JUDGMENT : A.N. VARMA, J. 1. The facts of this writ petition stands concluded by the judgment of this Court in a second appeal between the parties delivered earlier in the day. 2. The petition arises out of an order passed against the Defendants, who, are the Petitioners before me under Order XIL Rule 2-A of the Code of Civil Procedure. The lower appellate court was of the view that the Appellants had committed breach of an order of injunction issued against them by the trial court by way of an ad interim injunction. The trial court had rejected the application of the plaintiff-Respondents. On appeal by the plaintiffs the lower appellate court held that the Defendants had disobeyed the ad interim injunction issued by the trial court and were, therefore, liable to restore the property in favour of the plaintiff-Respondents. 3. Aggrieved by this order the Defendant have approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. The plaintiff-Respondents in this petition had instituted a suit for injunction against the Petitioners restraining them from interfering with their right of passage over the disputed land. The Trial Court had decreed the suit. On appeal by the Petitioners the suit was dismissed by the lower appellate court. Thereafter the plaintiffs preferred a second appeal which have been dismissed by the judgment and order delivered today. 4. The position, therefore, that emerges out of the facts stated above is that the suit of the plaintiff-Respondents stands dismissed. The question is whether this Court should direct the enforcement of the order issued by the trial court during the pendency of the suit by way of an ad interim injunction even after dismissal of the suit. In Sheo Kumar Saxena v. Zila Sahkari Vikas Sangh Gonda AIR 1988 All. 180, a learned Single Judge of this Court field that after the vacation of temporary injunction the violation of which is alleged in the proceedings initiated under Order XIL Rule 2-A of the CPC punitive action for breach of that order cannot be taken. The learned Single Judge was of the opinion that Order XIL Rule 2-A is primarily concerned with the preservation of the property and once the injunction order is vacated the court cannot enforce the order. 5. The learned Single Judge was of the opinion that Order XIL Rule 2-A is primarily concerned with the preservation of the property and once the injunction order is vacated the court cannot enforce the order. 5. With great respect to the learned Single Judge I find it difficult to share the view that the proceedings initiated under Order XIL Rule 2-A do not survive after the injunction is discharged or vacated. It seems to me that the Order XIL Rule 2-A is not merely concerned with the restoration of the property or preservation thereof during the pendency of the suit but is based on a more vital consideration, namely, the need to require and ensure that the orders of the court are not flouted or disobeyed by the parties. The writ of the court must operate. It is another matter that after the dismissal of the suit the court may not, in the facts of a case, be inclined to enforce the order under Order XIL Rule 2-A of the CPC on the ground that the very substratum of the title of the complainant having disappeared it may not be just and fair to insist on the enforcement of the order. It is on this principle that I am of the opinion that in the facts of the present case the order passed under Order XIL Rule 2-A against the Petitioners may not be enforced now. 6. In the result the petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order dated 5-8-91 passed by the learned Additional District Judge against the Petitioners is quashed. There will be, however, no order as to costs.