ORDER In this revisional application under s. 401 read with s. 482 Cr. P.C. the accused-petitioner his prayed for setting aside the order dated 23rd July, 1984. passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Diamond Harbonr in Case No. 1067 under s. 379 I.P.C., refusing thereby the prayer of the accused-petitioner to refer the case to the competent authority under s.21(3) of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act. 2. The complainant-opposite party claiming to be the owner of the disputed land and to have grown the paddy thereon before this Court with her case that the accused persons entered upon the said land on 27th November, 1983, and forcibly harvested the paddy grown therein by the complainant resulting a monetary loss to the extent of Rs. 6,000. 3. Cognizance was taken by the Magistrate under s. 379 of the IPC. The accused-persons after entering appearance submitted a petition before the learned Magistrate for referring the case to the Bhag Chas Officer under s. 21 (3) of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, obviously on their plea that the accused-persons were bargadars in respect of such land. The petitioner was seriously opposed by the complainant asserting that the complainant had herself grown paddy on such land and this being a case of theft should not be referred to the said authority under s. 21(3) of West Bengal Land Reforms Act. The learned Magistrate in consideration of the respective contentions of the parties as appearing from the petition of complaint as well as the petition submitted by the accused petitioner, rejected the same mainly relying on a Division Bench decision of this Court reported in 1983 (1) CLJ 301. It is against the said order of refusal to entertain the petition of the accused-petitioner that this Court has been moved by the petitioner. 4. The question is as to whether the learned Magistrate was justified in rejecting the prayer of the accused petitioner. Mr. Pradip Kumar Chakraborty, appearing on behalf of the accused-petitioner has in this connection drawn my attention to the specific provision of s. 21(3) of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act. It has been contended on behalf of the petitioner that in view of the specific provision of s. 21 a blanket prohibition has been imposed as to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain any proceeding in respect of matters mentioned in ss. It has been contended on behalf of the petitioner that in view of the specific provision of s. 21 a blanket prohibition has been imposed as to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain any proceeding in respect of matters mentioned in ss. 17, 18, 19, 19(B) and 20(B) as laid down in s. 21(1). Sub-section (2) of s. 21, refers to appointment of an officer or authority to whom such matters are to be transferred. 5. However, sub-so (3) of s. 21 is the relevant provision for our determination. It has been argued on the basis of specific provision of sub-so (3) that any case either civil or criminal where question arises as to whether a person is a borgadar or not the matter shall be referred to the particular officer as mentioned in sub-so (2). It has, therefore, been argued on behalf of the petitioner that irrespective of any other question if the principal question in a case is one whether a person is a bargadar or not, in that event the Court has no other option or alternative but to refer the matter to that particular officer. I am afraid, if provisions of sub-so (3) of s. 21, is amenable to such broad interpretation to make it applicable to a case of theft as in the instant case. It seems sub-so (3) cannot be interpreted in such a way as "to lay down such a broad and wide proposition of law that in each and every case of theft of paddy from a particular land the court has no other way out but to refer the matter to the competent authority as contemplated under sub-so (2) of s. 21 for the simple reason that one of the parties to such case, claims to be a bargadar in respect of such land. The primary question in a case of theft of paddy from a particular land is actually who was in lawful possession of the same and grew the paddy and whether there has been a removal of such paddy by a person other than the person who grew the same. The primary question in such a case is not who is the bargadar of such land. In a case of theft of paddy divergent pleas may be rasied by defence and bargadar-ship may be among one such various pleas. The primary question in such a case is not who is the bargadar of such land. In a case of theft of paddy divergent pleas may be rasied by defence and bargadar-ship may be among one such various pleas. Even if the plea of bargadar-ship fails-and it is not for the defence to prove its plea the case of complainant-prosecution will not be proved automatically. In other words failure on the part of the defence to prove its plea of bargadarship in a case of removal of paddy will not automatically prove the case of the complainant. It is for the complainant to prove his case that he grew paddy and that he was in possession of such land when the paddy was removed by the accused. As such, the primary question in such a case would not be the determination of the question of bargadar-ship but that of proving the lawful possession of the particular person concerned at the relevant time when the alleged theft took place Exactly similar view has been taken by this Court in a Bench decision reported in 1983(1) CLJ page 301. In that case the petitioner claiming to be a bargadar in respect of a particular land filed a petition of complaint in respect of the paddy harvested by the other side. It was held in that case that in order to decide whether the accused opposite parties had committed theft of paddy by the petitioner, it would not be necessary to determine whether the petitioner had the legal right to grow paddy on the land in question as a bargadar. That being so, it was not necessary on the part of the learned Magistrate to make a reference to the Bhagceas Officer under s. 21(3) of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act. The accused petitioner can therefore put up a defence in the instant case that it was he who actually grew paddy as bargadar and can support such contention, if he so chooses by evidence oral and documentary. But primarily it is for the complainant to prove that he as the owner of the land grew the paddy which was illegally removed by the accused opposite party. I think therefore, in view of what has been stated, that the learned Magistrate was justified in rejecting the said petition filed on behalf of the accused-petitioner. But primarily it is for the complainant to prove that he as the owner of the land grew the paddy which was illegally removed by the accused opposite party. I think therefore, in view of what has been stated, that the learned Magistrate was justified in rejecting the said petition filed on behalf of the accused-petitioner. I find no substance in the present revisional application. The revisional application is, therefore, rejected. 6. The rule is discharged. Interim order stands vacated. Rule discharged.