Research › Browse › Judgment

Allahabad High Court · body

1991 DIGILAW 1299 (ALL)

Tripal Singh v. Harpal Singh

1991-10-09

N.N.MITHAL

body1991
JUDGMENT N.N. Mithal, J. - The petitioner was appointed as an, Assistant Clerk in a recognised educational institution on 1.9.77 and was duly confirmed a year after. It is alleged that the Principal and Manager of the institution did not permit him to sign the attendance register and, therefore, the petitioner approached the District Inspector of Schools who, after making enquiries, held that the petitioner had been duly appointed and confirmed to his post after the period of probation. Not satisfied with the decision of the District Inspector of Schools the Committee of Management filed an appeal before the Dy. Director of Education which was allowed and thereafter the petitioner challenged the order of the Dy. Director of Education in writ petition No. 12949 of 1981. It is alleged that certain interim orders were passed by the High Court and ultimately by an order dated 3.5.83 it was directed that the petitioner be paid his salary from 20th October 1981 to 30th April, 1983 by 10th July, 1983 and the salary which became due from 1st May, 1983 onwards will be paid continuously by the opposite party month by month. 2. The grievance of the petitioner is that inspite of the categorical orders passed by the High Court the opposite parties have been disobeying the same with a view to cause harassment and inconvenience to the petitioner. 3. In reply to the show cause notice the stand of the opposite parties is mainly two fold, firstly it is urged that there was no disobedience of the orders passed by the High Court but on account of accute financial constraints the opposite parties were unable to pay the salary to the petitioner and also all other employees of the institution. It was, therefore, contended that there was no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court as the opposite parties always intended to bona fide to comply with the directions of the High Court. The second line of I defence is that a sum of Rs. 6,202.20 which was due to the petitioner up to 30th April, 1982 was duly. paid to him by cheque on 9.7.83 within the prescribed period. The second line of I defence is that a sum of Rs. 6,202.20 which was due to the petitioner up to 30th April, 1982 was duly. paid to him by cheque on 9.7.83 within the prescribed period. In respect of the salary from May 1983 onwards it is alleged that the institution was not a Government aided institution until 31st March, 1984 and, therefore, it was not possible to make payment of the salary to any of the employees of the institution including the petitioner. After the Government started giving aid the financial condition of the institution improved a little and further payment was made to the petitioner. 4. During the course of argument, however, one more plea, which I think, is more substantial was raised to the effect that the petition was barred by time and no action can be taken for contempt of court. 5. Heard learned counsel for the parties. It is not disputed before me that the main writ petition has already been disposed of on 31st July, 1985 and the same was allowed. It is also not disputed that aggrieved by the order of the High Court the Committee of Management has filed Special Leave petition which has been allowed and the appeal has been admitted by the Supreme Court and operation of the order has been completely stayed on 24th Sept. 1985. The effect of the said order, therefore, is that the petitioner is no longer entitled to any salary inasmuch as the interim order dated 3.5.83 had merged in the final order disposing of the petition and the final order has since been stayed by the Supreme Court. 6. There is some controversy between the parties as to whether payment of Rs. 6,202.20 covers the entire claim of the petitioner in respect of the salary prior to 30th April, 1983. It is, however, needless to go into that controversy because, in my opinion the petition can be disposed of on mere substantial ground of limitation. 7. Under Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act action for contempt can be taken only within a period of one year of the date of committal of the alleged contempt. In the case before me the petitioner's case is that the contempt was committed on 10th July, 1983 when the opposite. 7. Under Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act action for contempt can be taken only within a period of one year of the date of committal of the alleged contempt. In the case before me the petitioner's case is that the contempt was committed on 10th July, 1983 when the opposite. party failed to comply with the directions of the Court given on 3.5.83 and as such the limitation for taking proceeding for contempt against the opposite party was only up to 10th July, 1984. The present petition for contempt was, however, filed on 2.5.84 but the same was not admitted and merely a show cause notice was issued to the opposite parties. Subsequently after the parties had exchanged their affidavits the matter was taken up by the Court on 1.8.85 when the petition was admitted and notices were ordered to be issued to the opposite parties. 8. The contention of the opposite party before me is that the cognizance of the petition has been taken by the Court only on 1.8.85 notwithstanding the fact that the petition has been filed on 2.8.84 when show cause notice only were issued. Since 1.8.85 was much beyond the period of one year from the date of alleged. contempt no action can be taken by the Court in view of Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. 9. The learned counsel, it support of his contention, relies on a decision reported in Dinesh Chandra Sharma v. B.K. Banerji 1988, ALJ where it was held that: "Merely issuing of notice to show cause why proceedings may not be taken for contempt is not an initiation of proceedings. It is simply asking the party to appear and give reason as to why should proceedings for contempt be not initiated against him. Such a notice does not come within the four corners of Section 20 of the Act. It is only when that the court decides to take action, that amounts to initiation of proceedings within the meaning of Section 20". 10. The Court in giving that decision relied on two earlier cases reported in 1988 ALJ 114 and (2) 1988 ALJ 700. Applying the principles laid down it that case to the facts of the present case we find that initially when the contempt petition was presented the Court did not decide to take action against the opposite parties for contempt. The Court in giving that decision relied on two earlier cases reported in 1988 ALJ 114 and (2) 1988 ALJ 700. Applying the principles laid down it that case to the facts of the present case we find that initially when the contempt petition was presented the Court did not decide to take action against the opposite parties for contempt. Notice was issued only for showing cause as to why proceedings for contempt be not initiated. This did not amount to initiation of proceedings as held in the above mentioned case. 11. In view of the decision referred to above, it is clear that the proceedings for contempt can be initiated only within a period of one year of the alleged contempt. Since in the present case contempt had been committed on 10th July, 1983 contempt proceedings ought to have been initiated on or before 10th July, 1984. This, however, has not been done in this case. Proceedings were initiated only on 1.8.85 i.e. much beyond one year. 12. In view of above the petition is clearly barred by time and is hereby dismissed. Since the petition has been dismissed on technical ground it appears to be appropriate that the parties be left to bear their own costs.