Anil Kumar v. Rent Control & Eviction officer, Gorakhpur
1991-09-16
RAVI S.DHAVAN
body1991
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER Ravi S. Dhavan, J. - On an order of the District Magistrate, interlocutory in nature in a proceeding under the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 the present petition has been filed. The order is dated 28-10-1989 (Annexure 3 to the writ petition) by which an application seeking to summon the landlord's mother Smt. Suraj Devi for cross-examination before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, was rejected. The writ petition is sketchy. It does not even mention the details of the release application of the opposite party No. 3 as a tenant, supposedly, under S. 16 of the Act. These details are available from the counter affidavit. 2. A revision was filed against this order by the tenant before the District Judge, Gorakhpur and was rejected on 3 November 1989 as not maintainable against an interlocutory order but only final orders. This order is appended as Annexure 4 to the writ petition. 3. At this stage this court may clarify that the writ petition is seeking a writ of certiorari to correct an error in the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, in rejecting the tenant's prayer for the cross examination of the landlord's mother. In so far as the order of the District Judge is concerned the occasion to file a revision would arise only if a final order had been passed. S. 18 of the Act, aforesaid, is very clear when it declares that any person aggrieved by the final order may maintain a revision. an interlocutory order declining the request to summon the landlord's mother for cross-examination is not a final order. Thus, no revision was even maintainable against such an order. Suffice it to say that the revision was filed solely for the purposes of delaying the proceedings initiated by the tenant seeking release of the premises on his retirement. 4. Likewise, this court is not inclined to interfere in the petition seeking interference with an interlocutory order for more than one reason. To day, as the matter stands the opposite party No. 3 an officer of the Indian Railways posted in Gorakhpur as Deputy Chief Operating Superintendent, North Eastern Railway, retired in December, 1990 on reaching age of superannuation.
4. Likewise, this court is not inclined to interfere in the petition seeking interference with an interlocutory order for more than one reason. To day, as the matter stands the opposite party No. 3 an officer of the Indian Railways posted in Gorakhpur as Deputy Chief Operating Superintendent, North Eastern Railway, retired in December, 1990 on reaching age of superannuation. In these circumstances, the intention of the legislature in the Act, aforesaid, is to the effect that should the landlord be occupying any accommodation for reasons of his employment which accommodation has been provided by the employer and such a landlord may have had to vacate this accommodation on the cessation of his employment, then the tenant who occupied the house of the landlord would be visited with an order of eviction. Such is the stipulation as expressed in subsection (1A) of S. 21, of the Act aforesaid. Thus, notwithstanding that the landlord sought release of the accommodation before his retirement, and the fact that he did not mention in the application whether it was under S. 16 or S. 21 would not imply that it is a release application under S. 16 as the tenant suggests it to be. 5. Then, the context today has changed completely. The landlord, has retired from service. This application can only be under S. 21(1A) and the contents of it clearly reveal that the owner of the premises is seeking his house in a vacant state for occupation on retirement. Today he has, in fact, retired and is entitled to live in a house of his own. The legislative intent in sub-clause (1 A) of S. 21 is specific that upon the contingencies spelled out in the sub-clause, taking effect, the needs of the landlord become conclusive. A landlord on retirement, without a house, must have access to his residence. 6. The present writ petition, thus, against an interlocutory order as above is misconceived and this court declines to interfere on any of the reliefs which the petitioner seeks. 7. The court expects that the application of the respondent No. 3 seeking his own house in a vacant state upon a consideration of the application before the District Magistrate under S. 21(1A) of the Act, will be considered expeditiously. 8. The petition is dismissed with costs.