PALOK BASU, J. ( 1 ) THE question involved in the present writ petition is as to whether the respondents Jagdish prasad and Om Pal Singh could be held by the impugned award of the Labour Court dated september 6, 1985 to have been retrenched contrary to the provision contained in the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act and could they on the facts and circumstances of the present case be directed to be reinstated by their employer? ( 2 ) THE short facts are that Indodan Milk Products Ltd, is a company with limited liability registered under the Indian Companies Act with its factory at Muzaffarnagar and produces milk products. It has about 2200 workmen. There was a Route Supervisor Cadre in the Company in which respondents Jagdish Prasad and Om Pal were working since quite sometime past. It is said that the company decided in February 1975, to abolish and discontinue the doing of the business through Route Supervision and instead resorted to engage commission agents who were not to be employees of the petitioner but were independent contractors. Consequently they retrenched all their Route Supervisors including respondents 3 and 4. ( 3 ) ON this point the petitioners case is that after the aforesaid decision was taken, they sent demand drafts representing one months notice and retrenchment compensation as required under the law and its officials wanted to effect personal service but the respondents 3 and 4 refused, this attempt to serve and their refusal is said to have been witnessed by the officials of the company. Retrenchment came to be effective from February 6, 1975. Because of the refusal by the respondents 3 and 4 the letter along with a draft representing the pay and retrenchment compensation was sent to them by registered post which again, was refused by the respondents no. 3 and 4 as it contained a remark by the postal authorities that the respondents 3 and 4 were not available at the addresses given though correct address, as noted in the companys records, were noted in the envelopes. Some letters were, again, sent intimating the respondents about their refusal of accepting the registered envelopes. 3 and 4 as it contained a remark by the postal authorities that the respondents 3 and 4 were not available at the addresses given though correct address, as noted in the companys records, were noted in the envelopes. Some letters were, again, sent intimating the respondents about their refusal of accepting the registered envelopes. ( 4 ) FURTHER case of the petitioner company is that there were conciliation proceedings in which a settlement was reached between the petitioner and Doodh Factory Karamchari Union, muzaffarnagar which was representing the Route Supervisors cause who had been retrenched. In terms of the settlement negotiations ensued which were finalised on December 8, 1976, a true copy of which is filed as Annexure 6 to this petition. In the meantime the matter was taken by the respondents to the State Government who made two references which have been decided against the Company illegally by the impugned award. It has been stated that the consistent case of the company has been that the respondents 3 and 4 were incapable for any clerical, technical or supervisory job and as they could only do the job of the Route Supervisor no alternative job was available for them in the company or its factory. ( 5 ) THE case set up by the respondents 3 and 4 before the Labour Court as well as in this court is that their services as Route Supervisors have been illegally terminated by the order dated february 5, 1975 by the company and they carried the matter rightly to the State Government for making a reference which has been rightly decided by the Labour Court in their favour. The provisions of Section 6-N of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act have not been complied with in passing the termination order (referred as retrenchment order ). They denied that the Route supervisors job was really of supervisory nature and they were only workmen. It was pleaded that one Ram Gopal has been retained by the petitioner though Ram Gopal was junior to the answering respondents and, therefore, the action of the petitioner was discriminatory and against the principle of last come first go. They stoutly denied that they had refused either orally the bank draft and the letter or they refused to accept the registered letter. No such offer was ever made by the petitioner company. They stoutly denied that they had refused either orally the bank draft and the letter or they refused to accept the registered letter. No such offer was ever made by the petitioner company. They wanted the petitioner company to be put to strict proof of the allegation that they had refused the registered letter sent to their address. ( 6 ) THE further case set up by the respondents was that the petitioner company had won over the office bearers of the Union and, as such, the settlement was not binding upon the respondents and, therefore, the answering respondents severed their connection with the Union and refiled the case in terms of Section 2-A of the Act. Consequently the respondents espoused their case as a breach of the requirements mentioned in Section 6-N of the Act and further that the petitioner company were duty bound to keep the answering respondents as clerk because they had appointed other similarly situated person, namely, Ram Gopal and similar posting should have been offered to the answering respondents also. ( 7 ) IT has been stated before this Court that the finding of fact recorded by the Labour Court about the petitioner Company failing to prove payment of retrenchment compensation or its being lawfully forwarded to the answering respondents, cannot be interfered with either on facts or in law and the order of reinstatement passed by the Labour Court is also justified. ( 8 ) SRI Markendey Katju, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri V. S. Sharma on behalf of the answering opposite parties and the Standing Counsel for the State and the Labour Court have been heard at length for and against this petition and the entire record has been examined. ( 9 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon the case of Sirsilk Ltd. v. Government of Andhra Pradesh (1963-II-LLJ-647), showing that a retrenched workman cannot claim an alternative employment. He is only entitled to the compensation as envisaged by section 6-N of the Industrial Disputes Act. It was emphasised by him that the Labour Court has recorded a categorical finding that the termination of the employment of the answering respondents amounted to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 6-N of the Act. On the strength of this finding it was argued that reinstatement of respondents 3 and 4 could not be ordered. It was emphasised by him that the Labour Court has recorded a categorical finding that the termination of the employment of the answering respondents amounted to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 6-N of the Act. On the strength of this finding it was argued that reinstatement of respondents 3 and 4 could not be ordered. In this very connection it was stated that at most the petitioner company may be directed to pay the amount of compensation which, according to the respondents 3 and 4, they never refused to accept. He has also cited the case of Herbertson Ltd. v. The Workmen of herbertsons Ltd. and Ors. (1976 (33) FLR 398 (SC ). On the basis of the authorities it was contended that once there was a settlement by which retrenchment compensation was payable to all the Route Supervisors the respondents 3 and 4 as such are bound by the said settlement in conciliation preceedings as the other Route Supervision who abided by it and took the retrenchment compensation amount as per the settlement. It has to be remembered that an agreement signed in a prescribed manner in conciliation proceeding becomes binding at once on the parties and comes into operation immediately or on the date mentioned in it. In such a case there is no scope for any enquiry as to the bona fide character of the settlement which becomes binding and comes into operation once it is signed in the manner provided in the rules. ( 10 ) THE learned counsel for the answering respondents 3 and 4, however, argued vehemently that a clear finding of fact has been recorded by the Labour Court that the petitioner company never made an attempt to serve the letter and pay the compensation amount to them and that they have failed to prove by cogent and reliable evidence the assertion that registered envelopes sent to the addresses of answering respondents 3 and 4 were, in fact, refused by them. On the basis of this arguement, it was strongly contended that the order of the Labour Court should be upheld. For this proposition reliance was placed on the case of U. P. Bijli Karamchari Sangh v. State electricity Board, U. P. 1990 LTC 1676. On the basis of this arguement, it was strongly contended that the order of the Labour Court should be upheld. For this proposition reliance was placed on the case of U. P. Bijli Karamchari Sangh v. State electricity Board, U. P. 1990 LTC 1676. ( 11 ) IT was further contended that it has been rightly held by the court that the order of termination of employment of respondents 3 and 4 amounted to retrenchment and therefore, compensation required under the provisions of Section 6-N of the Act had to be paid and no interference is called for with the aforesaid finding nor can it be said to be vitiated under the law in any manner whatsoever. ( 12 ) THE question, however, requires serious consideration as to whether termination of employment could be ordered on the facts and circumstances of the present case. ( 13 ) IT is now settled that the settlement between the Union of the Route Supervisors and the petitioner-company was binding upon all the memebers of the said Union whose cause was espoused by the said Union. It is not denied by the respondents 3 and 4 that their cause, just as the case of the other Route Supervisors of the company, was espoused by their Union. Their assertion now in this court that the Union officials had been won over by the company is an assertion made too late in the day. It was not stated in the representations made before the State government while making the reference, for in that event the said question may also have been referred to the Labour Court and a finding may have been attempted on the said question. If respondents 3 and 4 were aggrieved by the alleged winning over of the Union officials by the petitioner company their remedy lay elsewhere and in a different manner. It will be setting up a bad precedent in industrial relations if it is held that while on the one hand the retrenched can be permitted to enter into a settlement in conciliation proceedings and on the other hand they are permitted to turn around and say that they are not bound by the said agreement as their Union officials had been won over, particularly so where no evidence whatsoever, not even relevant material, exists on the record to probabilisc such a defence. For these reasons the case of U. P. Bijli Karamchari Sangh (supra) cited by the respondents 3 and 4 is out of point. ( 14 ) CONSEQUENTLY it must be held that the respondents 3 and 4 were also bound by the settlement and they arc entitled to only retrenchment compensation payable under the law. The Award of the Labour Court thus suffers from a manifest error of law inasmuch as it has ignored the evidence existing on the record which stands admitted in this court by the respondents 3 and 4, subject only to the further allegation that the settlement was procured by winning over the oficials of the union. These allegations, for the reasons staled above, had to be rejected as wholly untenable and unjustified and, therefore, the award of the Labour Court stands vitiated to that extent. ( 15 ) IN view of the aforesaid discussion this writ petition is partly allowed. Let a writ in the nature of ccrliorari issue quashing the award dated September 6, 1985 of the Labour Court, Meerut, in so far as it directs reinstatement of respondents 3 and 4 but it is upheld to the extent that the retrenchment compensation shall be payable by the petitioner-company to the respondents 3 and 4. ( 16 ) COST will be borne by the parties. .