CHANDRAKANTARAJ, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal is directed against the judgments and decrees of the courts below. This is a second appeal by the defendant against whom a decree of specific performance of the contract was granted by ihc court below. ( 2 ) PLAINTIFF presented the suit in the second munsiff court, Bangalore, in o. s. no. 214/1984 inter alia pleading that the defendant had agreed to sell certain agricultural land for a sum of rs. 7,500/- in accordance with the suit agreement dated 11-8-1975. It was set out in the agreement that the advance of rs. 1,000/- should be paid on the dale of the agreement and ihe balance consideration should be paid at the time of registralion of the instrument of sale deed before the sub- registrar having jurisdiction. However, before ihe expiry of the period of 90 days specified in the suil agreement, defendant approached the plaintiff twice and obtained monies in respect of the immovable propety agreed to be sold under the suit agreement. He had received in all a sum of Rs. 6,000/- or so before the expiration of the period of 90 days specified in the suit agreement, but he did not execute the suit agreement despite persistent pleas by the plaintiff. However, on 1-4-1978 the defendant approached the plaintiff for enhancement of the price or consideration to rs. l0,000/ -. the defendant did not agree. But on the instance of mutual friends, he agreed to pay the consideration of rs. 10,000/- demanded by the defendant. The defendant wanted the cnllrc balance of sale price to be paid to him. Accordingly, on that day, he paid Rs. 2,000/- and defendant undertook to be present in the office of the sub-registrar to register the sale deed whenever the plaintiff called upon him to do so. The same was approved by the defendant. Since then, the plaintiff had been repeatedly requesting him to execute the registered sale deed. The defendant postponed the registralion of the sale deed on one or the other pretext. Therefore, a registered notice was issued on 16-11-1981 calling upon the defendant to execute the sale deed in his favour. The defendant caused an untenable reply to that notice to be issued. He refused to cxcculc ihe sate deed. In thai circumstance, the plaint was presented seeking a decree for specific performance. Therefore, a registered notice was issued on 16-11-1981 calling upon the defendant to execute the sale deed in his favour. The defendant caused an untenable reply to that notice to be issued. He refused to cxcculc ihe sate deed. In thai circumstance, the plaint was presented seeking a decree for specific performance. ( 3 ) THE defendant resisted the suit and filed his written stalement. He admitted the execution of the suit agreement daled 11-8-1975 and the sale price agreed at rs. 7,500/- for the agricultural land, ihe subjecl matter of the agreement to sell. He further admitted the receipt of Rs. 1,000/- as advance on the date of the suit agreement Rs. 2,000/ on 13-8-1975 and another sum of Rs. 3,000/- from plaintiff towardslhe sale consideration. He denied that he had agreed to produce all the title deeds before the sub-registrar and would receive the balance amount before the sub-registrar. He alleged that he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. He had even obtained permission to alienate the suit schedule property to the plaintiff. He had not at all delivered possession of the suit schedule property to the plaintiff. He had signed a receipt for Rs. 3,000/- on bona fide belief. He was an illiterate as he did not know the english language. He never parted with the possession of the suit schedule property to any one muchless the plaintiff. He had been in lawful possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property. He had received Rs. 7,500/- in all. The plaintiff postponed the execution of the sale deed in his nominee's name as he was searching for a prospective purchaser who would pay the higher amount to him with a view to make profit in the said transaction. Ultimately, he informed the plaintiff that as he had committed default and breach of contract and had not completed his part of the agreement, that is the suit agreement, and as such he had forfeited the advance amount paid to him. All other allegations in the plaint were denied. ( 4 ) ON such pleadings, as many as 9 issues and 3 additional issues are framed. All other allegations in the plaint were denied. ( 4 ) ON such pleadings, as many as 9 issues and 3 additional issues are framed. It would be necessary to refer to only issues 3, 4 and 6 on which the decision of the courts below stand, as most of the other allegations have been admitted by the defendant, who is the appellant in this court. ISSUE No. 3) whether the plaintiff proves thai he paid the balance of sale price of Rs. 2,100/- apart from Rs. 7,900)/-?issue No. 4) whether the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract?issue No. 6) whether ihc defendant proved that agreement was time barred?on all the issues, from the evidence led, the trial court held in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant. In appeal, the judgment of the trial court in all respect have been confirmed. ( 5 ) IN this court, what has been urged by the learned counsel for the appellant is that ex. P. 2 the receipt said to have been signed by the defendant was a forged document and it was not correct that he received that amount in 1978 as balance of enhanced price and handed over possession of the property. But that is really a question of fact on which the courts below have found against the plaintiff. The trial court has relied upon the evidence of P. W. 1 and P. W. 4 the attesting witnesses to ex. P. 2 to accept that document as genuine. It has compared the signatures of the defendant no other documents in evidence as well as the admitted signatures on record and found them to be the same. On that reasoning and having regard to the other oral evidence led by the plaintiff, it came to the conclusion that the defendant had indeed parted with possession of the property and received the enhanced price of Rs. 10,0007- for the suit schedule property. In that circumstance, the plea of limitation pulforward was rejected on the ground that there was always the willingness on the part of the plaintiff to perform his part of the contract at all times and that indeed the defendant had performed part of his obligation under the suit agreement. It was in that view of the matter the suit came to be decreed rejecting the plea of limitation. It was in that view of the matter the suit came to be decreed rejecting the plea of limitation. ( 6 ) RELIANCE was however placed by the learned counsel on the decision of this court in the case of mahboob pasha v syed zahecntddin and others, AIR 1988 Karnataka 83. My attention was drawn by the learned counsel to what the division bench of this court has ruled in paragraphs 6 and 7, the substance of which is to the following effect:-"that the time prescribed by the Limitation Act may not be extended by consent of parties as that would amount to conferring jurisdiction on the court by consent which otherwise the court would lack by operation of law in regard to limitation to entertain a suit beyond a specified lime. "i am unable to see how that principle is attracted or in what way the said decision assists the appellant. In paragraph 9 of the judgment in mahboob pasha's case (supra) as reported in ILR (kant) it is held that:-"artkle 54 of the limitation in column 3 provides for two points of time according to which limitation should be completed. The first one in regard to the time specified in the agreement, if any, in the second part with reference to refusal or demand refusal to perform a contract by either of the parlies. "as already narrated, the findings on the facts of the case of the appellant is that though the suit agreement was of the year 1975, the courts found that he had received consideration under that agreement even after the period of 90 days specified and he had further changed the terms of the contract at a subsequent date namely 1-4-1978 by increasing the considerat ion which was evidenced by the receipt executed by him as at ex. P. 2 as well as the olhcr evidence of the attesting witness to that document, therefore, the earlier agreement stood replaced by a fresh agreement on 1-4-1978. As such the period specified for performance of the contract in the suit agreement was not the essence of the contract and as such no assistance may be derived by the division bench judgment of this court in mahaboob pasha's case. As such the period specified for performance of the contract in the suit agreement was not the essence of the contract and as such no assistance may be derived by the division bench judgment of this court in mahaboob pasha's case. ( 7 ) ON the other hand, the trial court has relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of govind prasad chatwvedi v han dull shastri and another, AIR 1977 SC 1005 . Interpreting Section 55 of the Contract Act with reference to Section 53-a of the transfer of properly Act, the Supreme Court held that:-"the fixation of the period within which the contract has to be performed does not make the stipulation as to time the essence of the contract. When a contract relates to sale of immovable property it will normally be presumed that the time is not the essence of the contract. The intention to treat time as the essence of the contract may be evidenced by circumstances which should be sufficiently strong to displace the normal presumption that in a contract of sale of land stipulation as to time is not the essence of the contract. "for that proposition, the supreme court relied on its earlier decision, (see AIR 1967 Supreme Court puge 868) in the case of gonta thinayagam piilai and others v piltaniswami nadar. ( 8 ) IN some what similar circuinstances, a division bench of this court in the case of sudha v sharadanunu, ILR 1985 (1) karnutaka page 1483 held that:-"the court was not bound to grant decree merely because it was lawful to do so and the court has to exercise discretion based on judicial principles to do perfect and complete Justice between parties. "it further held in regard to construction of contracts as follows:-" (I) principles of construction of contracts is quite different from construing a statute or a testamentary disposition. In considering a statute or a will the intention of one body only. Be it legislature or a testator is considered. In construing a contract or in considering whether the parlies have entered into a binding contract, the intentions of the two parties has to be considered. Whether the parties have agreed together on the terms lhat shall bind them has to be examined. Be it legislature or a testator is considered. In construing a contract or in considering whether the parlies have entered into a binding contract, the intentions of the two parties has to be considered. Whether the parties have agreed together on the terms lhat shall bind them has to be examined. As the good old maxim goes there must be consensus ad idem, this consensus ad idem could be gathered not by the words spoken or written by one,but by the outward expressions of both the parties gathered from surrounding circumstances. (ii) where letters between the parlies are not precise in terms as to offer or acceptance and if one party, however, asserts lhat there was offer and acceptance, the court must find out whether the acceptance was absolute in terms of the offer made. Unless such terms are reasonably ascertained, the court will not enforce the terms of the contract. "to the said decision in sudha's case (supra,) I am a party. Therefore, apart from the binding nature of the principles, I can not disagree with the view with which I have concurred in sudha's case. ( 9 ) IF substantial Justice is done and the intention of the parties to a contract must be gathered from the surrounding circumstances though not evidenced by express words stated or not staled, no question of law arises for consideration under Section 100 of C. P. C. and this court will not act as a further court of appeal to disturb the findings of facts. The appeal is therefore misconceived. It is rejected. --- *** --- .