JUDGMENT Anshuroan Singh, J. 1. Feeling aggrieved against the operative portion of the judgment dated November 21, 1990, delivered by Honourable H. C. Mithal, J. (Retired) in the aforesaid writ petition, the State of Uttar Pradesh has preferred this review petition. The judgment dated November 21, 1990 is Udai Narain Rai v. State of U. P. (1991) 1 UP LB EC 140. 2. The facts which necessitated the filing of the writ petition by the petitioners opposite parties brieflly stated are that the petitioners Udai Narain Rai, Kamla Prasad Rai and Ram Dutt Mishra are Sub-Inspector of Police. Selections for promotion to the post of Inspectors of Police was held in the year 1988 in which the petitioners were also called for interview. The result was declared on 31-12-1988 in which the names of the petitioners did not figure. THEreupon the petitioners opposite parties challenged the action of the Selection Committee in not selecting them to the post of Inspectors of Police. Promotion of respondents nos 3 to 9, namely, Rajendra Singh, Lok Nath Verma, Lal Chandra Bhartiya, Baleshwar Yadav, Raghvendra Singh, Tirath Raj Pandey and Mahesh Narain Mishra, who were selected in the said selection, was also challenged and it was prayed that the same may be quashed. The aforesaid respondents were not served with the notice of the writ petition and had no opportunity to controvert the allegations made against them in the writ petition and as such a statement was made by the counsel for the petitioners opposite parties that the petitioners opposite parties did not want their selection to be quashed. After hearing counsel for the parties Honourable H. C. Mithal, J. (Retired) allowed the writ petition. Operative portion of the order is quoted below :- "In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed to the extent that the respondent nos 1 and 2 directed to constitute a Selection Committee within one month of filing of the certified copy of this order and then it may recommend the names of the petitioners for promotion as Inspectors of Police and accordingly they be promoted. The petitioners have given an undertaking that they would not claim seniority from those selected promotees in 1988 Batch. The names of the petitioners be kept at the bottom of the selected 1988 Batch keeping in mind their inter so seniority." 3. Review petition was filed on 11-4-1991. The petitioners have given an undertaking that they would not claim seniority from those selected promotees in 1988 Batch. The names of the petitioners be kept at the bottom of the selected 1988 Batch keeping in mind their inter so seniority." 3. Review petition was filed on 11-4-1991. By an order dated 24-4- 1991 it was ordered to be listed on May, 9, 1991, and in the meantime learned 24-A.W-C-Suppl. counsel for the petitioners opposite parties was directed to file a counter- affidavit. On 21-5-1991 the case was listed again then Mr. N. C. Rajwanshi. learned counsel for the petitioners opposite parties, prayed for three weeks' time to file a counter-affidavit to the review petition as well as to the application under section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act. The Court allowed three week's time to Mr. Rajwanshi and thereafter three weeks' time was also granted to the learned Standing Counsel to file a rejoinder-affidavit and the case was ordered to be listed on July 10, 1991. 4. It appears that in the meantime on June 18, 1991 the Police, Head Quarter on behalf of the State of U. P. filed a Special Leave Petition against the judgment dated November 21, 1990, passed by this Court in the Supreme Court of India. The review petition was listed before Honourable H. C. Mithal, J. on July 11, 1991, and probably that was the last working day before his retirement. It was stated at the Bar that the case could not be concluded during the course of the day, therefore, Hon'b'e H. C Mithal, J. did not hear the case and ordered that the file of the case be laid before Honourable Chief Justice for necessary orders. On July 12, 1991, the case was ordered to be listed before the appropriate Bench and in this way the case has come before me. 5. The first preliminary objection raised on behalf of the petitioners opposite parties is that since the respondent applicant has already filed a special Leave Petition in the Supreme Court of India against the judgment dated November 21, 1990, the review petition is not maintainable and it should be thrown on this ground alone. This objection relates to the judicial propriety of disposing the present review petition on merit. This objection relates to the judicial propriety of disposing the present review petition on merit. Learned counsel for the petitioners opposite parties has not been able to point out any legal bar regarding the maintainability of a review petition in case the applicant has already filed a Special Leave Petition in the Supreme Court of India against the judgment sought to be reviewed by this Court. But normally if a party feeling aggrieved against any judgment or order passed by this court approaches the apex Court of the country and files a Special Leave Petition whether prior or after the filing of the review petition against the same judgment, this Court should decline to decide the review petition on merit and direct the party to seek his redress from the Supreme Court. But the present case stands on a different footing as disclosed in the counter-affidavit of S. C. Srivastava, Sub-Inspector (M), U. P. Police Headquarters, Allahabad, filed on 19-9-1991 in reply to the application moved by the petitioners opposite parties for grant of time. Paragraphs nos. 7, 8 and 9 of the aforesaid counter-affidavit are as follows :- "7. That against the judgment of Honourable High Court in Writ No. 2071/89 dated 21-11-90, the Police Headquarter has also filed an SLP on 18-6- 91 before Honourable Supreme Court of India during summer vacation. The case was listed in Honourable Supreme Court on 19-7-91 and when the fact about the pendency of the review petition was brought to the knowledge of Supreme Court, the Court had desired to obtain the verdict of review petition, which is pending before Honourable Allahabad High Court and in this view of the matter, The SLP was adjourned for two weeks. 8. That thereafter the matter was again listed on 2-8-91 before Honourable Supreme Court and the Honourable Supreme Court further adjourned the matter for 6 weeks to enable the respondents for getting the review petition disposed of. However, even in this extended time the review petition could not be disposed of. 9. That thereafter the case was listed on 13-9-91 and Sri Yogeshwar Prasad, Senior Advocate, Supreme Court, counsel for the State of U. P. had obtained 2 weeks further time to enable him to produce the outcome of the review petition. However, even in this extended time the review petition could not be disposed of. 9. That thereafter the case was listed on 13-9-91 and Sri Yogeshwar Prasad, Senior Advocate, Supreme Court, counsel for the State of U. P. had obtained 2 weeks further time to enable him to produce the outcome of the review petition. The case is likely to be listed immediately after two weeks." From the perusal of averments made in these' paragraphs it is abundantly clear that the fact of filing of the review petition by the applicant respondent in this Court has been specifically brought to the notice of the Supreme Court. Apart from this when the Special Leave Petition was listed on 13-9-1991 for hearing Sri Yogeshwar Prasad, learned counsel appearing for the applicant in the Supreme Court, was granted two weeks further time to inform the result of the present review petition. 6. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the question of judicial propriety of disposing the petition on merit and in view of the facts stated above I feel that since the Supreme Court itself has adjourned the hearing of the Special Leave Petition on the ground that the review petition is pending in this Court and has granted time to the counsel appearing on behalf of the applicant to intimate the result of t he same, with greatest respect to their Lordships of the Supreme Court I consider that the disposal of the present review petition on merit will not tantamount to any judicial impropriety and as such I propose to decide the review petition on merits. The next preliminary objection raised by the counsel for the petitioners opposite parties is that the review petition is belated and the same should be rejected as barred by limitation. Learned counsel for the petitioners opposite parties contended that the review petition has been filed under Order 47, Rule 1, CPC, and has been reported as beyond time by the Stamp Reporter. On the contrary learned counsel for the applicant respondent submitted that the review petition has been filed under section 151 CPC along with an application u/section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act for condonation of delay and as such the review petition is .maintainable and the argument advanced by counsel for the petitioners opposite parties regarding the maintainability of the review petition on the ground of limitation is not tenable. 7. 7. After hearing counsel for the parties on the question of maintainability of the review petition under Order 47, Rule 1 CPC/Section 151 CPC and regarding the limitation I am of the opinion that the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure do not control the power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and the snid provisions are wholly inapplicable to the review petition. I am strengthened in my view by the fact that a procedure has been prescribed for filing a review petition under Rule 12 of Chapter V of the High Court Rules. It 'is pertinent to mention that though a procedure has been prescribed by the High Court Rules for presentation of a review application but no limitation appears to have been prescribed for filing a review application. 8. Counsel for the petitioners opposite parties also contended that the review petition has been reported to be barred by time by the Stamp Report and as such the same should be rejected until and unless the delay is condoned. It is pertinent to mention here that for filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India no limitation has been prescribed but normally the practice of this court has been that in case a writ petition is filed beyond ninety days of the impugned order then it is reported as beyond limitation by the Stamp Reporter. Likewise no limitation is prescribed for a review but if it has been filed beyond thirty days, it is reported to be beyond time and as such the report of the Stamp Reporter regarding writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution as well as the review petition is mainly based on the practice that has been followed in this court and not on any statutory rule. In my opinion if the review petition has some merit otherwise than there being no statutory rules of limitation, it cannot be rejected on the ground of limitation. In Mr. Mukhtar Ahmad, Advocate v. Addl. In my opinion if the review petition has some merit otherwise than there being no statutory rules of limitation, it cannot be rejected on the ground of limitation. In Mr. Mukhtar Ahmad, Advocate v. Addl. District Judge, Allahabad, 1978 ARC 118, a controversy arose regarding the maintainability of a review petition against a judgment delivered in exercise of the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and it was urged that a review of an order made in a writ petition could be maintained under Order 47, Rule 1 read with section 141 CPC the said contention was repelled by the Division Bench of this Court and it was held that the High Court had inherent jurisdiction to review its order under Article 226 of the Constitution. The view taken by the Division Bench in the aforesaid case was supported from the decision of the Supreme Court in Shiv Deo Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 1909 . The Supreme Court at page 1911 observed :- "It is sufficient to say that there is nothing in Art. 226 of the Constitution to preclude a High Court from exercising the power of review which inheres in every court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it." 9. Now coming to the merit of the review petition it may be pointed at the very outset that the counsel for the applicant respondent has been very specific in his submission that the grievance of the applicant respondeat is strictly confined to a part of the operative portion of the judgment passed in the writ petition. He has not whispered a word with regard to the result of the writ petition. His main grievance is that the mandamus issued by the Court in the operative portion of the judgment is contradictory, ambiguous, and unworkable. He has not whispered a word with regard to the result of the writ petition. His main grievance is that the mandamus issued by the Court in the operative portion of the judgment is contradictory, ambiguous, and unworkable. Learned counsel submitted that in .the operative portion of the judgment the Hon'ble Judge has in fact issued mandamus to the State to promote the petitioners opposite parties to the post of Inspectors irrespective of the fact whether they are found suitable or not according to the Government Order relating to the selection though the respondents have been directed to constitute the selection committee within one month of filing a certified copy of the order but the subsequent direction issued namely "the names of the petitioners be kept at the bottom of the selected 1988 Batch keeping in mind their inter so seniority" does not provide any option to the selection committee to judge the suitability or otherwise of the petitioners. It has been contended on behalf of the applicant respondent that the writ petition was allowed relying on the law .laid down by this Court in Dhurva Lal Yadav v. State of U. P., 1988 UP LB EC 381, as is evident from paragraph no. 14 of the judgment and I propose to adopt the same in varbatim in the order :- "14. On behalf of the petitioners reliance has been placed on Dhurva Lal Yadav v. State of U. P., 1988 UP LB EC 381. decided by a Division Bench of Hon. R. M. Sahai, J. (now Honourable Judge of the Supreme Court) and Hon B. L. Yadav, J. In that case also the validity of selection of Circle Inspectors from the post of Sub-Inspector of Police had been challenged primarily on the ground that the selection was made in violation of Government orders and also because the Selection Committee took into consideration irrelevant materials and failed to take into account the relevant material which resulted in the non-selection of the petitioner, a person of outstanding achievements. Hon. R. M. Sahai, J. (now Honourable Judge of the Supreme Court) who delivered the judgment held :- "Method of selection of Sub-Inspectors for promotion to rank of Inspectors was laid down by Governor in an order issued on 5th November, 1966 relevant portion of which is extracted below :- The existing quota system by which a certain number of Sub-Inspectors are at present selected from each Range should be abolished, Sub-Inspectors, Civil Police who have put in not less than 10 years' service as such 'and are below 50 years of age' has been deleted, vide GO. No. 4384/V1I1-I-140-73, dated March 5, 1974, Home Police Annexure I, effective from the date of this order" on the 1st day of April of the year in which the selection is made will now be eligible for promotion to the post of Inspector. The Range Deputy Inspector General of Police will sent to the Police Head-quarters every year the following list : (i) List of Sub-Inspector, Civil Police considered suitable for officiating promotion as Inspector in order of seniority in a prescribed Form, which may be laid down by the Police Headquarters- (ii) Lists of Sub-Inspectors, who are not considered firm for officiating promotion with brief reasons. The Departmental Selection Committee will thereafter have a final considered list prepared of Sub-Inspectors. Civil Police considered suitable for officiating promotion arranged in the order of their seniority. From the final consolidated list four times the number of Inspectors require to be approved for officiating promotion will be called for interview by the Departmental Selection Committee as constituted by Government, vide G.O. No. 438-A/ VIII-388-61, dated August 2, 1986. The assessment made by the Committee will be done and a list of approved candidates will be prepared of which the names of selected candidates will be arranged in order of their Seniority. Those who are borne on the approved list of an earlier year will rank above those selected and brought on an approved list of later year. Criteria for selection, therefore was merit." From a perusal of the G.O. mentioned above it appears that an assessment has to be made by the Selection Committee. It is also not in dispute that the criteria for selection is merit. It is also admitted to the parties that the criteria for selection is not the seniority and perusal of the records i.e. character rolls etc. It is also not in dispute that the criteria for selection is merit. It is also admitted to the parties that the criteria for selection is not the seniority and perusal of the records i.e. character rolls etc. alone but the candidates have also to be interview by the selection committee and an assessment has to be made by them. If the mode of selection for the post includes holding of interview also of the candidates, then discretion has to be left to the selection committee to judge the suitability on the basis of the question asked in the interview, judging the personality of the candidates keeping in view the nature of the job etc. and, in my opinion, the same view has been expressed by the Division Bench in Dhuiva Lal Yadav (supra). 10. Counsel for the applicant-respondent urged that if this Court directed to constitute a Selection Committee then only other direction which could be issued in the nature of mandamus was to consider the case of the petitioners opposite parties according to law but the subsequent direction issued by this Court deprived the selection committee to assess the suitability of the petitioners opposite parties and in fact has compelled the applicant respondent to promote the petitioners opposite parties even if they are not found suitable. Counsel for the applicant respondent in support of the said contention has placed reliance on Union Public Service Commission v. Hiranyalal Dev, 1988 Vol. 2 SCC 243. The facts of the aforesaid case were that a meeting of the Selection Committee for preparing a select list for promotion to the Joint I.P.S. Cadre of Assam, Meghalaya as contemplated by the Indian Police Service (Appointment by Promotion) Regulations, 1955 was held on December 27, 1983. Even though two officers junior of respondent 1 (of that case) were selected and included in the select list, the name of respondent 1 was not included in the said list. Aggrieved respondent 1 (of that case) filed a Civil Rule in the Gawahati High Court which stood transferred to the Central Administrative Tribunal under section 29 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. Aggrieved respondent 1 (of that case) filed a Civil Rule in the Gawahati High Court which stood transferred to the Central Administrative Tribunal under section 29 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. The Tribunal came to the conclusion that certain adverse remarks in the Confidential Character Rolls of respondent 1 had not been communicated to him till the date of meeting and on their being communicated respondent 1 made a representation to the State Government which was allowed with the result that even the adverse remarks subsequently expunged were taken into consideration by the Setection Committee. According to the Tribunal the non-selection of respondent No. 1 was in this view of the matter bad in law, and the Tribunal held that respondent 1 (of that case) should be deemed to have been included in the impugned select list, at least, in the place in the order of his seniority and appointed to Indian Police Service on the date on which his immediate junior, namely, Sardar Pradeep Kar was appointed. After taking this view, the Tribunal went a step further and directed respondent 1 (of that case) to be appointed to the Indian Police Service with effect from the date on which Sardar Pradeep Kar had been appointed and allowed all the benefits on that basis 11. In the appeal filed against the aforesaid judgment before the Supreme Court of INdia the main question raised was whether the Tribunal could have lawfully issued direction contained in the order. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and held that the powers to make selection were vested into the Selection Committee under the relevant rules and the Tribunal could not have played the role which the Selection Committee had to play by making conjectures and surmises. The proper order for the Tribunal to pass under the circumstances was to direct the Selection Committee to reconsider the merits of the respondent vis-a-vis the official who was junior to him. The Supreme Court set aside the following operative portion of the judgment passed by the Tribunal :- "Accordingly, we hold that the applicant should be deemed to have been included in the impugned select list prepared in 1983, at least, in the place in the order of his seniority and appointed to INdian Police Service on the date on which his immediate junior, namely respondent II Shri Sardar Pradeep Kar was appointed. Accordingly, we direct that the applicant be appointed to the INdian Police Service with effect from the date on which respondent II Shri Sardar Pradeep Kar was appointed to the INdian Police Service and allowed all the benefits on that basis." and substituted the same in the following terms :- 'The Selection Committee shall reconsider the impugned select list prepared in 1983 as if it was deciding the matter on the date of the selection on the footing that the adverse remarks made against respondent 1 which were subsequently set aside did not exist in the records and consider the question as to whether he would have been appointed or respondent II Shri Sardar Pradeep Kar would have been appointed on the basis of the categorization to which each of them was entitled having regard to the C. C. Rolls (ignoring the adverse remarks against respondent I which were subsequently quashed) and pass appropriate orders in the light of the decision taken on this point." 12. Reliance was also placed on U. P State Road Transport Corporation v. Mohd. Ismail, (1991) 3 SCC 239 . In that case the Supreme Court up set the judgment of this Court and observed as follows :- "The High Court was equally in error in directing the Corporation to offer alternative job to drivers who are found to be medically unfit before dispensing with their services. The court cannot dictate the decision of the statutory authority that ought to be made in the exercise of discretion in a given case. The court cannot effect that statutory authority to exercise the discretion in a particular manner not expressly required by law. The court could only command the statutory authority by a writ of mandamus to perform its duty by exercising the discretion according to law. Whether alternative job is to be offered or not is a matter left to the discretion of the competent authority of the Corporation and the Corporation has to exercise the discretion in individual cases. The court cannot command the Corporation to exercise discretion in a particular manner and in favour of a particular person. That would be beyond the jurisdiction of the Court." (Emphasis on underlined). Reliance has also been placed on U. P. State Electricity Board v. Fateh Chand Sharma Kaushik, AIR 1988 SC 2140 . The court cannot command the Corporation to exercise discretion in a particular manner and in favour of a particular person. That would be beyond the jurisdiction of the Court." (Emphasis on underlined). Reliance has also been placed on U. P. State Electricity Board v. Fateh Chand Sharma Kaushik, AIR 1988 SC 2140 . In the aforesaid case the Services Tribunal had issued a direction to the Electricity Board to promote certain person which was endorsed by the High Court but in the appeal filed by the U P. State Electricity Board the Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the High Court in the following words :- "We accordingly set aside the judgment of the High Court and modify the order passed by the Tribunal by setting aside the direction issued by the Tribunal asking the Board to promote respondent No. 1 to the post of Assistant Engineer and in its place we substitute the direction that the Electricity Board shall now reconsider the case of respondent No. 1 for promotion in accordance with law and in the light of the judgment of the Tribunal." 13. Reliance was also placed on Union . of India v. Ranbir, Singh Yadav, 1988 Vol. I LLJ 324. In the aforesaid case also the direction given by the Tribunal to the Union of India to promote employees was set aside by the Supreme Court in the following words :- "........we set aside the direction given by the Central Administrative Tribunal to the Union of India and other respondents before the Tribunal to promote the first respondent in this appeal and to pay him the consequential benefits consequent upon his inclusion in the promotion list and direct the Departmental Promotion Committee entrusted with the duty of making selection of officers for promotion to the Cadre of 'F' (Executive) to consider the case of respondent No. 1 in the light of the findings recorded by the Central Administrative Tribunal." 14. On the basis of the law laid down in the aforesaid cases it has been urged that where the selection has to be made by the selection committee on the basis of merit, this Court should not deprive the selection committee of using its discretion or applying its mind to the suitability or otherwise and the matter should be left to the discretion of the selection committee and if the Court feels that the selection committee has acted arbitrarily or selection made by the selection committee is vitiated by law, then this Court should direct the selection committee to reconsider the case of the officer but should not assume the power of the selection committee and should not issue a direction to promote a person straightway even if he is not suitable. On the contrary learned counsel for the petitioners opposite parties has contended that since the respondents who wers juniors to the petitioners and were having bad records, have been selected and promoted to the post of Inspectors and the petitioners, who were having better records and were also seniors, were not selected by the Selection Committee, this Court was wholly justified in directing this respondents to promote the petitioners opposite parties and it was not necessary that the Selection Committee should have been directed to re-consider the case of the petitioners opposite parties for promotion and as such the operative portion of the judgment of this Court is neither contradictory nor ambiguous and does not require any modification or substitution and the review petition is liable to be dismissed. In support of his contention learned counsel has placed reliance on Miss Neelima Shangla v. State of Haryana, (1986) 4 SCC 268 . In my opinion the facts of the said case are entirely distinguishable from the facts of the case in hand. In the aforesaid ease the petitioner "appeared at the competitive test held in 1983- 84 for selection to the Haryana Civil Service (Judicial) Branch. She secured 60-8 per cent marks in the written test and 50-5 per cent marks in the vive voce test. She was ranked No. 24. It may be mentioned here that there were altogether 774 applicants, while 390 only appeared at the test. She secured 60-8 per cent marks in the written test and 50-5 per cent marks in the vive voce test. She was ranked No. 24. It may be mentioned here that there were altogether 774 applicants, while 390 only appeared at the test. Out of the candidates who appeared at the test, 54 candidates belonging to the general category, four candidates belonging to backward classes, four candidates belonging to scheduled castes and two candidates belonging to the category of ex-servicemen, qualified for appointment by securing the prescribed minimum of 55 per cent. According to the petitioner, though there were 54 vacancies altogether, the Public Service Commission purported to recommend 26 candidates only and they included 17 from the general category. The petitioner claims that 32 candidates in order of merit from the general category should have been selected for appointment and that the Service Commission illegally with- held the names of all the successful candidates from the government and the High Court. She contends that if the rules had been adhered to, she would have been selected for appointment. la the aforesaid case the Supreme Court directed "the first respondent (Government of Haryana) to include the name of the petitioner (Miss Neelima Shangla) in the 1984 list of candidates selected for appointment as subordinate judges in Haryana Civil Service (Judicial Branch) and forward the same to the High Court of Punjab and Haryana for inclusion in the High Court Register maintained under Rule 1 of Part D of the Rules." 15. From the perusal of the aforesaid facts and the direction issued by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case it is abundantly clear that no question of selection or re-consideration was involved in the said case inasmuch as the petitioner had already been declared successful. The question was only regarding sending the name of the petitioner for appointment to the Government as well as to the High Court concerned. It is, therefore, clear that no amount of discretion was to be exercised by the Public Service Commission as the petitioner had already been selected but since the Public Service Commission had not forwarded her name, it was directed to do so. 16. Counsel for the petitioners opposite parties also placed reliance on Comptroller and Auditor General of India Gian Prakash, New Delhi v. K. S. Jagannathan, (1986) 2 SCC 679 . 16. Counsel for the petitioners opposite parties also placed reliance on Comptroller and Auditor General of India Gian Prakash, New Delhi v. K. S. Jagannathan, (1986) 2 SCC 679 . On the perusal of the facts of the aforesaid case I am of the opinion that the facts of the present case are entirely distinguishable from the said case. From the perusal of the entire operative portion of the order it is evidently clear that the learned Single Judge never intended to direct the authorities to promote the petitioners opposite parties on the ground that the discretion was. not .properly exercised inasmuch as the learned Single Judge himself directed the respondent applicant to constitute a selection committee. If the learned single Judge was of the opinion that the discretion was not properly exercised by the authorities there was no necessity of making any direction to the respondents to constitute a selection committee. Lastly learned counsel for the petitioners opposite parties placed reliance on Devaraju Pillai v. Sellayya Pillai, (1987) I SCC 61. In the aforesaid case the fact was that the learned Single Judge of the High Court while disposing the second appeal held that the document in question was a deed of settlement and not a will. On a review petition being filed, another single Judge, in the absence of the former, took a different view. In these circumstances the Supreme Court held that the appropriate remedy for the aggrieved party was to file an appeal against the judgment of the learned single Judge because if two views were possible and if one was taken by the Judge deciding the second appeal originally, and if the other Judge while disposing of the review petition took a different view, the same would be beyond the purview of review jurisdiction. With great respect I am of the opinion that the principle enunciated in the aforesaid case also does not apply to the facts of the case in hand inasmuch as in the present case neither the reasonings nor the ultimate result arrived at by the learned single Judge of this court are under challenge. The attack is confined only to a part of the operative portion of the judgment which contained a direction in the nature of mandamus contrary to the mandamus issued in the earlier part of the operative portion of the judgment. 17. The attack is confined only to a part of the operative portion of the judgment which contained a direction in the nature of mandamus contrary to the mandamus issued in the earlier part of the operative portion of the judgment. 17. Though the question whether modification/substitution of the operative portion of the judgement passed by the learned single Judge would be within the scope of the review jurisdiction of this court has not been raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners opposite parties, still I consider it my solemn duty to decide the same. 18. In that connection I would like to refer to a Full Bench decision of five Honourable Judges of the Supreme Court in State of Gujarat v. Saidar- begum, AIR 1976 SC 1695 . IN the aforesaid case in an application under Article 226 praying for a writ of mandamus ordering the respondent-state and its officers to pay to the petitioner and his heirs in perpetuity, a sum of Rs. 500/- as and by way of political pension the High Court, at the instance of writ applicant by its order deleted the words "in perpetuity" in the prayer clause. The Supreme Court held that "the inevitable implication of such deletion was that the claim of the writ applicant had become limited to pension payable for the lifetime of the writ applicant. The High Court therefore manifestly erred inasmuch as it directed the State to pay pension at the rate of Rs. 500/-per month, even to the heirs of the deceased in their own right. This patent error which was perhaps due to inadvertence could and should have been sue motu corrected by the High Court in the exercise of its inherent Jurisdiction even after the expiry of the ordinary period of limitation, if any, prescribed for a review application." I would also like to refer to a Full Bench decision of the Supreme Court in State of Kerala v. P. K. Syed Akbar Sahib, AIR 1988 SC 702 . In the aforesaid case the learned single Judge of the Kerala High Court upheld the vires of certain Act but the Division Bench of the said High Court had taken the view that the Validation Act was ultra vires. In the aforesaid case the learned single Judge of the Kerala High Court upheld the vires of certain Act but the Division Bench of the said High Court had taken the view that the Validation Act was ultra vires. From this judgment of the High Court an appeal by way of special leave had been filed in the Supreme Court which allowed the appeal and remanded the matter to the High Court for a fresh decision in the light of the observations made in the judgment of the Supreme Court. The Division Bench of the High Court which heard the matter in the light of the observations made by the Supreme Court upon remand took the view that the Validation Act was not ultra vires. It was in this background that the State of Kerala was obliged to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court to review its earlier order dated 1-1-1969 ordering the refund of a sum of Rs. 30,500/- collected from the respondent as licence fee during the years 1952-57. The High Court took the view that the review was not competent. In appeal the Supreme Court held that the High Court was not justified in refusing to entertain the review petition on supertechnical considerations which were ill- founded. It further held that the High Court was in error in taking the view that the review petition was not maintainable notwithstanding the fact that the validity of the Act had been subsequently upheld by the Court whereas the judgment sought to be reviewed was based on the premise that the Validation Act was ultra vires. 19. In Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma, AIR 1979 SC 1047 , also the Supreme Court held that the power of review may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is found and it may also be exercised on any analogous 'grounds but at the time it has been held by the Supreme Court that it may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. 20. Not by way of repetition but as a matter of abundant caution I would like to emphasise again that so far as the merits of the judgment passed by the learned single Judge is concerned, the same has not been questioned at all in the present review petition. 20. Not by way of repetition but as a matter of abundant caution I would like to emphasise again that so far as the merits of the judgment passed by the learned single Judge is concerned, the same has not been questioned at all in the present review petition. On the facts of the present case and also on the strength of the pronouncements made by the Supreme Court as well as this court in the cases mentioned in the preceding paragraphs, I am clear in my mind that the learned single Judge has committed an error in issuing such direction and the operative portion of the judgment contained in paragraph no. 28 is ambigous and contradictory and the same requires clarification as its substitution in order to Prevent the miscarriage of justice. 21. Consequently the review petition is allowed to the extent that the operative portion of the judgment contained in paragraph no. 28 of the judgment is substituted as follows : "In the result the writ petition succeeds and is allowed to the extent that the respondents nos. 1 and 2 are directed to constitute a Selection Committee within one month of filing of the certified copy of this order and re-consider the case of the petitioners opposite parties for promotion as Inspectors of Police according to the G.O. applicable to the said promotion and, if selected, their seniority shall be fixed according to law but without disturbing the seniority of respondents nos. 3 to 9. Petition allowed.