIR 1975 Alld. 445). Our courts have held that it is not necessary to give reasons in support of the order. Mr. Yog invited attention to a decision of this Court in the case of The Managing Committee of the Digambar College, Dubai v. The Vice-Chancellor, Meerut University and another, (AIR 1975 Alld. 445). A single Judge of this Court took his view from an earlier decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Special Appeal No. 1597 of 1969, Sri Devi Dayal Agarwal v. The Vice-Chancellor (decided on 20-8-1970), wherein the Division Bench, inter alia, held that the grant of approval by the Vice-Chancellor is treated as internal matter of the college. The learned single Judge held that approvals of the type found in the First Statutes of Agra University are calculated to safeguard the interest of the teachers and to ensure security of tenure. It is precisely for these reasons that the statute provided that the services of the teachers and employees would not be terminated without the approval of the Vice-Chancellor. In other words the object of obtaining the approval of the Vice-Chancellor is to keep a check on the administration of the College. It is accordingly regulatory measure and, in order to obtain the approval, the management is required to satisfy the Vice-Chancellor that its proposed action of termination of the service of the probationer is just and proper. The learned single Judge went on to hold that it was. It is accordingly regulatory measure and, in order to obtain the approval, the management is required to satisfy the Vice-Chancellor that its proposed action of termination of the service of the probationer is just and proper. The learned single Judge went on to hold that it was. therefore, clear that an action terminating the services of a teacher cannot be held to arise out of quasi-judicial proceedings so as to attract the principles of natural justice and that any instence of any reasons by the Vice-Chancellor is likely to convert the proceedings of simple termination of services of a probationer into a regular proceeding of removal or dismissal, whereas there can be no doubt that the object of obtaining approval of the Vice-Chancellor is to keep a check on the administration of the college and that the management, in order to obtain the approval of the Vice-Chancellor, is required to satisfy him that its proposed action of termination of service is not only proposed after compliance of the necessary Statutes and the Ordinance, but is a just and proper order However, the question whether the proceedings of approval by the Vice-Chancellor under Section 35 (2) can be said to be quasi-judicial proceeding, it appears chat the matter is concluded by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Dr Smt Kuntesh Gupta v. Management of Hindu Kanyu Mahavidyalaya, Sitapur and others, reported in AIR 1987 SC 2186 . This was a case where initially the Vice-Chancellor, after hearing the parties, by an order declined to grant approval to the order of dismissal of the appellant proposed by the management of the college, but thereafter chose to review his own order or an application made to her in that behalf. Considering the legal position arising out of the aforesaid facts, the Supreme Court, in Paragraph 11 of its judgment, held as follows : It is now well established that a quasi-judicial authority cannot review its own order, unless the power of review is expressly conferred on it by the statute under which it derives its jurisdiction. The Vice-Chancellor in considering the question of approval of an order of dismissal of the Principal, acts as a quasi-judicial authority. It is not disputed that the provisions of the U. P. State Universities Act, 1973 or of the Statutes of the University do not confer any power of review on the Vice-Chancellor. The Vice-Chancellor in considering the question of approval of an order of dismissal of the Principal, acts as a quasi-judicial authority. It is not disputed that the provisions of the U. P. State Universities Act, 1973 or of the Statutes of the University do not confer any power of review on the Vice-Chancellor. In the circumstances, it must be held that the Vice-Chancellor acted wholly without jurisdiction in reviewing her order dated January 24, 1987 by her order dated March 7, 1987. The said order of the Vice-Chancellor dated March 7, 1987 was a nullity. 10. Mr. Yog tried to suggest that the sentence containing the finding 'The Vice-Chancellor in considering the question of approval of an order of dismissal of the Principal acts as a quasi-judicial authority, seems to be an Obiter of the Supreme Court. Even obiter dicta of the Supreme Court are binding on other courts. It is not possible to suggest that aforesaid pronouncement of law by the Supreme Court can, in any way, be stated to be an obiter dicta. The Supreme Court was considering whether it was open to the Vice-Chancellor to review his own order, in the first sentence in Paragraph 11 it was pointed that, it is now well settled that the quasi-judicial authority cannot review its own order. In the next line the Supreme Court laid down the law to the effect that the Vice-Chancellor, in considering the question approval of an order of dismissal of the Principal assets as quasi judicial authority and then went on to hold that the provisions in the U. P. State Universities Act, 1973 or of the Statutes of the University do not confer any power on the Vice-Chancellor to review. This decision, it must be noted, held that the Vice-Chancellor in reviewing his own decision acted wholly without jurisdiction and his decision was a nullity. The law, therefore, as laid down by the Supreme Court, must be accepted as settled law binding on all courts in the country and 1 do not think that it is open to me to go into the pros and cons of the question whether the Vice-Chancellor, while acting under Section 35 (2) of the said Act can be stated to be acting as a quasi-judicial authority. 11. Mr. 11. Mr. Sushil Harkauli argued the matter on behalf of the third respondent with admirable brevity and invited my attention to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Mis. Babubhai and Co. and others v. State of Gujarat and others, AIR 1985 SC 613 and pointed out the implications of the exercise a quasi-judicial power in the passage which occurs in Paragraph 8 of the judgment, which, for the sake of convenience, is reproduced herein-below : "Further we are in agreement with the High Court that the power conferred upon the local authority is a quasi-judicial power which implies that the same has to be exercised after observing the principles of natural justice, that is to say, the decision that the occupants are not entitled to occupy the plots in their occupation has to be arrived at after hearing such occupants and that too by passing a speaking order which implies giving of reasons and that ensures the application of mind to only germane or relevant material on record achieving matter extraneous and irrelevant." 12. Mr. Harkauli then cited the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of The Siemens Engineering and Manufacturing Co. of India Ltd v. The Union of India and another, reported in AIR 1976 SC 1785 , where Bhagwati, J. as he then was, speaking for the Court pointed out, inter alia, in Paragraph 6 of the judgment that every quasi-judicial order must be supported by reasons. He went on to observe that it is not suggested that the Collector should have made an elaborate order discussing the arguments of the appellants in the manner of court law. But the order of the Collector (which was under review before the Court) could have been a little more explicit and articulate so as to lend as urance that the case of the appellant had been properly considered by him.' The rule requiring reasons to be given in support of an order is, like the principle of audi alteram partem a basic principle of natural justice which must inform every quasi-judicial process and this rule must be observed in this proper spirit and mere pretence of compliance of it would not satisfy the requirement of law. In the light of the above pronouncement of the Supreme Court, the inescapable conclusion is that the Vice-Chancellor, while according his approval to the proposal of the management for terminating the services of its teacher or Principal under Section 35 (2) of the said Act, is bound to disclose his reasons, of which though they need not be very elaborate or in great, the detail, must be explicit, articulate and discernible. It also underlines that the basic requirement that the approval of the Vice-Chancellor has not to be given like a rubber stamp in a mechanical manner, but after considering all the facts and the law points that arise for consideration. We take a very small illustration from the very facts of the instant case It is the case of the petitioners that the petitioners repeatedly sent notices by special messengers to the third respondent, Dr. H. P Singh, who avoided taking delivery of the same. In the rejoinder affidavit filed in the present proceeding, they proceeded to state as follows : "The letter sent by registered post on 28-3-1984, regarding inquiry on 31-3-1984, was taken delivery of by Dr H P. Singh only on 4-4-1984 as admitted by him. Even on this date the enquiry was continuing but Dr H. P. Singh did not care to find out." 13. Now it is common knowledge that a letter dispatched by registered post on 28th of March of a particular year is normally not likely to reach the addressee thereof before the 31st of March, 1984 so as to give him even the slightest possible notice of the hearing even on the 31st of March, 1984. As it turns out in the instant case this letter was received by Dr. H. P. Singh on the 4th of April, 1984 on which date, according to the petitioners in the passage quoted above, "the enquiry was continuing but Dr. H P. Singh did not care to find out. As it turns out in the instant case this letter was received by Dr. H. P. Singh on the 4th of April, 1984 on which date, according to the petitioners in the passage quoted above, "the enquiry was continuing but Dr. H P. Singh did not care to find out. This is factually incorrect and misleading as one finds from page 11 of Annexure RA-5 that" of after 'bought which occurred to him on 23-4-1984 (for Enquiry Officer), 27-6-1984 (for Management) and 4-8 1984 and 3112 1984 (for V. C.) i. e long after the enquiry w;as over on 4-4-1984", indicating that the enquiry was, in fact, over on the 4th of April, 1984 Indeed before me it is not in dispute that the enquiry was not concluded on 4-4-1984. In the context of the fact that a teacher, whose services are proposed to be terminated, is entitled to a fair hearing and an adequate opportunity of defending himself There can be no gainsaying the fact that the aspect of the matter, highlighted by the dates indicated from the passage quoted above, needs careful consideration by an authority considering the question whether the proceedings against the Principal of the institution were carried on in a manner which can be said to be just and fair and concluded after giving an adequate opportunity to the Principal to defend himself. In this context the allegation of the earlier, letter having been sent by special messenger not having taken delivery of by the Principal, respondent No. 3, might be called conceivably assume a different aspect. Ail these matters definitely deserve the anxious and careful consideration of the Vice-Chancellor on whose approval is depends the question of termination of services of as high an official as the Principal of an institution. The Chancel for seems to be clearly and fairly quoted in the petition that various points requiring his consideration require a close consideration. But a perusal of the order passed by the Vice-Chancellor showed that it was rather perfunctory and it was not safe to lead to a cryptic order whether the vital points raised by the petitioner were duly considered by him and whether he applied his mind to the facts of the case and law points arising therein while approving the decision of the Committee of Management. The Chancellor is again entirely right when he says that principles of natural - justice involve a bona fide hearing of both the parties. The argument, therefore, that, while passing an order of approval under Section 35 (2) of the aforesaid Act, the Vice-Chancellor is not required to pass a reasoned order, however, brief, cannot be accepted. 14. That brings me to the last of the three arguments put forward on behalf of the petitioners, namely, that the'Chancellor has not referred to the representation of the management which w as before him. Mr Harkauli, it must be mentioned at this stage invited attention of the Court to Paragraph 42 of the petition, which is as follows : "That the Chancellor has itself committed gross illegality in having failed to give notice to the parties concerned and thus denied reasonable opportunity of hearing and as such on this score the order of the Chancellor itself is a nullity and liable to be set aside. No opportunity of personal hearing has been given to the management." The above averment, read with the very first of the grounds, set out in Paragraph 51 of the petition, which is as follows: "Because the impugned order passed by the Chancellor is a nullity inasmuch as the same has been passed without affording reasonable opportunity to the petitioners and as such the said order having been passed in contravention of principles of natural justice is liable to be quashed." Definitely conveys breach of the agreement being made by the petitioners and the petitioners were denied the reasonable opportunity of being heard and on that account the order of the Chancellor is nullity. Mr. Harkauli then invited attention to RA-2, being the second exhibit to the affidavit in rejoinder filed by the petitioners. This exhibit is a notice addressed by the Assistant Legal Advisor to the Chancellor on the 11th of December, 1985 to the second petitioner Shri K. P. Singh, Honorary Secretary of the first petitioner. inter alia, enclosing a copy of the representation made to the petitioners alongwith the enclosures received through Dr. H P. Singh, the third respondent herein, and requesting that the Chancellor be conveyed within a fortnight the parawise comments in duplicate of the petitioners on the issues raised in the petition. inter alia, enclosing a copy of the representation made to the petitioners alongwith the enclosures received through Dr. H P. Singh, the third respondent herein, and requesting that the Chancellor be conveyed within a fortnight the parawise comments in duplicate of the petitioners on the issues raised in the petition. This was, admittedly, received on the 17th of December, 1985 and appears to have been passed on to the Honorary Secretary Shri K. P. Singh, the second petitioner herein, who has also put in signature on the 25th of December, 1985. Indeed RA-5 is the reply, communication by the petitioners to the Assistant Legal Adviser to the Chancellor, Governor's Secretariat, Uttar Pradesh, in response to the earlier notice. This would indicate that the suggestion that the petitioners had been denied reasonable opportunity of being heard by the Chancellor anti that on account of the same the order of the Chancellor is nudity and liable to be set aside is entirely false and misleading Indeed, the same-thing has been highlighted in the form of the ground (in the ship. and form of Ground I) indicating that the said suggestion in the petition is not the result of an error or inadvertence, but has been seriously sought to be canvassed as absence of reasonable opportunity to the petitioners. This ground has already been quoted above. An attempt was made the learned advocate for the petitioners to explain this way by suggesting that the words "without affording reasonable opportunity" are not the something as saying that no opportunity has been afforded to the petitioners. I am afraid, it is not possible to accept this type of complaint and Paragraph 42, read with ground I, leaves not the slightest room for doubt that the petitioners made an attempt to represent to the Court that the Chancellor had not given them an opportunity of being heard before passing his order. Further, the complaint in the last sentence of Paragraph 42 of the petition that 'no opportunity of personal hearing has been given to the management' can be said to be equally unfounded and misleading. Further, the complaint in the last sentence of Paragraph 42 of the petition that 'no opportunity of personal hearing has been given to the management' can be said to be equally unfounded and misleading. When one reads the equating sentence in RA-5 of the affidavit in rejoinder, which states "in case any further clarification is required, the management shall be happy to give the same and to be heard by "His Excellency the Chancellor" The above statement makes it amply clear that the petitioners have conte -do i themselves while placing various facts in their reply to the Chancellor's notice and have incidated their willingness to assist further 'in case any further clarification is required'. This can never justify the complaint made of no opportunity of personal hearing being given to the management (though whether the management was entitled to a personal hearing, would be another matter. It is a matter of some distress to this Court that the management of an educational institution should try to take recourse to the types contrivances evidenced by the Court, what has been discussed herein above. Mr. Harkauli submitted with great emphasis that the aforesaid conduct of the petitioner alone was enough to disentitle the petitioners from any relief from a Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India Whereas I am inclined to agree with the aforesaid submission. I wish to make it clear that is not the only reason for the disposal of the petition, which is also being dismissed for the various reasons discussed in the course of this judgment. 15. That leaves the last aspect of the matter, namely, the complaint that the Chancellor has not referred to the representation of the management, which was before him. 15. That leaves the last aspect of the matter, namely, the complaint that the Chancellor has not referred to the representation of the management, which was before him. It must be borne in mind that apart from the fact that there is no duty cast on the Chancellor to refer to the representation made by the management in the course of his order passed by him upon the representation made to him under Section 68 of the said Act, it must be underlying that, as is obvious from the context of the order of the Chancellor in view of the representation, the Chancellor has, in substance and in fact, done his duty to point out that the matter gave rise to points of fact and law, which require close examination with reference to the material available on record and, if need be, a personal hearing to the concerned parties. It is important to endorse that this was required to be done by the Vice-Chancellor under the provisions of Section 35 (2) of the aforesaid Act and the Chancellor going on to point out that the order pa- ed by the Vice-Chancellor hardly thrown any light at all or given any indication that he has applied his mind to the facts of the case and the points of law a dag therefrom and observed the principles of natural justice and it is only against this background that the Chancellor has remanded the matter to the Vice-Chancellor after setting aside his order dated 25th of April, 1985 directing him to consider the matter afresh in its entirety after affording reasonable opportunity to both the parties For all these aspects of the matter there could be no question of considering the reply given by the management, particularly, when the reply was, admittedly, wholly silent on these aspects of the matter. 16. Mr. Harkauli passed scathing comments 0x1 the conduct of the petitioners. 16. Mr. Harkauli passed scathing comments 0x1 the conduct of the petitioners. There is no gain saying to the fact that instead of permitting the order of the Chancellor to take effect and permitting the Vice-Chancellor to comply with the same, the petitioners approached this Court, on wholly inadequate material, putting forth ground's which are not borne out on facts on record and has not been bona fide and has led to tremendous inordinate delay from the dale of the filling of the petition dated 8th of July, 1986 till its disposal, at present, obtaining a stay in the mean time, which indicates delay on the part of the Vice-Chancellor from complying with the order of the Chancellor. It is difficult to avoid the impression that the actions of the petitioners, apart from showing their power and sanctity of the record of the Chancellor of the University of which they are affiliated institution, seem to be badly lacking in bona fide. .The petition therefore, seems to be neither tenable nor sustainable. There seems to be absolutely no reason or justification in quashing the order of the Vice-Chancellor passed by him on 3rd of June, 1986. by the issue of writ of certiorari. The petition fails and is hereby dismissed. 17. At this point Mr. Harkauli invited attention to two applications made by the third respondent on the 2nd of May, 1989 seeking direction to the petitioners to furnish the statement of provident fund of the applicant, Respondent No. 3 and to pay the provident fund contribution of the Respondent No. 3, which is approximately, Rs. 1,10,000/- together with interest thereon. The situation that emerged on discussion with the learned advocates for both the said as, indicated that the petitioners have not paid all the salary and wages of the third respondent since 12th of May, 1985 and even before then they have not paid the full salary and allowances, but have purported to pay him the subsistence allowance. The situation that emerged on discussion with the learned advocates for both the said as, indicated that the petitioners have not paid all the salary and wages of the third respondent since 12th of May, 1985 and even before then they have not paid the full salary and allowances, but have purported to pay him the subsistence allowance. This is against the fact that the order of the Vice-Chancellor, according approval to the proposal of the management to remove the third respondent from service, had been set aside by the Chancellor on the 3rd of June, 1986 and also despite the fact that the third respondent who has born on the 9th of February, 1928, attained the superannuation of the 9th February, 1988 and was entitled, under the rules, to be paid his salary until the 30th of June, 1988. Further grievance was also made by the third respondent with regard to the petitioners wrongful detaining with' them the National Savings Certificates and the policy belonging to the third respondent without accounting for the same. Mr. Harkauli made a serious grievance with regard to the aforesaid amounts, particularly, in the light of the proviso under the provisions of Section 60 of the Code of Civil Procedure, that they cannot be made subject-matter of the attachment and in view of the further submission of Mr. Harkauli there is no provision of law enabling the petitioners either not to pay or continue to detain the same. This Court does not think it appropriate to enter into this controversy when the petition filed by the petitioners is liable to be dismissed. This Court does net certainly expect from the institution like the petitioners either to adept measures to detain the aforesaid amounts or not to make payment of the same, and the third respondent from realising whatever he is entitled. These points cannot, fairly, be stated to be the subject-matter of the present writ petition and, therefore, it would not be proper to make any pronouncement with regard to them. 18. Coming to the question of costs, that costs follow the events. In the instant case, taking into consideration the various aspects of the matter, discussed in some detail herein above, and the conduct of the petitioners, the petitioners are ordered to my the third respondent costs of the petition quantified at Rs. 3,000/- (three thousand).