The question which arises in this case is that whether the limitation as provided under section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 shall apply in case of the power of this Court under Article 215 of the Constitution of India. Earlier I expressed some doubts and accordingly Sri Sharma took some time to clarify the matter and accordingly the matter has been listed today. Sri Sharma has placed before me 2 decisions of the Apex Court of the land ie AIR 1992 SC 904 (Pritam Pal vs. High Court of Madhya Pradesh) where the Supreme Court in paragraph 24 of the judgment pointed out as follows : "From the above judicial pronouncements of this Court, it is manifestly clear that the power of the Supreme Court and the High Court being the Courts of Record as embodied under Article 129 and 215 respectively cannot be restricted and trammelled by an ordinary legislation including the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act and their inherent power is elastic, unfettered and not subject to any limit. It would be appropriate, 1 in this connection, to refer certain English authorities dealing with the power of the superior Courts as Courts of Record." 2. In paragraph 41 the Supreme Court pointed out as follows : . "The position of law that emerges from the above decisions is that the power conferred up m the Supreme Court and the High Court, being Courts of Record under Articles 129 and 215 of the Constitution respec­tively is an inherent power and that the jurisdiction vested is a special one not derived from any other statute but derived only from Articles 129 and 215 of the C6nstitution of India (See DM Taneja vs. Bhajan Lal, (1988) 2 SCC 26) and therefore the constitutionally vested right cannot be either abridged by any legislation or abrogated or cut down. Nor can they be controlled or limited by any statute or by any provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure or any Rules. The caution that has to be observed in exercising this inherent power by summary procedure is that the power should be used sparingly, that the procedure to be followed should be fair and that the contemner should be made aware of the charge against him and given a reasonable opportunity to defend himself." 3. The caution that has to be observed in exercising this inherent power by summary procedure is that the power should be used sparingly, that the procedure to be followed should be fair and that the contemner should be made aware of the charge against him and given a reasonable opportunity to defend himself." 3. The next case relied on AIR 1989 SC 2285 (Firm Gampat Ram Rajkumar vs. Kalu Ram & others), the Supreme Court was considering section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act. In this connection, the Supreme Court pointed out that in case of continuing wrong the limitation as provided under section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act cannot be applicable. Paragraph 7 is quoted below : “Another point was taken about limitation of this application under section -0 of the Act. Section 20 states that no Court shall initiate any proceedings for contempt, either on its own motion or otherwise, after the expiry of a period, of one year from the date en which the contempt is alleged to have been committed. In this case, the present application was filed on or about 3rd November, 1988 as appears from the affidavit 'in support of the application. The contempt consisted, inter alia, of the act of not giving the possession by force of the order of the learned Senior Sub-judge, Narmaul dated 3td November, 1988. Therefore, the applica­tion was well within the period of one year. Failure to give possession, if it amounts to a contempt in a situation of this nature is a continuing wrong. There was no scope for application of section 20 of the Act." (1980) 3 SCC 311 (Advocate-General, State of Bihar vs. M/s Madhya Pradesh Khair Industries), the Supreme Court in paragraph 5 of the judgment pointed out as follows: "Vexed by the manner fn which the first respondent was filing repeated applications and procuring orders from a learned Single Judge of the High Court, necessitating the filing of as many appeals to the Division Bench, the State of Bihar filed an application for committing the respondents for contempt of Court alleging that, by their conduct the respondents were obstructing the administration of justice and interfering with the due course of judicial proceedings. The Patna High Court held that the respondents' conduct was a most unscrupulous one and that there was gross abuse of the process of the Court, which could in certain circumstances amount to contempt of Court. The High Court, however, dismissed the application on the ground that it was barred by limitation as it was filed beyond the period of one year prescribed in regard to the contempt by section 20 of the Contempt of Court's Act. The High Court held, on a reading of the contempt application, that the material allegation in regard to the contempt committed by the respondents was that relating to the filing of the application dated April 7, 1971, before the Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court to circumvent and nullify the order dated March 29, 1971 o the of the Division Bench of the Patna High Court As the contempt application was filed more than a year later it was, time barred. In regard to the allegation relating to the filing of the petition dated December 14, 1972, the High Court observed that there was no specific allegation that any contempt of Court was committed by the filing of this application. We may also mention that the respondents tendered an unconditional apology to the High Court of Bihar. The question of acc­epting the apology was not considered as the application was found to he beyond time. The Advocate General of Bihar has filed this appeal against the judgment of the Patna High Court." 4. The Supreme Court in paragraph 7 inter alia held as follows : "But on the other hand, it may be necessary to punish as a, con­tempt, a course of conduct which abuses and makes a, mockery of the judicial process and which thus extends its pernicious influence beyond the parties to the action and effects the interest of the public in the administration of justice. The public have an interest, an abiding and a real interest, and a vital stake in the effective and orderly administration of justice because unless justice is so administered, there is the peril of all rights and liberties perishing. The public have an interest, an abiding and a real interest, and a vital stake in the effective and orderly administration of justice because unless justice is so administered, there is the peril of all rights and liberties perishing. The Court has the duty of protecting the interest of the public in the due administration of justice, and, so, it is entrusted with the power to commit for contempt of Court, not in order to protect the dignity of the Court against insult or injury as the, expression "Contempt of Court" may seem to suggest, but, to protect and to vindicate the right of the public that the administration of justice shall not be prevented, prejudicated, obstructed or interfered with .."It is a mode of vindicating the majesty of law, in its active manifesation against obstruction and outrage." "The law should not be seen to sit by, limply, while those who defy it go free, and those who seek its; protection lose hope." 5. This being the settled position of law, I hold that section, 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 does not apply to a contempt proceeding under Article 215 of the Constitution of India. I am grateful to Sri Sharma that the removed the wrong notion which I held earlier in, the matter. The mattre regarding limitation stands disposed of.