Makaddas Ali; Aftab Ali v. Joy Shree Tea and Industries Ltd.
1991-01-10
J.M.SRIVASTAVA
body1991
DigiLaw.ai
These two appeals arising out of two suits raise similar questions of fact and law and hence are being decided by this common judgment. The plaintiff respondent has filed the two suits against the defendant appellant in each of the two appeals for declaration of right and recovery of possession of land after ejectment of the defendant on the allegation that the plaintiff tea company was the owner of the tea estate which it held for special cultivation and production of tea and had been in exclusive possession of the land including the land in suit. Besides the land under actual cultivation of tea there was tilla land which had been kept for future expansion of tea garden. In the year 1578 it was noticed that some villagers had started encroachment on the said tilla land. The police took some action. However, subsequently the defendant in each of the two suits surreptitiously obtained khatians without observing legal formalities. The defendant in each of the two suits had not acquired any right, title and possession of the suit land. Hence the suits were filed. The defence in each suit was that the defendant had been in possession of the suit land after having taken settlement from the plaintiff since 1969. The defendant had constructed houses on the suit land on the strength of the settlement from the plaintiff and in course of survey and settlement operation the land record staff made local enquiry and found that the defendant was tenant under the plaintiff. The suit was therefore liable to be dismissed. The learned trial Court had framed necessary issues and had held that the defendant had the tenancy right and was not liable for ejectment and consequently the suits were dismissed. On appeal by the plaintiff the learned appellate Court below by the judgment and decree impugned in these appeals held that the land in suit was held by the plaintiff tea company for special cultivation and the Assam (Temporarily Settled Areas) Tenancy Act 1971, hereinafter referred as the Act" was not applicable to the suit land, the issue of khatian was of no consequence and the defendant in each suit had not acquired tenancy right and was liable for ejectment. The appeals were allowed and the plaintiff's suits were decreed.
The appeals were allowed and the plaintiff's suits were decreed. Aggrieved the defendant in each suit has come in appeal and Shri S.K. Senapati, learned counsel for the appellants has submitted, that in view of the clear case of the plaintiff that the land in suit formed part of tilla land and had been kept for future expansion i.e. was not under actual cultivation for tea and was also not held for any ancillary purposes as specified under section 2 (e) of the Act and hence the provisions of the Act were applicable, the khatian which had been issued in favour of the defendants clearly established that the defendants had tenancy right in the land consequently could not be ejected, Shri Senapati has also submitted that this Court could not question the issue of khatian. Shri Senapati has also contended that the plaintiff respondent had not shown that the land in suit which formed part of tilla land had been allowed to be retained by the plaintiff after the ceiling operation under the Assam Fixation of Ceiling on Landholdings Act, 1956. Shri S. Dutta, learned counsel for the plaintiff respondent on the other hand has submitted that the land in suit was part of the land which the plaintiff tea garden had kept for future expansion and as such continued to be held for special cultivation and hence in view of section 2(e), the Act did not apply to the land in suit. Shri Dutta has also submitted that the learned appellate Court below had observed that the khatiaa was granted without notice and since the provisions of the Act were not attracted the issue of khatian had no significance. I have considered the submissions for the parties and the material on record. The first question which arises for consideration is whether the Act was applicable to the land in suit. Section 2 (e) of the Act provides that the Act does not apply to land comprised within estates settled for special cultivation when and only so long as, such lands are used for purposes of special cultivation or for purposes ancillary thereto. Under explanation 2 the ancillary purposes have been specified.
Section 2 (e) of the Act provides that the Act does not apply to land comprised within estates settled for special cultivation when and only so long as, such lands are used for purposes of special cultivation or for purposes ancillary thereto. Under explanation 2 the ancillary purposes have been specified. Shri Senapati, learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that since admittedly the land in suit was part of tilla land was not actually used for special cultivation as it was held for future expansion, the provisions of section 2 (e) were not attracted in that only so long as such lands are used for purposes of special cultivation or purposes ancillary thereto the provisions of the Act would not apply. Shri Senapati has also contended that future expansion was not purposes which had been categorised as purposes ancillary to special cultivation I am unable to accept the submission for the reason that the entire land including the land in suit formed part of one settlement held for special cultivation and just because a part thereof was not under actual tea bushes but had been kept for future expansion it would not cease to be land held for special cultivation and consequently land not under actual tea bushes or for any ancillary purposes as such but kept for future expansion would not cease to be land held for purposes of special cultivation. It is well recognised fact that in tea gardens some land is kept for future expansion. It may also be noted that under the ceiling law land kept for future expansion is allowed to retained and has not been acquired as ceiling surplus land. In my opinion therefore the land in suit which comprised tilla land kept for future expansion had not ceased to be land held for special cultivation and consequently the provisions of the Act did not apply to the land in suit. The view taken by the appellate Court below was therefore correct. Shri S.K-Senapati, learned counsel for the appellant has strenuously urged that khatian has been issued to the defendant appellant and since it was issued under the provision of Chapter X of the Act in view of section 66 of the Act the civil Court had no jurisdiction to question the grant of khatian.
Shri S.K-Senapati, learned counsel for the appellant has strenuously urged that khatian has been issued to the defendant appellant and since it was issued under the provision of Chapter X of the Act in view of section 66 of the Act the civil Court had no jurisdiction to question the grant of khatian. Shri Senapati has also submitted that since it was admitted by the plaintiff respondent that khatian has been issued there should be presumption under section 114 (e) of the Indian Evidence Act that all offical action had bee/i correctly done in accordance with proper procedure while it was true that the plaintiff respondent had stated that khatian had been issued to the defendant in respect of the land in suit it was the clear case that khatian had surreptitiously and collusively been obtained. In any case as stated since the provisions of the Act were not attracted the provisions of Chapter X of the Act were also not applicable. Hence the issue of khatian to the defendant in my opinion was not of any consequence. The question of operation of the bar to the jurisdiction of the civil Court under section 66 of the Act therefore did not arise. It may also be noted that according to the defendant the land in suit had been taken on settlement from the plaintiff which clearly meant that the plaintiff still continued to hold the land under 'grant for special cultivation', because there was no other case in regard to the plaintiff's right over the land. The very fact therefore that the defendant claimed tenancy rights under the plaintiff shows that the plaintiff's right to land for special cultivation continued and hence the suit was not barred by the provisions of section 66 of the Act. For the aforesaid reasons the defendant not having acquired tenancy right in the land the plaintiff's suits were tightly decreed by the learned appellate Court below. The appeals fail and are dismissed, No costs.