ORDER S.R. Singh, J. - The petition in hand seeks quashing of an order contained in the communication dated 9-4-1991 (Annexure 16 to the writ petition) whereby the petitioner was informed that the resolution of the Committee of Management passed in its meeting dated 27-10-1990 terminating the petitioners' services with effect from 30-3- 1990 had been approved by the Director, Pravidhik Shiksha, U.P. 2. Factual matrix of the case in short is that the petitioner was appointed as Lecturer in Digambar Jain Polytechnic College, Meerut (in short the institution) which is governed by the provisions of the U.P. Pravidhik Shiksha Adhiniyam, 1962 (herein after referred to as the Adhiniyam). Subsequently he was selected for appointment as Principal of the institution. The selection, however, could not receive approval of the Director, Pravidhik Shiksha, U.P. under S. 22F (2) of the Adhiniyam. But upon the representation being made by the petitioner to the State Government under S. 22F(4) of the Adhiniyam, approval to his selection was accorded by the Governor and the Adhyaksha of the institution was accordingly informed vide Government Order dated 19-11-1985 (Annexure 2. to the writ petition). Pursuant to the said approval accorded by the State Government vide order dated 19-11-1985, the petitioner was appointed as Principal of the institution vide order dated 1-12-1985 (Annexure-4 to the writ petition) and he started working as such. It appears that by his letter dated 15-12-1987, the petitioner applied for leave without pay for going abroad in connection with private assignment as Quality Control Engineer pertaining to road project undertaken by M/s. Som Dutt Builders in co-operation with M.M.T. C. of India in Jordan. The committee of management, however granted him only one years' leave uptill 30-12-1988. The petitioner applied for extension, but the same was refused by the Managing Committee of the Institution. The petitioner did not join his duties even though the extension of leave sought for was refused, whereupon a show cause notice was given to him, in response to which the petitioner joined his duties in the institution on 28-2-1989 i.e. about two months after the expiry of the leave period. 3. The petitioner again appears to have applied for leave to go abroad vide his application dated 15-2-1990 which was moved by him before the Committee of Management whilst he was holding a meeting on 16-2-1990. 3. The petitioner again appears to have applied for leave to go abroad vide his application dated 15-2-1990 which was moved by him before the Committee of Management whilst he was holding a meeting on 16-2-1990. The application was admittedly directed to be placed, with the sanction of the chairman, on the agenda of the next meeting of the committee of management. The petitioner, who is the Ex officio secretary of the Committee of Management, did not call the meeting of the committee of management for consideration of his leave application dated 15-2-1990 and preferred to leave the institution on 28-2-1990 and went to Jordan after handing over the charge to Sri Satya Pal Singh, the Junior most teacher of the institution. It may be pertinent to mention here that the petitioner personally met the Chairman of the Managing Committee in connection with his leave application but the Chairman too refused to sanction the leave without resolution being passed in this regard by the Managing Committee. The petitioner seems to have sent a letter dated 28-2-1990 to the Chairman of the Managing Committee informing the latter that he (petitioner) was sanctioned two year's leave on 30-12-1987 and that he was leaving for Jordan after handing over the charge to Sri Satya Pal Singh. In the back ground of these events the petitioner was placed under suspension with effect from 30-3-1990 and was given a notice dated 30-3-1990 calling upon him to show cause why necessary disciplinary action be not taken against him on the charges indicated in the notice. Relevant portion of the suspension order dated 30-3-1990, a photostat copy of which has been annexed an Annexure-7 to the writ petition, is reproduced below : 4. (Matter in vernacular, Omitted...... Ed.) The reply to the above notice is said to have been sent to the Chairman of the Institution through petitioner's counsel Sri S. N. Upadhyaya vide covering letter dated 26-5- 1990 (Annexures-8 and 9 to the writ petition respectively). Although the covering letter and the draft reply (Annexures-9 and 8 respectively) both bear the signature of Sri S. N. Upadhyaya as also the date viz. 26-5- 1990, but it appears from the counter affidavit that the covering letter and the draft reply sent to the Chairman were not dated and signed either by the petitioner or by his counsel Sri S. N. Upadhyaya. 5. 26-5- 1990, but it appears from the counter affidavit that the covering letter and the draft reply sent to the Chairman were not dated and signed either by the petitioner or by his counsel Sri S. N. Upadhyaya. 5. The Committee of management in its meeting dated 22-6-1990 appointed Sri Ram Krishan Agarwal, Proprietor, Hursh Engineering Works, Surajkund, Meerut as Enquiry Officer to enquire into the charge levelled against the petitioner vide notice/charge-sheet/suspension order dated 30-3-1990. The petitioner as also his counsel Sri S. N. Upadhyaya were informed accordingly vide letter dated 17-7-1990 (Annexure-10 to the writ petition), wherein it is also mentioned that the reply and the covering letter (Annexures-8 and 9) were neither dated nor signed by the petitioner. The Enquiry Officer Sri Ram Krishna Agarwal in his report dated 17-8-1990 submitted to the Chairman of the Inspection stated that the charge that the petitioner left the institution without his leave being sanctioned and without any prior notice to any one as also the charge that the petitioner left the institution after handing over the charge to the junior most teacher in the institution, were as evident and proved by documents on record as anything and no enquiry was required to be held to ascertain the facts pertaining to these charges. A copy of this report dated 17-8- 1990 was endorsed to the petitioner with a note that he may send his reply to the Committee of the Management straightway with a warning that if no reply was received from the petitioner by 30-9-1990, it would be taken that he had nothing to say in the matter. The Managing Committee appears to have taken up the matter in its meeting held on 27- 10-1990. The report of the Enquiry Officer was accepted in the said meeting and the petitioner was found guilty of the charges levelled against him and accordingly the notice dated 21-2-1991 was issued to the petitioner calling upon him to show cause within 15 days of the receipt of the notice, why the proposed punishment be not awarded to him. The petitioner was warned that if no reply was received from him, it would be taken that he had nothing to say in the matter. This notice was sent to the petitioner as per his address in Jordan, New Delhi and Meeruit. 6. The petitioner was warned that if no reply was received from him, it would be taken that he had nothing to say in the matter. This notice was sent to the petitioner as per his address in Jordan, New Delhi and Meeruit. 6. It appears that the above notice was handed over to be petitioner's counsel Sri S. N. Upadhyaya, who on the basis of the instruction received from the petitioner's son, wrote a letter dated 9-3-1991 to the Director, Providhik Shiksha, Kanpur stating therein that the petitioner had been taking all possible endeavour to come to India to join his services at the institution. But due to Gulf War he had not been able to come back. Accordingly it was requested that one month further time be allowed to the petitioner to enable him to submit his explanation to the show cause notice. The Director, Technical Education, U.P. accorded approval to the decision taken by the committee of management in its meeting held on 27-10-1990, according to which the petitioner's services were to be terminated w.e.f. 30-3-1990. On the basis of the said approval the Managing Committee by its registered letter dated 23-4-1991 informed the petitioner that in view of the Director's letter dated 9-4-1991, the decision taken by the committee of management in its meeting held on 27-10-1990 to terminate the petitioner's services w.e.f. 30-3-1990 became effective and operative. The petitioner was further informed by means of the said letter that his salary and other emoluments upto 28-2-1990 had been paid. According to that letter he was not entitled to any salary from 1-3-1990 to 30-3-1990 during which period he was absent from duty without leave. The petitioner was further asked to return the books taken by him from the library and other articles of the institution possessed by him. These two orders dated 9-4-1991 and 23- 4-1991 are sought to be quashed by means of this writ petition. 7. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. S. 22G of the Adhiniyam which deals with the dismissal or removal etc. teachers being relevant for the purposes of this case is quoted below : "22-G Dismissal or removal etc. These two orders dated 9-4-1991 and 23- 4-1991 are sought to be quashed by means of this writ petition. 7. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. S. 22G of the Adhiniyam which deals with the dismissal or removal etc. teachers being relevant for the purposes of this case is quoted below : "22-G Dismissal or removal etc. of teachers : (1) No principal or teacher may be dismissed from service or reduced in rank or subject to any diminution in emoluments, or served with notice of termination of service except with the prior approval in writing of the Director, whose decision shall be communicated within such period as may be provided by regulations. (2) The Director may approve or disapprove or reduce or enhance the punishment or approve or disapprove of the notice for termination of service proposed by the Management : Provided that in the case of a punishment before passing orders, the Director shall give an opportunity to the Principal or the teacher to show cause within a fortnight of the receipt of the notice why the proposed punishment should not be approved. (3) Nothing in this section shall apply to an order of suspension during the pendency or in contemplation of an inquiry." 8. The section quoted above is pari materia with S. 16G(3) of the U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921. The expression "except with prior approval in writing of the Director" occurring in S. 22G of the Adhiniyam suggests that the removal, dismissal or termination of the services of teachers with effect from a date anterior to the date of approval may not be permissible under law. It is true that the Managing Committee in its meeting held on 27-10-1990, which resolved to terminate the petitioner's services with effect from 30-3-1990 i.e. the date with effect from which he was under suspension and the Director approved the said resolution of the Committee of Management so as to make it lawful in absence of any legal inhibition, for the Committee of Management to terminate the services of a teacher with retrospective effect in terms of the approved resolution. But in my considered view the expression "with prior approval in writing" as distinguished from the expression "subject to approval in writing" forbids the Director to approve dismissal, removal or termination with a retrospective date i.e. to say w.e.f. a date anterior to the date of approval accorded in writing. But is in accordance with the view that I have taken in writ petition No. 2578 of 1985, R.S. Saxena v. Managing Committee and others decided on 28-8-1991, dismissal, removal or termination etc. may still be effective and valid with effect from the date of passing the order of termination viz. 9-4-1991. 9. Now the next question to be seen, is whether the order of termination of the petitioner's services is vitiated, as urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner, firstly because the petitioner was not afforded reasonable opportunity for showing cause as contemplated by the proviso to sub-section (2) of S. 22G of the Adhiniyam; secondly because absence of any Regulations contemplated by S. 23(2) (ri) resulted in conferral of arbitrary, unrestricted and unguided power upon the Committee of Management and the Director, Providhik Shiksha, U.P. thirdly because the petitioner's services were terminated on mala fide ground at the behest of Sri Kailash chand Jain, Acting Chairman of the Institution arrayed as respondent No. 3 and lastly for the reasons that the approval was accorded arbitrarily and without application of mind, as to whether the proposed punishment was commensurate with the charges levelled against the petitioner. 10. As regards the plea that the petitioner was denied opportunity within the meaning of proviso to sub-section (2) of S. 22G of the Adhiniyam, I find from the record that the contention of the petitioner's counsel in respect of breach of proviso to sub-section (2) of S. 22G has no legs to stand upon. The petitioner was given ample opportunity to have his say at every pertinent stage of the disciplinary proceeding against him. The petitioner was given due and reasonable opportunity to explain the charges levelled against him vide letter/notice/charge-sheet dated 30-3-1990, which is said to have been received by the petitioner on 3-5-1990 and also to have his say before the Enquiry Officer vide letter dated 17-7-1990 and then before the Chairman of the Committee of Management vide letter dated 17-8-1990 and lastly before the Director, Providhik Shiksha vide D.O. letter dated 21-2-1991. If the petitioner failed to avail these opportunities given to him, he must thank himself. It is true that in the letter dated 9-3-1991 addressed to the Director, Technical Education, U.P. Kanpur and signed by Sri S. N. Upadhyaya, Advocate on the basis of the instructions allegedly received from the petitioner's son Sri Saurabh, a month's further time was sought for to enable the petitioner to submit his explanation before the Director in view of the fact that the petitioner was unable to come to India from Jardan due to situation prevailing at that time on account of Gulf War. But the fact remains that in his letter dated 3-12-1990 (Annexure 13 to the writ petition) written by Sri S. N. Upadhyaya on behalf of the petitioner to the Director, Technical Education, U.P. Kanpur, all that could have been said in the matter by the petitioner, was said. The fact that the petitioner went abroad without leave being sanctioned and the fact that he handed over the charge of the office of the Principal to a Junior teacher, are self evident and demonstrate casual manner in which the petitioner was discharging onerous duties of the Principal of an institution. "The post of Principal is of Pivotal importance in the life of a college, around whom wheels the tone and temper of the institution, on whom depends the continuity of its traditions maintenance of discipline and the efficiency of its teaching. "Lilly Kurrian v. Sr. Lewina, AIR 1979 SC 52 : 1978 Lab IC 1644. From the conduct of the petitioner it is abundantly clear that he was more interested in his private assignment abroad, may be on terms advantageous to him from financial point of view than in the interest of the institution, of which he was the Principal. Admittedly in the post also the petitioner had gone abroad and did not join his duties on expiry of the leave period. He joined his duties only on receipt of a show cause notice. On the second occasion he went abroad without getting his leave sanctioned, even though the Chairman of the institution had personally declined to grant him leave without the same being sanctioned by the Managing Committee. He joined his duties only on receipt of a show cause notice. On the second occasion he went abroad without getting his leave sanctioned, even though the Chairman of the institution had personally declined to grant him leave without the same being sanctioned by the Managing Committee. The submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner that in view of the fact that the petitioner was granted leave in the past, he could be said to have reasonably anticipated grant of leave applied for again, cannot be accepted. It is also to be noticed that although on that occasion the petitioner was granted only one year's leave and his application for extension of leave was rejected and he was duly informed of the rejection of his application vide resolution dated 23-10-1988, the information of which was sent to the petitioner the letter dated 2-11-1988, but in his letter dated 28-2-1990, the petitioner wrongly stated that he was granted two year's leave on 30-12-1987. Such a conduct is unbecoming of the Principal of an institution. 11. Coming to the second contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that absence of Regulation contemplated by S. 23(2)(ri) of the Adhiniyam has resulted in arbitrary decision against the petitioner by the committee of management as well as by the Director, Providhik, Shiksha. I am afraid this contention cannot be accepted. Here absence of Regulation contemplated by S. 23(2)(ri) of the Adhiniyam will neither put the bar against initiation and conclusion of the disciplinary proceeding against a teacher governed by the Adhiniyam nor will it result in such action being termed as arbitrary and illegal. Law is too well settled that the power conferred upon an authority or body must not be exercised for unauthorised purpose. It is trite proposition of law that the exercise of power for unauthorised purpose is vitiated in law. The repository power must exercise the power in good faith and not in bad faith and this can be done even without formal Regulations being made governing exercise of discretion of the body or the authority vested with the power, for the action taken by the authority can still be tested on touch stone of reasonableness which is a facet of Article 14 of the Constitution. Action taken by a body of authority has to be decided in the light of these principles whether or not there are Regulations governing exercise of power. In the instant case I do not find that the committee of management or the Director, Providhik Shiksha acted arbitrarily or capriciously in exercise of powers vested in them under the Adhiniyam. 12. Learned counsel for the petitioner was not very serious about his contention regarding the order being actuated because of the animosity of the respondent No. 3. Even otherwise the decision was taken by the entire body constituting the committee which was to become effective with the prior approval of the Director, Providhik Shiksha, U.P. The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the impugned order was vitiated because of the reasons of mala fide as alleged in the writ petition, is devoid of merits. 13. The further contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Director accorded approval without application of mind to all the relevant facts and circumstances and without giving reasons for approval particularly with regard to the quantum of punishment. In order to appreciate this contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner, I have to examine the nature and scope of the power conferred upon the Director, Technical Education by S. 22C of the Adhiniyam. The provisions of law enacted in S. 22G are regulatory in nature and confer supervisory power upon the Director, Technical Education. While according or refusing approval to the punishment proposed by the Committee of Management, Director has to act with reasons. The exercise of supervisory power vested in the Director by S. 22G must be on objective assessment of material on record justifying the approval or disapproval of the proposed punishment. The power vested in the Director is not an absolute power in the sense that the Director may approve or disapprove as he likes. Rather he has to approve the proposed punishment if the facts and circumstances of the case so warrant and disapprove the proposed punishment if it is not warranted on the facts and circumstances of the case. The Director has power to reduce or enhance the punishment or to approve or disapprove of the notice of termination of service proposed by the management and this power has to be exercised reasonably and not capriciously. The Director has power to reduce or enhance the punishment or to approve or disapprove of the notice of termination of service proposed by the management and this power has to be exercised reasonably and not capriciously. For all these reasons it is implicit in the nature of the power conferred upon the Director under S. 22G that the power of approval or disapproval, as the case may be, must be based upon reasons and the Director while approving or disapproving, reducing or enhancing the proposed punishment must record reasons. Relying upon a five Judge Bench Decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in S.N. Mukherji v. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 1984 : 1990 Cri LJ 2148 I have taken a view in writ petition No. 5083, of 1983, Devesh Misra v. State of U.P. and others decided on 28-8-1991, that the Director General of Police while approving of the proposed punishment of removal of a cadet from training College under the relevant Regulations was obliged to record reasons for justifying the approval particularly in the context of the explanation submitted by the cadet. The Hon'ble Supreme Court after considering a number of authorities in S. N. Mukherji's case (supra) laid down that the requirement of recording reasons is now considered as a facet of natural justice keeping in view its expanding horizon. 14. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents placed reliance upon Som Datt Datta v. Union of India, AIR 1969 SC 414 : 1969 Cri LJ 663 and in State of Madras v. Sri Niwasan, AIR 1966 SC 1827 and urged before me that the observations made in S. N. Mukerji's case (supra) are obiter and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the above two decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents still held the field on the question under consideration. 15. So far as Som Dutta's case (supra) is concerned, it was considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in S. N. Mukherji's case and I have nothing to say about it. 15. So far as Som Dutta's case (supra) is concerned, it was considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in S. N. Mukherji's case and I have nothing to say about it. So far as Sriniwasan's case (supra) is concerned it is to be seen that the complaints against Sriniwasan were investigated by the C.I.D. and as a result of this investigation a reference was made to the Tribunal for disciplinary proceeding which framed certain charges against him and on a further reference by the State Government, the Tribunal framed further charges and all these charges were in respect of the acts of corruption alleged to have been committed by Sriniwasan. The parties adduced evidence before the Tribunal. As a result of enquiry the Tribunal found that out of five charges 1st and the last charges were not proved. Although there was same suspicion of guilt in respect of golden wrist watch chain mentioned in the charge No. 1. The Tribunal also found that remaining three charges had been proved against Sriniwasan, accordingly it (Tribunal) recommended that he (Sriniwasan) be compulsorily retired from service. On receipt of the report of the Tribunal, the State Government provisionally accepted its findings and issued a notice calling upon him to show cause why he should not be compulsorily retired from service. In response to the show cause notice an elaborate explanation in support of his case, that he was completely innocent of the charges levelled against him, was submitted by Sriniwasan. The matter was sent by the State Government to the Madras Public Service Commission for its advice. The Commission-communicated to the State Government that it was "generally in agreement" with the findings of the Tribunal. On receipt of the Communication from the commission, the State Government passed an order compulsorily retiring Sri Niwasan from service. The appeal filed by Sriniwasan was dismissed by by the Governor. Thereafter Sriniwasan moved the Madras High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the validity of the order by which he was compulsorily retired from service. The High Court allowed the writ petition on the ground that the impugned order was based on suspicion. The State of Madras preferred an appeal to the Hon'ble Supreme Court by special leave. The appeal was allowed and the High Court's order was set aside. The High Court allowed the writ petition on the ground that the impugned order was based on suspicion. The State of Madras preferred an appeal to the Hon'ble Supreme Court by special leave. The appeal was allowed and the High Court's order was set aside. In paragraph 15 the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the submissions made on behalf of Sriniwasan that the State was under an obligation to indicate the reasons as to why it accepted the findings of the Tribunal, has observed as below : "We are not prepared to accept this argument. In dealing with the question as to whether it is obligatory on the State Government to give reasons in support of the order imposing a penalty on the delinquent officer, we cannot overlook the fact that the disciplinary proceedings against such a delinquent officer being with an enquiry conducted by an officer appointed in that behalf. The enquiry is followed by a report and the Public Service Commission is consulted where necessary. Having regard to the material which is thus made available to the State Government and which is made available to the delinquent officer also, it seems to us somewhat unreasonable to suggest that the State Government must record its reasons why it accepted the findings of the Tribunal. It is conceivable that if the State Government does not accept the findings of the Tribunal which may be in favour of the delinquent officer and proposes to impose a penalty on the delinquent officer, it should give reasons why it differs from the conclusions of the Tribunal, though even in such a case, it is not necessary that the reasons should be detailed or elaborate. But where the State Government agrees with the findings of the Tribunal which are against the delinquent officer, we do not think as a matter law. It could be said that the State Government cannot impose the penalty against the delinquent officer in accordance with the findings of the Tribunal unless it gives reasons to show why the said findings were accepted by it. The proceedings are no doubt, quasi-judicial; but having regard to the manner in which these enquiries are conducted, we do not think an obligation can be imposed on the State Government to record reasons in every case." 16. The proceedings are no doubt, quasi-judicial; but having regard to the manner in which these enquiries are conducted, we do not think an obligation can be imposed on the State Government to record reasons in every case." 16. The above authority of the Hon'ble Supreme Court is not in conflict with the law laid down by it in S. N. Mukherji's case. In that case there was a fullfledged enquiry before the Tribunal and the Public Service Commission too was consulted by the State Government and the State Government on the basis of the material made available to it accepted the findings of the Tribunal and it was in this context that the Hon'ble Supreme Court held it being a case of affirmance of the findings of the Tribunal, order of the State Government could not be vitiated for the reasons that the State Government did not record reasons why it accepted the findings of the Tribunal. The said authority relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent is therefore, of no avail to him and his submissions made before me that the observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in S. N. Mukherji's case (supra) are only obiter, cannot be accepted and I am of the view that the Director of Technical Education is under an obligation to record reasons for approval or disapproval of the proposed punishment or reduction or enhancement thereof under S. 22-G of the Adhiniyam. The approval in the instant case was given by one word order "Anumodit" noted on the nothings/reports prepared by the Officers at the lower level for perusal of the Director. Now so far as this case is concerned, I find that on the facts of this case, Director had, before him, nothing in defence of the charges levelled against the petitioner so as to make it obligatory on his part to go into the defence put forth on behalf of the petitioner and record reasons on the basis of the material made available to him whether such defence be or be not accepted. The petitioner has admittedly left the institution for abroad without his leave being sanctioned and the act of being absent from duty without leave was certainly an act of misconduct tantamounting to dereliction of duty justifying disciplinary action against the petitioner. The petitioner has admittedly left the institution for abroad without his leave being sanctioned and the act of being absent from duty without leave was certainly an act of misconduct tantamounting to dereliction of duty justifying disciplinary action against the petitioner. But that alone is not sufficient to justify the one word order of approval given by the Director of Technical Education and followed by the order of termination issued by the Committee of Management, for in my opinion, the Director ought to have considered as to what punishment, on the proved facts and circumstances of the case, would have met the ends of justice. It is in this respect that the non-application of mind by the Director vitiates the order according approval to the proposed punishment in as much as it was just a mechanical approval given by the Director. Even the notings/reports made by the Subordinate Officers at different level do not indicate application of mind in this regard. 17. Looking to the fact that the petitioner is still in the prime of his career, the punishment awarded to him is, in my opinion too harsh. The power given to the Director under Section 22-G(2) of the Adhiniyam to reduce the punishment shall, if expedient should be exercised/utilised to award reformatory punishment i.e. to say minor punishment so as to enable the delinquent to improve upon himself and devote his time and intellect in the service of the institution. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, a punishment (other than one of dismissal from or termination of service) whether by way of reduction to the lowest grade in the scale of pay admissible to the post of Principal and/or by way of stoppage of increments, as the Director may think fit and appropriate, if awarded, would not only save the petitioner's career from being ruined, but would also afford him an opportunity to use his time, intellect and energy besides experience he has acquired abroad for promoting the interest of the institution of which he was appointed as Principal. 18. In the result the petition succeeds d is allowed. The impugned orders dated -1991 (Annexure-16 to the writ petition) dated 23-4-1991 (Annexure-19) are quashed. 18. In the result the petition succeeds d is allowed. The impugned orders dated -1991 (Annexure-16 to the writ petition) dated 23-4-1991 (Annexure-19) are quashed. he Director, Technical Education, U.P. is directed to pass a fresh order in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made in this judgment within six weeks from e date of presentation of a certified copy of is judgment before him. 19. Parties shall bear their own costs.