JUDGMENT S. H. A. Raza, J. 1. This writ petition is directed against the judgment and order dated 2-11-83 passed by the U. P. Public Services Tribunal-I, Lucknow (hereinafter called as Tribunal) in Claim Case No. 515 of 1980, In re: Pooran Chand v. State of U. P. and others whereby the learned Tribunal had allowed the claim of the claimant and had declared that the claimant shall be deemed to have continued in service with all benefits including pay after having recorded a finding to the effect that the order of termination was void ab nitio as well as the order rejecting the representations contained in Annexures 5 and 8 to the claim petition as without jurisdiction. 2. The State of U. P. in this writ petition has alleged that on 14-3-55 opposite party no. 1 Sri Pooran Chand was initially appointed as Assistant Consolidation Commissioner, U. P. Thereafter on 15-1-57 the opposite party no. 1 was given appointment to officiate as Consolidation Officer vide G. O. No. 10617 (l)-A-443/5o. On 15-1-65 the services of the opposite party no. 1 were terminated by means of an order simpliciter but on 8-9-1960 the opposite party no. 1 was appointed afresh to officiate as Consolidation Officer vide order passed by the Consolidation Commissioner. It has been averred that the order of appointment of the opposite party no; 1 was a fresh appointment and it was mentioned that if opposite party no. 1 wishes to accept the fresh appointment he may accept the same. The opposite party no. 1 joined the office on 1-10-66 in pursuance of the letter of appointment issued by the Consolidation Commissioner. It was further averred that this fresh appointment dated 8-9-66 was given in pursuance of the representations made by the opposite party no. 1 to the authorities concerned and the appointment letter indicated that he was free to accept the appointment if he so desired. When opposite party no 1 got the appointment and he did not get the desired declaration that he continued in service with all benefits etc. from the State of U. P., opposite party no. 1 filed claim petition bearing No. 515 of 1980. 3. In claim petition the opposite party no. When opposite party no 1 got the appointment and he did not get the desired declaration that he continued in service with all benefits etc. from the State of U. P., opposite party no. 1 filed claim petition bearing No. 515 of 1980. 3. In claim petition the opposite party no. 1 averred that by means of order dated 14-3-55, he was appointed as Assistant Consolidation Officer vide order passed by the Director of Consolidation, U. P. Lucknow He joined the service as Assistant Consolidation Officer and was posted at Unnao. Thereafter, on June 15, 1957 vide Gazette Notification No. 10617 (1) 1-A- 448/56, opposite party no. 1 was promoted to the post of Consolidation Officer. It was further averred that on 13-1-65 his services were terminated. The opposite party no. 1 thereafter represented to the authorities concerned. Later on he received an order from Sri Kahar Singh, the then Consolidation Commissioner, U. P. appointing him to officiate on the temporary post of Consolidation Officer with effect from the date of his joining. Opposite Party no. 1 made every possible efforts for the disposal of his appeal which he had preferred. Ultimately on 13-7-79 the opposite party no. 1 was intimated that all his reminders, memorandum dated 13-9-66, 8-3-67,31-5-67 and 8-5-68 were rejected. 4. It was further submitted in the claim petition that the then Consolidation Commissioner Sri Kehar Singh, who terminated the services of opposite party no. 1 was not at all empowered to terminate the services of opposite party no. 1 as he was not the appointing authority. IT was further stated that there cannot be any appointment on post. All appointments are made on the post of Assistant Consolidation Officer. A direct appointment on the post of Consolidation Officer was actually an order of re-instatement of the opposite party no. 1 The claim petition was contested by the State of U. P. on the ground that the claim petition was barred by time and the same was not maintainable and secondly that the appointing authority of opposite party no. 1 was the Consolidation Commissioner and services of the opposite party no. 1 were rightly terminated by him. 5. 1 The claim petition was contested by the State of U. P. on the ground that the claim petition was barred by time and the same was not maintainable and secondly that the appointing authority of opposite party no. 1 was the Consolidation Commissioner and services of the opposite party no. 1 were rightly terminated by him. 5. Learned counsel for the State has submitted before this Court that the claim petition was barred by time and the Tribunal committed a manifest error of law by giving a finding to the effect that the defence of limitation which was based only on the contention that the order had to be set aside by a court before it became invalid must therefore be rejected. 228, the Tribunal held that as the order of termination was void there existed no necessity to declare the same as void and the petitioner can be allowed, the relief of continuity of service with all service benefits. The first question which arises for determination in this writ petition is as to whether the order of termination dated 13-1-65 is valid or not. The said order was passed by the Consolidation Commissioner, U. P. There is no denial of the fact that the order of appointment of the petitioner on the post of Consolidation Officer was passed by the State of U. P. The Consolidation Commissioner being an authority lower in rank was not competent to terminate the services of the petitioner. Learned counsel for the State has submitted that by means of the Notification No. UO-751/CH/IE-351/1958 dated January 6, 1960, notification No. 3507/1A-254/56 dated November 1, 1957, was modified and in exercise of the powers conferred by section 44 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 (U. P. Act No. V of 1954), the Governor of Uttar Pradesh was pleased to delegate the power of the State Government to appoint Consolidation Officers under section 3 (3) of the aforesaid Act, to the Consolidation Commissioner, empowered under the said Act to exercise the power of the Director of Consolidation. The main thrust of his argument is that in view of the Notification dated January 6, 1960 the Consolidation Commissioner who has been delegated the powers to appoint Consolidation Officers can terminate the service of the petitioner. The main thrust of his argument is that in view of the Notification dated January 6, 1960 the Consolidation Commissioner who has been delegated the powers to appoint Consolidation Officers can terminate the service of the petitioner. This argument is misconceived for the reason that in the said Government Order it is mentioned that the Consolidation Commissioner, Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow will not inflict the punishments of dismissal and removal on the existing Consolidation Officers who were appointed by the Government or the Board. The case of such persons will be referred to Government for orders. By means of the said notification the government of Uttar Pradesh has only delegated the authority to Consolidation Commissioner to appoint Consolidation Officers. The petitioner was promoted/appointed to the post of Consolidation Officer prior to coming into force of notification dated January 6, 1960, hence the Consolidation Commissioner had no right to terminate the services of the petitioner. The Tribunal has rightly given a finding to the effect that the Consolidation Commissioner had no authority to pass the order of termination. Further more the order of the Commissioner Consolidation is non-est for the reason that by means of a subsequent delegation or authorisation made in favour of Consolidation Commissioner, in order to make appointment cannot confer upon him the power to terminate. In the case of Krishna Kumar v. Divisional Assistant Electrical Engineer, 1979 (2) SLR 291, it has been held that the delegation of power to make a particular appointment does not enhance or improve the hiearchical status of the delegate. Officer subordinate to another will not become his equal in rank by reason of his coming to possess some of the powers of that another. The Divisional Engineer in other words, does not cease to be subordinate in rank to the Chief Electrical Engineer merely because the latter's power to make appointments to certain posts has been delegated to him. 7. Honourable Mr. Justice Y. V. Chandrachud, Chief Justice, as he then was, delivering the judgment on behalf of the Bench in the aforesaid case 6et-aside the order dated August 31, 1976, passed by the Divisional Assistant Electrical Engineer removing the appellant from service although he was given power to make appointments to the post of Train Lighting Inspector. Their lordships indicated. "We cannot accept this contention. Their lordships indicated. "We cannot accept this contention. Whether or not an authority is subordinate in rank to another has to be determined with reference to the state of affairs existing on the date of appointment It is that point of time that the constitutional guarantee under Article 311 (1) becomes available to the person holding, for example a civil post under the Union Government that he shall not be removed or dismissed by an authority subordinate to that which appointed him. The subsequent authorisation made in favour of respondent 1 in regard to making appointment to the post held by the appellant cannot confer upon respondent 1 the power to remove him. On the date of the appellant's appointment as a Train Lighting Inspector, respondent 1 had no power to make that appointment. He cannot have, therefore, the power to remove him." 8. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Sheo Ram Singh v. U. P. State, 1984 (2) LCD 321, relying upon the case of Krishna Kumar (supra), held the same view. In view of the law laid down in Krishna Kumar's case (supra) it cannot be said that the Tribunal committed any manifest error of law by giving finding to the effect that the order of termination was void ab-initio. As the order was void ab initio, the Tribunal was perfectly justified in rejecting the claim of the State of U. P. that the claim petition was not maintainable as it was barred by time. As the order of termination is totally invalid for reason of the fact that it was passed by the Consolidation Commissioner, who was not the appointing authority of the petitioner and the appointing authority of the petitioner was the State of U. P., hence the order of termination has no legal substance and it was not necessary for the opposite party no. 1 to have the order set-aside. The Tribunal was perfectly justified in granting the relief of continuity of service to the opposite party no. 1 with all service benefits. 9. In view of what has been indicated hereinabove the writ petition is devoid of merit and it is accordingly dismissed with costs. Petition dismissed.