JUDGMENT : G.P. Mathur, J. Prem Shankar Pandey, applicant, was appointed as a temporary clerk in Krishi Utapadan Mandi Samiti, Allahabad, in November, 1973. His services were terminated on 7th April, 1978. The termination order was challenged by him by filing claim petition No. 461(f)/3/78 before the U.P. Services Tribunal but the petition was dismissed on 29-11-1990. Thereafter he filed writ petition No. 33609 of 1990 in which the operation of the orders dated 7th April, 1978, and 29th November, 1990, were stayed by order dated 20th December, 1990 and 18th January 1991. The present contempt petition has been filed on the ground that though the Petitioner had served the certified copy of the stay order upon the Respondents on 22nd December and 28th December, 1990, but he has not been reinstated. 2. Both the Respondents have filed separate counter affidavits in response to the notices issued to them by this Court. The main plea of the Respondents is that the stay order was passed behind the back of the counsel for the Mandi Samiti and the Mandi Samiti had already moved an application supported with counter-affidavit for vacating the stay order and as two weeks, had elapsed since the filing of the stay vacating application, the stay order stood automatically vacated in view of Article 226(3) of the Constitution. It is also pleaded that the services of the Petitioner were terminated in 1978 and his claim petition was dismissed in 1990, thus he was out of employment for more than 12 years and, therefore, there was no occasion to take him back in service. 3. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner contended that as the operation of the order terminating his services as well as the order of the tribunal dismissing the claim petition had been stayed, the Respondents were bound to reinstate him and their action in not reinstating the Petitioner and paying him entire arrears of salary amounts to flouting of the interim orders passed by this Court. In support of his submission reliance was placed on a Division Bench decision of our court in Chandra veer Singh v. M.B. Mathur, 1990 AWC 47 . In support of his submission reliance was placed on a Division Bench decision of our court in Chandra veer Singh v. M.B. Mathur, 1990 AWC 47 . Learned Counsel for the Respondents has, however, submitted that since there was no positive direction in the interim order passed by this Court on 20th December, 1990, for reinstating the Petitioner or for paying him the arrears of his salary, it cannot be said that the Respondents have committed wilful disobedience of the orders passed by this Court and as such the Respondents cannot be held guilty of having committed contempt of court. I have considered the submissions made by learned Counsel for the parties and in my opinion on the facts and circumstances of the present case it cannot be said that the Respondents have committed contempt of court. Chandra veer Singh was an employee of the Indian Telephone Industries Ltd. which was covered by the definition of "factory" and also "industrial or other establishment" as defined by Section 2 (b) and (ii) of Payment of Wages Act, u/s 4 of Payment of Wages Act a wage-period in respect of which wages are to be paid has to be fixed and Section 5 provides that the wages of every employee shall be paid before the expiry of the 7th day or before the 10th day, as the case may be, after the last day of the wage-period in respect of which wages are payable. Section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act provides that where contrary to the provisions of the Act any payment of wages has been delayed the authority may make a direction for the payment of the delayed wages and the amount so directed to be paid may be recovered as if it were a fine imposed by a magistrate. Section 20 further provides that if a person responsible for payment of wages to an employed person contravenes the provisions of Section 5 he shall be liable to be punished. The Bench observed that the applicant Chandraveer Singh was governed by various industrial laws and after analysis of the aforesaid provisions it was held that it was incumbent upon the employer to pay salary to an employee by the date fixed every month and in case operation of the termination order was stayed it would mean that he continued to be a regular employee. It was in these circumstances that the court held that the interim order passed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India staying operation of the termination order without any consequential order or direction would not be a superfluous or redundant order and the inaction even in payment of salary in the absence of any plausible explanation of delay will amount to flouting of the interim orders passed by the courts. In the case in hand the Petitioner P.S. Pandy is an employee of a Mandi Samiti which is neither a "factory" nor an "industrial or other establishment" as defined in Payment of Wages Act. There is no material on record to show that there was any such provision in the service rule governing the conditions of service of the Petitioner which required fixing of wage-period or payment of wages before a particular day. Similarly there is no material to show that non payment of wages by a particular day shall be punishable as an offence. Therefore, in my opinion the ratio of Chandraveer Singh's case (supra) will not be applicable to the case of the Petitioner. 4. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has considered a similar controversy in R.M. Ramaul Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and Others, AIR 1991 SC 1171 . In this case the Hon'ble Supreme Court had given a direction on 2-12-1988 for restoration of the applicant's seniority in service over and above two other officers of the H.P. Tourism Development Corporation in an earlier appeal filed by the applicant. In compliance of the said direction the Corporation reviewed the promotion with effect from 28-5-1982 and granted promotion to the applicant but treated the promotion for the period from 28-5-1982 to 3-9-1986 as a mere notional promotion without any monetary benefits. In the contempt application filed later, on the ground of non compliance of the earlier order, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as follows in para 2 of the report: The withholding of the monetary benefits in respect of this period is inconsistent with what was decided in the judgment and what complainant was clearly entitled to. In the contempt application filed later, on the ground of non compliance of the earlier order, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as follows in para 2 of the report: The withholding of the monetary benefits in respect of this period is inconsistent with what was decided in the judgment and what complainant was clearly entitled to. Since there was no specific direction in this behalf in the order, technically, there may be no case for punishment for contempt, but we make it clear that the promotion for the period from 28-5-1982 to 3-9-1986 should be accompanied by the monetary' benefits, if a specific direction is necessary we issue it here and now. The appropriate monetary benefits shall be granted within two months from today. In view of the law declared by Hon'ble Supreme Court I am of opinion that as there was no specific direction in the stay order passed by this Court on 20th December, 1990, for reinstating the Petitioner or for paying him arrears of salary no case for taking action under the contempt of courts Act has been made out against the Respondents on the ground that the Petitioner has not been reinstated or has not been paid arrears of salary. 5. Sri V.C. Misra, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the Petitioner, next contended that a positive direction may now be issued to the Respondents to reinstate the Petitioner and pay him arrears of salary as was done by the Supreme Court in R.M. Ramaul's case (sipra). Shri B.D. Mandhyan, learned Counsel for the Respondents, has, however submitted that while in R.M. Ramaul's case the controversy had been finally decided by the Hon'ble Supreme Court by the judgment and order dated 2-12-1988, in the present case only an ex parte stay order has been passed in favour of the Petitioner and the writ petition has not even been admitted. He has further submitted that as an application to vacate the interim order has already been moved and is pending consideration it will not be proper for this Court to issue any direction to the Respondents to either reinstate the Petitioner or to pay him arrears of salary at this stage. In order to appreciate the contention advanced by the learned Counsel for the parties I have examined the record of the writ petition from which the following facts are revealed. 6. In order to appreciate the contention advanced by the learned Counsel for the parties I have examined the record of the writ petition from which the following facts are revealed. 6. The copy of the writ petition was served in the office of the Standing Counsel for the State of U.P. on 12-12-1990 and upon Shri B.D. Mandhyan, standing counsel for Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti, on 13-12-1990. Thereafter the petition was filed before the Joint Registrar in accordance with the rules on 14-12-1990. It appears that the petition was heard by Hon'ble Anshuman Singh, J. on 20-12-1990 when His Lordship directed that the petition be listed for admission after a month and in the meantime the Standing Counsel was directed to file counter-affidavit. On the stay application the following order was passed on the same day: Mean while the operation of the order dated 29-11-1990 passed by Respondent No. 4 shall remain stayed. Shri B.D. Mandhyan has made a statement at the bar that though the copy of the writ petition was served upon him on 13-12-1990 he was not given any information that the writ petition has actually been filed nor he was given any notice by learned Counsel for the Petitioner when the petition was actually heard for admission in Court. He has further stated that he was not present in court and the order dated 20-12-1990 was passed in his absence. The record further shows that the Petitioner moved an application for correction of the stay order dated 20-12-1990 wherein a prayer was made that after the date 29-11-1990, 7-4-1978 be inserted in the stay order. Copy of this correction application was served upon Sri B.D. Mandhyan on 11-1-1991 The application was filed before Hon'ble M.P. Singh, J. on 17-1-1991 when the same was returned for presentation before Hon'ble Anshuman Singh, J. Thereafter the application was presented before His Lordship on 18-1-1991 and on the same day the correction application was allowed. The interim order after correction reads as follows: Mean while the operation of the order dated 7-4-78, 29-11-90 passed by Respondent No. 4 shall remain stayed. The interim order after correction reads as follows: Mean while the operation of the order dated 7-4-78, 29-11-90 passed by Respondent No. 4 shall remain stayed. Shri B.D. Mandhyan, has further made a statement at the bar that after the correction application was served upon him on 11-1-1991 he was not given any information as to when the application would be filed and the order dated 17-1-1991 passed by Hon'ble M.P. Singh, J. for returning the application as well as the order dated 18-1-1991 passed by Hon'ble Anshuman Singh, J. correcting the stay order were passed in his absence, Sri Mandhyan has stated that he was under an impression that the correction application would be listed in Court and he would get knowledge of the same but as it was directly filed he got no knowledge of the same and thus the stay order dated 20-12-1990 was corrected and the operation of the termination order dated 7-4-1978 was also stayed not only in his absence but also without giving him an opportunity of hearing. The statements made by Shri Mandhyan have not been seriously challenged on behalf of the Petitioner and I do not see any reason not to accept the same. The record of the writ petition further shows that an application to vacate the stay order dated 20-12-1990 was filed on behalf of Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti on 23-1-1991 when it was directed to be listed with previous papers. The application is supported with two counter-affidavits of Jahroshan Lal which have been sworn on 27-12-1990 and 21-1-1991. On 6-2-1991 this application to vacate the stay order was listed in Court then the counsel for the Petitioner was granted two weeks and no more for filing rejoinder-affidavit and the writ petition was directed to be listed for admission on 21-2-1991- The record does not show that any rejoinder affidavit has been filed by the Petitioner so far. The present contempt petition was filed by the Petitioner before the Joint Registrar on 6-2-1991 and notice on the same was issued to the Respondents on 19--2-1991. 7. The facts mentioned above would show that the writ petition has not yet been admitted. In spite of a clear order passed by this Court on 6-2-1991 for listing the writ petition for admission on 21-2-1991 the writ petition has not yet been listed for admission. 7. The facts mentioned above would show that the writ petition has not yet been admitted. In spite of a clear order passed by this Court on 6-2-1991 for listing the writ petition for admission on 21-2-1991 the writ petition has not yet been listed for admission. Shri B.D. Mandhyan has submitted that he made serious attempts for getting the writ petition listed for admission but on account of some ulterior motive the petition was not listed for admission in court. However, the fact remains that although the Respondents have moved an application for vacating the stay order as far back as 23-1-1991 but the writ petition has not yet been listed in court for admission. The delay in the hearing of the writ petition for admission can only benefit the Petitioner and not the Respondents. 8. The question for consideration is whether on these facts when the writ petition has not yet been admitted and only an exparte interim order has been passed in favour of the Petitioner and when the Respondents have promptly moved an application for vacating the stay order, a direction should be issued to the Respondents for complying with the interim order for reinstating the Petitioner or for paying the arrears of his salary. In my opinion in such a situation it will not be a proper exercise of discretion to issue any direction to the Respondents to comply with the interim order. I do not mean to say that an ex parte interim order passed by this Court should not be obeyed or complied with. The orders passed by this Court can be broadly put in two categories, viz., one, passed after hearing both the sides, and the other passed after hearing the Petitioner or the Appellant only and before issuing notice to the Respondent, which are commonly known as ex parte orders. Final judgments or orders disposing of the cases and also interim orders passed after exchange of affidavits and hearing both the sides (commonly known as confirmed interim orders) must be shown utmost respect and must be complied forthwith. In the second category of cases, viz., ex parte orders, a distinction can be drawn looking to the nature of the orders. Final judgments or orders disposing of the cases and also interim orders passed after exchange of affidavits and hearing both the sides (commonly known as confirmed interim orders) must be shown utmost respect and must be complied forthwith. In the second category of cases, viz., ex parte orders, a distinction can be drawn looking to the nature of the orders. If it is an order of the type staying demolition of construction or dispossession or of a nature where the party in whose favour the order is passed is likely to suffer grave or irreparable injury on account of non observance thereof, the same must be promptly complied with. Any breach of such kind of orders would make the defaulting party liable for being punished for contempt of court. However, those cases where the order is of such type that immediate non compliance thereof does not cause grave or irreparable injury to the person in whose favour order was passed like staying suspension or termination from service or of like nature and where he can be compensated with money, stand on a different footing. If in these type of cases the Respondents appear with promptitude and move an application for vacating the interim order placing on record their version of the case it will not be fair to deny them a hearing and to compel them to comply with the ex parte interim order by taking recourse to contempt proceedings. The court must act fairly to both the sides. It is quite possible that ex parte interim order may have been obtained either by concealing material facts or by making wrong statement of facts. If the Respondent appears promptly and puts forward his version I think it will be highly unfair and unjust not to afford him a hearing and initiate contempt proceedings for the alleged breach or violation of the ex parte order passed by the Court. The principle of natural justice, which lays down that no man should be condemned unheard, requires that the Respondent's application for vacating interim order must be heard before initiating contempt proceedings. In what situation such a course should be adopted will depend upon the facts and circumstances of a particular case. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any general rule of universal application. In what situation such a course should be adopted will depend upon the facts and circumstances of a particular case. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any general rule of universal application. It will depend upon many factors, like, the nature of the order impugned in the writ petition or appeal, the nature of the interim order passed by the court and the consequence of non-compliance of the order, namely, whether it results in a serious or irreparable injury to the party in whose favour the interim order was passed. The other factor which has to be taken into consideration is with what promptitude the Respondent approaches the court for vacating the interim order. Was it only after the Respondent was served with a notice of the contempt application or before that? 9. It is well settled that the power of the High Court to initiate contempt proceedings against the alleged contemner is discretionary. The applicant has no vested right to claim that the contemner must be punished. The applicant brings the facts to the knowledge of the Court and points out that the contempt of court has been committed and thereafter the matter is between the court and the contemner. In Baradakanta Mishra Vs. Justice Gatikrushna Misra, Chief Justice of the Orissa High Court, (1975) 3 SCC 535 , it was held as follows in para 5: No one has a statutory or oommon law right to say that he is entitled as a matter of course to an order for committal because the alleged contemner is guilty of contempt. All that he can do is to move the Court and draw its attention to the contempt alleged to have been committed and it will then be for the Court, if it so thinks fit, to take action to vindicate its authority and commit the alleged contemner for contempt. It is for the Court in the exercise of its discretion to decide whether or not to initiate a proceeding for contempt. Even if the Court is prima facie satisfied that a contempt has been committed, the Court may choose to ignore it and decline to take action. It is for the Court in the exercise of its discretion to decide whether or not to initiate a proceeding for contempt. Even if the Court is prima facie satisfied that a contempt has been committed, the Court may choose to ignore it and decline to take action. There is no right in any one to compel the Court to initiate a proceeding for contempt even where a prima facie case appears to have been made out...So far as the contempt jurisdiction is concerned, the only actors in the drama are the Court and the alleged contemner. An outside party comes in only by way of drawing the attention of the Court to the contempt which has been committed; he does not become a party to the proceeding for contempt which may be initiated by the Court... . It is, therefore, well Settled that the Court has to decide after considering the entire facts and circumstances of the -case whether to exercise its discretion to initiate contempt proceedings in a given case. 10. The facts of the present, case show that the services of the Petitioner were terminated on 7th April, 1978, and his claim petition was dismissed by the Public Services Tribunal on 29th November, 1990. Thus when the Petitioner filed the writ petition in this Court he was already out of service for more than 12 years. This writ petition filed by the Petitioner has not yet been admitted and the interim order has been passed in his favour without giving an opportunity of hearing to the learned Counsel appearing for Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti. The initial interim order passed on 20th December, 1990, merely stayed the operation of the order dated 29-11-1990. This order did not stay the termination order dated 7-4-1978. It was on 18-1-1991 that the operation of the termination order was also stayed. The Respondents have filed the application for vacating the stay order on 23-1-1991 which was supported with counter-affidavit of Respondent No. 1 to the present contempt petition and the said affidavit was sworn on 27th December, 1990. Another important fact is that in spite of a clear order passed by this Court on 6-2-1991 for listing the writ petition on 21-2-1991 the writ petition has not yet been listed in. court for admission. Another important fact is that in spite of a clear order passed by this Court on 6-2-1991 for listing the writ petition on 21-2-1991 the writ petition has not yet been listed in. court for admission. The contempt petition has been filed on 6-2-1991, i.e., after the application to vacate the interim order had already been filed in this Court. On these facts I do not consider it a fit case for giving any direction or for taking action against the Respondents on the ground that they have committed contempt of court. It is well settled that no-one should be condemned unheard. In all fairness it will be proper that the Respondents be also given an opportunity of hearing. I have no reason to doubt that the Respondents will comply with the order which will be passed by this Court after hearing the stay vacating application. At this stage the contempt application lacks merit and is liable to be rejected. 11. The contempt application is accordingly dismissed. The notices issued to the Respondents are discharged. There will be no order as to costs.