ORDER S. M. Singh, J. - The petitioner was employed as an armed guard in the United Commercial Bank, Robert Sganj Branch District Mirzapur (Now Sonbhadra) by an order of the Branch Manager on 20.3.1958. The post of armed guard admittedly is class IV post. At the time of entry into service the recorded age of the petitioner was about 27 years: No exact date of birth was entered any where in his service record. By order/notice dated 18.12.1990 (Annexure-1 to the writ petition), the petitioner was informed that since at the time of his entry into service on 20.3.1958 his recorded age was about 27 years, he would be attaining the age of superannuation on 20.3.1991 and accordingly he would be retiring from bank service on the last date of the month i.e. 31.3.1991. It is his order/notice 18.12.1990 which is sought to be quashed by means of this writ petition. 2. Sri S.N. Verma Senior learned counsel for the respondents No. 1 and has raised a preliminary objection as to the maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that the petitioner had been alternative remedy by way of the reference under the provisions of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. He has placed reliance upon a Full Bench Decision of this court in Charndrama Singh v. Managing Director, U.P. Cooperative Union Lucknow (1991) 2 U.P.L.B.E.C. 898. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner, however contended before me that the petitioner was almost illiterate and ignorant of the formalities about the entries of his age in his service book and that the bank authorities too did not require him to complete any formality or furnish any document with regard to his exact date of birth and without any basis they have superannuated the petitioner on the basis of his approximate age entered at the time of his entry into service, he further contended that the order impugned in the writ petition was passed in breach of principles of natural justice and hence the plea of alternative remedy would not be available to the respondents. Sri Sidheshari Prasad learned senior counsel for the petitioner has further contended before me that the remedy by way of reference of industrial dispute under section 10 of the Act is not a remedy which may said to be available to the petitioner. 4. Sri Sidheshari Prasad learned senior counsel for the petitioner has further contended before me that the remedy by way of reference of industrial dispute under section 10 of the Act is not a remedy which may said to be available to the petitioner. 4. In the that appropriate Government may or may not refer the dispute for adjudication to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal. He invited my attention to Section 2(oo) read with Section 2-A of the Act and contended that the petitioner having been superannuated by means of the impugned order, the case in hand may not amount to an industrial dispute, it being a case of superannuation, though illegal, of a individual workman. 5. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and having given thoughtful consideration to the submissions advanced at the Bar, I am of the considered view that the dispute involved in the present case is in he nature of a dispute comprehended by Section 2-A of the Act not withstanding the fact they and individual workman only is concerned with the dispute and other workmen or their unit may not come forward to espouse the case of the petitioner. The expression 'retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Act being relevant for the purposes of the case may be quoted below : "2(oo) retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service or a workman for any reason whatsoever otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include- (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or (b) retirement of the workman of reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf; or (b) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein; or (c) termination of the service of a workman on the ground of continued ill-health. Section 2-A of the Act provides that where any employer discharges, dismiss, retrenches or otherwise terminates the services of an individual workman, any dispute or difference between that workman and his employer connected with, or arising out, of such discharge dismissal retrenchment or termination shall be deemed to be an industrial dispute notwithstanding that no other workman nor any union of workmen is party to the dispute. it is evident from the section that any dispute arising out of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination shall be deemed to be an industrial dispute and if what the petitioner says is accepted, the impugned order/notice of superannuation would be nothing but retrenchment within the meaning of section 2(oo) of the Act attracting the provisions of section 2-A of the Act. Learned counsel for the petitioner cannot be permitted to blow hot and could in the same breath. His contention that he has been illegally superannuated before he could attain the prescribed age of superannuation if accepted as a fact would bring the case out of exception (b) to Section 2(oo) of the Act. 6. In view of this the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the impugned order being an order of superannuation, though on the basis of erroneous age of the petitioner would not tantamount an industrial dispute within the meaning of section 2(oo) of the Act cannot be accepted. 7. Sri Sidheshwari Prasad, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner has placed great reliance upon the following observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ram and Shyam Co. v. State of Haryana, AIR 1985 (S.C.) 1147 ; "Ordinarily it is true that the court has imposed a restraint in its own wisdom on its exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution where the party invoking jurisdiction has an effective, adequate alternative remedy. More often it has been expressly stated that the rule which requires exhaustion of alternative remedies in the rule of convenience and the discretion rate than the rule of law, at any date it does not out jurisdiction of the court." Learned counsel for the respondents rightly submitted before me that there is no quarrel with the above proposition of law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ram & Shyam Co. (supra). (supra). But the fact still remains that this court may not, in its discretion, choose to go into a disputed question of fact, record evidence in relation to such disputed question of fact and record a finding thereon, Special Tribunal constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act would certainly be in a better position to record evidence and finding on such disputed question of fact on appraisal of the evidence adduced before it. The parties would have full opportunity to lead oral and documentary evidence in respect of their case. Such a procedure is neither feasible nor advisable in writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. It may be that the Bank authorities in issuing the impugned order/notice of superannuation have not acted in consonance with the rule of natural justice in superannuating the petitioner without first affording him a opportunity to establish as to what was his, exact date of birth, particularly when no date of birth was entered in his service record and only an approximate age was mentioned as "about 27 years" on the date of entry into service. But the petitioner cannot get an effective relief from this court, so long as it is not determined as to what is the exact date of birth. On the other hand the Tribunal, on the basis of the evidence that may be adduced before it, may record a finding and give an award in his favour. A notice dated 22.2.1981 (Annexure-C.A.10) no doubt appears to have been issued to the petitioner calling upon him to produce certificate such as school leaving certificate/extract of birth entry from the relevant register of Nagar Palika or hospital in order to show his date of birth and no decision seems to have been taken in the matter by the Bank Authorities, but my attention has not been invited to any rule regulation or standing order providing for an independent authority empowered to adjudicate upon any such dispute as in involved in the present case to which this court may issue direction to decide the controversy in tune with the principles of natural justice instead of relegating the petitioner to the alternative remedy available to his under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. 8. 8. Sri Sidheshwari Prasad cited before me a decision of this court in Ahmad Hussain v. Managing Director (1991)1, U.P.B.E.C. 557 and urged on its basis that the petitioner be not relegated to the alternative remedy of reference of industrial dispute under he provisions of the industrial Disputes Act. He has placed reliance upon the following observations of the Learned Single Judge (Hon. R.R.K. Trivedi, J.) In the above case: "Now it has to be considered as to whether the respondents have rightly retired the petitioner on the basis of the birth year 1929 mentioned in the service record. It is not clear as to how the respondents have chosen 30th June, 1989 for retiring the petitioner on the basis of the year 1929. No rule or regulation or Standing order has been placed before me for determining the age of superannuation in such circumstances. If only year is mentioned it could be very well said that the petitioner was born on Ist January, 1929 and it can also be said that the petitioner was born on 31st December, 1929 but in the two dates of the same year the difference will be of one year and in these circumstances, the notice Annexure-7 to the writ petition, retiring the petitioner on 30th June, 1989 is wholly illegal and arbitrary. In my opinion in such doubtful cases only the last date of the year i.e. 31st December, 1929 can be taken to be the date for calculating the age of superannuation. The reason for the aforesaid view is that in case of doubt the benefit will go always to the weaker side or to who shall suffer more. In case the employee is allowed to continue for same time more, no harm will be caused to******* For the reasons stated above, in my opinion, the petitioner cannot be legally retired on the basis of the nol.ice, Annexure-7 to the writ petition, dated 9th May, 1989. The notice was illegal arbitrary and is liable to be quashed." Ahmad Hussain, the petitioner in the above case had filed a school leaving certificate issued by the Basic Shiksha Adhikari, Barabanki in support of his date of birth and no reasons were recorded by the Corporation authorities to reject the said certificate, accordingly the High Court vide its order dated 5.5.1989 directed for deciding the representation of Adhad Hussaid by a reasoned order. The representation was there decided but the reasons given in the decision were in the opinion of the High Court, arbitrary and not sustainable in law. The facts of the present case are different from the facts of Ahmad Husain's case (supra). The said decision to my mind would not help the petitioner. In this case the respondents have determined the age of superannuation on the basis of the petitioner's age entered in his service book, taking the date of his entry into service as the date on which he completed 27 years of his age. In absence of any material as to what as the exact date of birth such a course of action adopted by the respondent Bank cannot be termed as illegal or arbitrary under Article 226 of the Constitution. If, however, the petitioner succeeds in proving before the Industrial Tribunal on the basis of the evidence adduced with regard to his exact date of birth that he is yet to attain the age of superannuation, Industrial Tribunal will have ample power to grant appropriate relief including the relief of back wages. 9. The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the appropriate Government may or may not refer the dispute under Section 10 of the Act, is without any substance. The discretion vested in the appropriate Government under section 10 of the Act is not an arbitrary discretion. It has to be exercised reasonably and not capriciously. Law is too settled that when a statutory power is conferred upon an authority with an obligation to exercise it for the legitimate purposes and lawful objects for which power is conferred, an arbitrary refused to exercise the power may be successfully questioned in the High court under Articles 226, 227 of the Constitution and this court may issue and appropriate writ, order of direction to the appropriate Government to refer the dispute. 10. In view of the above discussion the writ petitioner fails and is accordingly dismissed in limine on the ground of alternative remedy.