JUDGMENT R.B.Mehrotra, J. 1. By means of the present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioners have challenged the orders, dated 21-5-1991 passed by the Munsif City, Jaunpur and the order, dated 20-7-1991 passed by the 1st Additional District Judge, Jaunpur. 2. By orders, dated 21-5-1990, the Munsif, Jaunpur had allowed an application of the plaintiff respondent for construction of his cottage (Marhaha) which was alleged to have been demolished after passing of the status quo order in the suit filed by the plaintiff-respondent. The 1st Additional District Judge rejected the revision of the petitioners filed against the order dated 21-5-1990 of the Munsif, by his order, dated 20-7-1991. 230 Rajendra Pratap v. A. D. J. (R. B. Mchrotra, J.) [ 1991 At the stage of admission itself, the writ petition was opposed by the learned counsel for the respondent Sri Indra Raj Singh, as such the case is being disposed of after hearing the learned counsel for the petitioners Sri B. B. Paul and the learned counsel for the respondent Sri Indra Raj Singh. 3. Sri Paul learned counsel for the petitioners has raised three contentions in the present writ petition. 1. The order of the status quo is not an order of injunction as such cannot be treated as an order under the provisions of order 39 rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code. 2. The order of status quo is not an executable order. 3. The courts below erred in law in passing the impugned order on the basis of the Commissioner's report alone. The said Commissioner's report was not admissible in evidence as the objections against the said Commissioner's report were pending consideration before the court itself. 4. Sri Paul has relied upon the following decisions in support of his submissions : (a) Harbhajan Singh v. Smt. Shakuntala Devi Sharma, AIR 1976 Delhi 175. (b) Haji Kutubuddin v. Allah Banda, AIR 1973 Alld. (c) Satyanarayana v. T. Jalaiah, AIR 1972 AP 265. All the above three decisions have been relied upon for the proposition that the Commissioner's report cannot be treated as substantive evidence unless objection against the said report has been disposed of. Sri Paul has relied upon the. case of M/s. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. v. State of Bihar, 1987 SCC supp. 394. All the above three decisions have been relied upon for the proposition that the Commissioner's report cannot be treated as substantive evidence unless objection against the said report has been disposed of. Sri Paul has relied upon the. case of M/s. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. v. State of Bihar, 1987 SCC supp. 394. This decision has been relied for the proposition that the order of status quo cannot be treated as an order of injunction. 5. Sri Paul has then relied upon the following decisions for the proposition that stay orders capable of two interpretation or giving rise to the disputed questions of facts are not enforceable under Order 39 Rule 2A of the Civil Procedure Code ;- (i) M/s. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. v. State of Bihar, 1987 SCC Supp- 396. (ii) Chhunnu Lal Gupta v. K. P. Singh, 1991 UP LB EC 262. (iii) State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati Kumari, AIR 1961 SC 221 . 6. However, before examining the import of the aforesaid cases, it is necessary to appreciate the facts of the present case which, in brief, are as under : The plaintiff respondent filed Original suit no. 393 of 1989 for permanent injunction against the present petitioners, for restraining them from disrupting the constructions made on the disputed land and also for restraining the petitioners-defendants from demolishing the aforesaid constructions. Further restraint sought that the defendants petitioners may not make any constructions over the land in dispute, may not disturb the possession of the plaintiff respondents and may not cut the trees standing on the land in dispute. The plaintiff respondent also filed an application for temporary injunction which was numbered as application no. 6-Ga and prayed for issuance of Commission of Court Amin for examining the situation on the spot. On plaintiffs application, the Munsif City Jaupur, vide his order, dated 26-4-1989 directed that the Court Amin should go and inspect the situation on the spot and submit report and also directed that both the parties should maintain status quo on the spot. This order of status quo was duly served on the defendants in whose presence, the court Amin inspected the disputed land and submitted his report along with a scale map. On this report, the plaintiff himself filed an objection stating that the Amin has not correctly shown in his map the dimensions of the constructed Marhaha. This order of status quo was duly served on the defendants in whose presence, the court Amin inspected the disputed land and submitted his report along with a scale map. On this report, the plaintiff himself filed an objection stating that the Amin has not correctly shown in his map the dimensions of the constructed Marhaha. During the pendency of the aforesaid application for temporary injunction, the plaintiff respondent moved another application no. 23C on 18-7-1989. This application was duly supported by an affidavit. In this application, it was stated that the petitioners have forcibly evicted the plaintiff-respondent from the disputed Marhaha (cottage) on 17-7-1989. It was stated in the aforesaid application that the defendant petitioners came on the spot along with 50 labourers armed with lathies and spears and forcibly evicted the plaintiff from the disputed Marhaha (cottage) and demolished the walls of the Marhaha to a lot of extent Therefore, it was prayed that the plaintiff should be permitted to reconstruct the Marhaha which was in existence at the time the order of status quo was passed by the Munsif in the suit. Despite notice the defendant-petitioners did not put in appearance and Munsif cited by a detailed order, dated 4-8-1989 allowed the plaintiff respondents' application no. 23-C and held therein that it is established from the application and affidavit of the plaintiff-respondent and also from the second report of the court Amin that after passing of the status quo order, the petitioner-defendants had demolished the Marhaha of the plaintiff and had blocked the drain (nali) of the plaintiff's house Accordingly it was directed that the plaintiff be permitted to reconstruct the Marhaha and open the drain which was blocked by the defendant-petitioners. This detailed order of the Munsif has been filed as Annexure 6 to the writ petition This order was passed in absence of the defendant petitioners as defendant- petitioners were not present despite notice of the court. There is nothing on record to show that this order has been set aside by the Munsif at any subsequent stage nor there is any statement to this effect in the writ petition. However, it seems that later on the defendant-petitioners have put in appearance and filed objection against the injunction application filed by the plaintiff-respondent. They also filed objection to the report of the court Amin. Thereafter on 21-5-1991. However, it seems that later on the defendant-petitioners have put in appearance and filed objection against the injunction application filed by the plaintiff-respondent. They also filed objection to the report of the court Amin. Thereafter on 21-5-1991. the Munsif again passed an order in the presence of both the parties. In this order, the Munsif has stated that the contention of the defendants that the disputed Marhaha (cottage) is only 10' x 16' is not correct. From the report of the Amin it is clear that the disputed Marhaha is 10' x 42'. The Munsif accordingly directed reconstruction of the Marhaha of 10' x 42' and fixed 5th of July 1991 for disposal of temporary injunction application moved by the plaintiff-respondent in the original suit. Against this order, the present petitioners agitated the matter in revision which has also been dismissed by a detailed reasoned order. 7. The above facts demonstrate that application no. 23C has been disposed of pending the temporary injunction application no 6Ga. THE question whether the plaintiff respondent is entitled for an injunction or not is yet to be decided on merits. THE trial has only passed the order of status quo during the pendency of the injunction application. Subsequently the trial court was satisfied on the materials available on record that the defendant-petitioners had demolished the constructions existing on the spot. THE trial court accordingly permitted the construction of Marhaha to restore the order of status quo. 8. I am not in agreement with the submission made by Sri Paul that the order of status quo is not an order of injunction and is not executable. The Supreme Court's decision relied upon by the counsel for the petitioner in M/s. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. case (supra) held as under : "The expression 'status quo' is undoubtedly a term of ambiguity and at times gives rise to doubt and difficulty. According to the ordinary legal connotation, the term status quo implies the existing state of things at any given point of time......". The Supreme Court has clearly indicated that the existing state of things at the given point of time is to be maintained in the order of status quo. In the present case, the Marhaha (cottage) existing on the date of the order of status quo was to be preserved in accordance with the court's order. The Supreme Court has clearly indicated that the existing state of things at the given point of time is to be maintained in the order of status quo. In the present case, the Marhaha (cottage) existing on the date of the order of status quo was to be preserved in accordance with the court's order. If the defendants or anybody else have demolished it, the court was perfectly justified in ordering that the Marhaha should be reconstructed, such an order was clearly an enforceable order. So far as the petitioners' contention that the court Amin's report could not have been relied upon unless the objections to the said report were decided, this question can still be agitated by the petitioners when the application for temporary injunction will be decided by the trial court after affording full opportunity to both the parties. At present the stage is even prior to the decision of the injunction application. The order is clearly of an interlocutory character and does not call for any interference in exercise of my jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The writ petition accordingly fails and is dismissed. Parties will bear their own costs. Petition dismissed.