JUDGMENT S R. Singh, J. 1. Ismail Girls National Inter College, situate at Old Tahsil Meerut (in short 'college') before its upgradation to "Inter College" in 1977, was recognised as Higher Secondary School known as ISMAIL Girls Higher Secondary School, Old Tahsil, Meerut. The College is run by a society known as Mohd. ISMAIL Girls Association and the same is managed by a Committee of Management constituted in accordance with the scheme of administration approved under section 16-A of the U P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 (hereinafter referred to as 'Act') 2. Petitioner Smt Shamim Zafar was appointed as Head Mistress of the Institution with effect from 1-7-1966, by means of the letter dated 30-6-1966 and confirmed as such with effect from 1-7-1967. Upon the institution being upgraded to Inter College, the petitioner was appointed as its principal. She was dismissed from service vide letter dated 12/14-1-91 (Annexure 11 to the writ petition) issued in pursuance of the resolution passed in this regard by the Committee of Management in its meeting held on 12-1-1991. Dismissal was made operative from an anterior date i.e. 14-9-90 on which date the petitioner was placed under suspension. By means of the present petition, the petitioner has sought quashing of the order of her dismissal dated 12/14-1-1991 (Annexure 11 to the writ petition) and for a direction commanding the respondents to treat her in continuous service and pay to her the entire salary. The facts giving rise to the present writ petition in short, are to the effect that the petitioner, as stated above, was suspended by order dated 14-9-90 A charge-sheet dated 6-10-tO was issued under the signatures of Sri S. A. Razi Convenor Mohd. lliyas and Mohd. Omar Alvi, two members of the Sub-committee allegedly constituted for purposes of holding enquiry against the petitioner pursuant to the decision of the Committee of Management allegedly taken in its meeting held on 13-9-90. The charges in the charge-sheet may be summed up as below : (i) That the petitioner made unauthorised realisation of fees amounting to Rs. 43,690/- from the students through class teachers of the college between 1988-89 and July and August 1990 in contravention of section 7-C which was punishable under section 7-D of the Act (vide charges 1 to 4). The charges in the charge-sheet may be summed up as below : (i) That the petitioner made unauthorised realisation of fees amounting to Rs. 43,690/- from the students through class teachers of the college between 1988-89 and July and August 1990 in contravention of section 7-C which was punishable under section 7-D of the Act (vide charges 1 to 4). (ii) That the petitioner appointed one Sri Ram Chander as part-time Mali for which there was no provision in the Act and regulations made thereunder and realised Rs. 25/- from each student from July 1986 to May 1990 and the Mali was paid at the rate of Rs. 200/- per month. This realisation from the students too is said to be unauthorised in view of section 7-C and punishable u/Sec. 7-D of the Act (vide charge no. 5). (iii) That the petitioner illegally Nand Deo Pandey v. Committee of Management, 1990 0 ALJ 911 appointed her own nephew Sri Shahab Zafar as a clerk in the college in contravention of Regulation 99 of Chapter III of the Regulations made under the Act and illegally sanctioned his medical and earned leaves which power vests in the Manager of the college and not in the principal and further that with a view to concealing the information about Sri Shahab Zafar being absent from duty, the petitioner conspired and manipulated records with a view to enable, him to draw his salary (in all amounting to Rs. 36,37542) which was illegal and she was responsible for all these illegalities, irregularities and manipulated in records (vide charge no. 6). (iv) That the petitioner illegally terminated the services of a Class IV employee Bhagwati whose suit for damages was decreed by the Civil Court at appellate stage and decree for a sum of Rs. 37,200.00 was passed in her favour on the ground that her termination was arbitrary and suffered from the vice of malafide. This according to charge no. 7 was a gross misconduct resulting in pecuniary loss to the institution ; and (v) That the petitioner was guilty of gross insubordination in that she had been disobeying the orders of the Manager as mentioned in charge no. 8. 3. This according to charge no. 7 was a gross misconduct resulting in pecuniary loss to the institution ; and (v) That the petitioner was guilty of gross insubordination in that she had been disobeying the orders of the Manager as mentioned in charge no. 8. 3. Although there is a dispute as to the service of the charge-sheet together with its enclosures upon the petitioner, the fact remains that the petitioner submitted her reply to the charges framed against her vide letter dated 22-10-1990 (Annexure 7 to the writ petition). In her reply, the petitioner challenged the validity of the meeting of the Committee of Management held on 13-9-1990 pursuant to which decision to commence disciplinary proceeding against her was taken. In her reply she also remonstrated to the effect that no preliminary enquiry was held before embarking upon disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner. It was also pleaded by her that the charge-sheet was not issued with the approval of the Committee of Management. The petitioner challenged the validity of her suspension as also commencement of disciplinary proceedings against her and asserted her right to cross-examine the witnesses and inspect other records proposed to be used against her. She also claimed protection of section 16G of U. P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 and the Regulations made thereunder. As to the charge of realisation of certain amount other than the prescribed fee from the students as mentioned in charges 1 to 5, the petitioner's defence was that certain amount was collected from the students pursuant to resolutions passed by parent-teachers Association (in short P.T.A.) in its annual meetings and the expenditures of such collection too were made on the basis of such resolutions. In this regard, the petitioner further placed in her reply that the provisions of section 7-C were not attracted in respect of activities of parent-teachers Association, of which she was the Ex- officio patron. In respect of the charge as to the appointment of her nephew, the petitioner stated in para 7 of her reply that she had in fact, opposed the appointment of Sri Shahab Zafar on the ground that he was related to her and that she did not participate in the selection of Sri Shahab Zafar. In respect of the charge as to the appointment of her nephew, the petitioner stated in para 7 of her reply that she had in fact, opposed the appointment of Sri Shahab Zafar on the ground that he was related to her and that she did not participate in the selection of Sri Shahab Zafar. According to the petitioner, she was directed by the Manager, Sri Saifuddin himself who had personal relations with the District Inspector of School Ghaziabad, to allow Sri Shahab Zafar to continue on the rolls of the Staff of the college. According to the petitioner, whatever facilities were made available and payments made to Sri Shahab Zafar were so given at the behest of the Manager, Sri Saifuddin himself and the responsibility, if any for the payment of salary of Sri Shahab Zafar was being illegally fastened to her. As regards the charge of insubordination and non-obedience of the orders of the manager as mentioned in charge no. 8, the petitioner in her reply dated 22-10-90 stated that she would cross-examine the witnesses and inspect the records in original which the Management proposed to rely" upon against her in support of the charge. The petitioner in her reply, submitted a list of witnesses, whom she proposed to examine in support of her case. However, the reply of the petitioner dated 22-10-90 seems to be completely and conspicuously silent about the charge No. 7, which was to the effect that the petitioner had illegally and arbitrarily terminated the services of a class 4 employee Smt. Bhagwati who filed a suit in the Civil Court for damages which was decreed by the appellate court awarding a decree for a sum of Rs. 37200/- in her favour and against the defendants namely the principal and the Management Committee of the college. 4. The Enquiry Committee submitted its report dated 4-1-91 on the basis of which the petitioner, by means of the letter dated 4-1-91, was informed that the Committee of Management would meet on 12-1-91 at about 2 p.m. in the principal's chamber/office to consider the enquiry report. Accordingly, the petitioner was called upon to show cause as to why the recommendations made by the Enquiry Committee be not accepted and the punishment awarded accordingly. Accordingly, the petitioner was called upon to show cause as to why the recommendations made by the Enquiry Committee be not accepted and the punishment awarded accordingly. It was made clear that the petitioner may file her reply in writing and may also appear before the Committee to put forth her defence orally or in writing. A copy of the Enquiry report was also made available to the petitioner alongwith the said letter dated 4-1-1991. It transpires form the record that the petitioner received the show cause notice on 10-1-91 but earlier to that, she had come to know through a notice in a local daily 'Amar Ujala' dated 7-1-91 of the proposed meeting of the Committee of Management to consider the report of the Enquiry Committee and she also claims to have sent her reply to show cause notice by a registered letter dated 10-1-91. She, however,' appeared personally before the Managing Committee and submitted her reply dated 12-11-91, a copy of which is annexed to the writ petition as Annexure 10. The Managing Committee in its meeting dated 12-1-91 arrived at a decision to dismiss the petitioner from service in accordance with the recommendations made by the Enquiry Committee with effect from the date of her suspension, namely 14-9-90 i.e. with retrospective effect. The petitioner was accordingly let known by letter dated 12/14-1-91 annexed as Annexure 11 to the writ petition, of the decision. The validity of the order contained in Annexure 11 to the writ petition dismissing the petitioner from service with effect from 14-9-90 is under challenge in the instant petition. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended before me that the entire disciplinary proceeding was vitiated against the petitioner due to malafide, bias and personal animosity of Hakim Saifuddin for reasons stated in paragraph 9 to 15 of the writ petition THEse allegations have been controverted in the counter affidavit and being a question of fact, it is not feasible for me so go into this question specially when the plea was not raised by the petitioner in her replies dated 22-10-90 and 22-12-90 submitted before the Enquiry Committee, nor even in her written reply submitted to the Committee of Management on 12-1-91. The allegations of malafides made in paragraphs 9 to 15 of the writ petition, therefore, appear to be offsprings of an after-thought defence. 6. The allegations of malafides made in paragraphs 9 to 15 of the writ petition, therefore, appear to be offsprings of an after-thought defence. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner also submitted before me that the petitioner was appointed as Principal of the college on 30th June 1966 when the institution was not recognised as minority institution and therefore, according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the conditions of service of the petitioner as they stood at that time, would remain unaltered, even after the institution was recognised as a minority institution vide letter dated 8-7-1976 by the Regional Inspectress of Girls Schools. In reply, the learned counsel for the Committee of Management submitted before me that the institution was a minority institution from the very inception and its character as a minority institution did not depend upon recognition as such by the Education Department. He submitted that whether or not an institution is a minority institution would depend upon the constitution and the aims and objects of the society which runs the institution. He invited my attention to the objects enshrined in the memorandum of Association of the society, which is quoted below :- "(a) to take over the Muslim Girls School Adder Kote Meerut from the Control of the Municipal Board and renominate it 'Mohd. Ismail who had founded the institution in 1909 to promote the cause of family Education amongst the Muslims of Meerut. (b) to impart education to Muslim Girls and to girls belonging to other religion." It appears that the Management of the institution applied for recognition of the institution as a minority institution and the Regional Inspectress of Girls School by her letter dated 8-7-1976 declared the institution as a minority institution under section 16-FF of the Act. This however, does not mean that the institution was not a minority institution prior to the said date. The object of the Society clearly indicates that the institution was a minority institution within the meaning of Article 30 (1) of the Constitution. The learned couusel for the petitioner further placed reliance upon a resolution allegedly passed by the society in its Annual General Meeting held on 2-9-1967 copy of which has been annexed to the Suppl- Rejoinder affidavit dated 13th August 1991. The learned couusel for the petitioner further placed reliance upon a resolution allegedly passed by the society in its Annual General Meeting held on 2-9-1967 copy of which has been annexed to the Suppl- Rejoinder affidavit dated 13th August 1991. By means of this resolution, certain amendments were sought to be made including the amendment by deletion of the then existing objects and its substitution by the following : 'The object of the Association is to promote the cause of women's education and to impart education to them in Indian culture, language, arts, science and industries, paying due attention to their physical training." And the addition of the following was also sought to be made under the head 'object'. "(a) to establish and maintain schools and colleges. (b) to acquire financial assistance from Government and other bodies from persons and from private and public charity funds and from others in order to effectively carry out the object of the Association. (c) To acquire by purchase or otherwise any moveable or immovable property for the proper carrying out of the object of the association. (d) To sell, mortgage, lease or otherwise dispose of any property movable or immovable for the better management of the association. (e) to erect, repair or alter any existing or future building for the purpose of the association, and (f) To do all such other things by itself or in conjunction with other bodies with similar object, as may be necessary for the purpose of carrying out the object of the association. 7. Along with the aforesaid memorandum a list of the members of the Association is also attached showing the name of Sri Seth Banarsi Dass as patron and a number of non-muslims as members of the Association. This document though purports to be a copy of the resolution passed in the Annual General Meeting of the Association held on 2-9-1967, but it does not bear the signature of the authority issuing the copy. It does not appear to be a complete copy of the minutes of the meeting held on 2-9-1967 and is signed neither by the Manager nor by the president of the Association. This document was not referred to in "the writ petition and has seen the light of the day for the first time when it was filed alongwith Supplementary Rejoinder Affidavit on 14-8-1991. This document was not referred to in "the writ petition and has seen the light of the day for the first time when it was filed alongwith Supplementary Rejoinder Affidavit on 14-8-1991. For all these reasons, this document does not inspire confidence and no reliance can be placed on such document. The memorandum of Association initially registered under the provisions of the Societies Registration Act, as already extracted hereinbefore coupled with the letter of the R. [ G S. dated 8-7-1976 leads me to an irresistible conclusion that the institution is a minority institution and the fact that it was no recognised by the Education department on 8-7-1976 would not divest it of its minority character on its inception. Accordingly, I am of the view that the institution was a minority institution even at the time of the appointment of the petitioner as Head Mistress of the High School and later as principal of the college notwithstanding the fact that it was expressly recognised as a minority institution for the first time by the R. I. G. S. vide letter dated 8-7-1976. 8. The learned counsel for the petitioner then contended before me that the Society which runs the institution stood de-recognised in view of section 3-A (5) of the Societies Registration Act, 1860 due to non-renewal of its registration certificate within the stipulated period and consequently neither the sub -committee which made the enquiry, nor the Committee of Management could be said to be duly constituted and therefore, the order of dismissal 46-A.W.C.-Suppl. of the petitioner from service cannot be sustained, as legal. In reply the learned counsel for the respondent contended that the Committee of Management, which has dismissed the petitioaer from service, wjs duly constituted and recognised as such by the Education Department vide order contained in the communication dated 8-3-1991 issued by the Regional Inspectress of Girls Schools, I Region Meerut (annexed as Annexure 3 to the Suppl. Counter affidavit, a copy of which was served upon the petitioner on 7-8-1991). The letter dated 5-6-1991, written by the Asstt. Registrar, Firms, Societies and Chits U. P. Meerut, and addressed to the petitioner in response to her letter dated 4-6-1991, no doubt indicates that some managerial dispute in relation to the society is pending before the ? Counter affidavit, a copy of which was served upon the petitioner on 7-8-1991). The letter dated 5-6-1991, written by the Asstt. Registrar, Firms, Societies and Chits U. P. Meerut, and addressed to the petitioner in response to her letter dated 4-6-1991, no doubt indicates that some managerial dispute in relation to the society is pending before the ? Sub-Divisional Magistrate Meerut, pursuant to a reference dated 8-10-1980 under section 25 (i) of the Societies' Registration Act, but that by itself would not divest the Committee of Management of its efficacy if it was constituted and recognised in a ccord- aace with the approved scheme of administration under section 16-A of the U. P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921. The letter dated 8-3-91 written by the Regional Inspectress of Girls School to the District Inspector of Schools is of no avail for all that it indicates is that a Committee of Management of the College consisting of Mohd. Omar Alvi, Babu Mian as president and Hakim Saifuddin Ahmad as Manager was constituted on 17-1-1991 and recognised by the Education Department for purposes of administration of the affairs of the College. 9. The impugned action in the present case was taken prior to 17-1- 1991 the date on which the present Managing Committee was constituted. It is true that the plea regarding the validity of the Managing Committee which took action against the petitioner was not taken by her in her reply to the charge-sheet but in her reply to the show cause notice, she did raise the plea. Under the Scheme of Administration, as it stands amended in tune with sections 16-C, 16-CC and 16-CCC of the Act, there is a provision for automatic cessation of the Committee at the end of its three year term if fresh election is not held within a month next after the term of three 3 ears. As held by the Supreme Court in Nand Deo Pandey v. Committee of Management, 1990 ALJ 911, the petitioner could lawfully raise the plea that the Committee which was going to take final action in her matter was not legally constituted. The plea is based upon statutory consequences of the failure to hold election within the prescribed period of three years and a month and could be raised at any time as there is no estoppel against statute. The plea is based upon statutory consequences of the failure to hold election within the prescribed period of three years and a month and could be raised at any time as there is no estoppel against statute. In paragraph 24 of the writ petition, it is averred that the last election of the Managing Committee took place in 1978 and thereafter no election was held. THEre is no specific denial of this plea and the plea of estoppel raised in paragraph 24 of the Counter Affidavit is not acceptable for the above reason. Accordingly in the absence of specific denial the respondents shall be taken to have admitted that the elections of the Committee of Management were not held between 1978 and January 17, 1991 and the Managing Committee which dismissed the petitioner from service, was not a valid committee of Management. 10. The learned counsel for the petitioner proceeds on to contend before me that the petitioner was not afforded reasonable opportunity to represent her case effectively before the enquiry Committee and therefore, the enquiry was vitiated for non-compliance of" regulation 36 (1) of Chapter III of the Regulations and the principles of natural justice. The learned counsel for the respondents refuted the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner and contended that ample opportunity was afforded by the sub committee to the petitioner and the enquiry was held fairly and reasonably without outraging the principles of natural justice. The petitioner was required to appear before the Sub-Committee on 3-11-90. The requisite information was sent to her by registered post. Meeting of the Sub-Committee, however, could not take place on 3-11-90, due to the curfew having been clamped in the city of Meerut and accordingly, 1-12-1990 was fixed as the next date for the meeting of the Sub-Committee. The petitioner, it is alleged by the Management Committee in paragraph 22 of the Counter affidavit, was informed of this date by registered post and telegram as also by Special Messenger. The receipt of the information aforesaid through letter, telegram or through special messenger is denied by the petitioner, but I do not consider it necessary to delve into this question for the Sub-Committee adjourned its meeting to 15-12-1990 of which date the petitioner on her own showing, had full knowledge though through a . notice published in this regard in a local news paper. notice published in this regard in a local news paper. However, that meeting too could not take place due to unabated curfew and 3-1-1991 was fixed as the next date for meeting for purposes of the enquiry by the Sub-Committee. As to the information about the meeting of the Enquiry Committee held on 3-1- 91, it is averred in paragraph 24 of the counter affidavit that the petitioner Was duly apprised of the meeting through registered letter, publication in the local Daily News Paper and through telegrams also dated 29-12-90 and 2-1- 1991. The averments made in para 24 of the Counter Affidavit are supported with documents including notices published in Dainik Samachar in its issue dated 31st December, 1990 and the telegrams dated 29-12-90 and 2-1-1991. I have.no manner of doubt that the petitioner had information of the meeting of the Enquiry committee held on 3-1-91 and it was upto her to have availed of the opportunity to appear before the Enquiry Committee and to represent her case before the Committee. It may fairly be observed that although the notices through publication in the News paper on 31-12-90 and through telegrams dated 29-12-90 and 2-1-91 may not be said to be information well in advance, but the notice through Special messenger given to the petitioner on 27-12-1990 was, in my view, sufficient notice. If she did not appear before the Enquiry Committee on 3-1-91 notwithstanding the fact that she had sufficient notice, she cannot pass the buck to the Enquiry Committee for the blame and remonstrate that she was not afforded reasonable opportunity of hearing at the enquiry stage. As regards the plea that non supply of the documents demanded and informations sought for by the petitioner vide her letter dated 22-12-1990, has resulted in denial of effective opportunity, I am afraid, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner in this regard, cannot be accepted. 11. As regards the plea that non supply of the documents demanded and informations sought for by the petitioner vide her letter dated 22-12-1990, has resulted in denial of effective opportunity, I am afraid, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner in this regard, cannot be accepted. 11. From the materials on record, it transpires that Agenda dated 9-9- 1990 (Annexed as Annexure RA-3 to the Rejoinder Affidavit) was circulated amongst the member of the Committee of Management that a meeting of the Managing Committee would be held on 13-9-1990 to traverse upon the matters listed in the Agenda namely- "Pradhanacharya Kumari Shamim Zafar Ke Virudh Shikayato Par Vichar Evam Nirnaya." In the said meeting the Committee appears to have passed a resolution constituting a sub-committee to probe into the charges. It was also decided in the said meeting to suspend the petitioner pending enquiry. She was accordingly suspended by order dated 14-9-90. The suspension would have normally not lasted beyond 60 days,but it appears that the period was extended for two more months by means of an order contained in communication dated 12-11-90 sent by the Regional Inspectress of Girls Schools to the Manager of the College, a copy of which is annexed as Annexure-2 to the Suppl. Counter affidavit. In her repl y to the charge-sheet, the petitioner did not raise any grievance about non-receipt of the enclosures mentioned in the charge-sheet. Subsequent grievance in this regard appears to be after-thought. 364 Ms. Shamim Zafar v. R.I.G.S. (S.R.Singh) [ 1991 12. As regards her plea that non- supply of the papers demanded and informations solicited vide letter dated 22-12-90 received by the Enquiry Committee on 1-1-91 has resulted in denial of an effective opportunity of putting forth her defence, I find that some of the papers demanded and informations sought for vide paragraph 9 of the said letter were germans and relevant to the question regarding the validity of the Managing Committee and non- supply of these papers and informations to the petitioner did prejudice her in taking a proper defence and this, in my considered view resulted in denial of an effective opportunity to the petitioner to defend herself. The petitioner, on receipt of these papers and informations could have been able to prove that the term of the Committee had expired and it was not competent to take action against her. The petitioner, on receipt of these papers and informations could have been able to prove that the term of the Committee had expired and it was not competent to take action against her. The petitioner had not been provided with documents and information sought for by her through her letter dated 22-12 90 even by the alleged Committee of Management before taking a decision on the basis of the report submitted by the Enquiry Committee. In her letter dated 12-1-91 (Annexure- 10 to the writ petition), the petitioner reiterated her demand about these papers and information (supra) with a specific plea about the validity of the alleged Committee of Management, but the alleged Committee of Management seems to have proceeded further on the basis of the report without ensuring supply of the documents and information sought for by the petitioner through her letter dated 12-1-91. This has resulted in denial of effective and fair opportunity of hearing even at the final stage. The impugned order of dismissal from service is, thus, vitiated also for non-compliance of the principles of natural justice. 13. The learned Counsel for the petitioner further contended before me that even if the institution be held to be a minority institution from its very inception, it would be bound by the scheme of administration under which the Committee of Management of the colleges owes its existence and relying upon paragraph 22 of the approved scheme of administration, the learned counsel urged before me that the services of the petitioner were not liable to be terminated except with prior approval of the Regional Inspectress of Girls School by virtue of paragraph 22 of the Scheme of Administration read. with section 16 G (3) of U. P. Intermediate Education Act and Regulations 31 and 37 of Chapter III of the Regulations made under the said Act. - In reply, the learned Counsel for the respondent contended before me that section 16 G (3) of the Intermediate Education Act, stands impliedly repealed by virtue of section 21 of the U. P. Secondary Education Services Commission and Selection Boards Act, 1982 which has been expressly made inapplicable to minority institution. Even otherwise, proceeds the argument, section 16 G (3) is in-applicable to minority institution, being arbitrary and violative of Article 30 (1) of the Constitution of India. 14. Even otherwise, proceeds the argument, section 16 G (3) is in-applicable to minority institution, being arbitrary and violative of Article 30 (1) of the Constitution of India. 14. In order to appreciate the above contentions raised by the learned counsel for the Parties, I consider it necessary to reproduce paragraph 2 of the Approved Scheme of Administration as below. "22. Employees of the institution :- (a) Subject to the provisions of the Act, and the Regulations all appointments of the Principal, Teacher, clerk shall be made by the Committee of Management and of all inferior staff by the Principal. (b) The terms and conditions of the service of the employees of the institution shall be governed by the Act, and the Regulations and the contract of service (if any), in so for as the same be consistent with the Act and the Regulations. I shall first examine the question regarding the applicability of section 16-G (3) of the Act to Minority Institutions and thereafter, the question regarding the scope and ambit of clause 22 of the Scheme of Administration. 15. Article 30 (1) of the Constitution of India, guarantees a right for all minorities to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. It is true that unlike the fundamental right to freedom guaranteed by Article 19 of the Constitution, the fundamental right of minorities to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice is not subject to reasonable restrictions, the State may impose in the interests of sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State and public order etc. but that does not mean that the State is forbidden even to make regulatory provisions ensuring the exercise of the right in its true sense and purpose and preventing the right itself being eroded by mal- administration. It could be seen from the authorities discussed below that the State is not estopped from making permissive regulatory provisions in the interest of the Institution, the students and the teachers. Section 16 G (3) of the Act and regulation 31 of Chapter III of the Regulations made under the Act, requiring prior approval of the Inspector in the matter of dismissal etc. Section 16 G (3) of the Act and regulation 31 of Chapter III of the Regulations made under the Act, requiring prior approval of the Inspector in the matter of dismissal etc. of teachers and other employees should not be taken as a restriction on the fundamental right of minorities to administer educational Institution of their choice, but as a check or restriction against mal- administration and in that sense, these provisions should veritably be construed as provisions made in aid to Article 30 (1) of the Constitution. 16. In St. Xavier College Society v. State of Gujrat, AIR 1974 SC 1389 , the constitutional validity of section 51-A of the Gujarat University Act, was under consideration on the touch stone of Article 30 (1) of the Constitution "51-A (1) No member of the teaching, other academic and non-teaching staff of an affiliated college and recognised or approved institution shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except after an enquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges and until- (a) he has been given a reasonable opportunity of making representation on any such penalty proposed to be inflicted on him, and (b) the penalty to be inflicted on him is approved br the Vice-Chancel lor or any other officer of the University authorised by the Vice Chancellor in this behalf. (2) No termination of service of such member not amounting to his dismissal or removal falling under sub-section (1) shall be valid unless- (a) he has been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the proposed termination, and (b) such termination is approved by the Vice- Chancellor or any officer of the University authorised by the Vice Chancellor in this behalf; Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply to any person who is appointed for a temporary period only." The Nine Judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in St. Xaviers College Society's case has taken a unanimous view that the provisions prescribing proper conditions of service and security of tenure which would have the effect of attracting better and competent teachers, would not be considered violative of fundamental right guaranteed by Article 30 (1) of the Constitution. Xaviers College Society's case has taken a unanimous view that the provisions prescribing proper conditions of service and security of tenure which would have the effect of attracting better and competent teachers, would not be considered violative of fundamental right guaranteed by Article 30 (1) of the Constitution. The provisions requiring prior approval as contained in section 51-A (1) (b) and 51-A (2) (b) of the Gujarat University Act were hit by Article 30 (1) because in view of the majority opinion, these provisions conferred unguided and unbridled power upon an outside agency. According to the minority view, expressed by Hon. M. H. Beg, J. (as he then was) and Hon. S. N. Dwevedi, J., these provisions were not arbitrary, in that the guidelines for the exercise of the power may be gleaned from the object and purpose of conferral of regulatory powers. The view expressed by the Judges in the said case was summed up by the Hon. Supreme Court in Lilly Kurian v. Sr. Lewina, AIR 1979 SC 52 as below. "An analysis of the Judgment in St. Xaviers f.College's case AIR 1974 SC 1389 (supra) clearly shows that seven out of nine Judges held that the provisions contained in clause (b) of sub sections (1) and (2) of section 51-A of the Act were not applicable to an educational institution established and managed by religious or linguistic minority as they interfere with the disciplinary control of the management over the staff of its educational institutions. The reasons given by the majority were that the power of the management to terminate the services of any member of the teaching or other academic and non-academic staff was based on the relationship between5 an employer and his employees and no encroachment could be made on this right to dispense with their services under the contract of employment, which was an integral part of the right to administer and that these provisions conferred on the vice chancellor or any other officer of the University authorised by him, uncanalised, unguided and unlimited power to veto the actions of the management. According to the majority view, the conferral of such blanket power on the Vice Chancellor and his nominee was an infringement of the right of administration guaranteed under Article 30 (1) to the minority institutions, religious and lingustic. According to the majority view, the conferral of such blanket power on the Vice Chancellor and his nominee was an infringement of the right of administration guaranteed under Article 30 (1) to the minority institutions, religious and lingustic. The majority was accordingly of the view that the provisions contained in clause (b) of subsections (1) and (2) of section 51-A of the Act had the effect of destroying the minority institution's disciplinary control over the teaching and non- teaching staff of the college as no punishment could be inflicted by the management on a member of the staff unless it gets approval from an outside authority like the Vice Chancellor or an officer of the University authorised by him. On the contrary, the two dissenting Judges were of the view that these provisions were permissive regulatory measures " In Frank Anthony P. S. E. Association v. Union of India, AIR 1987 SC 311 , the Supreme Court has laid down the following proposition of law : "The excellence of the instruction provided by an institution would depend directly on the excellence of the teaching staff, and in turn, that would depend on the quality and the contentment of the teachers. Conditions of service pertaining to minimum qualifications of teachers, their salaries allowances and other conditions of service which ensure security, contentment and decent living standards to teachers and which will consequently enable them to render better service to the institution and the pupils cannot surely be said to be violative of the fundamental right guaranteed by Article 30 (1) of the Constitution. The Management of a minority Educational Institution cannot be permitted under the guise of the fundamental right guaranteed by Article 30 (1) of the Constitution, to oppress or exploit its employees any more than any other private employee. Oppression or exploitation of the teaching staff of an educational institution is bound to lead, inevitably, to discontent and deterioration of the standard of instruction imparted in the institution affecting adversely the object of making the institution an effective vehicle of education for the minority community or other persons who resort to it. Oppression or exploitation of the teaching staff of an educational institution is bound to lead, inevitably, to discontent and deterioration of the standard of instruction imparted in the institution affecting adversely the object of making the institution an effective vehicle of education for the minority community or other persons who resort to it. The management of minority institution cannot complain of invasion of the fundamental right to administer the institution when it denies the members of its staff the opportunity to achieve the very object of Article 30 (1) which is to make the institution an effective vehicle of education." 17. It is abundantly clear from the aforesaid authorities of the Hon'-ble Supreme Court that the requirement of prior approval contained in section 16-G (3) of the Intermediate Education Act and regulation 31 of Chapter III of the Regulations, is one of the service conditions of the teachers of the institution and may be constitutionally held valid from the point of view of Article 30 (I) of the Constitution if it is not found arbitrary and unbridled. As noticed herein- below the argument that section 16-G (3) was arbitrary, in that it provides no guidelines for the exercise of the power thereunder, was specifically repelled by this Court in Committee of Management Lal Bahadur Shastri Balika Inter College Mughalsarai v. Joint Director of Education (Women), 1982 UP LB EC 533 on the basis of the Supreme Court's decision in Katra Education Society case (below). The Inspector has to record reasons for approval or disapproval in view of the Law laid down by the five Judge Bench of the Hon. Supreme Court in S. N. Mukerji v. Union of India and the reasons to conform to the provisions contained in regulations 32, 33, 34, 35, 36 and 37 of Chapter III of the Regulations. 18. In Katra Education Society v. State of U. P., AIR 1966 SC 1307 , the constitutional validity of section 16-A to 16 I added to U. P. INtermediate Education Act by U. P. Act no. 35 of 1958 was challenged in the context of Articles 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution, inter- alia on the ground of these provisions being unreasonable and arbitrary. The argument was repelled by the Supreme Court and the provisions contained in section 16 A to 16 I of the Act were held to be constitutionally valid. 35 of 1958 was challenged in the context of Articles 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution, inter- alia on the ground of these provisions being unreasonable and arbitrary. The argument was repelled by the Supreme Court and the provisions contained in section 16 A to 16 I of the Act were held to be constitutionally valid. In Committee of Management Lal Bahadur Shastri Balika Inter College, Mughalsarai v. Joint Director (Women) Education, 1982 UP LB EC 533, the constitutional validity of section 16 G (3; was challenged on the ground that it conferred unbridled and unguided powers to the Inspector or for matter of that, Regional Inspectress of Girls Schools, as the case may be in the matter of approval of the punishment proposed by the Committee of Management. Relying upon the Supreme Court decision in Katra Education Society (supra), a learned Single Judge of this Court was pleased to repell the contention as below : "19. The last argument which has been raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that section 16 G (3) of the Act is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution as the aforesaid provision is arbitrary, having not provided the guidelines to the authority as to how the powers of approval are to be exercised. Learned Counsel for the petitioner had relied on three cases of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1981 SC 234 , AIR 1979 SC 52 and AIR 1974 SC 1389 . The learned counsel for the respondents has however, urged that the validity of sections 16A to 16 I have been upheld by the Supreme Court in the case of Katra Education Society v. State of U. P., AIR 1966 SC 1307 . The learned counsel for the petitioners has however, urged that the ground on which the provisions of section 16G (.3) of the Act are being challenged in this writ petition were not considered in the case of Katra Education Society (supra). 20. The case of the Supreme Court which have been cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners are not on U. P. Intermediate Education Act. The case of Katra Education Society precisely dealt with the validity of the provisions of sections 16A to 16 I on various grounds besides being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 20. The case of the Supreme Court which have been cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners are not on U. P. Intermediate Education Act. The case of Katra Education Society precisely dealt with the validity of the provisions of sections 16A to 16 I on various grounds besides being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid case has upheld the validity of the entire Amending Act 368 Ms Shamin) Zafar v. RIGS. (S R. Singh, J) f 1991 bv which these provisions i e sections 16-A to 16-1 were added. The Supreme Court in the case of Ballabhadas Mathuradas Lakhani v. Municipal Committee Malkapur, AIR 1970 SC 1002 held :- **The first question is concluded by judgment of this Court in. Bharat Kala Bhandar's case 1965 (3) SCR 499 , AIR 1966 SC 249 . That case arose under the C. P. and Berar Municipalities Act, 1922. The right of a Municipality governed by that Act to levy under section 66 (1) (b) a tax on bales of cotton ginned at the prescribed rate was challenged by a tax prayer. This Court held that levy of tax on cotton ginned by the tax prayer in excess of the amount prescribed by Article 276 of the Constitution was invalid, and since the Municipality had no authority to levy the tax in excess of the rate permitted by the constitution the assessment proceedings levying tax in excess of the permissible limit were invalid and a suit for refund of tax in excess of the amount permitted by Article 276 was maintainable. The decision was binding on the High Court and the High Court could not ignore it because they thought that ''relevant provisions were not brought to the notice of the court***". 19. S L. P. filed against this judgment was dismissed by the Supreme Court. 20. The decision was binding on the High Court and the High Court could not ignore it because they thought that ''relevant provisions were not brought to the notice of the court***". 19. S L. P. filed against this judgment was dismissed by the Supreme Court. 20. It is true that in the aforesaid cases, the constitutional validity of section 16G (3) of the Act was tested on the touchstone of Articles 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution, and the question was not considered in the light of the Article 30 (1) but the Supreme Court had subsequently taken the view that the right to administer educational institutions cannot include the right to mal- administer and that the minority cannot ask for aid and recognition for an educational institution run by them in unhealthy surrounding without any competent teachers possessing any semblance of qualification, and which does not maintain even a fair standard of teaching. From the pronouncements of the Honourable Supreme Court as noticed above it stands well settled that the constitutional right of the minority Community to administer an educational institution of their choice does not necessarily militate against the claim of the State to insist that in order to grant aid and recognition the State may prescribe reasonable regulations to ensure excellence of the institution. The provisions like the ones under consideration here requiring prior approval or an statutory authority for dismissal, termination etc of the teachers tantamount to prescribing proper conditions of service and ensuring security of tenure so as to attract able and qualified teachers necessary for maintenance of standards of excellence expected of Educational Institutions, wherein are brought up the future builders and governors of the Nation. The learned counsel for the respondent has however, placed reliance upon two Division Bench decisions of this Court, (i) in Smt. Joseph Higher Secondary School Meerut Cantt v. Ravi Shanker Sharma, AIR 1976, Alld. 390 and (ii) in J. S. Mahasabha U. P v. D. I O. S . 1979 ALJ 1070 wherein it was held that section 16C (3) of the Act, in so far as it requires prior approval in writing of the inspector, is inapplicable in relation to minority institution being violative of Article 30 (1) of the Constitution. In both these cases, reliance has been placed upon Nine Judge Bench decision of Hon. Supreme Court in St. In both these cases, reliance has been placed upon Nine Judge Bench decision of Hon. Supreme Court in St. Xaviers College case (supra) and it has been held that the power conferred on the Inspector is uncanalised and unguided in the sense that no facts have been mentioned on the basis of which alone the Inspector may exercise the power. Both these authorities proceed on assumption that the power conferred on the Inspector is uncanalised and unguided mentioning no facts on the basis of which alone the Inspector may exercise his power and it was this assumption that the learned Judges constituting the two Division Benches held that it can not be said that the power of approval conferred on the Inspector was merely a check on maladministration. The decision of Hon. Supreme Court in 'Katra Education Society case (supra) was not brought to the notice of the Division Benches of this Court which decided the. aforesaid cases, nor was the attention of the court invited towards regulations referred to above which, in my opinion, provide' sufficient guidelines for the exercise of power. 21. The Regulations contained in Chapter III of the Regulations made the Act, particularly the regulations 25, 26, 27, 28, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36 and 37 provide sufficient guidelines for the exercises of the power conferred upon District Inspector of Schools/Regional Inspectress of Girls School under, section 16G (3) of the Act. A combined reading of these provisions would indicate that the conferral of power upon the D.I.OS /R.I.G S. u/Sec 16G (3) is not without guidelines, in that these provisions taken as a whole, are, sufficient to guide the concerned authority as to whether the approval sought for by the committed of management be given or refused. Accordingly, in my. view the provisions contained in section 16G (3) and regulation 31, requiring prior approval of the Regional Inspectress of Girls Schools, for termination, dismissal or removal etc. of the teachers of a minority Institution, is not hit by Article 30 (3) of the Constitution of India and the decisions of this Court, relied upon by the respondent's counsel are per incuriem. The plea of implied repeal of the section is not acceptable in view of section 30 of U. P. Act 8 of 1982. 22. of the teachers of a minority Institution, is not hit by Article 30 (3) of the Constitution of India and the decisions of this Court, relied upon by the respondent's counsel are per incuriem. The plea of implied repeal of the section is not acceptable in view of section 30 of U. P. Act 8 of 1982. 22. Now coming to the scope and ambit of Clause (b) of paragraph 2 of the Scheme of Administration, I find that it adopts the Act and the regulations made thereunder as terms and conditions of service of the teachers and other employees of the institution This necessarily implies that the requirement of prior approval of the Regional Inspectress of Girls Schools for dismissal, termination etc. of a teacher as required by section 16G (3) read with regulations 31 and 37 of the Chapter III of the Regulations, is a condition of service subject to which the petititioner was appointed. The Committee of Management which owes its existence to the Scheme of Administration, cannot be permitted to wriggle out of its obligations under paragraph 22 of the Scheme of Administration and to say that the terms and conditions subject to which the petitioner was appointed, including the condition regarding prior approval of the Regional Inspectress of Girls Schools for dismissal etc. was not binding on it. I am of the considered view that the Committee of Management was bound to seek prior approval of the R.I.G S., if not on account of any statutory obligation under section 16G (3) of the Act, then at least on account of its obligation under Paragraph 22 of the Scheme of Administration which adopts section 16G (3) read with regulations 31 and 37 of Chapter III of the Regulations, as an integral part of the service condition of the teachers of the Institution. The guarantee of fundamental rights under Article 30 (I) of the Constitution is against any infringement at the instance of the State It doss not, in my view, come into play when the community itself, acting through its Managing Committee, adopts certain statutory provisions requiring prior approval of a statutory authority for the dismissal, termination etc. The guarantee of fundamental rights under Article 30 (I) of the Constitution is against any infringement at the instance of the State It doss not, in my view, come into play when the community itself, acting through its Managing Committee, adopts certain statutory provisions requiring prior approval of a statutory authority for the dismissal, termination etc. of its employees, the Committee will be estopped by principles of promissory estoppel to plead that the requirements of prior approval of the R.I.G-S., for purposes of dismissal, termination etc of its employees be not insisted upon on the ground that the provisions of law requiring prior approval are violative of Article 30 (1) of the Constitution, for prior approval is a condition precedent by virtue of paragraph 22 of the Scheme of Administration to which section 16G (3) now constitutes on integral part by way of adoption of the said provisions. This would not be hit by Article 30 (1) as the Community has on its own chosen that course of action. Coming to the merits of the charges, I find that so far as the charge of causing collection of funds from the students through their class teachers in contravention of section 7-G of the Act, as contained in charge 2, 3, 5 and 6, is concerned, the statement of imputation as disclosed in the charge-sheet in relation to this charge, does not constitute a charge of causing collection or receipt of funds from students in contravention of the section, in that these charges do not contain any imputation to the effect that such collections or receipts of funds from the students were made or caused to be made as a condition for granting them admission to or permitting them after such admission to continue in the college. Though section 7-C is wide enough to embrace within its ambits any contribution, donation, fees or any payment of any sort, either in cash or in kind, except the fees at the rates specified by the State Government in this behalf, from or on behalf of any student notwithstanding the fact that such contribution, donation etc is made or caused to be made through the instrumentality of the Parent-Teacher Association provided that such contribution, denation etc. is taken or caused to be taken by any person connected with the management of the institution, Head of the institution, teacher or any employee 'as a condition for granting him admissions to or permitting him after such admission to continue in such institution'. The charge of causing collection of funds from students of the college being penal in nature and punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and also with fine which shall not be less than one thou- sand of rupees ought not to have been made the basis of disciplinary proceeding aganst the Head of the Institution in absence of a specific allegation making out the ingredients of section 7-C of the Act. Not only the charge-sheet but the enquiry report and the decision contained in the resolution dated 12-1-91 pursuant to which the impugned order of dismissal of the petitioner from service was issued are conpicuously silent as to whether the collections referred to in the charges 2, 3, 5 and 6 were caused to be made from the students as a condition for granting them admission to or permitting them after such admission to continue in the college. 23. So far as charge no 1 is concerned, it no doubt contains statement of imputation to the effect that the collection referred to in the charge sheet was caused to be made from the students as a condition for granting them admission to or permitting them after such admission- to continue in the college, but no evidence in proof of the charge, seems to have been brought forth before the Enquiry Committee or the Managing Committee which took the impugned decision for dismissal of the petitioner from service. As already noticed, the charge being penal in nature, strict proof thereof on the basis of valid material and evidence has to be insisted upon. Regulation 36 (1) of Chapter III of the Regulations made under the Act being relevant, is quoted below. "36 (1) The grounds on which it is proposed to take action shall be 1 reduced in the form of a definite charge or charge which shall be communicated. to the employee charged and which shall be so clear and precise as to 1 give sufficient indication to the charged employee of the facts and circumstances against him. "36 (1) The grounds on which it is proposed to take action shall be 1 reduced in the form of a definite charge or charge which shall be communicated. to the employee charged and which shall be so clear and precise as to 1 give sufficient indication to the charged employee of the facts and circumstances against him. He shall be required within three weeks of the receipt of the charge-sheet to out in ft written statement of his defence and to Mate whether he desired to be heard in person. If he or the inquiring authority so desires an oral enquiry shall be held in respect of such of the allegations as are not admitted. At that enquiry such oral evidence will be heard as that enquiring authority considers necessary. The person charged shall be entitled to cross-examine the witnesses, to give evidence in person, and to have such witnesses called as he may wish provided that the enquiring authority conducting the enquiry may for sufficient reasons to be recorded in writing refuse to call a witness The proceedings shall contain a sufficient record of the evidence and statement of the findings and the grounds thereof. The enquiring authority conducting the enquiry may also, separately from these proceedings, make his own recommeedation regarding the punishment to be imposed on the employee." 24. The Regulation referred to above, no doubt, confers a discretion Upon the Enquiring Authority to hold an oral enquiry, but that discretion must be exercised reasonably and not arbitrarily. In the charge-sheet, it was indicated that the statements of the witnesses mentioned therein would be recorded in support of such charge, but the Enquiry Committee did not examine any witness in support of the charges framed against the petitioner. Instead, it proceeded to submit its report on certain papers which do not consitute evidence in so far as the charge regarding collection of funds in contravention of section 7-C is concerned. The evidence within the meaning of regulation 36 (1) must be 'evidence' in the sense of the term defined in section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, according to which 'evidence' means and includes :- (i) all statements which the court permits or requires to be made before it by the witnesses in relation to the matters or facts under enquiry; and (ii) all documents produced for the inspection of. the court. 25. the court. 25. The finding with regard to charges no. 1 and 2, appears to be based on a chart submitted by Smt. Ishrat Begum. This chart was not proved in accordance with law inasmuch as neither Smt. Ishrat Begum was examined nor any other person who could have proved that the same was prepared by Smt. Ishrat Begum. Its contents too were not proved according to law. The finding on charge 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 in so far as the question of collection of funds from the students is concerned, is further based upon alleged admission of the petitioners contained in her replies referred to hereinbefore but a perusal of the replies submitted by the petitioner to the Enquiry Committee and the respondent no. 2, would indicate that the petitioner nowhere admitted that the disputed collections were made as a condition for granting admission to students or permitting them, after such admission to continue in the Institution. The entire finding on the charge regarding collection of funds from the students, is, thus, based on no valid evidence on record and has to be ignored. 26. As regards the charge no. 6 in respect of appointment of Sri Shahab Zafar a nephew of the petitioner, suffice it to say, that the defence of the petitioner in this regard, has not been duly considered and the Managing Committee has failed to take notice of the mitigating factors also as required by regulation 33 of Chapter III of the Regulations. So is the case with charges Nos. 7 and 8, Appropriate punishment on these charges and charges No. 1 and 4, if proved on the basis of valid evidence, may be awarded in accordance with law with due consideration to the mitigating factors, if any. In the result, the petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order dated 12/14-1-1991 (Annexure 11 to the writ petition) is accordingly quashed. Parties to bear their own costs. Petition allowed.