JUDGMENT : A.N. Varma, J. This is a plaintiffs' second-Appeal arising out of suit for injunction restraining the Defendants from interfering with the alleged right of plaintiffs to pass through a passage marked by the letters Ta, Tha, Da and Dha. The plaintiffs set up a case that they had prescribed title as an easementary right to pass through the aforesaid passage which incidentally is in front of the Defendants' house. 2. The suit was contested by the Defendants-Respondents alleging that the disputed land over which the plaintiffs were claiming right of passage was their 'Baithaka' and the same had vested in them u/s 9 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. The Defendants denied that the plaintiffs were passing through the land in dispute, the passage marked by the aforesaid letters. 3. Relevant issues were framed by the trial court and on a considerations of the evidence which comprised the oral evidence of the parties as well as the Commissioner's report, the trial court decreed the plaintiffs' suit and restrained the Defendants from interfering with the plaintiffs' right of passage over the aforesaid land. 4. Aggrieved by the aforesaid decree the Defendants preferred an appeal which was allowed by the Additional District Judge. The learned Additional District Judge recorded two findings: One, that the disputed land is appurtenant to the plaintiff's, house and has, therefore, vested in them u/s 9 of the U.P. Act No. 1 of 1951, and second, that the finding that the plaintiffs have failed to establish that they were using the land in dispute as a passage for their bullock cart etc. or their cattle. In the premise, the appeal was allowed and the suit of the plaintiff-Respondents' was dismissed. 5. Against the decision of the lower appellate court the plaintiffs have preferred this second-appeal. The second-appeal has been admitted by this Court solely on the question which has been formulated by the learned Single Judge admitting the appeal in the following terms: The substantial question of law involved in the case is whether the interference with the plaintiffs' claim to right of passage was violative of Rule 26(a)(iii) of the UP ZA and LR Rules, 1952. 6. 6. Sri V.B. Khare, learned Counsel for the Appellants submits that even if it may be assumed that the disputed land had vested in the Defendants-Respondent's u/s 9 of the U.P. Act No. 1 of 1951, the plaintiffs still had a right to use the site as a passage for the purposes mentioned above. in support, the learned Counsel placed reliance on Clause (iii) of Rule 26(a) of the UP ZA and LR Rules read with Section 7(aa) of the UP ZA and LR Act. 7. Having heard learned Counsel for the parties I find no merit in the second appeal. Rule 26(a)(iii) provides that: Subject to Sub-rule (b) the site of a well or building along with the area appurtenant there to situate within the limits of an estate shall be deemed to be settled with the owner of the said well or building on the following terms and conditions: (i) ... . (ii) ... . (iii) He shall have the right to use the site for any purpose whatsoever subject to the existing rights to easement. This rule has been enacted to give effect to the provisions of Section 7 of the aforesaid Act which saves the easementary right or rights analogous there to notwithstanding the abolition of Zamindari. 8. The question, however, is whether the plaintiffs did acquire any easementary right over the land in dispute. The lower appellate court has answered this issue in the negative and against the plaintiffs-Appellants. It considered the oral evidence led by the parties in the light of the facts found by the Commissioner as emerging from the report submitted by him and on a consideration of the evidence existing on the record and circumstances emerging there from it has found that the plaintiffs had failed to prove that they had enjoyed any right of passager over the disputed land. This finding of the lower appellate court is based on a consideration of the location of the houses of the two parties and various kinds of uses to which the land appurtenant to the same were enjoyed by the two parties. It is on cumulative consideration of all the facts and circumstances emerging from the evidence on record that the lower appellate court has concluded 'that the plaintiffs were not using the disputed land as their passage. On the contrary they were using another passage. 9. It is on cumulative consideration of all the facts and circumstances emerging from the evidence on record that the lower appellate court has concluded 'that the plaintiffs were not using the disputed land as their passage. On the contrary they were using another passage. 9. These findings are wholly unexceptionable in law. They are based on assessment of evidence on record and the circumstances emerging there from. The issue whether the plaintiffs Appellants were using the land as a passage is undeniably one of fact. The inference to be drawn from the evidence on record, would, therefore. also raise an issue of fact and not an issue of law. The law on the subject is too well settled to require further elaboration. 10. Learned Counsel for the Appellants, however, submitted that the lower appellate court had not adverted to or discussed the statements of the some of the witnesses on a consideration of which the trial court had reached the contrary conclusion I do not think that this by itself introduces any error of law much less a substantial error of law in the ultimate decision. 11. Reliance was placed by the learned Counsel on a decision of Supreme Court in the case of Dilbagrai Punjabi Vs. Sharad Chandra, AIR 1988 SC 1858 . I have gone through this decision but I am clearly of the view that this decision lends no assistance to the plaintiffs' case. Their Lordships ruled that where the lower appellate court does not consider the admission of the parties which admission relates to the title to the disputed property, the High Court would be fully authorised to set aside the finding of the lower appellate court in a second-appeal u/s 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The position in the case before the Supreme Court was that the lower appellate court had not considered the tenants admission of landlord's title to the disputed property as contained in his reply to the notice given by the landlord and in numerous rent receipts issued by him. 12. It is apparent that an error of law would undoubtedly be introduced if a court of fact fails to consider an admission made by a party comprised in a large number of documents which are neither considered nor adverted to by that court. That, however, is not the position in the present case. 12. It is apparent that an error of law would undoubtedly be introduced if a court of fact fails to consider an admission made by a party comprised in a large number of documents which are neither considered nor adverted to by that court. That, however, is not the position in the present case. The learned Counsel for the Appellants has not pointed out any such admission of the Defendants in the present case which may have been overlooked by the lower appellate court. It is well settled that if the lower appellate court overlooks the admission of a party which is vital to the case, the High Court would be justified in interfering in second appeal. 13. In view of the foregoing discussion, the appeal fails and is dismissed. But I make no order as to costs.