Judgment :- Nainar Sundaram; J.: This appeal is directed against the judgment and O.S.No.2439 of 1981, on the file of the Second Additional City Civil Judge, Madras defendant is the appellant and the plaintiff is the respondent. The facts leading to the may be traced as follows: On 7.8.1964, an agreement of lease, as per Ex.A-1, was into between the plaintiff and Esso Standard Eastern Inc., in and by which a lease of land was given to the defendant. It is sufficient if we recapitulate only the relevant the lease. The period of lease was from 1.7.1964 to 30.6.1974. There was a payment advance of Rs.15,600 to be adjusted from half of the monthly rent for the first four Clause 3(d) of the lease contemplated the renewal of the lease and since a part controversy in this appeal arises out of this clause, we feel obliged to extract the said as follows: “That the landlord will on the written request of the tenant made 2 calendar months the expiry of the term hereby created and if there shall not at the time of such request existing breach or non-observance of any of the covenants on the part of the hereinbefore contained grant to it a lease of the demised premises for the further term years from the expiration of the said term at the rate of Rs.910 (Rupees nine hundred ten only) per month and containing the like covenants and provisions as are contained except the renewal option clause.” On 15.2.1974, as per Ex.A-2, Esso Standard Eastern Inc. by a letter purported to the option for renewal also suggesting the inclusion of the following clause, in the lease document: “The lessee shall be at liberty to determine this agreement by giving to the lessor months’ notice in writing expiring at any time during the currency of this agreement. On 30.3.1974, as per Ex.A-3, the plaintiff apprised the defendant that the renewal lease shall be on the same terms and like conditions as in the original lease excepting renewal option clause. The plaintiff in the said letter also indicated that mutual negotiations over the terms of renewal cannot be ruled out. It must be noted here that after Ex.A before Ex.A-3, the Esso (Acquisition of Undertakings in India) Act 4 of 1974 came on 13.3.1974. The plaintiff in the said letter also indicated that mutual negotiations over the terms of renewal cannot be ruled out. It must be noted here that after Ex.A before Ex.A-3, the Esso (Acquisition of Undertakings in India) Act 4 of 1974 came on 13.3.1974. On 15.4.1974, as per Ex.A-4 the successor to Esso Standard Eastern namely, Esso Standard Refining Company of India Limited, addressed a letter to the in the following terms:” We write with reference to our Reg. Ack. due letter 5150/MV of February 15, 1974 reply dated 30.3.74. Inasmuch as you are not in favour of including a 3 months clause for determining the agreement please treat our request as withdrawn. We forwarding to you our draft lease embodying the same terms and covenants as contained our earlier registered lease. As per clause 3(d) of the lease, we have also exercised option for renewal of the lease for a further period of ten years commencing July 1,1974 rental of Rs.910 p.m. on the same terms and conditions contained in the earlier for lease. ”On 4.6.1974, as per Ex.A-5, the said company forwarded a draft lease in duplicate plaintiff. On 20.6.1974, as per Ex.A-6, the plaintiff replied to Esso Standard Company of India Limited that without the payment of advance there can be no question renewal of the lease. On 5.7.1974, as per Ex.A-7, the plaintiff by addressing a letter Esso Standard Refining Company of India Limited declined to accept a cheque purporting be the rent for the month of July, 1974 and pointed out that the draft renewal been rejected by the plaintiff since it violated the condition precedent for the exercise option for renewal with regard to the payment of advance and the plaintiff wanted of possession of the property. With effect from 12.7.1974, consequent on the LUBE (India) Limited with Esso Standard Refining Company of India Limited, the name amalgamated Corporation stood changed to Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited, the defendant in the suit. On 15.7.1974, as per Ex.A Standard Refining Company of India Limited, wrote to the plaintiff that no advance need paid and they enclosed the draft of the lease deed once again for approval by the and return. On 22.7.1974, as per Ex.A-9. and again on 4.9.1974, as per Ex.A defendant has been requesting for the return of the draft lease deed duly signed to proceed with the matter further. On 22.7.1974, as per Ex.A-9. and again on 4.9.1974, as per Ex.A defendant has been requesting for the return of the draft lease deed duly signed to proceed with the matter further. On 6.1.1975, as per Ex.A-11, the plaintiff through his counsel the notice calling upon the defendant to vacate and deliver vacant possession property before 31.1.1975. On 31.3.1975, the defendant through its counsel replied, Ex.A. 12, insisting for approval of the draft lease. On 13.8. 1977, as per Ex.A plaintiff’s counsel called upon the defendant to vacate the property by 1.10.1977 and pay damages to the tune of Rs.40,330. On 18.8.1977,as per Ex.A-14, the defendant Ex.A-13 declining to accede to the demand put forth on behalf of the plaintiff in his counsel letter. On 11.9.1977, as per Ex.A-15, realising that a mistake had crept in with reference a date, the plaintiffs counsel issued a fresh notice. On 22.3.1978, the plaintiff filed the praying for a decree for delivery of vacant possession by the defendant and for damages. The defendant filed the written statement on 16.9.1979. Taking advantage of the extension of the provisions of the Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act III of 1922, hereinafter referred to as the Act, to leases entered into prior to March, 1980, by the amending Act 1980, an additional written statement was filed by the defendant on 9.9.1981. We will occasion to deal with the concerned contentions of the defendant while we consider submissions put forth before us in this appeal on behalf of the defendant. Suffice it to at this juncture that in the additional written statement a plea has been projected that defendant is entitled to protection under the Act. The defendant filed an application Sec.9 of the Act. But, there was an inordinate delay of 500 days in filing that application. The application for condonation of delay was numbered as I.A.No.13557 of 1981, and substantive application I.A.No.13555 of 1981, filed under section was numbered I.A.No.13557 of 1981 was dismissed and consequently I.A.No.13555 of 1981 was dismissed. So far as the application under Sec.9 of the Act is concerned, the matter allowed to rest there. 2. The Court below, on the pleadings, framed the following issues: “(1) Has there been a valid renewal of the lease?- (2) Are the plaintiffs entitled to claim damages for use and occupation and if so, at rate? (3) Has the suit not been properly valued? 2. The Court below, on the pleadings, framed the following issues: “(1) Has there been a valid renewal of the lease?- (2) Are the plaintiffs entitled to claim damages for use and occupation and if so, at rate? (3) Has the suit not been properly valued? (4) To what relief, are the plaintiffs entitled? Additional Issue: (1) Whether the defendant is entitled to the benefit of the Madras City Tenants ’ Act as amended by Act 2 of 1980 and if so, whether the suit is bad for want of Sec.11 notice? ” The plaintiff placed his evidence, oral and documentary. The defendant placed only evidence and it had no documentary evidence. The Court below on issue No.1 held there has been no valid renewal of the lease. On issue No.2, the Court below held that plaintiff is entitled to claim damages for use and occupation at Rs.2,000 per month from 1.10.1977 till the date of delivery. On issue No.3, the Court below on the ground nothing having been demonstrated as to how the suit has not been properly valued, answered that issue in favour of the plaintiff. On additional issue No.l, the Court below held that the defendant is entitled to the benefits of the Act. Besides this finding, the Court below did not proceed further to ascertain the amount of compensation payable for superstructure to the defendant and did not follow the other processes as contemplated under Sec.4 of the Act. On issue No.4, the Court below repelled the plea put forth on behalf of the defendant that Sec.53-A of the Transfer of Property Act could be availed of by it the court below also repelled the contention that there was no valid notice to quit. As result, the court below decreed the suit for delivery of possession and for damages at rate of 2,000 per month for use and occupation from 1.10.1977. 3. As result, the court below decreed the suit for delivery of possession and for damages at rate of 2,000 per month for use and occupation from 1.10.1977. 3. The main contention put forth by Mr.S.Govinda-swaminathan, learned senior counsel appearing for the defendant, appellant herein, is built on the provisions of Sec.4 of the contention gets projected as follows: Under Sec.4(1) of the Act, in any suit ejectment against the tenant in which the landlord succeeds, there shall be a determination of the amount of compensation, if any, payable under Sec.3 of the Act and the decree shall declare the amount so found due and direct that on payment by the landlord into within three months from the date of the decree, the tenant shall put the landlord possession of the land with the building and trees thereon. If the amount found due paid within three months from the date of the decree, the suit shall stand dismissed. instant case, there had been no determination of the amount of compensation declaration of the same in the decree inspite of the fact that a finding has been rendered the defendant is a tenant within the meaning of the Act and entitled to the benefits same and consequently no payment of any amount of compensation could be and had made within the time limit, and hence the suit has got to be thrown out. Learned counsel for the defendant places heavy reliance on the pronouncement of the Supreme in Ranganatha v. Tiruchirap-palli Municipal Council, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 65: (1965)2 S.C.R. As against the submissions put forth on behalf of the defendant through its learned counsel Mr.V.Krishnan, learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff, would submit proper understanding and construction of the provisions of Sec.4 of the Act cannot the proposition as advanced by the learned senior counsel appearing for the defendant; there has got to be primarily an ascertainment of the amount of compensation by the and declaration of the same in the decree and only thereafter if there had been compliance with the payment of the amount of compensation so ascertained within period prescribed by the provision itself namely, three months the suit shall be dismissed in the present case, there had been an omission on the part of the Court below in making very ascertainment of the amount of compensation and in that contingency the question making a payment within the time prescribed by the statute would not at all arise and could not be an entailment of the dismissal of the suit on the ground of non-compliance payment of the amount of compensation ascertained within the statutory time limit. counsel appearing for the plaintiff would submit that the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Ranganatha v. Tiruchirappalli Municipal Council, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 65: (1965)2 645, cannot be construed in the manner, as suggested by the learned senior appearing for the defendant. Learned counsel for the plaintiff would place reliance pronouncement of Srinivasan, J. in Mohanambal v. Selvanayaki (1961)2 M.L.J. 261 . 4. Sec.3 of the Act has got to be initially looked into because that alone speaks about payment of compensation on ejectment. That provision runs as follows: "Sec.3: Payment of compensation on ejectment: Every tenant shall on ejectment be to be paid as compensation the value of any building, which may have been erected by any of his predecessors-in interest, or by any person not in occupation at the time ejectment who derived title from either of them, and for which compensation has not been paid. A tenant who is entitled to compensation for the value of any building shall be paid the value of trees which may have been planted by him on the land and improvements which may have been made by him." Sec.4 lays down the procedure for disposal of suits for ejectment and it has got four sections and the whole provision runs as follows: "Sec.4: Disposal of suits for ejectment: (1) In a suit for ejectment against a tenant in the landlord succeeds, the Courts shall ascertain the amount of compensation, payable under Sec.3 and the decree in the suit shall declare the amount so found due direct that, on payment by the landlord into Court, within three months from the date decree, of the amount so found due, the tenant shall put the landlord into possession land with the building and trees thereon. (2) In an application under Sec.41 of the Presidency Small Causes Courts Act, 1882, in the landlord succeeds, the Court shall ascertain the amount of compensation payable Sec.3 and shall pass an interim order declaring the amount so found due and stating payment, by the landlord into Court within three months of the date of the said interim of the amount so found due, the landlord shall be entitled to the order contemplated Sec.43 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882. (3) If in such suit or-application the court finds that any sum of money is due by the to the landlord for rent or otherwise in respect of the tenancy, the Court shall set off such sum against the sum found due under Sub or Sub-sec.(2), as the case may be, and shall pass a decree of interim order declaring as amount payable to the tenant on ejectment, the amount, if any, remaining due to him such set-off. (4) If the amount found due is not paid into Court within three months from the date of decree under Sub-sec(1) or of the interim order under Sub-sec(1) or of the interim under Sub-sec. (2) or if no application is made under Sec.6, the suit or application, as case may be, shall stand dismissed, and the landlord shall not be entitled to institute a suit for ejectment, or present a fresh application for recovery of possession for a period five years from the date of such dismissal. (2) or if no application is made under Sec.6, the suit or application, as case may be, shall stand dismissed, and the landlord shall not be entitled to institute a suit for ejectment, or present a fresh application for recovery of possession for a period five years from the date of such dismissal. “For the purpose of this case, we are more concerned with Sub-secs.(1) and (4) Sec.4 of Act. As we could see from the very language of Sub-sec(1) of Sec.4, it says that in a suit ejectment against a tenant in which the landlord succeeds, the Court shall ascertain amount of compensation, if any, payable under Sec.3 and the decree in the suit shall declare the amount so found due and direct that, on payment by the landlord into Court, within three months from the date of the decree, of the amount so found due, the tenant shall the landlord into possession of the land with the building and trees thereon. Hence, has got to be first an ascertainment of the amount of compensation and that is the duty the court. It can be stated that there has got to be assistance rendered by the parties reference to the ascertainment of the amount of compensation by exposing and placing requisite evidence therefore before the Court. We will keep aside that aspect for the being. Then, the amount ascertained as compensation shall be declared in the decree there shall be a direction that on payment by the landlord into Court of the amount three months from the date of the decree, the tenant shall put the landlord into possession the land with the building and trees thereon. Sub-sec.(4) of Sec.4 is only supplementary Sub-sec(1) when it contemplates that if the amount found due is not paid into court three months from the date of the decree under Sub-sec.(1), the suit shall stand dismissed. But, where there is a failure or omission on the part of the Court to ascertain the amount compensation and declare the same in the decree, there is no scope for considering the aspect of compliance by the landlord with regard to the payment of the amount ascertained within the period of three months as per Sub-sec(1) of Sec.4. This is the plainly visible as per a cogent reading of and as per the express language employed provisions of Sub-secs.(1) and (4) of Sec.4. 5. This is the plainly visible as per a cogent reading of and as per the express language employed provisions of Sub-secs.(1) and (4) of Sec.4. 5. We shall now resort to the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Ranganatha Tiruchirap-palli Municipal Council, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 65: (1965)2 S.C.R 645 . We find there the decree dated 26.3.1956 passed by the Trial Court omitted to prescribe the time which is a matter of statutory prescription, though the amount of compensation ascertained and declared in the decree. An application was taken out by the defendant dismiss the suit filed by the plaintiff on the ground that there was no deposit made three months from the date of the decree. The plaintiff filed an application for amendment the decree to specify the time within which the deposit should be made. The trial Court 20.11.1956 ordering the amendment of the decree inserted a direction to the effect that deposit should be made before June 23, 1956 that is to say within three months from 26,1956, the date of the original decree. Obviously, the amendment of the decree was helpful to the plaintiff and that resulted in the dismissal of the suit under Sec.4(4) of the dismissal of the suit was challenged before this Court and this Court countenanced plea that only when the decree makes a direction calling upon the plaintiff to deposit certain amount by way of compensation to the defendant-tenant within three months, requirements of Sec.4(1) could be stated to have been complied drawn in accordance the requirements of Sec.4(1), that the mandatory provision of Sec.4(4) could be invoked. This Court allowed the appeal and the original decree passed on March, 26,1956 confirmed. The result of the decision of this Court was that the plaintiff had the liberty take out execution for obtaining possession of the property. On a certificate being granted, the matter went to the Supreme Court, there was an advertence to the object to the Act the implications of Sec.4(1) and Sec.4(4) of the Act have been discussed in the following terms: ” Reverting them to the question of construing Sec.4(1) and (4), it would appear that what Sec.4(1) purports to do is to require that decree in the suit to which it applies shall, in the first instance, declare the amount due by way of compensation. The said provision also requires that the decree shall that the tenant shall put the landlord into possession of the land on payment by the landlord into Court, within three months from the date of the decree, of the amount, found due. two operative parts of the decree as contemplated by Sec.4(1) are the declaration amount due to the tenant, and the direction to the tenant to deliver possession of the to the landlord in case he paid into Court within three months of the date of the decree amount declared due. It is true that the decree would state that the landlord has to pay amount within three months from its date, but having regard to the specific and mandatory terms in which Sec.4(4) is couched, it would not be reasonable to construe Sec.4(1) controlling Sec.4(4). The relevant clause provides that the decree shall direct that payment by the landlord into Court, within three months, of the amount found due, tenant shall put the landlord into possession. The clause in respect of the payment landlord into Court within three months, amount to a condition which has to be satisfied the landlord before the tenant is required to deliver to him possession of the property question. In other words, reference to the payment by the landlord of the amount found within the specified period in Sec.4(1) is not so much a direction issued by the Court specification of a condition expressly and independently provided by Sec.4(4). The provision of Sec.4(4) clearly shows that if the amount found due is not paid within months, the suit of the landlord shall stand dismissed. The opening clause of Sec.4(4) that the amount has to be paid within three months from the date of the decree under Sub-sec(1). The expression ‘ the decree under Sub-sec(1) ‘merely describes subsection under which the decree is passed, the emphasis in the context being on the of the said decree and not so much on the strict compliance with the form prescribed Sec.4(1). If the decree is passed under Sec.4(1), its date is material for the purpose deciding the period beyond which Sec.4(4) would come into operation. If the decree is passed under Sec.4(1), its date is material for the purpose deciding the period beyond which Sec.4(4) would come into operation. In other words, soon as it is shown by a tenant that a decree has been passed under Sec.4(1), declaring amount of compensation due to him from the landlord, he is entitled to claim that he longer under obligation to deliver possession of the property to the landlord, because months have passed from the date of the decree and the amount declared as compensation has not been paid to him. If the decree happens to be defective in the sense that it does reproduce the requirement of Sec.4(1) expressly in its terms, that would not take the outside the purview of Sec.4(4). We are inclined to think that having regard mandatory terms used in Sec.4(4), it would be illogical and unreasonable to suggest defective decree like the present enables the landlord to circumvent the provisions of (4). The applicability of Sec.4(4) cannot be repelled merely on the ground that the passed under Sec.4(1) does not specify the period of three months within which the found due has to be paid. In our opinion, the logical way to reconcile Sec.4(1) and Sec.4(4) would be to treat the provision prescribed by Sec.4(4) as mandatory and paramount read the relevant portion of Sec.4(1) accordingly. That is why even if the decree does mention that the amount has to be paid within three months, the landlord’s obligation make the payment within three months is still enforceable under Sec.4(4), otherwise defective decrees would deprive the tenants of the benefit intended to be conferred on by Sec.4(4). We are, therefore, satisfied that the High Court was in error in reversing order passed by the trial court. Respondent No.1 has not paid the amount within months from the date of the decree and the suit instituted by it shall stand dismissed Sec.4(4). 6. We do not think that the ratio expressed by the Supreme Court could have a play the sphere of the question and the facts on the basis of which the question arose case. There was, in fact, an ascertainment of the amount of compensation. But, there an omission to direct payment within three months. 6. We do not think that the ratio expressed by the Supreme Court could have a play the sphere of the question and the facts on the basis of which the question arose case. There was, in fact, an ascertainment of the amount of compensation. But, there an omission to direct payment within three months. It was opined construing Sub and (4) of Sec.4 that time limit of three months is not so much the result of a direction by the Court, but a specification of a condition expressly and independently provided by Sec.4(4), failing which consequence of dismissal of the suit will entail. If there had been an ascertainment amount due by way of compensation and even if there is an omission to make a for payment of the same, within the period of three months, which is a prescription condition under the statute the provision of the statute, namely, Sec.4(4) will have and the plaintiff omitting to make the deposit within the time limit, will have to scathe of Sec.4(4) of the Act in having his suit dismissed. The decree not directing payment, and in that sense being defective would not make the implications of Sec.4(4) read Sec.4(1) unworkable, and despite the defect in the decree, they will have their force effect. In the present case, there had been no ascertainment of the quantum compensation and there had been no declaration of the same in the decree and in circumstances, it is not possible to fall back upon Sec.4(4) of the Act that on the failure the plaintiff to pay any amount of compensation, his suit must be thrown out. The Court had no occasion to consider a case where there had been no ascertainment amount of compensation at all, as in the present case. The ascertainment is the first followed up by a declaration in the decree. Then whether there is a direction to pay three months or not, the obligation to do so, arises by the force of the statutory prescription or condition and failure thereof will lead to dismissal of the suit. 7. The ascertainment is the first followed up by a declaration in the decree. Then whether there is a direction to pay three months or not, the obligation to do so, arises by the force of the statutory prescription or condition and failure thereof will lead to dismissal of the suit. 7. In Mohanambal v. Selvanayaki, (1961)2 M.L.J. 261 , Srinivasan, J., in an ejectment application under Sec.41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, found that there ascertainment at the time of determining the ejectment application in favour of the and there was no consequent interim order declaring the amount ascertained as per (2), and an ascertainment done long prior to the determination of the ejectment application and the failure of the landlord to pay the amount within time after such ascertainment put against him to throw out the ejectment application itself. The learned Judge deemed to remit the matter back for ascertainment of compensation and passing of orders Sec.4(2). The reasons expressed by the learned Judge run as follows: "It seems to me that the order made on 19th August, 1958 was not an interim order the meaning of Sec.4(2). What this provision contemplates is that at the time of disposal the application under Sec.41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, in which the landlord succeeds’, the Court shall ascertain the amount of compensation payable. It is quite that the stage, at which the Court is called upon to determine the amount of compensation is the date on which it comes to the conclusion that the landlord is entitled to possession of the premises, and it is at this stage that the Court is under a duty to what is called an interim order declaring the amount so found due, and directing its payment within three months from the date. This obviously amounts to a conditional order sense that, if the amount is deposited as directed the landlord would be entitled to possession, and, if he fails to make the deposit his application for ejectment would dismissed. The provisions of the Act do not contemplate an order, determining compensation, and directing its payment at any point of time anterior to the determination of the ejectment application itself. Even an application proceeding from a party, plaintiff defendant is uncalled for in a matter which comes within the scope of Sec.4(2) of the Tenants ’ Protection Act. The provisions of the Act do not contemplate an order, determining compensation, and directing its payment at any point of time anterior to the determination of the ejectment application itself. Even an application proceeding from a party, plaintiff defendant is uncalled for in a matter which comes within the scope of Sec.4(2) of the Tenants ’ Protection Act. The Court is under a mandatory duty in such cases to determine compensation and make an order in terms, of the section. It is clear, therefore, that order dated the 19th August, 1958, when the Court had not thought fit to come to a decision as to the right of the plaintiff-landlord to vacant possession, was wholly beyond jurisdiction of the Court. The proper order under Sec.4(2) of the Act is one made when the Court decides that landlord is entitled to a decree for vacant possession. The order that was made in application, the one dated 21st September, 1959, did not incorporate any determination the compensation or its payment into Court, as required by Sec.4(2). At the stage disposal of the application for eviction, this matter appears to Have been completely sight of by the trial Judge. It is clear, therefore, that the Court has failed to discharge a that has been statutorily laid upon it. It must be noted here that a case under Sec.4(2) covered by Sec.4(4) with the same implications as in the case of Sec.4(1). Mr.V.Krishnan, learned counsel for the plaintiff, wants us in the present case to adopt the same reasonings and the course, as done by the learned Judge. This, in our view, is a legitimate suggestion. 8. In N.A.Munavar Hussain v. E.R.Narayanan, A.I.R. 1984 Mad. 47, which is a decision on for the defendant, the rigour of Secs.4(1) and 4(4) has been generally discussed follows: “The three months’ time limit in Sec.4(1) of the Act is a rigid, fixed and inflexible, unalterable one incapable of extension either by court or by agreement of parties. Even time is fixed under a decree, only period of three months will be available under and failure to deposit the amount within that time would automatically attract Sec.4(4) the Act resulting in the dismissal of the suit.” This decision could be of no assistance at all to the defendant on the facts of this court. Even time is fixed under a decree, only period of three months will be available under and failure to deposit the amount within that time would automatically attract Sec.4(4) the Act resulting in the dismissal of the suit.” This decision could be of no assistance at all to the defendant on the facts of this court. Bench of this Court was not dealing with a case where there had been no ascertainment the amount of compensation at all. 9. Then the question that relevantly arises for consideration in the present case is the proper course to be adopted, when the Court below has found that the defendant entitled to the benefits of the Act and yet has not proceeded to ascertain the amount compensation and declare it in the decree. Mr.V.Krishnan, learned counsel for the though would complain about the lack of positive move on the part of the defendant the amount of compensation ascertained, yet was not averse to the matter going back Court below for ascertainment of the compensation as per Sec.4(1) of the Act prosecution of the further processes on that basis under the Act. As opined by Srinivasan, in Mohanambal v. Selvanayaki, (1961)2 M.L.J. 261 , it is a mandatory duty cast upon Court by the statute. It would be a different matter, if the parties wilfully obtain extending any co-operation in that process. But, such could not be stated to be here. In the interests of justice, we think that we should give this much relief defendant, once it is found that it is entitled to the benefits of the Act. Hence, only limited purpose, we are obliged to remit the matter back to the Court below as direction to be given hereunder. 10. There is another contention, which, though not vehemently argued, yet has expressed by the learned senior counsel appearing for the defendant and that renewal of the lease had come into existence and force by the exercise of option for by the defendant and hence the suit laid before the lapse of the period of the renewed was incompetent. With regard to the exercise of option for renewal, we can construe as amounting to exercise of the option, dropping the addition of any new clause, suggested in Ex.A-2. With regard to the exercise of option for renewal, we can construe as amounting to exercise of the option, dropping the addition of any new clause, suggested in Ex.A-2. However, Mr.V.Krishnan, learned counsel for the plaintiff, would that the set of expressions ‘please treat our request as withdrawn’ occurring in Ex.A mean the withdrawal of the very exercise of option for renewal. Strain we may, yet not able to fall in line with this thinking of the learned counsel for the plaintiff. It is only reference to the new clause suggested in Ex.A-2 the request of the defendant has withdrawn and nothing more. Then the learned counsel for the plaintiff would submit the expressions ‘we have also exercised our option for renewal of the lease’, are in the tense, and would not amount to exercise of option by Ex.A-4 itself. A harmonious reading the document along with the preceding correspondence leaves no room for ambiguity mind, that by Ex.A-4, there had been a valid exercise of option for renewal. But, exercise of option for renewal could not be of any avail to the defendant, because the well settled that a covenant for renewal contained in a lease does not ipso facto extend tenure or term of the lease, but only entitles the lessee to obtain a fresh lease. If there clause for renewal in the original lease, and that clause has been taken advantage any option pursuant thereto has been properly exercised it only gives a lever for the to obtain a new lease in accordance with and in due satisfaction of the law governing making of leases. If to the renewed lease, the requirements of the first part of Sec.107 the Transfer of Property Act are attracted, as obviously are in the present case, no lease would come into existence unless the said requirements are satisfied. So far as present case is concerned, even if the defendant is stated to have exercised its option for renewal, which position we have accepted, it has not improved the lot of the defendant to there had been a renewed lease, which had enured in its favour, because admittedly requirements of Sec.107 of the Transfer of Property Act were not satisfied. The proposition law has been clearly recapitulated by Ismail, J., as he then was, after tracing the authorities on the subject, in R.M.Mehta v. Hindustan Photo Films Manufacturing Company, M.L.J. 115, a decision cited by Mr.V.Krishnan, learned counsel for the plaintiff-in the terms: “ The result, is, once the option is exercised either by the lessor or by the lessee, a valid as such does not come into existence unless a registered document is executed, renewed lease in question satisfies the requirements of Sec.107 of the Transfer of Act. After all, the option conferred either on the lessee or on the lessor is more or less nature of a pre-emption and neither the conferment of such option itself nor the thereof automatically or of its own force brings into existence a new lease irrespective other statutory provisions regarding the form, procedure or the modalities by which such a lease can be brought into existence. Therefore, looked at from any point of view, of the opinion that once a renewed lease comes within the scope of Sec.107 of the of Property Act, such a lease can be made only by a registered instrument. I am emphasising that notwithstanding the option conferred on the lessor or the lessee in the light judgment of the Federal Court referred to above, it is a new lease that comes into as a result of the exercise of the option for renewal and that too by the bilateral acts parties and consequently the new lease is made within the scope of the expression in Sec.107 of the Transfer of Property Act and therefore it has to be only by a instrument. In this case, admittedly the renewed lease was for a period of three years it has not been a renewed lease, the initial lease itself, there was no dispute that it registration. Simply because it happened to be a renewed lease, it does not follow registered document was necessary to bring into existence such a lease. In this case, the appellants instituted the suit only on the basis of a valid renewed lease for of three years and the respondent herein having committed a breach of that contract surrendering possession or terminating that lease prior to the expiration of the prescribed thereunder. In this case, the appellants instituted the suit only on the basis of a valid renewed lease for of three years and the respondent herein having committed a breach of that contract surrendering possession or terminating that lease prior to the expiration of the prescribed thereunder. Once I hold that such a lease should have been made only registered instrument and there being no registered instrument, there was no valid a period of three years, the appellants were not entitled to institute the suit for recovery the amounts in question as damages for breach of the contract alleged to have committed by the respondent herein.” 11. In Delhi Development Authority v. Durga Chand, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 2609’, which again decision, relied on by Mr.V.Krishnan, learned counsel for the plaintiff, there are observations as follows indicating that the renewal of a lease is really a fresh lease: “A renewal of a lease is really the grant of a fresh lease. It is called a ‘renewal because it postulates the existence of a prior lease which generally provides for renewals of right. In all other respects, it is really a fresh lease.” In the present case, as we could see from the correspondence, the parties loggerheads even with regard to terms of the lease to be renewed and no document lease as per the requirements of Sec.107 of the Transfer of Property Act had come existence to bring about a renewed lease valid in the eye of law. Hence, we do not think the defendant through his learned counsel could successfully put forth a plea that there been a renewed lease, and hence the suit for ejectment was not competently laid. 12. There was a contention raised with reference to the validity of the notice to quit we did not hear any expatiative submission on this question by the learned senior counsel the defendant, yet we must express the view concurring with that of the court below exception could be taken to the validity of the notice to quit in the present case point was argued before us. 13. 13. As per our above discussion, we allow this appeal to the extent of remitting the back to the Court below for the purpose of the Court below ascertaining the amount compensation; to declare the same in the decree; to give directions with regard to deposit of the same; to work out further processes as set down under Sec.4 of the Act. In the peculiar facts circumstances of the case, the parties are directed to bear their costs upto and inclusive the disposal of this appeal. Further costs will abide the results before the Court pursuant to this order of remittal. The defendant, appellant herein, is entitled to refund the court-fees paid on the memorandum of this appeal. We make it clear that the remittal only for the purposes indicated above and we have not disturbed the findings of the below on any of the issues. V.K. — Appeal allowed in part.