JUDGMENT : B.L. Hansaria, C.J. - The petitioners while approaching this Court in July, 1985 assailed the constitutionality of Art 323-A of the Constitution and the vires of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 (for short "the Act"). They also impugned establishment of the Orissa Administrative Tribunal (hereinafter, "the Tribunal") by the Central Government in exercise of the power u/s 4(2) of the Act. They further felt aggrieved at the non-sitting of the Tribunal at Cuttack which is the seat of the High Court. The last grievance related to the appointment of Shri Cian Chand, retired I. A. S., to the post of Chairman of the Tribunal. 2. The scene, however, changed in December, 1986 in the wake of the decision of the Apex Court in S. P. Sampath Kumar v. Union of India, AIR 1987 SC 386 . After this rendering by a Constitution Bench, Shri Dora appearing for the petitioners has urged the following two points for our consideration : (1) There should be a permanent Bench of the Tribunal at Cuttack and (2) the continuance of Shri Gian Chand in the post of Chairman is invalid in the eye of law, 3. In so far as the first submission is concerned, it would be worthwhile to refer to two interlocutory orders passed by this Court in these petitions. The first was on 30-7-1986 in which it was opined that the sitting of the Bench of the Tribunal for three days a week in Cuttatk or for such a period as the Chairman considers proper would be just, proper and reasonable. This sitting of the Bench at Cuttack was to hear principally the matters transferred from this Court along with other matters It may be stated that by the time this order was passed, the decision of the Supreme Court in Sampath Sumar was not available. After the judgment was rende- red, this Court by its order dated 10-4-1987 first noted that despite the earlier order passed, no steps had been taken by the Chairman of the Tribunal for holding the sitting of the Tribunal at Cuttack. Thereafter this Court noted what was stated in Sampath Kumar in paragraph 7 where it was observed that there must be a permanent, or if there be not sufficient work, then a circuit Bench of the Administrative Tribunal at every place where there is a seat of the High Court. Thereafter this Court noted what was stated in Sampath Kumar in paragraph 7 where it was observed that there must be a permanent, or if there be not sufficient work, then a circuit Bench of the Administrative Tribunal at every place where there is a seat of the High Court. Relying on this observation, this Court stated in the aforesaid order that there could be no cavil about the sittings of the Tribunal at the seat of the High Court. 4. We understand that after the aforesaid order, the Tribunal has started sitting for two days a week at Cutttack, but it is confining its work to the hearing of the cases, transferred from this Court. It is urged by Shri Dora that there is no reason as to why the Tribunal should so confine itself to the aforesaid cases and why it should not take up other cases and not accept filing of new cases. Learned Advocate General appearing for the State shares the view expressed by Shri Dora, and, according to him, the sitting of the Tribunal at Cuttack has to be effective sitting and new metters and admission hearing have also to be taken up by the sitting of the Tribunal at Cuttack. We find no difficulty in accepting this submission of Shri Dora. 5. The aforesaid to, however, not all Bhagawati, C.J. has opined in Sampath Kumar that the Tribunal has to have permanent Bench of the seat of the High Court, if there be sufficient work. There is no complaint before us from any source regarding dearth of work at the Cuttack Bench. Learned Advocate General, however, contends that before a permanent Bench starts functioning at Cuttack, some infrastructure shall have to be built up which is lacking for the present in particular, the learned counsel had in mind the necessity of providing suitable residential accommodation to the learned Members of the Tribunal, If this infrastructure has to be built up to see a permanent Bench functioning at Cuttack, we find no reason as to why even after more than four years of the decision of the Apex Court in Sampath Kumar, the same has not been taken care of by the State Government. We would, therefore, direct the State Government to make available all facilities to see that a permanent Bench of the Tribunal starts functioning at Cuttack without further loss of time. We would, therefore, direct the State Government to make available all facilities to see that a permanent Bench of the Tribunal starts functioning at Cuttack without further loss of time. We understand from Shri Dora that there would be no difficulty in a permanent Bench functioning at Cuttack in so far as accommodation for the sitting of the Tribunal is concerned inasmuch as presently the Tribunal has at its disposal a very spacious hall in which the sittings of the Tribunal could be held appropriately and seasonably. 6. Apart from calling upon the State Government to make necessary infrastructure available for starting of the permanent Bench at Cuttack, we would also direct the Chairman of the Tribunal to pass necessary orders in this regard in exercise of his powers conferred by the Proviso to Rule 14 of the Orissa Administrative Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1986. As the Tribunal as constituted is to have four Members including the Chairman and the Vice-Chairman, we do not find any difficulty in having a permanent Bench at Cuttack which could be manned by two Members and the other two could have their sittings at Bhubaneswar. We would like to see a permanent Bench of the Tribunal functioning at Cuttack within a period of three months from today. We have mentioned about a period of three months because in the order passed on 11-4-1991 in OJC No, 3909 of 1990 we have granted two months' time to the opposite parties to get the Tribunal fully constituted so that one of its Benches could permanently sit at Cuttack and another at Bhubaneswar. We are also of the view that the period of three months would be sufficient for the State to see that necessary infrastructure facility comes up at Cuttack of which mention has been made by the learned Advocate General. 7. This takes us to the second submission of Shri Dora which relates to the lack of competence of the present Chairman to continue as such. 7. This takes us to the second submission of Shri Dora which relates to the lack of competence of the present Chairman to continue as such. May it be stated that Shri Gian Chand was appointed as the Chairman of the the Tribunal when Section 6 of the Act contained the following clause in Sub-section (1) dealing with the qualifications for the post of Chairman ; "(c) has, for at least, two years held the post of a Secretary to the Government of India or any other posts under the control of a State Government carrying a scale of pay which is not less than that of a Secretary to the Government of India." It is the admitted-position that Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 6(1) of the Act has no application in so far as Shri Gian Chand is concerned. In Sarnpath Kumar, the eligibility condition laid down in Clause (c) of Sub-section (1) of Section 8 of the Act was not approved for reasons, mentioned in paragraphs 4 and 20 of the judgment. To put the views of the Apex Court on this aspect shortly, it was felt that the Chairman should be one who has Segal training and judicial experience for warn of which it would be difficult for him to adjudicate matters coming before the Tribunal. The Court opined that normally the Chairman of the Tribunal should be ordinarily a retiring or retired Chisf Justice of a High Court, or when such a person is not available, a senior Judge of proved ability either in office or one who has retired, as it was felt that the office of the Chairman should, for all practical purposes, be equated with the office of the Chief Justice of a High Court. The Supreme Court, however, instead of striking down Section 6(1)(c) took the view that the Central Government should take steps to omit this provision. Pursuant to this view, the Administrative Tribunals (Amendment) Act, 1987 was enacted on 22nd December, 1987 which omitted Clause (c) from Sub-section (1) of Section 6 of the Act. 8. Relying on the above position, it is contended by Shri Dora that Shri Gian Chand having become disqualified to bold the post of Chairman should not be allowed to continue any longer. 8. Relying on the above position, it is contended by Shri Dora that Shri Gian Chand having become disqualified to bold the post of Chairman should not be allowed to continue any longer. Question, however, is whether the omission of Clause (c) aforesaid has taken away the right which inhered in a person on his appointment to the post of Chairman of the Tribunal. As to this, we are of the view that the right to hold the office with which the Chairman was clothed by virtue of what has been stated in Section 8 of the Act subsisted despite on the omission of the foresaid Clause (c) from the Act. A reference to Section 8 of the Act snows that a Chairman is clothed with the right to hold the office for a term of five years from the date on which he enters upon his office or until he attains the age of 65 years, whichever is earlier. This period has not expired in so far as Shri Gian Chand is concerned. Question is whether he can continue to act as the Chairman for the period visualised by Section 8 of the Act despite the omission of Clause(c)aforesaid from the Act A reference to Section 6(c) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 would show that the repeal of an enactment is not to affect any right acquired under any enactment repealed unless a different intention appears, The omission of Clause (c) of Section 6(1) of the Act was not given retrospective effect. Had it been that the omission was to operate from the very date of enactment of the Act, the legal position would have been different, because in that case the very appointment would have been put in jeopardy. The same result would have happened if the Supreme Court would have struck down Clause (c) of Section 6(1), which was not done as it was left for the Central Government to get this clause omitted. 9. On the aforesaid aspect of the matter being brought to the notice of Shri Dora, his submission is that though the Supreme Court has not struck down Clause (c) of Section 6(1) of the Act as invalid, there is nothing to doubt that it did not favour holding of the post of Chairman by any person who had satisfied the eligibility condition mentioned in Clause (c). According to the learned counsel, continuance of such person as Chairman after the rendering in Sampath Kumar would be an act of injustice which should not be allowed to be prolonged. Shri Dora in particular seeks to rely heavily on the observation made in the judgment of Mistira, J. (as he then was) at the end of para 20 wherein while observing that the judgment shall operate prospectively it was stated that the same would not affect appointments already made to the offices of Vice-Chairman and Member - both administrative and judicial. On the strength of this observation, it is strenuously contended that appointment of Chairman because of the satisfaction of eligibility condition laid down in Clause (c) must be deemed to have declared nugatory by the Apex Court. But then," if reference is made to what was stated by Bhagwati, C. J. towards the end of para 6 of his judgment, It would appear that his Lordship saved ail appointments already made to the Tribunal. Shri Dora states that this is not the majority view, which has to be found in the judgment of Misra J. But then/a reference to this decision as reported in 1987 (I) SCC 124 shows that the three other learned Judges of the Bench had agreed with the main judgment of Misra, J. as well as with the judgment of the Hon'ble Chief Justice. It cannot, therefore, be said that the view expressed in the judgment of Misra, J. alone constitutes the majority opinion. 10. Shri Murty appearing as amicus curiae submits that as Section 6 of the General Clauses Act operates unless a different intention appears and as a different intention does appear from what has been stated in the two judgments rendered in Sampath Kumar, we may not give the benefit of Section 6 to the present Chairman. As to this, we would like to observe that reading the two judgments together along with the view expressed by the three other learned Judges constituting the Bench we cannot say for definite that the Apex Court wanted to invalidate appointments of such Chairmen who had been selected only because of the fulfilment of the eligibility condition mentioned in Clause (c) of Sec 6(1) of the Act. 11. 11. In view of all that is stated above, we are of the opinion that the right which was conferred on the Chairman by Section 8 of the Act has survived despite the omission of Clause (c) by 1987 amendment as we find a different intention missing from the Amendment Act in so far as the omission of this clause is concerned. We would, therefore, hold that Shri Gian Chand is legally entitled to continue to act as the Chairman till the period visualised by Section 8 of the Act is over. May we say here that we under- stand from what is stated from the Bar that the term of Shri Gian Chand is expiring in June July, 1991. It is apparent that after Shri Gian Chand teases to be the Chairman of the Tribunal, the new incumbent has to be one who satisfies the requirement of Clause (a) or Clause (b) of Section 6(1) of the Act, namely, he has to be a person who is or has been a Judge of the High Court or has for at least two years held the office of Vice-Chairman. 12. In the result, we dispose of the applications by directing the opposite parties to take necessary steps to see that a permanent Bench of the Tribunal starts functioning at Cuttack within a period of three months from today. We also direct the Chairman of the Tribunal to issue necessary instructions immediately to see that the Tribunals's bench at Cuttack allows filing of new cases, and in the sittings here new cases as well as cases transferred from this Court are heard. We, however, reject the other prayer relating to laying down of the office by the Chairman before expiry of his term of office. In the facts and circumstances of -the case, 'we make no order as to costs. D.M. Patnaik, J. I agree.